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This thesis examines American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and seeks 
to determine President Ronald Reagan’s relationship to the guiding principles of this policy, both 
in their formulation and execution. It is proposed that America’s strategy towards the USSR 
during this period could be encompassed by five key ideas, which this study names ‘The Reagan 
Doctrine’. These are: 1) Peace through Strength—the need to restore military parity with the 
Soviets, both in terms of conventional and nuclear power; 2) That the Cold War was a moral 
struggle, and needed to be articulated as such by the President; 3) That reliance on the theory of 
Mutual Assured Destruction was not a sound basis for national security, and hence the need to 
build a missile defense system; 4) That the Superpowers should negotiate not just to limit, but 
rather reduce extant nuclear stockpiles, with the ultimate goal of total nuclear abolition; and 5) 
that the Superpowers should diminish reciprocal distrust, and ultimately achieve not a détente, 
but a lasting peace. 
This study, more so than any other to date, has incorporated recently released archival material 
from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library to help determine Reagan’s beliefs relating to and 
management of American Soviet policy. Furthermore, interviews were conducted with some of 
the key surviving figures of the Reagan Administration, including former Secretary of State 
George P. Shultz. Finally, a complete review of published work on this topic, both academic and 
popular, including books and journal articles, was undertaken by this researcher. The result is an 
original study on the Reagan Doctrine that cuts across the multi-disciplinary fields of 
international relations, and presidential and diplomatic history, and provides a revised 
perspective on both the Reagan presidency, and the end of the Cold War conflict. 
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The ‗Reagan Doctrine‘ was the fundamental set of principles guiding American foreign policy 
towards the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the 1980s. Traditionally limited 
to the definition: ‗that the United States would help anticommunist counterinsurgencies wrest 
their respective countries out of the Soviet sphere of influence‘,1 this study expands the 
classification to encompass the entire Reagan foreign policy towards the USSR, in all its 
aspects.
2
 The central focus of this dissertation is an analysis of the origins and implementation of 
that doctrine, which derives its name from the 40
th
 President of the United States of America 
(USA), Ronald Wilson Reagan, whose presidency from 1981-1989 saw a seismic change of 
course in Superpower relations. 
When Reagan was inaugurated President in 1981, the prospects for ending the perilous 
nuclear standoff between the USA and the USSR seemed bleak. Reagan inherited from President 
Jimmy Carter a policy of ‗détente‘ that was in tatters. Carter had attempted to replicate the 
success of President Richard Nixon‘s record of détente by meeting with Soviet leader Leonid 
                                                     
1
  As defined in Henry Kissinger‘s Diplomacy, (New York: Touchstone, 1994), p. 774. 
2As Chester Pach describes in his article ‗The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism and Policy‘ a broader 
interpretation of the term is permissible, because the doctrine ‗was discovered, rather than proclaimed‘. The 
‗discovery‘ was made by Charles Krauthammer, of Time Magazine, who first coined the term in an 1 April 1985 
piece based on Reagan‘s State of the Union address that year. Krauthammer honed in on Reagan‘s call for support 
of anti-communist resistance fighters, but as Pach argues, the Reagan Administration‘s goals were far more 
extensive than this. See Presidential Studies Quarterly, (Washington, March 2006),Vol. 36, Iss. 1, p. 75.   
For a review of Reagan‘s role in aiding counter insurgencies in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Angola see James 
Scott‘s ‗Reagan‘s Doctrine? The Formulation of an American Foreign Policy Strategy‘, Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, (Washington: Fall, 1996) Vol. 26, Iss. 4, p. 1047. In this article, Scott argues: ‗The Reagan Doctrine was 
"Reagan's" in the sense that the President's strategic "vision" was its foundation and because he selected key upper-
level officials who shared his outlook and more directly produced the initiative. Moreover, President Reagan clearly 
made some key decisions, (e.g., to start the Nicaragua policy in 1981, to expand the Afghanistan operation in 1985 
and 1986, and to provide covert aid to the Angolan rebels in 1985). However, the foreign policy bureaucracy and 
Congress were equally critical in each case.‘ 
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Brezhnev and negotiating an arms control agreement—the SALT II Treaty. However, the treaty 
was to be left unratified by the US Senate, as Carter was forced to withdraw it from 
consideration following a return to Cold War hostilities by the USSR. Beginning with the 1977 
Soviet deployment of the deadly accurate ‗SS-20‘ nuclear missile aimed at Western Europe and 
culminating with its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, the USSR‘s aggressive policies of 
intimidation and subversion meant that Superpower relations were practically non-existent when 
Reagan became ‗leader of the Free World‘ in 1981.   
 While the Reagan presidency has ultimately received a ‗mixed report card‘ when it 
comes to an evaluation of its performance on domestic and foreign policy issues, there is a 
growing consensus that when it comes to US/Soviet relations, the administration deserves high 
marks.3 After all, from 1985-1988, Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met annually, 
renouncing nuclear war and signing the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 
1987; an agreement that saw for the first time in history the standing down and destruction of 
thousands of nuclear weapons.  An arms-race had been replaced with arms-reduction; a policy of 
confrontation with co-operation; and instead of the Superpower leaders attacking each other with 
harsh rhetoric, the two seemed to have become good friends. The entire world breathed a 
collective sigh of relief as the threat of a ‗Nuclear Armageddon‘ seemed ever more remote as the 
decade of the 1980s came to a close. 
                                                     
3
 See Hugh Heclo, ‗The Mixed Legacies of Ronald Reagan‘, Presidential Studies Quarterly, (Washington:    
December 2008), Vo. 38. Iss. 4, p.555;  Alan P. Dobson, ‗The Reagan Administration, economic warfare, and 
starting to close down the Cold War‘, Diplomatic History, (June 2005), Vol. 29, Iss.3, pp. 531-556; Joyce 
Barnathan, ‗The Cowboy Who Roped In Russia‘, Business Week, 13888 (21 June 2004), p. 39; Anne R. Pierce ‗The 





Ronald Reagan: actor, union leader, corporate spokesman, governor, candidate, President—
enigma. Just who was America‘s 40th President? In the 1980s he was probably the most 
recognizable person on the face of the Earth; show a picture of him from the First World to the 
Third, and people could identify him as the leader of the United States. Yet, this man who was 
known to billions remained something of a mystery to those closest to him. Even those who had 
worked side-by-side with him for years were puzzled by the personality of one who was so warm 
and gregarious, yet also so aloof. His own children struggled with trying to understand just who 
their father was, and even his wife Nancy—the closest person to him in his life—wrote of a 
‗wall‘ that she herself was unable to penetrate.4  The contradictions and paradoxes of the man 
make the study of Reagan and his presidency a difficult task indeed. 
Firstly, one must deal with the popular image of Reagan as a lazy, somewhat dim-witted 
actor who was probably struggling with the onset of dementia.   Evidence to support this view is 
not in short supply. Throughout the 1980s public gaffes and the ‗tell all‘ accounts of former 
staffers painted an unflattering picture.
5
  Reagan, according to this view, knew ‗next to nothing‘ 
about policy details, preferred to watch The Sound of Music instead of reading his briefing book,
6
 
                                                     
4
 ‗Ronnie‘, Nancy wrote, was a ‗loner. Although he loves people, he often seems remote, and he doesn‘t let anybody 
get close. There‘s a wall around him. He lets me come closer than anyone else, but there are times when even I feel 
that barrier‘. Nancy Reagan, My Turn: The Memoirs of Nancy Reagan, (New York: Random House, 1989), p.106.  
5
 For a summary of these books see Gerald F. Seib and Alan Murry, ‗Portrait of Reagan Painted by Kiss-and-Tell 
Books Shows a Commander Who Rarely Takes Command‘, Wall Street Journal, (New York: 13 May 1988),p.1.  
 
6
 This anecdote was related by James Baker, who had prepared a substantive briefing book for the Williamsburg 
Economic Summit held in 1983. When Baker, the following morning, found that his book had been left untouched 
by Reagan, he was astounded. Reagan explained, ‗Well, Jim, the Sound of Music was on last night‘. This anecdote, 
as cited in Lou Cannnon‘s Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1990), p. 56-57, received wide 
circulation and helped to characterize Reagan as an out of touch leader. However, the historical record shows that 
Reagan had been thoroughly briefed, with the President recording in his diary ‗another hour briefing on the Summit. 
Enough already!‘ (Entry for 26 May 1983). Furthermore, Reagan‘s performance at the Summit showed a mastery of 
detail that impressed those gathered, with Margaret Thatcher describing him as being in ‗‘radiant form‘, as quoted in 
Edmund Morris, Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan, (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), p.485. 
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napped during Cabinet meetings, confused historical events with Hollywood movies,  did not 
know staffers names,
7
 and treated his job as though it were a ‗perpetual performance‘, even in 
private. The ‗happy-go-lucky‘ President, according to this view, merely coasted along, telling 
jokes, and reading his lines: a triumph of style and acting over substance and ability. But how 
could this ‗amiable dunce‘, as diplomat Clark Clifford derided him,8 have been such a seeming 
success? 
 Reagan‘s life was truly an extraordinary journey of drama and achievement, an 
embodiment of the ‗American century‘9.  Born into poverty in Middle America in 1911, the son 
of an unemployed alcoholic worked his way through college, achieved his dream of becoming a 
sports radio announcer, and wound up signed to Warner Brothers as a Hollywood star.  After 
many years on the silver screen, Reagan became the six-term President of the Screen Actors 
Guild, negotiating with the studio heavy-weights agreements on wages and working conditions 
that remain in force to this day.  A corporate spokesman for General Electric throughout the 
1950s, Reagan became a sought after speaker across the country, who warned about the evils of 
high taxes and ‗red tape‘, as well as the growing menace of communism.  Elected Governor of 
California in 1966, he served two terms, overseeing a complete overhaul of the state‘s welfare 
system, and turning record deficits into surpluses.  From there, he was elected President of the 
United States in 1980, and was re-elected in 1984 winning 49 out of the 50 states.  When he left 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
7
 Reagan generally did not use peoples‘ names with whom he worked, preferring to call them ‗you fellas‘. This led 
to them feeling that they were merely the ‗hired help‘ and were dispensable. Some theorize that Reagan‘s 
background of working on movie sets, with ever changing casts and crews, made him not get too attached to people. 
 
8
 Clifford‘s remark was said at a Washington cocktail party, and stuck when it was published in James M. Perry‘s 
article ‗For the Democrats, Pam‘s Is the Place for the Elite to meet,‘ The Wall Street Journal, 8 October, 1981. 
 
9
 Dan Rather, Ronald Reagan Remembered, (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2004), p. xi.  
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office in 1989, he had the highest approval rating of any outgoing President.  Just how did he do 
it? 
 Reagan‘s critics would charge that he was a talented actor, and in a country where ‗image 
is everything‘, being a skillful speaker and looking good on the screen can take you anywhere, 
including the White House.  Reagan‘s craft was acting: he was handed a script, memorized his 
lines, and then performed them. The key to being a good actor is delivering those lines so 
convincingly that the audience accepts the fantasy before them, and forgets that what they are 
watching is, in fact, an ‗act‘. Reagan‘s acting skills continued to be employed when his movie 
career came to an end: as the chief spokesman for General Electric, Reagan personified the 
interests of American business, and repeated their motto, ―Progress is our most important 
product‖ thousands of times over the years.  It was rich businessmen who largely funded 
Reagan‘s 1966 campaign for Governor, and in a system of government where someone with no 
legislative experience can immediately become the Chief Executive, Reagan‘s electoral success 
was due, in large part, to pulling off a well rehearsed performance.  Once in office, so the theory 
goes, the acting did not stop:  Reagan was handed his script to read on television, and memorized 
clever one-liners prior going before the press.  Repeat the successful formula for a Presidential 
campaign and take the hands-off management style from Sacramento to Washington and in this 
way, the White House years are a re-run of the California years—albeit before a much larger 
audience.  But is this theory valid? 
That Reagan was an actor and used those skills as a politician cannot be doubted. That 
Reagan was far better delivering a speech than he was holding a press conference or conversing 
one-on-one, also cannot be doubted. But the underlying assumption of this theory—that Reagan 
was a mere a mouthpiece for others who behind the scenes were running the show—warrants 
6 
 
investigation.  ‗When you talk to Reagan‘, Henry Kissinger once said to a group of historians, 
‗you sometimes wonder why it occurred to anyone that he should be President, or even 
Governor. But what you historians have to explain is how so unintellectual a man could have 
dominated California for eight years, and Washington already for nearly seven‘.10 An explanation 
of Reagan‘s role as President is indeed necessary, and no more so than when it comes to 
evaluating his role in the formulation and execution of American foreign policy towards the 
USSR; for as the passage of two decades demonstrates, it is this aspect of his presidency, more 
so than any other, that stands out as being of the greatest historic significance.  
This dissertation, therefore, investigates Ronald Reagan‘s relationship to the key ideas 
that guided America‘s defense and foreign policy towards the USSR during his presidency. 
Having studied American—Soviet policy of the 1980s for the past nine years, it is the author‘s 
belief that the ‗Reagan Doctrine‘ was composed of five key ideas that guided the Reagan 
Administration in its dealings with the USSR. These were: 
1) That ‗Peace comes through Strength‘, and deterring Soviet aggression required not just aiding 
counterinsurgencies around the globe, but also rebuilding America‘s military, both in terms of its 
conventional and nuclear capabilities;  
2) That the Cold War was a ‗moral struggle‘, and needed to be articulated by the President in 
such terms;  
3) That the theory of ‗Mutual Assured Destruction‘ was a deficient guarantee for international 
security, and hence the need for Missile Defense Technology; 
                                                     
10
  Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 765. 
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4) That nuclear weapons should be abolished, and the process should begin by replacing arms 
limitation treaties with ones that actually reduced nuclear stockpiles; and 
5) That a nuclear standoff between the Superpowers was keeping the world on the precipice of 
disaster, and mutual mistrust needed to give way to dialogue and cooperation between Moscow 
and Washington in the cause of peace. 
 
Central Questions and Propositions 
Leaving aside the controversial questions surrounding the ending of the Cold War—who ‗won it‘ 
(or deserves the most credit)—this thesis will focus solely on the key ideas of America‘s Soviet 
policy of the 1980s, as framed by the ‗Reagan Doctrine‘.  The key questions of this dissertation 
are as follows: 
1) What was Reagan‘s relationship to the five ideas (mentioned above) that guided 
American--Soviet policy?  
2) Whose ideas were they? Did Reagan author any of them, and if so, who influenced 
him?  
3) Were these ideas present during the previous Cold War administrations?  
4) When it came to the implementation of these ideas during his presidency, did Reagan 
sit back and allow his subordinates to implement them, or was he involved in their 
execution?  
5) Did Reagan direct the apparatus of government to pursue his agenda?  
8 
 
6) Did Reagan intervene at pivotal moments to see that the goals that he articulated were 
implemented as he wished?  
7) And, in the final analysis, who was the driver of US--Soviet policy: Reagan, or his 
team of foreign policy experts?  
 
The Need for a Revisionist Reagan Study 
What originally prompted this investigation is the fact that Reagan was, according to former 
Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan, completely disengaged from the other great passion of 
his presidency—reforming the tax code and cutting back on ‗big government‘. Regan, who wrote 
of his experiences in his tell-all book For the Record,11 portrayed a President who could not have 
been more ‗hands off‘ in his approach. As Regan records, upon being named over the telephone 
Secretary of the Treasury by then President-Elect Reagan in 1980, Regan did not see his new 
boss until his inauguration—over two months later.  Even after taking the helm at the Treasury, 
Regan received no one-on-one talk with the President, leaving the new Secretary in the dark as to 
what he was supposed to accomplish.  Terming it a ‗guesswork Presidency‘, Regan said: ‗From 
the first day to the last at Treasury, I was flying by the seat of my pants. The President never told 
me what he believed or what he wanted to accomplish in the field of economics. I had to figure 
these things out like any other American, by studying his speeches and reading the 
newspapers.‘12 When Regan moved to the closest position to the President—that of Chief-of-
                                                     
11
  Donald Regan, For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1988). 
12
  Ibid., p.142. 
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Staff—he did not observe a change of style and recalled the President handing him back the 
‗substantive plan of action‘ for his second term ‗without spoken or written comment.‘13 
 If Reagan was so detached when it came to his domestic goal of slashing income taxes 
and cutting ‗red tape‘, how engaged was he with his foreign policy passion of confronting the 
USSR? Donald Regan‘s view of the President prevailed throughout the 1980s and 1990s as 
accepted wisdom, but the release of three Reagan primary source materials has called for a 
revision of this popular image.  
 Starting in 2001, the release of Reagan‘s hand-written radio addresses, letters and his 
presidential diary, has necessitated a re-evaluation of the widely held image of Reagan described 
above. Hoover Institute fellows Kiron Skinner and Martin and Annelise Anderson discovered 
hundreds of Reagan‘s original drafts for his radio addresses of the 1970s, and published many of 
them in their book Reagan: In His Own Hand.14 Delivering an average of five addresses a week 
between the years 1975-1979, Reagan had to spend a great deal of time researching and writing. 
These primary source materials give the reader a doorway into Reagan‘s mind: one can see in the 
crossed out sentences and the substituted phrases Reagan wrestling with his own thoughts, and 
seeking to articulate as best he could, the ideas he wished to express. Their publication caused 
something of a stir, and as Newsweek magazine reported, the book did ‗more to counter the 
image of Reagan as a manipulated dolt than probably any other publication‘.15 Furthermore, the 
fact that Reagan used the addresses to help launch his presidential campaigns of 1976 and 1980, 
meant that he tackled a number of issues that he expected to make operational as President, 
                                                     
13
  Ibid., p. 267. 
14
  Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, Martin Anderson, Eds, Reagan In His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald 
Reagan That Reveal His Revolutionary Vision for America (New York: Touchstone Books, 2001).  
15
  Ibid. p.i. 
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including his viewpoints on US--Soviet relations. As such, they serve as something of a ‗blue-
print‘ for the Reagan presidency.  
Another publication, by the same editors, further changed prevalent perceptions of 
Reagan. Reagan: A Life in Letters,16 published in 2003, showed for the first time that Ronald 
Reagan was a prolific letter writer, having authored over 10,000 letters over 72 years of 
correspondence. The letters are addressed to people from all walks of life, from ordinary citizens, 
to celebrities and political leaders, and deal with a wide range of issues, allowing the reader to 
gain a greater understanding of the core beliefs that Reagan held, including those concerning 
America‘s Soviet policy. What has struck people reading these letters is Reagan‘s gift for 
penmanship.  As George Shultz states in the introduction to the work: 
Ronald Reagan is widely known as ‗The Great Communicator‘. Well, we hardly 
knew how great a communicator he really was...Now we have this volume of 
letters, based on a stream of personal correspondence with a large, diverse set of 
people. Anyone who writes knows what an effort it is to assemble your thoughts 
and commit them to a piece of paper. Writing is an exercise in communicating 
with yourself as well as with others.  A good writer is almost by necessity a good 
thinker.17 (Emphasis added). 
 
Furthermore, the 2007 release of The Reagan Diaries,18 which cover Reagan‘s presidential years, 
sheds even more light on Reagan‘s day-to-day management of policy in the White House. The 
first President to keep a daily diary since the 19
th
 century, Reagan‘s purpose was not to give an 
introspective account of his day, but rather to create a ‗memory log‘ that would help him  and his 
                                                     
16
  Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, Martin Anderson, Eds, Reagan: A Life In Letters, (New York: Free Press, 
2003). 
17
  Ibid. p. ix. 
18
  Ronald Reagan, Douglas Brinkley (ed.),The Reagan Diaries (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).   
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wife Nancy reminisce about the presidency when it was all over. As such, it often reads as a 
‗laundry list‘ of things that Reagan did throughout the day. Nonetheless, there are glimpses of 
the ‗inner man‘ and, perhaps more importantly, ‗contrary to the contemporary public image‘ the 
diary ‗demonstrates a huge capacity for work‘ on behalf of the President, ‗matched by an ability 
to master complicated briefs on both foreign policy and the economy‘.19 These newly released 
materials, as well as recently de-classified documents at the Reagan archives, call for a revision 
of the Reagan presidency. This thesis, however, will limit itself to re-examining his role vis-à-vis 




The first primary sources evaluated for this dissertation have been the memoirs of the key 
players in this presidential and diplomatic history, beginning with Ronald Reagan. The former 
President penned a personal account of his political career in his 1990 book, An American Life. 20 
The book provides considerable insight into Reagan‘s thinking, and provides lengthy excerpts of 
his correspondence with the Soviet leadership. Reagan‘s right-hand man for foreign policy, 
George Shultz, wrote the second most important work on American Soviet policy in his 1993 
                                                     
19
 John Matlin, ‗The Reagan Diaries (Review)‘, Journal of American Studies, (Cambridge: Dec. 2007), Vol.41, Iss. 
3, p. 708. Also, it should be noted that as one who has seen the original diaries at the Reagan library, and have 
spoken in person to Mike Duggan, the chief archivist on the diary and Douglas Brinkley, the editor of the publicized 
version, I can attest to the veracity of the 2007 release. While there could be some argument that Reagan at times 
wrote aware of history‘s future gaze, no attempt was made afterwards by the President or any other to alter the 
original manuscripts.   
 
20
 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990). 
12 
 
book, Triumph and Turmoil: My Years as Secretary of State.21 Over 1,000 pages long, it is 
invaluable for its ‗behind the scenes‘ details, particularly its description of the Superpower 
summits. 
  Since American--Soviet policy did not occur in a vacuum, but in opposition and 
response to Soviet policy, an examination of literature from a Soviet perspective was also 
undertaken. In terms of primary source autobiographies, Mikhail Gorbachev‘s 1995 book, 
entitled Memoirs22, is of the greatest importance. In it, the former Soviet leader gives his 
reasoning for his twin reform projects of glasnost (opening) and perestroika (restructuring). 
Unlike Reagan‘s and Shultz‘s accounts, Gorbachev does not attempt to give a point-by-point 
history of those years, but nonetheless his explanations have provided a clearer understanding of 
how American actions were perceived in the Kremlin. In particular, the effects the American 
1983 deployment of Pershing II nuclear weapons in Europe, which Gorbachev described as a 
‗literal pistol to the head‘ that ‗had to be removed‘,23 is of great significance, as are his 
descriptions of the relationship between himself and President Reagan. Also, the memoirs of the 
two Soviet foreign ministers during the 1980s, Andre Gromyko and Eduard Shevardnadze, 
rounds off Gorbachev‘s history and gives further context to this research.24  
 The Public Papers of President Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989, which contains every single 
press conference, interview, speech and statement from the President during his two terms, was 
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  George P. Shultz, Triumph and Turmoil: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 
1993). 
22
  Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Memoirs (London: Doubleday, 1995). 
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  Ibid. p.444. 
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  Andrei Andreevish Gromyko, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1990); Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future 
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an extremely useful primary resource for this investigation. Having completed an entire review 
of these papers, examining all statements related to Soviet policy, this researcher assembled a 
chronology of the Reagan years, pinpointing every major decision and address. Over 100 pages 
long, this time-line enabled this researcher to conduct a thorough review of administration 
paperwork at the Reagan Presidential Archives in California.
25
 
 This investigator spent close to three months examining primary source material relating 
to Reagan‘s Soviet policy at the Reagan Library in Simi Valley, California. First perused was the 
entire collection of Reagan‘s radio addresses from the 1970s. The ‗Handwriting File‘ contained 
all speeches that Reagan personally wrote as President, or those which he edited, which were 
numerous.  These demonstrate clearly the President‘s deliberation and involvement, including in 
foreign policy matters.  The documents belonging to the National Security Council relating to the 
USSR give insights into where Reagan‘s team wanted US policy to go in areas ranging from 
missile defense, to the Grenada invasion, to the Superpower Summits. And the files belonging to 
Reagan‘s key staff members—Donald Regan, Bud McFarlane, Colin Powell, and so on—
provided invaluable information about how events were viewed as they unfolded, especially 
those documents that spoke of the aims of US policy and the ‗talking points‘ they wanted the 
President to adopt.  
 Furthermore, as this thesis investigates Reagan‘s Soviet policies in the context of the 
entire Cold War period, archival research was undertaken at the Presidential Libraries of Richard 
M. Nixon (Yorba Linda, California) and John F. Kennedy (Boston), as well as at the National 
Archives in Washington D.C.   
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 While attention is not drawn to the fact throughout the thesis, it should be noted here that 
this work utilizes numerous documents never before published, and goes into greater analysis of 
the Superpower Summits, based on the transcripts, than any other publication.   
 
Secondary Sources 
As an emerging area of historiography, secondary sources on Reagan‘s Soviet policy are still 
relatively few. The vast majority of these over the past several years have been read by the 
author, who remains convinced of the originality of this dissertation.  
     Peter Schweizer‘s Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy That Hastened the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union,26 gives an incomplete, and therefore inaccurate, account Reagan‘s 
foreign policy. In Schweizer‘s view, the Reagan Administration was working with single-minded 
determination to bring about the end of the USSR, and hoped to achieve this by an arms race that 
would cripple the Soviets economically. For example, in Victory, the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI) that Reagan announced in 1983 terrified the Soviets not so much for its strategic value—in 
that it could aid a first strike capability—but more because it would have cost the USSR billions 
of dollars to create their own defense system. No mention is made of the fact that Reagan 
immediately offered to share any new technology with the Soviets. In addition to SDI, the 
Reagan Administration is credited in Victory for slashing the hard currency of the USSR by 
driving down the price of petroleum. They achieved this, so the theory goes, by plotting with 
Saudi Arabia. Shackled by an arms race, a weak currency and Reagan‘s support for Poland‘s 
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15 
 
Solidarity movement, the ‗wall came tumbling down‘ and with it a 70 year old empire. No doubt 
the issues Schweizer raises did impact on the USSR, but it was a system with grave economic 
problems before Reagan assumed office. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the 
Soviet Union had so many convergent forces—Gorbachev, Yeltsin, the ‗peace movement‘27 and 
so on—that it is almost impossible to say with any certainty that Reagan‘s attempts to ‗sabotage‘ 
the USSR played the decisive role. In addition to this, Schweizer‘s book concentrates on the 
Weinberger outlook on the USSR,28 which is very much of the early 1980s and not one that 
Reagan held by the end of his second term in office when he was attempting to assist Gorbachev 
with his reforms.29 In the end, this book fails to substantiate the theory that the Reagan 
Administration had a consistent strategy to bring down the USSR, and purposefully ignores 
evidence that gives an alternative view of Reagan—as a man who in addition to holding the 
arrows of war, also extended many olive branches of peace to the Soviets. 
 Paul Lettow‘s Ronald Reagan And His Quest To Abolish Nuclear Weapons30 is a step in 
the right direction, but focuses solely on Reagan‘s nuclear abolitionist views, to the exclusion of 
all others. Reagan‘s arms race strategy was his attempt to ‗build up‘ in order to ‗build down‘, as 
he believed that a restoration of American military might would place the US in a better 
bargaining position with the USSR, from which nuclear arms reduction agreements could be 
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 ‗People power‘ in Eastern Europe, Mary Kaldor argues in ‗Who Killed the Cold War‘, was a vital component of 
the Cold War‘s end, which is, in her view, entirely overlooked by most observers. See Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 
(Chicago: Jul. 1995), Vol. 51, Iss. 4, p. 57. 
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  Caspar Weinberger was Reagan‘s Defense Secretary from 1981-1987. Generally regarded as the chief ‗hawk‘ in 
the administration, he frequently resisted any overtures to the USSR and still considered them a hostile threat as late 
as 1990, as evidenced by his book, Fighting For Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner 
Books, 1990).  
29
  By the final years of his presidency, Reagan would cross out in speech drafts any direct criticism of the Soviets, 
as material in the Reagan archives demonstrates.  
30
  Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan And His Quest To Abolish Nuclear Weapons (New York: Random House, 2005). 
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reached. At the height of the ‗nuclear freeze movement‘, Reagan was portrayed by his critics as a 
dangerous warmonger, an out-of-touch Cold War Warrior, who could lead the world to nuclear 
war. This image of Reagan, as a political cowboy who loved nuclear weapons persists, when in 
reality the record shows that he detested nuclear weapons and desired to see their total abolition. 
Stereotypes die hard—particularly political stereotypes—and therefore Lettow‘s history of 
Reagan‘s anti-nuclearism is a much needed correction to a serious misconception. The work is 
also useful for its original research and its assessment of previously classified National Security 
documents. However, it is not a comprehensive history of Reagan‘s overall Soviet policy, and it 
concludes with the Reykjavik Summit of 1986, two years before Reagan‘s visit to Moscow. 
 Beth A. Fisher wrote a political science work entitled, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign 
Policy and the End of the Cold War.31 This book deals with the apparent turnaround in Reagan‘s 
attitude to the Soviet Union in 1984. Fisher looks at three explanations for this change: domestic 
considerations, forces within the administration, and Reagan‘s abhorrence for nuclear war. Fisher 
analyses positions one and two, dismisses them and settles on number three. In disagreement 
with Fisher‘s position, it is this author‘s view, having read the relevant historical documents, that 
it was a combination of all three elements. Furthermore, the Reagan ‗reversal‘ was more a 
change of emphasis in rhetoric than of policy, as the evidence shows that Reagan had made 
numerous diplomatic overtures to the USSR prior to 1984 and had expressed his hope for 
substantive arms reductions as early as March 1981.32 The book, however, like Lettow‘s, 
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  Beth A. Fisher, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Columbia, MO: University 
of Missouri Press, 2000). 
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supports the argument that Reagan‘s ideas, and not those of his subordinates, guided US Soviet 
policy.  
 Jay Winik‘s book, On the Brink: The Dramatic Behind the Scenes Saga of the Reagan 
Era and the Men and Women Who Won the Cold War33 concurs fully with Fisher‘s second 
position (mentioned above). For Winik, it was forces within the administration that were 
responsible for the President‘s foreign policy. Winik singles out four individuals as the true 
authors of the Reagan Doctrine. These were neo-conservative Richard Perle (a Pentagon 
official), Jeanne Kirkpatrick (UN Ambassador), Elliot Abrams (a State Department official) and 
Max Kampelman (a human rights campaigner). This author‘s reading of history is different: 
obviously there were numerous people behind the scenes working at the formulation and 
implementation of American foreign policy during the 1980s, as there is at any time. However, 
the research shows that while Reagan may have been a ‗delegator‘ in many respects, he refused 
to relinquish his right to guide foreign policy—best exemplified in his firing of Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig, who wanted total control.  Winik‘s work is important in helping understand 
how key ideas were hashed out within the Reagan Administration, but fails to adequately include 
how Reagan inspired these ideas and modified them at times. 
 John Lewis Gaddis, in his latest book on the Cold War, entitled, The Cold War: A New 
History,34 gives a greater emphasis to the role played by Reagan in the ending of the Cold War, 
but places him among a cast of other ‗actors‘ who helped bring this about. In a fresh look at the 
1980s, Gaddis emphasizes the role played by individual leaders whose vision helped propel 
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international relations into a new era. In Poland, there was Pope John Paul II, and Solidarity 
leader Lech Walesa, who emphasized Polish national and religious identity over communist 
control; in Great Britain, there was the ‗Iron Lady‘, Margaret Thatcher who, in Gaddis‘ 
estimation, used words as weapons as Churchill had done;35 in China, there was Deng Xiaoping, 
who brought market reforms, placing economic pragmatism over Marxist ideology; in the USSR, 
there was Gorbachev, a leader so unlike his predecessors in his willingness to reform; and in the 
United States, there was Reagan. Gaddis covers the main aspects of Reagan‘s Soviet policy: the 
rhetoric, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and the Superpower Summits. Gaddis‘ scholarly 
work, however, is not exhaustive: the Reagan/Gorbachev partnership is covered in 14 pages, as 
the entire book is meant to be a brief overview of the entire Cold War history. While it is 
satisfying to see a major historian emphasize the role played by individuals,
36
 this work does not 
ask the main question of this thesis: what was the role that Reagan played in the formulation and 
execution of American Soviet policy?  
Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Francis Fitzgerald‘s Way Out There in the Blue: 
Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War37 represents the ‗amiable dunce‘ school of 
thought. Fitzgerald‘s book focuses on Reagan‘s missile defense program, the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI), which she sees as an expression of American Protestant beliefs about American 
Exceptionalism. SDI, therefore, was more an attempt to protect the ‗new Eden‘ from the evils of 
the ‗godless Superpower‘ than it was about addressing the fact that there was no defense against 
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incoming nuclear weapons. The Reagan/Gorbachev Summits are almost tagged onto her work on 
‗Star Wars‘, and the 499 page book devotes less than 7 pages to the Moscow Summit. How 
Reagan transformed US--Soviet relations is not made clear in this work. She quotes Reagan in 
Moscow as saying: ‗There is no way I can really explain how I came to be here.‘38 For 
Fitzgerald, Reagan was merely ‗present at the creation‘ of a new world order.  This dissertation‘s 
evaluations on Reagan and his engagement with the Soviet Union are therefore substantially 
different from Fitzgerald‘s. 
 Edmund Morris‘s Dutch39 is more a work of literature than it is of history. Morris won 
acclaim for his book The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt and was therefore selected by Reagan to be 
his official biographer, and was granted unprecedented access to the White House.  
Unfortunately, the book lost a lot of credibility when Morris felt the need to insert himself into 
the text as a fictional character, with fake footnotes to boot. Morris did this to try and de-code the 
enigma of Reagan, and his book does offer interesting insights into Reagan‘s personality and his 
modus operandi,
40
 but it offers no real analysis of Reagan‘s involvement in US--Soviet policy. 
Instead, ‗Morris's Dutch tells much less than we'd like to know about Reagan and much more 
than we care to know about Morris‘.41  
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 Former US ambassador to Moscow, Jack F. Matlock, wrote a memoir/history of 
Superpower relations during the 1980s in his book Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War 
Ended.42 Though covering the same period of history as this thesis, the arguments differ over the 
aims of Reagan‘s Soviet policy. Matlock advocates for ‗the arms race was sending Russia broke‘ 
argument saying Reagan had to ‗convince the Soviet leader that his country would not be 
allowed to win an arms race.‘ Reagan‘s team certainly considered this, but in this author‘s 
estimation, for Reagan the arms race was about matching strength for strength in order to achieve 
deterrence and therefore encourage arms reduction negotiations. Useful for its behind the scenes 
details (as when Matlock drafted a letter to Gorbachev and Reagan copied it out in hand so that 
no-one else would question its authority) this book fails to present a comprehensive US foreign 
policy and Reagan‘s role in it. 
 Most recent in the evolving literature on Reagan and the Soviet Union is journalist James 
Mann‘s 2009 The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan.43 Mann, author of a bestselling account of 
George W. Bush‘s war cabinet,44here takes the reader through various stages of Reagan‘s 
presidency: his relationship with Richard Nixon; his interactions with Soviet expert Suzanne 
Massie; the Berlin Wall address; and the Washington and Moscow Summits. Throughout it all, 
Mann paints Reagan as one willing to go against the advice and criticism of the ‗foreign policy 
establishment‘ and his own conservative base, in his willingness to embrace Gorbachev as an 
agent of reform. Important in its thesis that Reagan was ‗no-body‘s puppet‘, it is different from 
this study in that it takes a largely thematic approach, while this thesis looks more closely at 
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tracing key ideas to Reagan and the implementation of these through actual documentary 
evidence.  
From the research to date, periodical and journal articles continue to offer analysis of 
Reagan and his foreign policy team that fall short of the substantive research required to tackle 
the issue. Take for example The Economist, which featured Reagan on its cover on 10 June 2004 
under the banner, ‗The man who beat communism‘. The author summed up Reagan‘s defeat of 
communism as follows: 
If a re-armed America stood nose-to-nose with its adversary and firmly but politely 
refused to budge, he reckoned it would win the day. He was right. By the year 
Reagan left the White House, the Russians had lost Eastern Europe; by the next 
year, they had abandoned communism. 
Just how a military arms buildup caused the USSR to fall the author does not explain—it simply 
happened. The author also gives no example of Reagan ever contemplating that his policies 
would cause the Soviet Union to fall overnight. 
 Though it clearly took the co-operation of both the US and the USSR, numerous scholars 
relegate Reagan as a mere spectator to Gorbachev‘s reforms. Diane B. Kunz, writing for the 
American Prospect45 contends that ‗the real story of the end of the Cold War was the Soviet 
Union‘. In her analysis, Reagan merely had to accept ‗the gift that was given‘. Vladislav M. 
Zubok‘s opinion only varies slightly. Writing for the New Republic,46 his praise for Reagan 
extends only so far as he co-operated with Gorbachev.  Zubok contends that the US arms race 
and SDI were only ‗bit players‘ in the drama, and it was rather the ‗new détente‘ that was 
responsible for helping to facilitate ‗Gorbachev‘s radical overhaul of Soviet domestic and foreign 
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policy‘. This, he says, ‗brought the USSR crashing down‘. Brookings Institute Senior Fellow 
Raymond L. Garthoff concurs, going so far as to say that the Reagan Administration actually 
‗delayed‘ the end of the Cold War through their ‗policy actions on the margin‘.47 While 
arguments about who ‗won‘ the Cold War are not included in this thesis, what will be made clear 
is that Reagan was no mere onlooker to Soviet changes, but was rather a participant. The 
transformation of relations between the Superpowers took many years to achieve and the Reagan 
Administration worked extremely hard to bring this about.  
 
Interviews 
If Ronald Reagan were alive today, he would be 99 years of age. This is stated to demonstrate 
that the availability of people from the Reagan era for interviews is limited due to the passage of 
time. For while the 1980s may not seem like a period too distant, time does catch up quickly. For 
example, a member of the Reagan White House in 1981 who was aged just 55, would now be 84. 
Many have reached a period in their life where old age precludes them giving an interview. And 
some key figures, like Caspar Weinberger and Michael Deaver, have passed on. Nonetheless, 
this researcher was privileged enough to be granted lengthy interviews by four of the most 
notable Reagan aides: George P. Shultz, Richard Perle, and Annelise and Martin Anderson. 
 George P. Shultz, former Secretary of State, granted almost an hour of his time for an in-
depth interview on Reagan‘s Soviet policy at his office in the Hoover Institute, on the campus of 
Stanford University. The interview, conducted on 5 October 2007, covered a wide range of 
topics, all focused on the five key areas under review for this thesis. Though 87 years old at the 
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time, Shultz‘s memory was sharp and he answered all the questions that were prepared. Shultz 




  Annelise and Martin Anderson, former Reagan aides and biographers, also gave 
generously of their time. In both 2006 and 2007, the Andersons gave this researcher lengthy 
interviews—two hours in 2006 at the Reagan Library in Simi Valley and three hours in 2007 at 
the Hoover Institute.  While not allowing a recording of these conversations, extensive notes 
were taken at the time, and a Memorandum of Conversation followed. Furthermore, discussed in 
detail was the focus of this study, and agreement was made that Reagan‘s Soviet policy could be 
encapsulated in the five key ideas proposed herein.  
 Richard Perle, former Pentagon official and the ‗intellectual heavyweight‘ of the Reagan 
Administration, was also enormously helpful. Graciously granting an hour and a half of his time 
at his home in Chevy Chase, Maryland, Perle‘s conversation was expansive. Perle permitted 
himself to be video recorded, and this interview, as well as those with Shultz and the Andersons, 




Research Design: Methodology and Analytical Framework 
The analysis undertaken in this study has been framed by articulating the central and ancillary 
questions presented on pages 6 and 7 of this chapter. These questions have allowed this 
researcher to focus the study on issues largely left unresolved or even untreated in other 
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scholarly (and more popular) works on the Reagan presidency to date. They assist this researcher 
in the task of ‗analytically interrogating‘ relevant source materials, many of which have only 
recently become accessible—as earlier explained. In particular, such a framework allows this 
researcher to propose a set of argumentative positions that are assessed in light of the evidence 
gleaned from a directed and in-depth perusal of both long extant and newer source materials. At 
all stages of the analysis undertaken in the study, this researcher has maintained an ‗open ended 
approach‘ so as to avoid a priori conclusions or arguments that would limit or bias the scholarly 
nature of this endeavor.  While presenting a revisionist interpretation of Reagan, hagiography is 
not the intention or result of this research: rather this author has critically evaluated the historical 
and academic record, to achieve an objective conclusion that is defended by the evidence 
presented herein. 
In terms of political theory, this thesis proposes that the Reagan Administration‘s Soviet 
policy began with a classic attempt of Realpolitik.
50
 Though President Reagan spoke in 
Wilsonian terms51 about the triumph of democracy and foreign policy as an extension of personal 
morality, his actions were nonetheless based on matching strength with strength. An imbalance 
of power led America to seek equilibrium.
52
  In terms of presidential historiography, this 
researcher argues that Reagan‘s presidency mirrors both that of Harry S. Truman and Richard 
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Nixon. Reagan, like Truman, sought to confront the USSR through a combination of military and 
diplomatic measures, with the goal of ‗containing‘ its aggression. Like Nixon, however, Reagan 
valued face-to-face negotiations with the Soviets, which he believed could result in nuclear arms 
control and lessen (if not eliminate) the hostility between the two nations. 
 Thus, in researching this dissertation through an archival/documentary approach, 
reference materials comprised of primary and secondary sources have been utilized. As 
mentioned above, the Public Papers of Ronald Reagan has been instrumental in re-constructing 
the President‘s unfolding attitude towards the USSR. Memoirs, speeches, letters, diary entries 
and memos from the Reagan Archives have been used to piece together how the principal figures 
of that history understood their place in the unfolding drama of the Cold War‘s end.  Newspaper 
articles, journals and periodicals have also played a useful role in providing insight into how 
events were viewed at the time and how the perspective that comes with time had led to 
historical revisionism. 
 
Why Reagan Is Misunderstood 
Before examining Reagan‘s role in the formulation and execution of American--Soviet policy, it 
is necessary to address some persistent myths and/or misconceptions about the 40
th
 President of 
the United States. These are so prevalent and ingrained that before proceeding to delve into the 
central focus of this study, it is  required to understand why until recently, it has been very hard 
for political scientists/historians and commentators, to take Reagan seriously. Only by first 
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recognizing these reasons, explaining them and to a certain extent challenging them, can the 
discussion on Reagan be conducted objectively and intelligently.   
 The first major reason that the generally held view of Reagan is likely at such odds with 
the historical record may be that while Reagan took the presidency seriously, he did not take 
himself seriously. Reagan passed out jars of jellybeans at Cabinet meetings, told endless jokes, 
and perhaps most significantly, told self depreciating jokes.53. The image of Reagan as a lazy 
Chief Executive who only worked a few hours a day and napped the rest of the time is not true—
Reagan did not nap, and after his 9-5 workday, he spent most of the evening going through his 
‗homework‘—boxes of paperwork that he had to review.54 Still, the image of Reagan as lazy was 
not helped by the President telling jokes that fed that perception; like his joke that one day they 
would hang a sign in the Cabinet room that read, ‗President Reagan slept here.‘ Reagan used 
humor as a valuable tool as President—it lightened the mood, and deflected criticism (after all, it 
is hard to be angry at someone when you are laughing with them).  Still, while making yourself 
the ‗butt‘ of your own jokes may beat your critics to the punch, it still means that you and your 
critics are in agreement. 
 The second major reason why Reagan may have been misunderstood is that Reagan was 
prone to the foibles of old men, and with the later revelation of Alzheimer‘s disease, people 
connect the two, and believe that Reagan was detached from reality, and therefore from his 
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presidency. For a man holding one of the most demanding jobs on Earth, Reagan performed 
remarkably well—there had not been a two-term President since Eisenhower, and far from being 
destroyed by the office like Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Carter, Reagan seemed to ‗make it 
look easy‘ and left the presidency without having visibly aged. Considering that he did this for 
eight years while being in his 70s, is testament to his stamina and good health. But, the media 
was not that forgiving: Reagan, like most men in their eighth decade, sometimes had trouble 
finding the right words to a tricky question, forgot peoples‘ names, or confused events. (Once, 
the jetlagged President even fell asleep while the Pope was addressing him!) When one considers 
the fact that the time period from the beginning of his candidacy to the end of his presidency was 
almost ten years—a decade before rolling cameras and open microphones, then one realizes that 
the gaffes were relatively few and far between. Nonetheless, when they did occur, they were 
played endlessly on television and tended to stick in the memory.  And, while medical records 
and the continuity and clarity of Reagan‘s diary over eight years rule out Alzheimer‘s as having 
been present during the 1980s,55 many link the gaffes of an old man to the later 1994 diagnosis of 
the debilitating disease, and conclude that Reagan must have been afflicted with the condition 
throughout his presidency. This is simply not true, as the evidence demonstrates.   
 Reagan‘s mystifying behavioral traits is the third reason why the President may not have 
been understood correctly.  First, Reagan was almost always in a good mood and his relentless 
optimism made people question how in touch he was with reality. After all, how can you keep up 
that positive attitude all the time? Nancy Reagan records being irritated at her husband during the 
Iran-Contra affair, because Reagan acted as though he did not have a care in the world, making 
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jokes while she was worried sick over potential impeachment.56  Also, the ‗wall‘ between himself 
and others made many wonder just exactly what he was he thinking, and whether anything they 
were saying was registering.
57
  Reagan appeared passive, and his reliance on cue cards in 
meetings did not help his image problem. But turn to his presidential diary, and there the 
evidence shows that Reagan was not merely playing the part of President: he had not mentally 
‗checked out‘, but was well aware of what was going on around him. 
 The fourth major reason why Reagan‘s role was so underappreciated was that he rarely 
trumpeted his accomplishments, allowing others to take the limelight. Being the so-called ‗most 
powerful man in the world‘ seemed never to go to Reagan‘s head; he was unfailingly polite, 
treating kings and servants with the same courtesy.  Part of being so well mannered was that 
Reagan rarely bragged about his achievements, and indeed he believed this to be a formula for 
success.  A sign on Reagan‘s desk read: ‗There is no limit to what you can achieve, if you don‘t 
mind who gets the credit‘.  As a leader, Reagan remained a team player, and saw his 
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administration as a single unit—if people thought that George Shultz or Robert McFarlane 
deserved the acclaim and recognition, Reagan did not protest.     
 And, finally, the other major reason why many may have downplayed Reagan‘s role in 
the formulation and execution of America‘s Soviet policy is because the entire American side 
was largely upstaged by Mikhail Gorbachev. There had never been a Soviet head of state like 
Gorbachev, and the media rightfully was intrigued by this cosmopolitan leader so at ease with 
himself, so in command, and so determined to enact sweeping reforms within the USSR.  It was 
Gorbachev who in 1990 received the accolades as Reagan receded from public view: Time 
Magazine declared him their ‗Man of the Decade‘, and he received the Nobel Peace Prize. Since 
Gorbachev looms so large in the popular imagination, the American side of the Superpower 
dialogue, and Reagan included, often get overlooked. This is understandable, but to borrow a 
phrase from Soviet usage, the ‗personality cult‘ must be put aside, and the historical record 
examined.   That record shows continual American diplomatic work with the USSR in the first 
four years of Reagan‘s presidency; an effort that only intensified once Gorbachev arrived on the 
scene in Reagan‘s second term. Furthermore, it could be argued, as Dinesh D‘Douza does, that 
Reagan purposely ceded the limelight to Gorbachev, giving him his ‗day in the sun‘ so that a 
‗zone of comfort‘ could emerge that would only help American interests.58  
 Reagan‘s self depreciating humor, his gaffes, his idiosyncrasies, his humility and having 
to ‗co-star‘ next to Gorbachev, have all led to Reagan‘s critical role in the formulation and 
execution of American Soviet policy to be misconstrued, overlooked or dismissed. It is hoped 
through a scholarly and objective investigation of more recent records this thesis can lead to a 
deeper understanding of Reagan‘s role. While acknowledging the huge credit owed to George 
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Shultz, Caspar Weinberger, Richard Perle and many others, this study endeavors to shed new 
light on, and de-mythologize, America‘s 40th President. 
  
Outline of Chapters 
In this dissertation, President Reagan‘s role is placed in the context of American Presidential 
history, and the thaw in Cold War politics in the context of US--Soviet diplomatic relations. 
 From this starting point, Chapter One examines Reagan‘s vision of ‗Peace through 
Strength‘ and details his long held opinion that America‘s decline in military superiority was the 
reason why the USSR seemingly held the upper-hand by 1980. The Soviets, to Reagan, only 
respected strength—and thus America needed a program of ‗military modernization‘ if it were to 
avert war and negotiate from a position of parity. Central questions posed are: What was the 
history of deterrence in the Cold War? What did Reagan have to say on deterring Soviet 
aggression prior his election to the presidency? Who influenced him to hold these beliefs? And 
how did Reagan ensure that his ideas would be implemented as he assumed the presidency? 
 Chapter Two details how America‘s rearmament program became a reality.   Spending 
close to two trillion dollars updating the triad of land, air and sea defenses, Reagan‘s military 
buildup demonstrated American resolve to return to a position of parity with the USSR. Central 
questions posed are: What were the main elements of America‘s military modernization 
program? Did Reagan play a passive role, or did he intervene at pivotal moments? To what 
extent was the projection of strength linked to Reagan‘s leadership during moments of crisis? 
Did Reagan as Commander-in-Chief increase or diminish the image of American strength? And, 
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in terms of military strategy, who played the leading role: Reagan, or Secretary of Defense 
Caspar Weinberger?   
 Chapter Three explores Reagan‘s moral struggle against communism, dating back to the 
1940s, and details how it evolved over the decades. Reagan had been denouncing the threat of 
communism since his days as President of the Screen Actors Guild in Hollywood and his 
message helped him to establish a conservative political following throughout the country. While 
Reagan toned down his rhetoric during the emergence of détente, by the mid 1970s he began 
again to rail against what he later termed an ‗Evil Empire‘. Central questions posed are: Where 
did Reagan‘s anti-communism emerge from? What personal experiences led him to be such a 
vocal opponent to this ideology? Did Reagan use his crusade against communism as a platform 
for electoral success? Was Reagan an ideologue, a pragmatist, or an opportunist? Was he all 
three?  
 Chapter Four investigates Reagan‘s presidential rhetoric concerning communism and the 
USSR and how it changed over the course of his eight years in the White House. Beginning with 
his first press conference as President, Reagan painted the Soviet leaders as people who could 
not be trusted, as the ‗focus of evil‘ who were destined to be left ‗on the ash heap of history‘.  
However, by 1984 Reagan had toned down his demagogy and spoke instead of a ‗constructive 
dialogue‘.  By 1987, he was challenging Gorbachev to ‗tear down‘ the Berlin Wall and 
implement other reforms. Central questions posed are: Was there a ‗Reagan reversal‘, or was the 
change in Reagan‘s rhetoric part of a strategy? Who wrote Reagan‘s main addresses: the 
President, or his speechwriters? Did Reagan edit or re-write addresses authored by others? To 
what extent were the speechwriters basing their work on Reagan‘s ideas, or on speeches he had 
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given previously? And finally, to what extent can the rhetoric of the Reagan years be ascribed to 
the President as being an authentic reflection of his beliefs? 
 Chapter Five examines the genesis of Reagan‘s disdain for the theory of ‗Mutual Assured 
Destruction‘ (MAD). The idea that the Superpower‘s ability to wipe each other out as a 
guarantee for security (as enshrined in the 1972 ABM Treaty) did not appeal to Reagan, and he 
ultimately believed that America should embark on a program of missile defense. Central 
questions posed are: What is the history of missile defense systems in the Cold War? Did Reagan 
support a missile defense system prior to his presidency? Who was influencing Reagan to adopt 
such a course? And can it be said that the language Reagan would later use to describe missile 
defense, found its origins in Hollywood movies? 
 The Strategic Defense Initiative was Reagan‘s answer to MAD, and his dream for a 
shield against nuclear weapons is the subject of Chapter Six. Unveiled in 1983 as the anticipated 
means of making nuclear weapons ‗impotent and obsolete‘, the announcement caused a storm of 
international controversy that remains to this day. Central questions posed are: Who in the 
administration brought missile defense to the fore in 1983? What role did Reagan have in this 
decision, and its announcement? Once proposed, how attached was Reagan to the concept? Can 
it be said that this was Reagan‘s policy, or others? 
 Closely linked with the preceding chapter is the idea that captivated the mind of Reagan: 
abolishing nuclear weapons. Chapter Seven examines where Reagan‘s nuclear abolitionist views 
originated from, and why he so intensely disliked nuclear weapons. Central questions posed are: 
What was the history of Reagan‘s anti-nuclearism? Did Reagan ever advocate total nuclear 
abolition prior to becoming President? Did any other President in the nuclear age support nuclear 
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abolition? What were Reagan‘s views on nuclear limitation and the SALT Treaties in particular? 
And, did Reagan have a clear agenda when it came to arms control?  
 Reagan‘s radical views about abolishing nuclear weapons had no support within the 
NATO alliance, and Chapter Eight explores Reagan‘s resolve in ensuring that it remained part of 
his government‘s official policy. Examined are the various arms reduction proposals tabled 
during his tenure, and Reagan‘s role is scrutinized to determine the influence of the President 
over his arms control experts. Central questions posed are: How involved was Reagan in 
supervising the agenda of his arms control negotiators? Was Reagan alone in the administration 
in advocating nuclear abolition? When it came to the Superpower Summits, was Reagan master 
of his brief? And, to what extent was Reagan responsible for the INF Treaty of 1987, and the 
START Treaties that were negotiated during his administration? 
 Chapter Nine assesses Reagan‘s belief concerning a possible ‗Nuclear Armageddon‘ 
between the Superpowers, and his sense that he was fated to end the nuclear standoff. The quest 
for peace between the Superpowers that America sought over many years and various 
administrations is examined, as is Reagan‘s sense of destiny to end the Cold War, heightened by 
his survival of an assassin‘s bullet in 1981. Central questions posed are: Did other Cold War 
presidents seek to make a lasting peace with the USSR, and if so, how did they go about 
achieving this? Did Reagan really believe that he was destined to be President and end the Cold 
War? If so, where did he get this understanding from? And to what extent did Reagan‘s 1981 
survival of an assassin‘s bullet influence his decision to reach out to the USSR in the hopes of 
making peace?   
34 
 
 Chapter Ten investigates how involved Reagan was in bettering relations between the 
Superpowers. Reagan‘s personal relationship with Gorbachev was obviously a major factor in 
the transformation of US--Soviet relations, and this chapter explores Reagan‘s perception of this 
relationship and how he understood its usefulness in ending Cold War tensions. Central 
questions posed are: Was Reagan pushed into talks with the USSR, due to political 
considerations, as some theorized at the time? Did Reagan reach out to the three Soviet leaders 
who preceded Gorbachev? When he did meet with Gorbachev, did Reagan merely read the 
‗talking points‘ prepared for him by his aides, or did he follow his own script? Was he a good 
negotiator? And ultimately, what role did the ‗human factor‘ of his personal relationship with 
Gorbachev play in the realization of a new détente between the Superpowers? 
 The Concluding Chapter reviews the thesis statement and looks again at the central 
questions of this dissertation. President Reagan‘s role, in the formulation and execution of Soviet 
foreign policy will then, it is hoped, be more fully clarified.  
 George Shultz called the subject of this thesis ‗extremely important‘, and it will indeed be 
an original contribution to Presidential and Cold War historiography. This researcher‘s PhD 
candidature began during the 20
th
 anniversary of the Geneva Summit and concludes with the 20
th
 
anniversary of Reagan‘s departure from the White House. The time has come, therefore, to write 








PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH 
 





Ronald Reagan was a master orator who had the ability to articulate his militant agenda in terms 
acceptable to the American people. He did this by appealing to their sense of nationalism, 
explaining matters in a down to earth manner, and by summing up extremely complex issues into 
small expressions that everyone could grasp.  
‗Peace through Strength‘ was the slogan that the Reagan Administration used to justify a 
military modernization program that would ultimately cost close to two trillion dollars.
60
  This 
chapter firstly determines how the arms buildup of the 1980s proceeded under the banner of 
‗Peace through Strength‘. From there, the concept of deterrence, which the expression represents, 
is examined, as is America‘s evolving understanding of its application in the Cold War era.  
Finally, Reagan‘s comprehension and use of this term and the possible influences on him in this 
regard are investigated, and it is detailed that Reagan, prior to assuming the presidency, was an 
ardent proponent of increased military preparedness.  
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‘Peace through Strength’: Official Reagan Administration Policy  
‗Peace through Strength‘ is a catchphrase that today is emblazoned on t-shirts and caps for sale at 
the Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, and it was one that the Reagan 
Administration itself tried to ‗sell‘ to the American people in the 1980s.  
On 23 September 1984 President Reagan declared a ‗National Peace through Strength 
Week‘ which involved rallies in all 50 states of the Union in support of ‗a strategy of peace 
based on strong defense.‘ A statement released by the White House declared: 
If history teaches us anything, it is that a strong defense is the prerequisite to a 
lasting peace, the only credible deterrent against aggression...We Americans 
maintain our military strength with the fervent hope that it will never be used, and 




Who this military arms buildup was directed against was no state secret: the Reagan 
Administration made clear that its policy of re-armament was aimed at matching the military 
capability of the USSR.  This was a theme that the Reagan team had promised to implement if 
their man was elected Commander-in-Chief because it was their view (and others) that America 
was seriously inferior to the Soviet Union in military strength.   
In the late 1970s there was a whole host of experts who agreed with Reagan‘s assessment 
that America‘s ability to defend itself was in serious question. President Carter‘s Defense 
Secretary, Harold Brown, and Pentagon official, William J. Perry, had disclosed that according 
to their estimation, the Soviets had the ability to destroy the entire arsenal of 1,000 US 
Minuteman land-based nuclear missiles in a single surprise attack.
62
 Carter‘s CIA Director, 
Stansfield Turner, did not say so at the time, but he later stated publicly that he too believed that 
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‗in the last several years all of the best studies have shown that the balance of strategic nuclear 
capabilities has been tipping in favor of the Soviet Union‘.63 President Carter apparently was not 
listening to his own experts when he declared in 1980 that the United States was ‗the strongest 
nation on earth—militarily‘.64 In contrast to Carter‘s glowing assessment of America‘s defense 
capability, the Republican Party Platform that nominated Reagan for President called for a 
massive arms buildup to achieve the very superiority that Carter claimed was already existent: 
Republicans commit themselves to an immediate increase in defense spending to 
be applied judiciously to critically needed programs. We will build toward 
sustained defense expenditure sufficient to close the gap with the Soviets, and 





Unlike President John F. Kennedy‘s realization upon taking office that the ‗missile gap‘ he 
claimed existed was in fact a gap in America‘s favor,66 Reagan‘s White House in its first year 
continued its refrain that America was in a dangerously weakened position.
67
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In his historic defense speech to the National Press Club in November 1981, President 
Reagan warned that ‗the continuing Soviet military buildup threatens both the conventional and 
nuclear balance.‘ He asked the audience to ‗consider the facts‘ as he contrasted American 
defense programs with that of the USSR: 
Over the past decade, the United States reduced the size of its Armed Forces and 
decreased its military spending. The Soviets steadily increased the number of men 
under arms. They now number more than double those of the United States. Over 
the same period, the Soviets expanded their real military spending by one third. 
The Soviet Union increased its inventory of tanks to some 50,000 compared to 
our 11,000. Historically a land power, they transformed their navy from a coastal 
defense force to an open ocean fleet, while the United States, a sea power with 
transoceanic alliances, cut its fleet in half.  
During a period when NATO deployed no new intermediate-range nuclear 
missiles and actually withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads, the Soviet Union 





Remarkably, the United States government did not state that its arms increase was to 
keep up with the Soviet Union, but rather to catch up to them. In a similar defense speech to the 
nation in 1982, President Reagan declared: ‗Today, in virtually every measure of military power, 
the Soviet Union enjoys a decided advantage.‘69  
Admitting that America was the number two Superpower came as a shock to many, and 
no doubt weakened its position in the world. The Cold War was above all a psychological battle, 
where perceived threats were just as deadly as real ones (as evidenced by the Soviet propensity 
to display dummy missiles along with real ones in their Mayday parade). For the President to 
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admit inferiority, therefore, invited potential disaster. But in the eyes of the Reagan 
Administration, the greater threat to American security was the lack of actual military might, and 
with a Congress being controlled by political adversaries, the President felt that only full 
disclosure of Soviet superiority would mobilize the masses to support his arms buildup program.  
Thus, ‗Peace through Strength‘ would involve a military arms buildup in the triad of 
America‘s defense capability: land, air and sea. Conventional military modernization—new 
tanks, ships and aircraft—would be undertaken simultaneously with enhanced nuclear capability. 
The ‗window of vulnerability‘ had to be closed, and Reagan had promised to do everything in his 
power to achieve this.  The idea behind ‗Peace through Strength‘—deterrence—is as old as 
human civilization, but it was only in the Cold War era that the United States fully grasped the 
concept. 
 
Peace through Strength in the Cold War: Deterring Soviet Aggression 
The concept of deterrence is that a potential aggressor will refrain from attack if it believes that 
its opponent has sufficient military strength to withstand it.  ‗The Imposer seeks to deter the 
Target from behaving in an unacceptable fashion by threatening punishment‘.70 It is an idea that 
is timeless, as any competent military campaigner will first calculate the risks of launching war 
before initiating hostilities. If the commander believes that his adversary is just as strong as his 
force, then the campaign will end in stalemate, and nothing could be gained from an attack. 
Worse still, if calculations determine that his opponent is stronger than he, then barring 
unforeseen events, any attack would certainly end in defeat, and the commander (if he is sane) 
will not initiate hostilities. 
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 Conversely, weakness invites aggression. If a potential adversary sees that a military 
conquest could be achieved with relative ease, then he is far more likely to seize the opportunity 
and ‗move in for the kill‘; hence the necessity for a nation to appear strong if it is to maintain the 
peace—si vis pacem para bellum. 
 After the end of World War II, the need to deter Soviet aggression became clear as 
America‘s former wartime ally became increasingly bellicose. Despite its promises of ‗free 
elections‘ in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union began to impose its political will on the nations 
that it occupied. Two spheres of influence began to emerge in Europe: those nations whose 
governments were democratic and those that were communist.  
 Winston Churchill, who had accurately predicted the threat of the ‗gathering storm‘ of 
Nazi Germany, had sought from the outset of post-war negotiations with the Soviet Union to 
deter its aggression by the threat of force. The Soviets, Churchill believed, only respected 
strength, and would not be moved by idealistic arguments. His recommendation to President 
Harry Truman was that: 
…the Allies ought not to retreat from their present positions to the occupational 
line until we are satisfied about Poland, and also about the temporary character of 
the Russian occupation of Germany, and the conditions to be established in the 
Russianised or Russian-controlled countries in the Danube valley, particularly 




Diplomacy, in other words, would be far more effective if the Allies maintained a military 
presence that could be used to leverage Soviet behavior by the threat of force. Unfortunately, 
American naivety about ‗Uncle Joe Stalin‘ and distrust of the ‗balance of power‘ school of 
thought led Truman to ignore the Prime Minister‘s advice, and Allied forces withdrew behind the 
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demarcation line prior to the Potsdam Summit. Needless to say, it did not take long for Churchill 
to be as vindicated in his warnings about the Soviets as he had been with the Germans, as 
communist puppet regimes were installed in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, Churchill felt that the 
threat of force could still alter the situation and nip the Cold War in the bud. 
 The nuclear bomb, Churchill believed, could be used to threaten the USSR into a 
negotiated settlement for Eastern Europe. With America being the sole possessor of the 
awesomely destructive weapon, the possibility existed that Stalin would feel intimidated enough 
to withdraw from his occupied territories if the matter were ‗brought to a head‘ in a tense, ‗no 
holds barred‘ negotiation. An out of office Churchill said on 9 October 1948: 
The question is asked: What will happen when they get the atomic bomb 
themselves and have accumulated a large store? You can judge yourselves what 
will happen then by what is happening now. ‘If these things are done in the green 
wood, what will be done in the dry?’… 
No one in his sense can believe that we have a limitless period of time 
before us. We ought to bring matters to a head and make a final settlement. We 
ought not to go jogging along improvident, incompetent, waiting for something to 
turn up, by which I mean waiting for something bad for us to turn up. The 
Western Nations will be far more likely to reach a lasting settlement, without 
bloodshed, if they formulate their just demands while they have the atomic power 




  The nuclear ultimatum was never used by the Truman Administration to force a Soviet 
withdrawal from Eastern Europe. Instead, it was decided that Eastern Europe had become 
something of a lost cause, and efforts were made to contain rather than rollback Soviet 
expansionism.  
 The policy of ‗containment‘ saw the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) as the first attempt by the West to deter further Soviet aggression. Diplomat George 
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Kennan, in his ‗long telegram‘ from the American embassy in Moscow, had argued that Russia 
was by its very nature expansionist due to its tsarist history and its communist ideology. Later, as 
‗Mr. X‘ in his 1947 Foreign Affairs article, Kennan had said that this expansionism could be 
stopped by Western pressure, for ‗if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these 
philosophically and accommodates itself to them.‘ Kennan, therefore, urged the adoption of ‗a 
policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at 
every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable 
world.‘73 So, in addition to the ‗Marshal Plan‘ of economic assistance in Europe, President 
Truman created NATO as a military coalition on 4 April 1949. NATO consisted of an alliance 
between the United States of America, Canada and Western European nations to counter the 
Soviet threat. Designed to stop Soviet tanks from rolling into Western Europe, the NATO 
alliance became far more complicated when the Soviet Union itself came to possess the atomic 
bomb. 
  When in 1949 the Soviet Union became the second nation to join the ‗nuclear club‘, a 
Cold War atomic standoff began, which ultimately created a real deterrence for both sides of the 
Superpower divide.  While news of the USSR‘s possession of the nuclear weapon created alarm 
in the West, it actually served to create greater stability in Europe. Aggressive moves by either 
side into the respective spheres of influence could trigger a nuclear attack, and if that were to 
occur, both sides would be guaranteed to experience ‗mutual assured destruction‘ (MAD). 
However, the nuclear deterrence was a precarious peace. As Churchill observed, ‗safety will be 
the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.‘74 Consequently, the 
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United States and the Soviet Union treaded carefully, lest they inadvertently turn a regional issue 
into a global thermo-nuclear war. The presence of the nuclear threat brought the longest period 
of peace to Europe for generations, but when the Soviets were acquiring their nuclear capability, 
the United States feared that it would actually increase the likelihood of war. As the National 
Security Document NSC-68 said in April 1950: 
At the moment our atomic retaliatory capability is probably adequate to deter the 
Kremlin from a deliberate direct military attack against ourselves or other free 
peoples. However, when it calculates that it has a sufficient atomic capability to 
make a surprise attack on us, nullifying our atomic superiority and creating a 
military situation decisively in its favor, the Kremlin might be tempted to strike 
swiftly and with stealth. The existence of two large atomic capabilities in such a 





And thus began the paranoia that ten or twenty or even one hundred nuclear weapons were not 
sufficient for security, and hence the need for an arms race whereby both sides stockpiled 
thousands upon thousands of nuclear weapons. This arms race spiraled out of control until the 
Nixon Administration sought to slow things down through nuclear arms limitation talks. 
 President Richard M. Nixon sought to achieve an arms control agreement with the 
Kremlin because he saw the convergence of two opposing wills in the Superpower psyche. On 
the one hand, the Soviet Union had greatly increased its missile stockpile in the aftermath of its 
humiliating back down over the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 and its upsurge in military 
spending saw no end in sight. Conversely, in the United States, Nixon accurately read the 
political will of the Congress, and foresaw a massive reduction in funding for defense spending. 
Thus, a brief window of opportunity existed for Nixon to engage the Soviets in negotiating an 
arms control treaty that would be mutually advantageous.   
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In 1972 President Nixon met with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow and signed 
a treaty aimed at achieving ‗nuclear sufficiency‘. The SALT I agreement saw, for the first time in 
the history of the Cold War, an acknowledgment between the two adversaries that peace was 
achievable only through an equal nuclear deterrent. President Nixon recounted his reasoning 
behind nuclear arms limitation in his memoirs: 
It was clear to me by 1969 that there could never be absolute parity between the 
U.S and the U.S.S.R in the area of nuclear and conventional armaments. For one 
thing, the Soviets are a land power and we are a sea power.  For another, while 
our nuclear weapons were better, theirs were bigger. Furthermore, absolute 
superiority in every area of armaments would have been meaningless, because 
there is a point in arms development at which each nation has the capacity to 
destroy the other. Beyond that point the most important consideration is not 
continued escalation of the number of arms but maintenance of the strategic 
equilibrium while making it clear to the adversary that a nuclear attack, even if 
successful, would be suicidal. 
Consequently, at the beginning of the administration, I began to talk in 





However, the majority of American people grew as distrustful of Nixon‘s assurances of 
‗sufficiency‘ as they were of his general policy of ‗détente‘, which they believed could not be 
depended upon as a reliable deterrent.  
In the face of renewed Soviet aggression, at the close of the 1970s American policy 
makers were calling for a new arms race that could deter a possible war. Despite President 
Carter‘s negotiation of a second SALT treaty with the USSR in 1979, which placed ceilings on 
nuclear arms levels between the Superpowers, a feeling of American inferiority developed as the 
Soviets flexed their military muscles. The Soviet deployment of the SS-20 missile in Europe, 
their invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 and their ongoing arms buildup convinced many 
analysts that the Soviets had rejected the idea of deterrence and were in fact preparing for war. 
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The fear expressed in the 1950 NSC-68 document—that the Soviet Union would attempt a first 
strike against the US—grew as its military capability looked geared more towards offense than 




Reagan’s Call for an Arms Buildup 
Ronald Reagan recognized the threat of the USSR and articulated his belief that only 
overwhelming military strength was capable of preventing war. Invoking the failed response of 
the Western democracies in the 1930s to the growing danger of a militarized Nazi Germany, 
Reagan said that a similar appeasement of the USSR was occurring in the 1970s.  In a radio 
address that Reagan wrote in April 1975, he said of the pre-World War Western Alliance: 
The leaders of that generation saw the growing menace and talked of it but 
reacted to the growing military might of Germany with anguished passiveness. 
Will it be said of today‘s world leaders as it was of the pre-World War II leaders 
‗they were better at surviving the catastrophe than they were at preventing it‘?77 
 
To those who believed that an American arms race could be destabilizing, Reagan countered 
that:  
 
World War II did not happen because the Nations of the free world engaged in a 
massive military buildup. In most countries including our own, ‗too little too late‘ 




Strength deters aggression, while weakness invites it. The weakness of the European nations 
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encouraged Hitler to become more aggressive, while American weakness caused the Pearl 
Harbor attack, Reagan believed. He stated: 
Certainly we haven‘t forgotten that after World War II the Japanese told us they 
decided on war when they saw our army staging war games with wooden guns. 
They also took note that one month before Pearl Harbor Congress came within a 




According to Reagan, what was true leading up to World War II was true of the Cold War 
conflict of the 1970s, and unless America re-armed, war was inevitable. He surmised: 
But if we are told the truth, namely that enough evidence of weakness or lack of 
willpower could tempt the Soviet Union as it once tempted Hitler and the military 
rulers of Japan, I believe our decision would be in favor of… prevention.80 
 
Only a massive military buildup on behalf of the United States could stop the coming 
conflict between the Superpowers. Reagan said he would ‗rather prevent a war by being well 
armed than by surrendering‘, for only this could bring an acceptable peace. His rationale was 
that:  
Peace is purchased by making yourself stronger than your adversary—or by 
dismantling power and submitting to one‘s enemies. Power is not only sufficient 
military strength, but a sound economy, a reliable energy supply and credibility—
the belief by any potential enemy that you will not choose surrender as the way to 
maintain peace. Thomas Jefferson said, ‘The American people won’t make a 
mistake if they are given all the facts.
81
 (Emphasis added).  
 
The ‗facts‘ according to Reagan were that the American people had been duped into believing 
that ‗détente‘ with the USSR had made them more secure. On the contrary, Reagan stated that 
the rapprochement with the Soviet Union had permitted it to achieve military superiority. His 
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1976 Presidential campaign had sought to take the Republican nomination from Gerald Ford, 
largely by mocking Ford and Kissinger‘s assertions that they had achieved ‗Peace through 
Strength‘. He noted: 
James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense has said, ‗at no point since the 
1930s has the Western World faced so formidable a threat to its survival.‘ Is that 
‘Peace through Strength?’ 
Paul Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, writing about Soviet 
strategic nuclear power says, ‗After 1977, the Soviet advantage after an assumed 
attack mounts rapidly.‘ Is that ‘Peace through Strength’? 
General Alexander Haig, Commander of NATO, said recently, ‗We are 
getting to the fine edge of disaster.‘ Is that ‘Peace through Strength’? 
Dr. Malcolm Currier, chief of Research and Engineering at the Pentagon 
says, ‗The momentum is now on the side of the Soviet Union and it is staggering.‘ 
Is that ‘Peace through Strength’?82 (Emphasis added). 
 
The USSR, Reagan warned, had surpassed the US in military power: 
The Soviet army outnumbers ours more than 2 to 1 and in reserves, 4 to 1. They 
outspend us on weapons by 50%. Their navy outnumbers ours in surface ships 
and subs 2 to 1. We are outgunned in artillery 3 to 1 and their tanks outnumber 
ours 4 to 1. Their strategic nuclear missiles are larger, more powerful and more 




Reagan‘s attempt to wrestle the nomination from the incumbent President was unsuccessful; 
however, while Ford became the Republican Party‘s nominee, he narrowly lost the White House 
to Jimmy Carter in the general election. Many blamed Reagan for this loss, but he remained 
unrepentant as the Ford Administration passed into history. On the eve of Carter‘s Presidential 
inauguration, Reagan wrote in 1977:  
Shortly before the changing of the guard in the nation‘s capital, the former 
Secretary of State [Henry Kissinger] addressed the Washington press club. In his 
address, he vehemently denied that we had lost military supremacy to the Soviet 
Union. He spoke somewhat harshly of those who claimed otherwise, which, I 
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assume, included me. But to tell you the truth, he didn‘t change my mind.84 
 
The title of this radio address was ‗Farewell Speeches‘, and Reagan contrasted Henry Kissinger‘s 
assertions of American power with that of the retiring head of Air Force Intelligence,  Major 
General George J. Keegan Jr. who told the New York Times flatly: ‗the Soviet Union has already 
achieved military superiority over this country.‘85 Reagan quoted the General as saying: 
By every criterion used to measure strategic balance…that is: damage expectancy, 
throw weight, equivalent mega tonnage or technology I am unaware of a single 
important category in which the Soviets have not established a significant lead 




This Soviet military buildup, the general said, was evidence that the ‗Soviet Union is not only 
trying for superiority but is preparing for war.‘ The general‘s ‗somber assessment‘ concluded 
that ‗the greatest global conflict in history is likely to occur within the next decade or two unless 
there is a radical change in United States intelligence perceptions.‘87 The General may not have 
converted the Carter Administration to his dire predictions, but he did find a loyal adherent to his 
views in Reagan. The future president called for a massive re-assertion of American military 
power in preparation for potential war. 
 
Weapons Systems  
Thus, in his years prior to assuming the presidency, Reagan proposed an arms buildup that he 
believed would be the best way to avert a possible war with the Soviet Union. Believing that the 
                                                     
84
 Ronald Reagan, Farwell Addresses‘ 19 Jan. 1977, Pre- Presidential Papers, Series 1: Speeches and Writings, 
Radio Addresses, Box 6  RPL. 
85
  David Binder, ‗Air Force‘s Ex-Intelligence Chief Fears Soviet Has Military Edge,‘ New York Times, 3 Jan.  1977. 
86
  Ronald Reagan, ‗Farewell Addresses‘, Ibid.   
87
  Ibid. 
49 
 
Soviets had already achieved military superiority and that only American strength could deter 
war, Reagan seemed to support every new weapons program under consideration, in spite of the 
arguments against them. 
  Take, for example, the Neutron Bomb: cancelled by the Carter Administration due to a 
lack of NATO support, it was a weapon that had the ability to kill civilians without doing major 
damage to infrastructure. It was thus deemed immoral by some, for it seemed to place a higher 
emphasis on protecting buildings than it did on saving lives. It was politically ‗dead in the 
water‘, and President Carter decided that whatever its military merits, the United States was not 
going to fund a weapon for NATO that had no support among the European people and their 
leadership.
88
 Reagan rejected the criticism of the Neutron Bomb in a radio address written in 
March 1978. Addressing the so called ‗immorality‘ of the weapon that kills people but leaves 
property undamaged, Reagan countered: 
Now some express horror at this and charging immorality portray those who 
would pursue such a weapon as placing a higher value on property than human 
life.  This is sheer unadulterated nonsense. It is harsh sounding but all war 
weapons back to the club, sling and arrow are designed to kill the soldiers of the 
enemy. With gunpowder and artillery and later bombs and bombers, war could 
not be confined to the battlefield. And so came total war with non-combatants 
outnumbering soldiers in casualties.
89
    
 
Reagan saw the Neutron Bomb as ‗the dreamed of death-ray weapon of science fiction‘ and said 
it was ‗one which can provide the deterrent we need to any Russian attack.‘ The Soviets, Reagan 
pointed out, had ‗assembled an offensive force of tanks, mobile artillery, support aircraft and 
armored personnel carriers on the Western front in Europe superior to our NATO forces.‘  To 
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counter this threat, the United States needed to employ tactical nuclear forces. Reagan thought it 
was well worth the price tag to manufacture and deploy the Neutron Bomb: 
Here is a deterrent weapon available to us at a much lower cost than trying to 
match the enemy gun for gun, tank for tank, plane for plane. It isn‘t unreasonable 
to believe that the Soviets will be most hesitant to send those waves of tanks 
westward if we have a weapon that can wipe out their crews at virtually no cost to 
ourselves. Indeed the neutron bomb represents a moral improvement in the horror 
of modern war. 
 
‗War‘, Reagan said, ‗is an unpleasant thing to talk about‘, but he believed that the ‗neutron bomb 
could be the ideal deterrent weapon—one that wouldn‘t have to be used.‘90   
 Carter‘s decision to cancel another military program, the ‗B-1 Bomber‘, was also harshly 
criticized by Reagan as yet another sign of American weakness in the Cold War.  The planned 
replacement of the ageing fleet of B-52 bombers had been cancelled by President Carter in 1977 
as being an unnecessary expense. With an estimated cost of $100 million dollars per plane, it was 
labeled by the President a ‗gross waste of money‘.91 Carter told the defense community that B-
52s and other alternatives would have to do, but for Reagan, the cancellation of the new plane 
became ‗symbolic‘of ‗an unease on the part of the people about our entire defense posture.‘ In 
Reagan‘s opinion, the B-1 bomber was: ‗a war plane so far advanced beyond anything we have 
that the world would be years trying to match it‘. And ‗the facts reveal the arguments supporting 
its cancellation are not true.‘92 Firstly, Reagan disputed the estimated cost of the program: 
We are told the B-1 had a price tag of $100 million and it was vulnerable to the 
Soviet Air Defense System. Well no one can look with pleasure on a $100 million 
aircraft being knocked down by anti-aircraft fire. First we should know that $100 
million price tag is figured in 1986 dollars on the basis that inflation will 
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continue. The real price tag is about $65 million—still a tidy sum.93 
 
Then, Reagan argued that the so called cheaper alternatives were not nearly as good as the B-1 
Bomber: 
It was pointed out that the air launched cruise missile could be made for $1 
million and launched by re-fitted B-52s, F1-11s or even 747s from outside 
Russia‘s perimeter. Now this is true—as far as it goes. But, the 747 modified 
costs more than the B-1 and of course is (with its size) extremely vulnerable. The 
B-52 can only carry half the pay load of the B-1 even though it‘s almost twice as 
big and the modification required is quite expensive-especially when you consider 
you are talking about two B-52s to substitute for a single B-1.
94
   
 
In addition to the B-1 being able to carry more bombs, Reagan spoke of its superior technology 
in other regards: 
The B-1 incidentally travels twice as fast as the B-52 and being so much smaller 
is less vulnerable because of its radar image. It shows up on a radar screen about 
the size of a fighter plane…The B-1 is designed to go in low beneath radar, 
penetrating the enemy air defense system before launching the cruise missiles. 
 
In Reagan‘s reasoning, therefore, there was not a single fact made available by the Carter 
Administration that would justify a cancellation of the B-1 program. Reagan could only think of 
one possibility that would cause Carter to cancel the new plane: ‗If the President has information 
that the Soviets have a new defense system that makes the B-1 less useful, he should tell us. It 
won‘t be a surprise to the Soviets‘ he said. And if they did not have that defense system, then 
Reagan thought the B-1 bomber would be useful in creating an arms race that would cost the 
Soviets ‗more than the B-1s cost to develop a defense against them, and what‘s wrong with 
that?‘95  
                                                     
93
  Ibid. 
94
  Pre-Presidential Papers, Series 1: Speeches and Writings, Radio Broadcasts BOX. 21 RPL. 
95
  Ibid. 
52 
 
Evident in Reagan‘s commentary on military programs is a sophisticated knowledge of 
the systems under discussion, but also a lack of concern over the potential costs of engaging the 
Soviet Union in a new arms race. Achieving deterrence, clearly, was priority number one. But 
where did Reagan get these ideas? 
 
 
The Origin of Reagan’s Ideas 
Ronald Reagan was a man who held stubbornly to his beliefs, and it was extremely rare for 
Reagan to ever change his opinions. When it came to developing his belief about strength 
deterring aggression, and hence ‗Peace through Strength‘, one can find in Reagan‘s writings 
many references to other thinkers of his day. Whether Reagan was influenced by these ideas or 
sought out those who thought as he did, remains open to debate. What is clear is that Reagan was 
not a solitary voice in the 1970s when sounding an alarm about increasing Soviet strength. It is 
evident in Reagan‘s radio addresses that he was drawing on a wide range of sources to back up 
his arguments concerning the need for military modernization. Quotations can be found from 
books, articles, newspaper columns and television programs that indicate that Reagan spent an 
enormous amount of time researching his radio addresses. As Nancy Reagan recalled of this era 
in his life: 
I can see him sitting at his desk, writing, which he seemed to do all the 
time…Nobody thought that he ever read anything either—but he was a voracious 
reader. I don‘t ever remember Ronnie sitting and watching television. I really don‘t.  





Reagan‘s work—his writing—took up most of his time, be it at home or travelling. And he 
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wanted to augment his arguments with facts, figures and quotes from others who had 
investigated American military strength and who felt as Reagan did, that only a resurgence of 
American military potency could possibility deter the Soviet Union from embarking on further 
aggressive activities. 
 What is manifest from Reagan‘s 1970s addresses is that he was an avid reader of 
conservative publications. Reagan quotes from the conservative magazine The National Review 
in his address on ‗Intelligence‘.97 This magazine was founded by William F. Buckley Jr. in 1955 
in response to a growing liberalism within the Republican Party. It found a champion in Barry 
Goldwater‘s campaign for the Presidency in 1964 and supported Reagan in his attempt to oust 
President Ford. Many National Review articles in the 1970s echoed Reagan‘s call for a massive 
arms build-up.  
 Similarly, it can be seen that Reagan was a subscriber to the conservative publication The 
American Spectator. This magazine, founded in 1967 by R. Emmett Tyrell Jr., was called by 
Reagan ‗a fine paper‘ and he quotes it as saying: 
Further, they [the USSR] rush ahead with gigantic civil defense projects and with 
a military buildup that strongly suggests that they are attempting to achieve 




Whether Reagan actually believed that the Soviets were preparing for a military confrontation 
with the US cannot be substantiated. However, he did use those who predicted such a dire 
outcome to support his call for a massive military buildup. Reagan was thus a part of the 
conservative movement that gained momentum in the 1970s and which would come to see him 
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as its champion. 
 Reagan was perhaps also influenced by several organizations formed in the 1970s by 
neo-conservatives to warn of the growing threat of the Soviet Union. The ‗Committee on the 
Present Danger‘ formed in 1976 was an off-shoot of President Ford‘s ‗Task Force B‘, an 
independent body of advisers organized to counter the CIA‘s assessment of the Soviet threat. 
The reasons for this action by Ford were completely political: his weakest point that Reagan had 
been manipulating during the Presidential primaries was his support of détente. Ford caved into 
pressure and appointed Task Force B, which lends further proof to the argument that when it 
came to foreign policy, by 1976 Reagan had achieved an effective ‗veto power‘ over the Ford 
Administration.  The group formed was made up of an ensemble of bi-partisan foreign policy 
figures, including former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, diplomat Paul Nitze and Jean 
Kirkpatrick. Reagan, who said that the ‗group [is] of unquestionable credentials‘ quoted them in 
a 1977 radio address as having said: 
Our country is in danger and the danger is increasing. The principal threat is the 
Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unprecedented military buildup. The 
scope and sophistication of the Soviet campaign and its tempo [has] quickened. 
Encouraging divisiveness among nations new and old, it has been acquiring a 
network of positions, including naval and air bases, which supports its 
…expansion.99 
 
 Eventually Reagan himself would join the organization in 1979. While it is clear that this 
organization did not create Reagan‘s views about the need for military modernization, what 
should be noted is that he was not a lone voice in championing this cause, but was rather part of 
a larger political movement.  
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1980 Presidential Election Campaign 
In challenging Jimmy Carter for the presidency, a constant theme that Reagan spoke of around 
the country was the need for America to re-arm in the face of renewed Soviet aggression. 
Echoing John F. Kennedy‘s assertion in 1960 that there was a ‗missile gap‘, Reagan denounced 
what he labeled a ‗window of vulnerability‘.  On the campaign trail, Reagan continued to re-
iterate the necessity for the United States to re-arm and rebuild its military capabilities so as to 
achieve not only ‗Peace through Strength‘, but also American superiority. Reagan warned in 
1980 that: ‗We now enter one of the most dangerous decades of Western civilization‘ and that 
‗our allies are losing confidence in us and our adversaries no longer respect us‘.100 American 
weakness was to blame, he said, and the lack of courage on behalf of the Carter Administration 
was reminiscent of Western appeasement of Adolph Hitler in the 1930s. ‗I believe we are seeing 
the same situation as when Mr. Chamberlain was tapping the cobblestones of Munich,‘101 
Reagan warned. America, Reagan claimed, was dangerously behind the Soviets in the arms race 
and the USSR ‗lead us in all but six or eight of the forty strategic military categories and may 
well surpass us in those if present trends continue‘.  In response to Carter‘s charge that should 
Reagan be elected President America would begin a new arms race, Reagan countered that 
America was already in an arms race, ‗but only one side is racing‘. It was time for the US to 
catch up, and spend ‗whatever is necessary‘ or else face the prospect of ‗surrender‘.  
Casting aside the conventional logic that the US should seek ‗parity‘ with the USSR in 
weapons numbers, Reagan was unashamedly pro-American superiority. In a speech to the 
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American Legion Reagan asked, ‗Since when has it been wrong for America to be first in 
military strength? How is military superiority dangerous?‘102 George Shultz would later be 
unsure about whether Reagan ever sought American military superiority,
103
 instead stating that 
Reagan ‗wanted to be strong enough to deter aggression‘ as superiority by one side creates 
imbalance and leads to a continued arms race.  But the record shows that in 1980 Reagan did in 
fact advocate US military superiority over the Soviets. 
 
Making His Ideas Policy 
Following his election to the presidency in November of 1980, President-elect Reagan wasted no 
time during the transition period making sure that his desire to achieve a military arms buildup to 
counter the USSR would become official US policy. 
The first and most important way Reagan achieved this was appointing Caspar 
Weinberger as his Secretary of Defense. Weinberger, a longtime friend of Reagan and a World 
War II veteran, had formerly held the office of Director of Budget Management under Nixon, 
where he had gained the nickname ‗Cap the Knife‘ for his slashing of expenditures. Shortly after 
his landslide victory, Reagan rang Weinberger and asked him to return to Washington. ‗I know 
that you have a full, a very exciting and a very rich life,‘ Reagan said. ‗I know all of the rewards 
that there are there for you, and now I want to spoil the whole thing by asking you to serve as 
Secretary of Defense.‘ Reagan outlined the reasons why he wanted Weinberger to accept the 
offer. As Weinberger later recounted: 
He emphasized briefly many of the points he had made during the campaign…the 
lamentable state to which our armed forces had sunk as a result of neglect, while 
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at the same time the Soviets were expanding and rapidly increasing their own 
military capabilities…the great alarm that our policies and lack of strength had 
occasioned among our allies; the growing belief, among both our allies and other 
nations with whom we should be friendly, that the United States was a very 
unreliable ally, not a good partner and certainly not a country that was militarily 





 Weinberger said he accepted the position of Secretary of Defense because, he explained, ‗I 
knew it was absolutely necessary for America to change course drastically to regain our military 
strength—and to regain also the respect and support of allies, without whom we could not expect 
to keep our freedom‘.105  
Reagan announced Weinberger as Secretary of Defense designate on 1 December  1980, 
and in doing so he appointed a man who would almost fanatically carry out the President‘s 
wishes to achieve ‗Peace through Strength‘. As Weinberger admitted: 
From then on I became almost totally immersed in defense and security issues, 
and would remain so with an intensity and single-mindedness that permitted 





Thus Reagan had taken his idea about ‗Peace through Strength‘, and made it official US 
defense policy. His challenge to Ford for the Presidential nomination had begun in earnest only 
when he had denounced ‗Dr. Kissinger‘s and Mr. Ford‘s‘ policy of détente. In his radio 
addresses he had warned that weakness invites aggression, that American military modernization 
was essential to deter Soviet attacks, and that unless this occurred America faced a choice 
between surrender and war. And in the 1980 Presidential election, he had promised that if elected 
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he would work to restore America‘s military superiority over the USSR. Many hours reading, 
writing and delivering these ideas, as well as campaigning all around the country, had paid off. 
In selecting Caspar Weinberger, Reagan had ensured that ‗Peace through Strength‘ would 
become the manifesto of the Pentagon.  
In the final analysis, the official defense policy of the United States in the 1980s can find 
its origin in the person of Ronald Reagan.  In this respect concerning his presidency, he was the 
chief script writer and producer of the biggest arms buildup in US peacetime history. But, 
whether Reagan directed the details of this ‗military modernization program‘ once in office will 


















Chapter 2:  
MILITARY MODERNIZATION 
  





‗Peace through Strength‘ was Ronald Reagan‘s theory that American military power could deter 
Soviet aggression.  Upon being inaugurated President, Reagan had the opportunity to put his 
hypothesis to the test. Over the course of the eight-years of the Reagan Administration, the 
United States would spend close to 2 trillion dollars on defense: an unprecedented ‗peace time‘ 
military buildup. In Reagan‘s worldview, the Soviet Union had spent the decade of the 1970s 
constructing the most awesome war machine ever produced in history of the world, and if 
America hoped to survive the 1980s, then they had to catch up fast.  Critics charged that Reagan 
had fallen prey to the ‗military-industrial complex‘ that Eisenhower had warned against in his 
farewell address to the nation,
108
 but the President perceived things differently.   
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Reagan, as the preceding chapter demonstrates, believed that strength deterred 
aggression. This simple message was summed up in a re-election commercial in 1984, which had 
the image of a bear moving about in the woods, with the narrator saying: 
There is a bear in the woods. For some people, the bear is easy to see. Other‘s 
don‘t see it at all. Some people say the bear is tame. Others say it‘s vicious, and 
dangerous. Since no one can really be sure who‘s right, isn‘t it smart to be as 
strong as the bear—if there is a bear?109 
 
The commercial ended with the image of a man, with a rifle hanging over his shoulder, walking 
up the bear. There could be no doubt that the bear represented the threat of the ‗Russian bear‘, 
and that the fearless hunter was Ronald Reagan.  
This chapter details how the US set out to achieve parity with the Soviets in the triad of 
America‘s conventional defense capability: air, land and sea. Also examined is the nuclear 
component—so central to the Cold War—and how the Reagan Administration sought to ‗close 
the window of vulnerability‘ through an enhanced nuclear deterrent. The questions addressed 
are: Did Reagan merely approve recommendations presented to him on proposed arms programs, 
or did he carefully review each case on its merits as his predecessor Jimmy Carter had done? Did 
Reagan as Commander-in-Chief project an image of strength, and thereby increase deterrence? 
And finally, who was the driver of America‘s arms buildup during the Reagan years: Was it 
Reagan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Defense Secretary?  
 
The Beginnings: Empowering the Secretary of Defense 
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In the Reagan White House, the President liked to empower his subordinates to do their jobs on 
their own, and only to see him if there was something they could not handle themselves and 
needed his decision on. Delegating so much power to unelected officials meant that Reagan had 
to carefully select people who would adhere to his ideological viewpoints. As the preceding 
chapter demonstrates, Caspar Weinberger absolutely agreed with Reagan‘s assessment of the 
defense situation and concurred with Reagan‘s conclusion that a ‗military modernization 
program‘ was a vital necessity. With the selection made, the next most important step was for 
Reagan to give clear guidelines on what he wished to see accomplished at the Defense 
Department, and this Reagan did prior to Weinberger taking command at the Pentagon. 
Weinberger received his first operational directives from Reagan when the two met a few 
weeks before the inauguration at the beginning of 1981. The transition team had moved into 
Blair House, a residence directly across from the White House traditionally used for visiting 
heads of state. There Reagan and Weinberger discussed the grave situation of Poland, and came 
to the conclusion that American military weakness meant that there was no real deterrent for the 
Soviets not to launch an aggressive strike on the rebellious Warsaw Pact nation. As Weinberger 
recalled, Reagan said that ‗his top priority was to reverse the situation, to give the military 
capabilities‘ that would ‗back up‘ diplomacy. In Reagan‘s view, ‗there was nothing worse than 
an empty threat or an idle boast or bluff‘. He stated:  ‗If you get called and cannot respond, your 
chances of being believed a second time are exceedingly low.‘110 
 Reagan made clear in that transition meeting that the modernization program would go 
forward regardless of cost, and as quickly as possible.  Weinberger recalled that Reagan, a man 
well known for his joviality, was ‗deadly serious‘ when making these points to him. If it came to 
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a choice between a balanced budget and an enhanced military program, Reagan opted for the 
latter, even if that meant running up large deficits.  Viewing the international situation, Reagan 
noted Soviet expansion into Angola, Afghanistan, Cuba, Nicaragua, Ethiopia and elsewhere, and 
said that America had to ‗regain our strength as quickly as possible‘ if it were to persuade the 
Soviets that they could not take similar actions in the future. These ‗extremely important 
conclusions,‘ as Weinberger recalled them, set the tone for the Administration‘s endeavors 
during the first months in office.
111
  The next step was to formulate Reagan‘s guidelines into an 
official manifesto that would steer the various branches of government towards the same goal of 
Reagan‘s vision of ‗Peace through Strength‘.   
 
National Security Decision Directive 12  
Eight months of strategic review by the Departments of Defense, State and the National Security 
Council resulted in a policy directive signed by Reagan that set the course for where America‘s 
arms buildup needed to go. 
 National Security Decision Directive 12 (NSDD-12)
112
 came into effect on 1 October 
1981 and outlined the critical areas of defense that required the ‗long term development of‘ 
America‘s ‗strategic forces‘. It further aimed to ‗help redress the deteriorated strategic balance 
with the Soviet Union.‘ Using classic ‗Peace through Strength‘ language, the document justified 
the expenditures as necessary to achieve deterrence; a deterrence that could in the end 
accomplish what no other administration before it had—actual nuclear arms reductions. It stated: 
The result will be a deterrent that is far more secure and stable than our present 
nuclear forces. The program will also give us a force that is more resilient to 
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Soviet attempts to negate our progress. This should, in turn, create better 
incentives for the Soviets to negotiate genuine arms reductions. 
 
To ‗build up in order to build down‘ was the stated aim of the nuclear program. But the 
document also called for a conventional arms buildup: 
It is important to bear in mind that in addition to the strategic forces 
modernization decided herein, we will also be devoting even greater resources to 
improving, modernizing and strengthening our conventional forces, and to 
research and development, as well as to improving the readiness of our existing 
forces. 
 
The document went on to outline five ‗mutually reinforcing parts‘ of the modernization program: 
 
1) ‘Making our strategic communications and command systems more survivable, so that we 
can communicate over survivable networks with our nuclear forces, even after an attack.’  
-Surprisingly this was deemed to be ‗the highest priority element in the program‘ as Reagan 
officials had discovered to their alarm that a single surprise attack by the Soviets could take 
out their entire communications system, thus bringing America‘s military to its knees in one 
foul blow. There was no use having the best weapons systems and the strongest army in the 
world if the President of the United States could not communicate with his generals and 
direct a response. The next point of the NSC document dealt with the air force: 
 
2) Bomber Force: ‘A modernized bomber force will be built and deployed, consisting of B-1s 
and Advanced Technology Bombers that could penetrate present and future Soviet air 
defense.‘  
-The B-1 Bomber cancelled by Carter and championed by Reagan was now ‗back from the 
dead‘. The document estimated that these planes would not be operational till 1986, and 
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therefore called for ‗air-launched cruise missiles  
(ALCMs)‘ to ‗be deployed, beginning in 1982, on the most modern of our present B-52 force. 
From airpower, to submarines: 
 
3) ‘Increasing the accuracy and payload of our submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBM)’  
-With the USSR having more land based intercontinental ballistic missiles than the US, and 
with the continual problems surrounding the basing of America‘s latest nuclear missile the 
MX, a reliance on submarine nuclear capability was a must.
113
 From offense, to defense: 
 
4) ‘Strategic Defense’:  
-What would later be known as the ‗Strategic Defense Initiative‘ was first mentioned here as 
part of a ‗vigorous research and development program‘ that looked to create ‗air and space 
defenses‘. In addition to this, Civil Defenses were proposed: the ability for society to 
continue in the wake of a nuclear attack. Citizen Reagan had criticized Carter for his failure 
to plan for a nuclear strike, now America was about to do just that. 
 
5) ‘Land Based Missile Deployment’:  
-To counter the Soviet nuclear threat, the Reagan Administration would push ahead with the 
MX missile. NSDD-12 called for enough units to be produced to ‗support 100 operational 
missiles‘. The document rejected Carter‘s ‗Multiple Protective Shelter basing‘ while calling 
for research and development of two other basing options: ‗airmobile basing and deep 
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In signing this document, Reagan was embarking on a long and sometimes vicious battle with 
the Congress over funding. His critics would paint him as a warmonger, but Reagan believed as 
the document stated: that his arms buildup would achieve peace via deterrence and could pave 
the way for actual arms reductions. As Reagan recounted in his memoirs: 
The journey leading to arms reduction wasn‘t going to be short or easy. And I 
knew it had to begin with an increase of arms…I had given final approval to 
blueprints for a multibillion-dollar modernization of our strategic forces. In order 
to assure that we would regain and sustain in military superiority over the Soviet 
Union, which for a decade had been moving forward with the largest and costliest 
military buildup in the history of man, we had decided to build one hundred B-1B 
bombers to replace our deteriorating fleet of B-52 bombers (the B-1s development 
had been canceled by the Carter administration); to build one hundred new 
intercontinental-range missiles, the MX Peacekeeper; to deploy new Trident 
nuclear submarines and develop a new missile to be launched from them; to 
develop the Stealth bomber, which was capable of penetrating Soviet defense 
radars; and to construct a wide array of new surface ships, fighter aircraft and 




Reagan recalled that his critics charged that it was ‗contradictory‘ and ‗hypocritical‘ of him to 
claim to be seeking ‗nuclear peace by building more nuclear weapons‘. But again it came back to 
Reagan‘s belief that ‗peace‘ came from ‗strength‘, and at the bargaining table it was always best 
to negotiate from a position of strength, not weaknesses.  ‗If you were going to approach the 





The MX ‘Peacekeeper Missile’ 
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A major component of Reagan‘s attempt to offset Soviet military advantage was his 
championing of the MX missile. This inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) had been in 
development since 1972 and had received the abbreviated title ‗MX‘ from ‗Missile-
eXperimental‘. To emphasize its deterrent factor and help neutralize opposition to the project, 
Reagan re-named the 10-warhead missile the ‗MX Peacekeeper‘. The vulnerability of 
American‘s ICBMs to a surprise Soviet attack made the MX an indispensable necessity if 
America were to convince the Soviets that they operated from a position of strength. 
Unfortunately for Reagan, Congress proved to be as unwilling to fund the missile as it had been 
under Carter, and it all had to do with the fact that the proposed mode of deployment kept the 
‗window of vulnerability‘ wide open. 
 If the MX ‗Peacekeeper‘ missile were to close a ‗window of vulnerability‘, then Reagan 
needed to find a deployment method that would be acceptable to the United States Congress. In 
1976 the House of Representatives had blocked the deployment of President Ford‘s silo-based 
proposal, arguing that the missiles were worthless if the Soviets knew of their exact location and 
could destroy them in a single strike. In 1979 President Carter again asked for Congressional 
approval of the MX, this time addressing the vulnerability question by proposing a system of 
underground silos linked by rail. Like a shell game, the Soviets would not know which silos had 
missiles in them and which ones did not. Critics pointed out that all the Soviet had to do to 
overcome this would be to bomb all of the silos. With this option politically dead, Reagan 
proposed a ‗dense pack‘ solution: hardened silos that could withstand a nuclear attack, and 
spaced only 1800 feet apart. In theory, ‗dense packing‘ would create a fratricide effect if 
bombed: after initial Soviet ICBM explosions, further incoming missiles would be destroyed by 
the lingering blast effect. The super-hardened silos would survive the attack, and thus allow the 
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US to respond. Again, the critics said that this too could be overcome by Soviet modifications to 
their weapons, and Reagan was left without a critical component to his nuclear re-armament 
program.  
Despite Reagan‘s many phone calls to Congressional leaders and his appeal to the public 
for support, the White House and the Congress had become completely deadlocked on the MX 
missile by 1982. Consequently, Reagan turned to a man that he knew had the intelligence and 
respect of those in power to show him a path to MX deployment: Brent Scowcroft. 
 Dr. Scowcroft, who would later serve as President George H.W Bush‘s National Security 
Advisor, was appointed by President Reagan on 3 January 1983 to head up a ‗Blue Ribbon 
Commission‘ to investigate and then advise the President and Congress on how best to achieve 
nuclear deterrent capability against the Soviets. Called the ‗Commission on Strategic Forces‘116 
it served as a ‗go between‘ for both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue and deliberately set out to 
create a political compromise that would be satisfactory to everyone over the long haul.
117
  
Scowcroft worked closely with NSC advisor Robert McFarlane and a host of congressional 
leaders including Senator Sam Nunn (Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee), 
Senator Henry ‗Scoop‘ Jackson and Representatives Les Aspin  and R. James Woolsey of the 
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House Armed Services Committee.
118
 A compromise was reached by this bi-partisan group 
within three months and they made three major recommendations: 
1) a hardened silo deployment was recommended for the MX; 
2) development of a small, mobile single warhead ICBM would solve the vulnerability 
question; and 




As the negotiated conclusions went to the House and Senate for a vote, Reagan worried about the 
outcome, as this November 1982 diary entry indicates: ‗During the day I sandwiched in meetings 
with Lyn N[ofziger] and another with John Tower re the MX. No doubt we‘re going to have 
trouble—the Dems will try to cancel the whole system. It will take a full court press to get it. If 
we don‘t, I shudder to think what it will do to our arms reduction negotiations in Geneva‘.120  
Reagan did push hard to get support for the MX missile, and linked it to his concept of ‗Peace 
through Strength‘. In a radio address to the nation on 21 May 1983 Reagan said: 
To prevent nuclear war, we must have the capability to deter nuclear war. This 
means we must keep our strategic forces strong enough to balance those of the 
Soviet Union…By building the MX Peacekeeper and small, single warhead 
missiles, we will not only preserve our ability to protect the peace, we will also 
demonstrate that any Soviet quest for nuclear superiority will not work, that it is 
in everyone‘s interest to end the arms race and agree to mutual arms reductions.121 
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 On 24 May 1983, the House of Representatives passed the MX missile program, and the 
following day the Senate followed suit. Reagan hailed it as ‗an important signal to the world: 
Americans are uniting in a common search to protect our security, reduce the level of nuclear 
weapons and strengthen the peace.‘122 The MX missile helped create stronger deterrence for the 
United States, but in Europe the nuclear imbalance between East and West was creating a crisis 
within NATO, and this too required strong leadership from President Reagan. 
 
INF 
If peace comes through strength, then there is a need to match the strength of the enemy if a 
nation is to achieve equilibrium. In the late 1970s the nuclear equilibrium of Europe, which had 
maintained the peace for three decades, was destroyed as the Soviets achieved a decided nuclear 
superiority. The imbalance of the nuclear forces in Europe thus created a crisis within the NATO 
alliance—a feeling of inferiority heightened a sense of vulnerability which would either lead to 
individual European nations cutting a deal with the Soviets, or a united front led by the United 
States to counter the Soviet threat with an increase of nuclear forces to restore a sense of parity. 
 The challenge to the West began in 1977 as the Soviet Union began replacing its 
intermediate range nuclear arsenal with the advanced ‗SS-20‘ nuclear weapon. The SS-20 had 
several elements that caused alarm within NATO: it had great range, with the ability to strike 
every European capital; it was fast, and could wipe out a European city within four minutes of its 
launch; it was mobile, meaning it had far greater survivability than a silo based missile; and it 
was superior to the weapons it replaced, with three independently targeted warheads.
123
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NATO alliance therefore decided in December 1979 that it had no choice but to enter into a 
period of negotiation with the USSR that would either lead to an agreement that placed ceilings 
on INF weapons, or in the event that no settlement could be reached, American deployment of 
Intermediate-Range-Nuclear forces to counter the Soviet threat. 
Reagan inherited this ‗dual track‘ approach to the SS-20 crisis and his administration 
threw the Soviets a ‗curve ball‘: the so called, ‗Zero-Option‘. This proposal, devised by Pentagon 
official Richard Perle, was a public relations triumph: President Reagan proposed in November 
1981 that NATO would deploy no INF missiles if the Soviets were to dismantle theirs. It was a 
fundamental break with the Carter Administration‘s position that some deployment would be 
necessary.
124
 This controversial negotiating offer received Reagan‘s personal imprimatur because 
it mirrored his nuclear abolitionist views and seemed to him to be a good diplomatic tactic.  
 The Administration‘s ‗Zero-Option‘ is an example of Reagan making a strong, clear cut 
executive decision and instructing how negotiations were to proceed. The arms control experts in 
the State Department thought that the concept was redundant: there was no way that the Soviets 
would trade their weapons for ‗air‘ and to even propose it was to invite ridicule. Reagan on the 
other hand did not agree with this opinion: the ultimate aim of his ‗Peace through Strength‘ 
program was get to a position where the Soviets would begin negotiating true nuclear arms 
reductions. In unveiling the ‗Zero-Option‘, Reagan was telling the world that America‘s 
intentions were peaceful—that its entire nuclear program was aimed at deterring war. Therefore, 
if the Soviets‘ unilaterally removed their weapons, there would be no need for America to deploy 
theirs. Secretary of State Alexander Haig strongly disagreed.    
Firstly, Haig did not like a diplomatic position originating from Weinberger‘s 
                                                     
124
  Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (New 
York: Alfred A Knopf, 1984),pp.72-3, 39, 58. 
71 
 
Department of Defense, and secondly he felt that it gave him no room to bargain with the 
Russians and proposed instead a ‗Zero-Plus Option‘, which would incorporate America‘s aim for 
zero weapons, but would enable him to negotiate a ceiling on INF weapons.
125
 And perhaps 
thirdly, Haig thought that he knew better than the President.
126
  Reagan later recalled, ‗It was one 
of many instances I faced as President when my policy of encouraging cabinet members to speak 
frankly and to fight for their points of view put me in the middle‘. The decision was the 
President‘s alone to make, and he gave his reasoning for the decision in his memoirs: 
Al‘s idea of leading with a flexible proposal had merit, but I‘d learned as a union 
negotiator that it‘s never smart to show your hole card in advance. If we first 
announced that our goal was the total elimination of intermediate-range nuclear 
weapons from Europe and then hinted we might be willing to leave a few, we‘d 
be tipping off the bottom line of our negotiating position before negotiations even 
began.  
I thought our goal should be the total elimination of all INF weapons from 
Europe, and stating this before the world would be a vivid gesture demonstrating 
to the Soviets, our allies, the people storming the streets of West Germany, and 




Reagan was as determined to pursue the Zero-Option as he was to see through deployment of 
INF weapons if his proposal was rejected by the Soviets. Considering the leadership in the 
Kremlin at the time, Reagan had no choice but to deploy, but to do so required all of his 
leadership abilities, to make sure that the NATO alliance held firm. 
 The successful deployment of American INF weapons in 1983 was due largely to 
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Reagan‘s ability to persuade European leaders to ignore massive protests and stand firm with the 
United States. Reagan began his personal offensive in earnest at the Williamsburg G-7 Summit 
in May 1983. Unlike the meetings that had preceded it, Reagan wanted his chairmanship of the 
summit to be different, and he therefore laid down some new ground rules. Firstly, there would 
be no pre-negotiated communiqué. In the past, diplomats representing the nations had met 
months in advance, written out a joint communiqué that could be agreed upon and left the circled 
sections that could not be resolved up to the leaders. Thus, the G-7 leaders were held hostage to 
lower level bureaucrats. Reagan wanted any communiqué to represent what was actually 
discussed during the meeting. Secondly, the President directed that as much time as possible 
would be spent by the leaders interacting among themselves, without foreign ministers. 
Accordingly, the heads of state sat around a circular table and discussed matters among 
themselves, with translators out of view. What came out of this format chaired by Reagan was a 
clear and unmistakable declaration of support for INF deployment. The joint communiqué read: 
Our nations express the strong wish that a balanced INF agreement be reached 
shortly. Should this occur, the negotiations will determine the level of 
deployment. It is well known that should this not occur, the countries concerned 
will proceed with the planned deployment of the US systems in Europe at the end 
of 1983…The security of our countries is indivisible and must be approached on a 
global basis. Attempts to avoid serious negotiation by seeking to influence public 
opinion in our countries will fail.
128
       
 
According to Shultz, Reagan‘s leadership during this period was ‗critical‘129 in getting a united 
NATO commitment to deploy.  
Despite dire predictions that deployment would cause a nuclear confrontation, Reagan 
gave the order to begin deployment of INF weapons on schedule beginning on 23 November 
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1983. The Soviets responded by walking out of the Geneva arms talks. While Superpower 
relations seemed to have reached a new low, Reagan believed that the united resolve shown by 
the NATO alliance was the greatest indicator that they would not be bullied, that strength would 
be matched by strength and that in this way deterrence and peace would be achieved. Though no-
one could see it at the time, the INF deployment would later prove to be a decisive turning point 
towards the ending of the Cold War.  
In addition to nuclear modernization and deployment, Reagan‘s ‗Peace through Strength‘ 
program included enhancing the triad of American military: Army, Navy and Air force. The 
most pressing of these three was the Navy, which was considered to be in a situation of extreme 
neglect. 
 
The Reagan Maritime Strategy 
President Reagan and his Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger were in complete agreement 
about the dilapidated state of American Naval power at the beginning of the 1980s. As Reagan 
recounted in his memoirs: 
Militarily, our nation was seriously in danger of falling behind the Soviet Union at 
a time a former naval officer was holding the watch as Commander-in-Chief. The 
Soviets were modernizing their fleet and their ground and air forces on a massive 
scale. Yet on any given day, I was told as many as half the ships in our navy 
couldn‘t leave port because of a lack of spare parts or crew.130  
 
Caspar Weinberger concurred: 
The condition of the Navy we inherited clearly required substantial increases in 
both the number of ships and their capabilities. The appropriations we needed, of 
course, were the result of ten years of neglect, during which we had not kept pace 
with the rapidly growing Soviet Navy, nor even with the normal maintenance, 
overhaul and repairs of the ships we did have. We would, if our proposals were 
approved, be well embarked on the goal of achieving the 600 ship Navy that our 
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The goal of 600 ships was an ambitious attempt to regain the former prestige of American Naval 
power which had declined from 689 vessels in 1961 to just 455 ships in 1981. In addition to this, 
Weinberger estimated that with the need for a global presence of the Navy, America would 
require 15 aircraft carrier task forces, as opposed to the 12 in existence.
132
 
 The shipbuilding began in earnest and with it a massive budget expenditure. Between 1980 
and 1985, the Navy‘s budget rose from 63 per cent in real dollars, more than the entire Pentagon 
budget, which increased 53.6 per cent during the same period.
133
 Many critics questioned the 
need for these massive expenditures,
134
 but Reagan‘s naval buildup received support from 
Congress due to what was to become known as the ‗Reagan Maritime Strategy‘. 
             Authored by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman Jr. and Chief of Naval Operations 
Admiral James Watkins, the ‗Reagan Maritime Strategy‘ gave Congress a reason to fund Naval 
expenditures other than the President‘s blanket call for deterrence through strength. The strategy 
that was sold to the Congress featured three rationales for Reagan‘s strengthened Navy in the 
event that America and the USSR went to war. Firstly, Lehman argued that in the early stages of 
combat, the US Navy could strike Soviet naval vessels before they had a chance to begin battle. 
Secondly, the Navy would attack the USSR in the Far East, in an attempt to move their forces 
from the likely scene of battle (Europe or the Middle East) and thus weaken their huge 
conventional force superiority. And finally, the Navy would destroy the Soviet‘s ballistic missile 
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submarines, making American survival of a nuclear war far more likely. Accurate war games 
demonstrating this theory in 1982 were conducted at the edge of Soviet territory in the Sea of 
Japan, the Kurile Islands in the northwest Pacific and in the Norwegian Sea. These successful 
operations garnered the support the Navy sought from Congress, and its budget increased 
dramatically, peaking at $99 billion in 1985.
135
 
 By the time Reagan left office, he had accomplished what he had promised: the United 
States Navy was again second to none. The Soviets feared the renewed presence of American 
naval ships constantly circling the globe, and Reagan‘s goal of a 600 ship Navy was almost 
achieved, falling short only by 9.
136
  New technologies and a new strategy also helped fund 
Reagan‘s Air Force modernization program.  
 
Air Force: New Technology and Strategy 
The Reagan years can also be credited for creating the modern American Air-Force as it is now 
known, both in terms of new technology, and a change in military strategy that has been 
employed by the US in all major military engagements since. Candidate Reagan had been quick 
to criticize Jimmy Carter‘s Pentagon for failing to adequately fund the military programs that 
would propel America towards a new dawn of aerial warfare. Once in office, Reagan reversed 
many of the Carter decisions and gave the green light for the cancelled programs to go ahead, 
and in many aspects the Air Force that America now has, was created during the Reagan 
Presidency. 
 In terms of new technology, the Reagan Administration advanced aerial warfare by the 
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introduction of ‗smart‘ bombing and weapons. The ageing B-52 bombers were given new life by 
equipping them with laser guided bombs and air-launched cruise missiles which permitted the 
US to strike targets in a highly accurate manner without exposing the planes to great danger, as 
the attacks could be carried out from a considerable distance.
137
 When air-strikes were carried 
out in close range, the ability to bomb and escape unnoticed took a quantum leap with the 
introduction of the ‗Stealth Bomber‘, an airplane which has the ability to go unnoticed by an 
enemy‘s radar. 138 These new technologies lent themselves to a ‗revolution in military strategy‘ 
that has been employed up to present times. 
 The ‗Vietnam Syndrome‘ saw American military leaders loathe to place ‗boots on the 
ground‘ and thereby risk the possibility of high causalities and the criticism and low morale 
engendered by this.
139
  Consequently, during the 1980‘s the military brass devised a new method 
for future warfare that sought to accomplish its war aims without the accompanying American 
death toll. The new military doctrine thus adopted, called ‗AirLand Battle‘ placed a heavy 
emphasis on the use of the Air Force to carry out initial bombardments designed to take out an 
enemy‘s ability to wage war.140 The aerial bombings could then pave the way for a more 
effective land invasion by the army, or if successful enough, remove the necessity for a manned 
invasion at all. Reagan employed the Air Force to bomb Libya in 1986 in retaliation for its 
support for terrorist activities, most notably the bombing of the LaBelle nightclub in West 
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Germany that was popular with US servicemen. This action was considered a sufficient 
response, without the need to use the army. Following Reagan‘s presidency, the ‗AirLand Battle‘ 
doctrine was employed with great success in the Gulf War of 1991 and the Kosovo military 
action of 1999 demonstrated that a war could be won with total reliance on air power. Despite its 
limited effectiveness in fighting insurgent guerilla forces, the wars of Afghanistan (2001) and 
Iraq (2003) each saw the Air Force used in a ‗shock and awe‘ opening salvo of targeted 
bombings. Thus, the Reagan presidency can be credited for the creation of a new military 
strategy that is still being employed over twenty years after its inception. Though Reagan cannot 
claim authorship personally for originating this new doctrine, his championing of a technological 
advancement in the Air Force brought this about. 
 But having the best military in the world does not make a nation appear strong if its 
leader is personally weak or indecisive. Thus, the Soviets watched closely when Reagan did 
order military strikes, and this was no more so than his 1983 decision to invade Grenada. 
Examined next will be Reagan‘s role as Commander-in-Chief during the Grenada invasion, and 
how his actions were perceived around the globe. 
 
Commander- In-Chief: the Grenada Invasion, a Case-study  
While this thesis argues that the ‗Reagan Doctrine‘ encompasses the whole spectrum of US 
Soviet policy in the 1980s, the term has been traditionally applied to Reagan‘s support of anti-
communist guerilla forces and his own military adventures as Commander-in-Chief. This 
emphasis on military action, demonstrates the belief that while projection of force is important, it 
is the actual use of force that leads to real battlefield results and above all else gives pause to 
one‘s enemies. While it is true that Reagan‘s use of the military in the theatre of battle was 
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limited generally to ‗coercive diplomacy‘,141 the times in which he did use it had enormous 
ramifications internationally and did enhance the idea of ‗Peace through Strength‘, as Reagan 
demonstrated his willingness to act decisively, unilaterally and overwhelmingly to further his 
goal of overturning ‗communist aggression‘.  
 As President, there is no duty more awesome or burdensome as that of Commander-in-
Chief. To give the order to send men and women into harm‘s way, knowing that they could well 
die, was according to Reagan, the toughest part of the job;
142
 but how a President acts during a 
crisis, especially if they do order a military strike, will greatly enhance or diminish the perceived 
strength of the nation. Presidential weakness can invite aggression, as evidenced by the Soviet 
decision to send nuclear weapons to Cuba following Kennedy‘s poor judgment during the 
botched Bay of Pigs invasion and his weak performance at the Vienna Summit.
143
 Similarly, a 
strong performance can strengthen deterrence, and Reagan‘s leadership during the Grenada crisis 
showed the leaders in the Kremlin that the President could be very strong indeed, perhaps 
deterring Soviet aggression elsewhere.  
 The crisis began on Wednesday, 19 October 1983, when President Reagan received word 
that the Caribbean nation of Grenada was in deep trouble: leftist leader Maurice Bishop had been 
murdered by his deputy Bernard Coard and General Austin had declared a state of martial law. 
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Of immediate concern to Reagan was the fate of some six-hundred American medical students 
living on the island as they were all potential hostages. The White House swung into action, and 
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North suggested on 20 October that a Beirut-bound ship of Marines be 
diverted to the vicinity of Grenada. Over the objections of the Joint-Chiefs-of Staff, Reagan 
agreed with North and ordered the USS Independence to stay close at hand and await the 
President‘s orders.144 So as not to create the impression that a military strike was imminent, 
Reagan went ahead with his schedule and flew Friday evening to Georgia for a weekend of golf.  
 Staying at the Eisenhower Cottage at the Augusta Country club, Reagan was awakened 
Saturday morning, 22 October, at around 3am by National Security Adviser Bud McFarlane. 
Emerging from his bedroom in robe and pajamas, the President was informed by McFarlane, 
who was joined by Secretary Shultz, that six East Caribbean states had formally requested 
American assistance to overthrow the government of Grenada, which they considered to be a 
puppet of Cuba and a potential threat to their own nations. Reagan had up to this point been 
presented with two possible military responses: one, a simple ‗non combatant evacuation 
operation‘ (NEO) to rescue the Americans studying at ‗St. George‘s University School of 
Medicine‘; or two, a full scale invasion. In an interview with the author, Shultz was asked why 
Reagan ultimately settled on the second option. His reply, in essence, was that only a fully 
fledged military invasion toppling the junta could ensure the safety of the students.
145
 However, 
at the time there were many around the President arguing that the US could stage a commando 
style raid and rescue the American citizens without having to overthrow the regime. Indeed, it 
appears that there was a lot more to the Grenada invasion than a mere ‗rescue mission‘ as the 
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Reagan White House sought to spin it.
146
  
 For Reagan the bigger issue at play was the allegation that Cuba was building a 10,000 
foot runway which had all the appearance of preparations to use Grenada as a base from which to 
export communism to the other Caribbean nations. Instead of seeking to ‗contain‘ Grenada‘s 
potential ambitions for conquest, Reagan would do what no President had done before in the 
history of the Cold War: he would ‗roll back‘ a communist government, overturning for the first 
time the so called ‗Brezhnev Doctrine‘ which held that ‗once a nation is part of the communist 
world, it will always be part of the communist world‘. Reagan‘s decision to give the go ahead 
could also be seen as an invocation of the ‗Monroe Doctrine‘, which stipulated that North 
America and its surrounds were ‗off limits‘ for European expansion, for if Cuba were behind 
events in Grenada, that meant that the USSR was also involved. Furthermore, Reagan felt that 
since America had been asked by Grenada‘s neighbors in the Caribbean to respond, failure to do 
so would weaken America‘s alliances throughout the world. As Reagan told his National 
Security Adviser:  
The real issue here is that we have four countries—the East Caribbean states—
asking us to help. And if we get that request and say no, what signal does that send 
to NATO, to London, Bonn, Tokyo and industrial nations who are relying on us? 
When somebody asks for help where there is such blatant provocation, we can‘t say 




As soon as Reagan was given this pre-text for invasion—the invitation from the Caribbean 
nations—Reagan gave the order for the military action, saying simply, ‗Let‘s do it‘. As Reagan 
recounted in his diary: ‗I OK‘d an outright invasion in response to a request by 6 other Caribbean 
nations including Jamaica & Barbados. They will all supply some forces so it will be a multi-
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national invasion.‘148 Shultz and McFarlane admired Reagan‘s absolute decisiveness in giving 
the go-ahead for the invasion and the seriousness with which he approached his responsibilities. 
‗Is there anything else I ought to know that I haven‘t thought about?‘ he asked.149 When it was 
discussed if they should return immediately to Washington, Reagan said no, as it would ‗give 
away the story‘. Instead he asked Shultz to join him on the pre-scheduled golfing game the 
following day, delegating the planning of the invasion to Vice President George Bush and his 
‗Special Situations Group‘ back at the White House. 
 The next twenty-four hours would see the lowest point in the Reagan presidency, as the 
Commander-in-Chief was buffeted by a surreal day that ended in unspeakable horror. That 
Saturday morning Reagan spoke with Bush‘s group over the telephone, vetoing suggestions that 
the operation be limited to rescuing the students. ‗Well, if we‘ve got to go there, we might as 
well do all that needs to be done,‘ the President said before leaving for his round of golf. The 
game looked normal enough with no hint of what was being planned for Grenada, when a 
presage of what lay ahead occurred when a crazed gunman crashed through the course gate in a 
pickup truck, before taking five people hostage in the pro-shop. The President and Shultz were at 
the sixteenth hole when an armored car suddenly appeared and the Secret Service whisked them 
away to a secure location. Hostage negotiators tried in vain to reason with the gunman, who 
demanded to speak with the President. Reagan got on the phone, only to be hung up on several 
times. One by one the hostages managed to escape, and two hours later the gunman was seized.  
 Reagan went back to his cottage and after dinner, to bed. But once more, it was not to be 
a good night‘s sleep: the President was awoken again by his National Security Adviser at 2:27am 
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Sunday morning, this time to be informed that a suicide bomber had driven past security 
checkpoints at Beirut International Airport and detonated himself where American soldiers were 
stationed. Reagan was told that at least a hundred were dead, with hundreds still unaccounted for. 
McFarlane thought that Reagan looked every one of his seventy-three years when he tried to 
comprehend the carnage, asking ‗How could this happen?‘150 The final death toll numbered 241 
US servicemen, with hundreds more injured. Reagan decided that it was time to return to 
Washington, and at 6:30am Air Force One took the deeply dejected President back home. 
 Despite the sobering news of the hundreds of Americans killed in an ill-fated 
‗peacekeeping‘ mission in Lebanon that Reagan had approved over the objections of his 
Secretary of State and Defense, the President determined that despite only a few days of 
planning, the invasion of Grenada would go ahead. Arriving back in Washington, Reagan 
composed himself and had a full day of meetings regarding the Beirut bombing and the Grenada 
invasion. Those who were present for the meeting saw that Reagan was ‗controlled, but furious‘. 
When some present argued for a delay of the invasion in light of the terrorist attack in Beirut, 
Reagan snapped, ‗If this was right yesterday, its right today, and we shouldn‘t let the act of a 
couple of terrorists dissuade us from going ahead‘.151 Another objection by Secretary of Defense 
Weinberger that the military action was being ‗rushed‘ was also brushed aside by the President. 
Leaving a meeting with the Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff, Reagan asked General John Vessey how many 
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troops were planned for the invasion. When he was told the number he said: ‗Double it‘. When 
asked why, he replied: ‗Because if Jimmy Carter had used 18 helicopters for Desert One instead 
of nine, you‘d be briefing him now instead of me‘.152  
 The National Security Directive authorizing the military action was brought to the 
President to sign. Taking a pen from his pocket, Reagan signed the papers quickly and said one 
word: ‗Go‘.153  American forces were thus authorized to begin to move into position for an 
invasion within the next forty-eight hours. If Sunday saw Reagan steering his government and 
military to get behind the invasion, Monday saw Reagan ignore the protests of the Congressional 
leadership and NATO allies to forge ahead. 
 Once Reagan had set in motion the American overthrow of Grenada‘s government, fierce 
protests from Congress and allies like Margaret Thatcher did not budge him an inch. Reagan‘s 
meeting with the leaders of the Congress and Senate did not go down too well: Reagan was 
hardly consulting with them, as the Constitution insisted, as he was informing them of a military 
decision that he had already made and one that would proceed regardless of how they felt about 
it. Speaker of the House Tip O‘Neil said: ‗You are informing us, not asking us‘.154 It was on 
purpose. As Reagan later recounted in his memoirs, he had deliberately kept the Congress in the 
dark for fear that involving them in the process would lead to leaks to the press and along with it, 
‗the prediction that Grenada was going to become another ―Vietnam‖‘.155 ―We didn‘t ask 
anyone‘s permission,‘ Reagan said, ‗we just did it‘. The meeting was interrupted by a call from 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who at 8:10 pm rang and ‗screamed‘ at the President 
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to halt the invasion immediately, as Grenada was a member of the British Commonwealth and 
therefore not America‘s responsibility. Holding the phone a few inches from his ear as Thatcher 
continued with her tirade,
156
 the President ended the call by informing her that ‗We are already at 
zero‘, but not telling her that operations had already begun. If Reagan was troubled by 
Thatcher‘s call, he did not show it: returning to the meeting he spoke with enormous confidence 
about the planned invasion, and predicted that just as American soldiers had departed the re-
liberated Philippines in 1946 to hundreds of thousands of islanders throwing garlands of flowers 
at them, so too the Grenadian people would react in a similar fashion.
157
 It turns out that 
Reagan‘s optimism was to be justified. 
 The invasion of Grenada achieved its objectives: the communist government was 
overthrown, and all US citizens on the island were rescued and returned safely to America. The 
success of the American invasion of Grenada also sent a powerful message to the Soviet Union: 
that Ronald Reagan was a resolute leader who was willing to act independently of his NATO 
allies to restore democracy and check communist aggression. As Andrew Busch notes:  
The invasion of Grenada represented the first time that a Communist country 
was liberated by U.S. troops and the first major use of force by the U.S. since 
Vietnam. The strategic and psychological balance in the Caribbean was altered 
favorably, and for the first time in recent memory, it was more dangerous to be 
America's enemy than her friend.
158  
 
International ramifications aside, domestically what was most important was the footage of the 
American medical students kissing the airport tarmac upon arrival on US soil. These images 
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made Reagan hugely popular with the public, and Congressional and media analysts, who had 
been sharply critical of the invasion, soon changed their tune. While Weinberger had been right 
about the lack of proper planning for the invasion—nine-teen American servicemen died during 
the two day assault, some drowning due to poor strategy—Reagan took the view that his actions 
had been both necessary and defensible. For in addition to saving the students, hundreds of 
Cuban military advisers and Soviet weaponry were found, which led credence to the idea that 
Grenada was in fact going to be used as a base to export communism to the region.
159
 While 
some thought that a Superpower invading a tiny Caribbean island was akin to a human swatting a 
fly, the ‗act of piracy‘ as the Soviets called it, along with Reagan‘s support for ‗contras‘ in the 
Americas helped make ‗Peace through Strength‘ more credible, for it demonstrated the fact that 





Reagan’s Role: Conclusions 
In assessing Reagan‘s leadership as Commander-in-Chief throughout the 1980s, one must credit 
him for achieving his goal of ‗Peace through Strength‘, by empowering his subordinates and 
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intervening at key points, but his overall ‗hands off‘ approach led to wasteful expenditures.  
 Reagan‘s greatest decision regarding defense policy was to select Caspar Weinberger as 
his Secretary of Defense. In doing so, Reagan was assured that he had his own man at the 
Pentagon. But who was the stronger partner, Reagan or Weinberger? Richard Perle, who worked 
closely with Weinberger, said of the Defense Secretary: 
He was very important not in shaping the ideology, the ideas, the framework—
that  was Reagan, though it was shared by Weinberger—but Weinberger was the 
implementer; he was the person who was tasked with restoring American 
defenses and restoring them in a way that recognized that for some years prior to 
Reagan, American defenses had been allowed to deteriorate… And it was 





Weinberger did fix it, but at the cost of plunging the American government into massive deficits. 
The man who had been dubbed ‗Cap the Knife‘ as Nixon‘s budget director, cared little about the 
costs of the military programs he brought to the President for approval. While the ‗ideology and 
framework‘ came from the President downwards, it was a ‗bottom up‘ process when it came to 
the procurement of defense contracts.   
 According to a former Pentagon insider, whatever the Generals wanted, they got: 
Weinberger never vetoed anything, and argued that everything was ‗essential‘ to America‘s 
national security.
162
 Weinberger was also infamously stubborn, and with Reagan‘s budget 
director David Stockman pushing for cuts, Reagan was in the awkward position of having to 
arbitrate between the two. At one time Stockman wanted a defense budget cut of $23 billion 
dollars, while Weinberger would only agree to $8 billion.  At a meeting between the two and the 
President, Stockman said he could live with a $15 billion dollar cut, with Weinberger saying that 
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an $11 billion cut was as far as he would go. Taking out a notepad and doing some arithmetic, 
Reagan could see that there was a four billion difference between the two men. Meeting them 
halfway, Reagan proposed a cut of $13 billion dollars.
163
 Problem solved, Reagan returned to 
reading his mail. Contrasted with Carter who read the Defense Budget line-by-line to scour any 
waste, Reagan‘s hands off/compromise approach is open to much criticism. Yet despite this, 
Reagan achieved his objectives. 
  Ultimately, Reagan was successful in his goal of ‗military modernization‘, and while 
most of the defense programs and strategies came from others, Reagan‘s intervention was pivotal 
at times.  On the MX basing problem, Reagan, a man who knew the value of negotiations from 
his days as President of the Screen Actors Guild, approved the formation of the Scowcroft 
Commission: a bi-partisan undertaking that finally solved the problem of weapons basing. In 
response to the Soviet SS-20 missiles, Reagan approved Richard Perle‘s INF ‗Zero-Option‘ over 
the objections of his Secretary of State, Alexander Haig. This gave him the political cover to 
proceed with deployments, and became the basis for the 1987 INF Treaty that did in fact reduce 
these weapons to zero. With the Navy, Reagan‘s figure of a 600 ship fleet was a target that was 
worked towards and almost accomplished, with some assistance by the ‗Reagan Maritime 
Strategy‘ which helped sell the budget to Congress. With the Air force, the programs cancelled 
by Carter like the B-1 Bomber proceeded, as candidate Reagan had promised they would along 
with a new ‗AirLand‘ strategy authored by others. And finally, as Commander-in-Chief, Reagan 
demonstrated that he was willing to decisively use force whenever necessary, whether to check 
terrorist activities in Libya, or overthrow a communist threat in Grenada. The details generally 
came from others, but the leadership came from the President who displayed that he was resolute 
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under pressure.    
 Thus it can be concluded that Reagan as Commander-in-Chief set the overall tone and 
goals of the military modernization program of the 1980s, was willing to make strong executive 
decisions when required, but generally left the weapons procurement and the details to others. 
‗Peace through Strength‘ was achieved in that America‘s nuclear and conventional capabilities 
took a quantum leap from what Reagan inherited from Carter to what he bequeathed to Bush. 
Reagan‘s weakness was his inability to rein in spending, but with a Secretary of Defense like 
Weinberger who insisted that every cent was ‗essential‘ for national security, cutting costs would 
have been a difficult task indeed. After all, Weinberger was so committed to implementing 
‗Peace through Strength‘, that the motto is now the epitaph inscribed on his tombstone.164 Still, 
the ‗buck stops‘ with the President, and therefore Reagan deserves both credit for restoring 
America‘s defense capabilities and strengthening deterrence, but also criticism for massive 
deficits which weakened America‘s economic position. For while Reagan quipped that the 
deficit was ‗big enough to take care of itself‘,165 it would be his successors Presidents George 
H.W Bush and William Jefferson Clinton that had to pay down that debt.    
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REAGAN THE IDEOLOGUE 
 
“The guiding hand of Providence did not create this new nation for America alone, but for a 
higher cause: the preservation and extension of the sacred fire of human liberty. This is 





As President, Ronald Reagan articulated his foreign policy agenda in sweeping ideological 
terms, more so than any other occupant of his office during the Cold War period. This chapter 
seeks to determine whether Reagan‘s ideological and moral rhetoric vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 
was indeed a true reflection of his personal views and asks: what were his beliefs in the decades 
preceding his presidency? Investigated are his experiences in Hollywood during the tumultuous 
late 1940s: an epoch marked by acrimonious worker strikes and career ruining black listings, the 
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result of an alleged conspiracy by the Communist Party of the United States of America 
(CPUSA) to take over the motion picture industry and turn it into its own propaganda tool. As 
President of the Screen Actors Guild during this time, Reagan came into contact with this 
turbulence first-hand, and it was an experience that marked him both personally and as a 
politician. From that period onward, it is questioned if there was a continuous line of developing 
thought expounded by Reagan right up to his presidency. What was Reagan saying through the 
1950s and 1960s on the speaking circuit? And what were his ideas throughout the 1970s, both on 
his radio program and on the stump as he sought the presidency? Does the evidence show that 
Reagan was a true anti-communist ideologue throughout his career?  
 
The Ideological Nature of the Reagan Administration 
The Reagan Administration, particularly in its first three years, articulated its foreign policy 
objectives towards the Soviet Union in ideological terms. This rhetoric reflected a belief that the 
Cold War was above all else a moral struggle between the forces of liberty and oppression; 
between free-markets and centrally controlled economies; between democracy and 
totalitarianism. Since the Soviet Communist manifesto was seemingly the antithesis of all that 
America stood for, the Reagan Administration placed its contest with the USSR in the context of 
a broader struggle between the very forces of good and evil. 
Perhaps no speech reflected this moral outlook more than Reagan‘s ‗Evil Empire‘ address 
to the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida on 8 March 1983. The speech 
came just over two weeks before the unveiling of the Strategic Defense Initiative, and may have 
been an early attempt to rally support for extra defense expenditures by reminding the American 
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people of the Manichean nature of their conflict with the Soviets. Using religious language, 
Reagan said: 
Let us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness—
pray that they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be 
aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence 
over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the 




Reagan then quoted from the religious writer C.S Lewis who in the Screwtape Letters
168
 said that 
the ‗greatest evil‘ is done not in the ‗final result‘ of ‗concentration camps‘ but ‗it is conceived 
and ordered‘ in ‗clear, carpeted, warmed, and well-lighted offices, by quiet men with white 
collars and cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who do not need to raise their voice.‘  
The ‗evil‘ men Reagan was referring to were obviously the leaders in the Kremlin, who at 
that time were seeking to paint America as a belligerent obstacle on the path to world peace. 
Reagan urged the Pastors gathered to: 
Beware the temptation of pride—the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves 
above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and 
the aggressive impulses of an Evil Empire. To simply call the arms race a giant 
misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right 




Reagan‘s rhetoric was obviously not the ‗run of the mill‘ diplomatic language used by world 
leaders. And even within the American context, where religious and moral precepts are used 
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commonly, his choice of words
170
 was seen as a dramatic departure from the standard norms of 
American diplomacy. Criticism abounded for this rhetoric,
171
 and when Henry Brandon of the 
London Sunday Times pointed out that these words left ‗no logical conclusion except war‘, 
Reagan responded by saying that his speech was ‗a recognition and a willingness to face up to 
what these differences are in our views and between us, to be realistic about it.‘172 Though not 
using the same choice of words, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, shared Reagan‘s outlook 
that the Cold War conflict was above all a moral conflict. 
 As President Reagan‘s Secretary of State, Shultz operated like Reagan from a standpoint 
where foreign policy was as much about morality as it was about strategic self interest.  In an 
interview with the author in 2007, Shultz was asked whether he would like to be remembered as 
a ‗realist‘ or an ‗idealist‘ practitioner of statecraft and replied, ‗Well, if you don‘t have a sense of 
realism, you aren‘t going to get very far. So I think the idea that they are two very different 
things is not correct‘. Shultz agreed that the two were ‗intertwined‘.173 His seminal address 
before the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on 22 February 1985, however, laid out his 
vision for America‘s global role, basing it firmly on ideological/moral grounds. He said: 
All Americans can be proud that the example of our Founding Fathers has helped 
to inspire millions around the globe. Throughout our own history, we have always 
believed that freedom is the birthright of all peoples and that we could not be true 
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to ourselves or our principles unless we stood for freedom and democracy not 
only for ourselves but for others… 
America also has a moral responsibility. The lesson of the postwar era is 
that America must be the leader of the free world; there is no one else to take our 
place. The nature and extent of our support—whether moral support or something 
more—necessarily varies from case to case. But there should be no doubt where 
our sympathies lie… 
First, as a matter of fundamental principle, the United States supports 
human rights and peaceful democratic change throughout the world, including in 
noncommunist, pro-Western countries. Democratic institutions are the best 
guarantor of stability and peace, as well as of human rights.
174
 (Emphasis added). 
 
Shultz, like Reagan, believed in the moral superiority of Western style democracy, and painted 
the struggle between communists and capitalists, as an expression of the human will triumphing 
over totalitarian dictatorship. He continued: 
In recent years, Soviet activities and pretensions have run head-on into the 
democratic revolution. People are insisting on their right to independence, on their 
right to choose their government free of outside control. Where once the Soviets 
may have thought that all discontent was ripe for turning into communist 
insurgencies, today we see a new and different kind of struggle: people around the 
world risking their lives against communist despotism. We see brave men and 




After listing various nations around the globe that were resisting communist take-over, such as 
Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua, Shultz insisted that despite massive US aid, the 
phenomenon was ‗not an American creation.‘ However, Shultz concluded on a note of renewed 
American involvement stating: 
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Our moral principles compel us to support those struggling against the imposition 
of communist tyranny. From the founding of this nation, Americans have believed 
that a people have the right to seek freedom and independence—and that we have 
a legal right and moral obligation to help them.
176
 (Emphasis Added). 
 
This image of America, intervening around the world as part of a moral crusade to resist 
communism and foster democracy was therefore official administration policy. While Reagan‘s 
‗Evil Empire‘ speech did not emerge from a consensus of his government, Shultz‘s speech did. 
Secretary Shultz had not only gone over the text of his address personally with the President, but 
had also run it past Secretary of Defense Weinberger, CIA Director Bill Casey and National 
Security Advisor, Bud McFarlane.
177
 Shultz‘s speech, therefore, represented a consensus within 
the Reagan Administration that its foreign policy would work through a moral and ideological 
framework. It should come as no surprise that Reagan had approved Shultz‘s speech. It was, after 
all, a reflection of his own beliefs that he had held since the 1940s. 
 
The Origins of Reagan’s Anti-Communism 
Ronald Reagan was a man of strong convictions, and after reading up on a particular topic, 
thinking it over and coming to his own conclusions, there was no way to change his opinion—or 
to stop him from sharing it with others. This was true of his beliefs concerning the role of 
government, and was also true of his beliefs concerning communism and the USSR. 
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 Reagan‘s political philosophy was originally left-wing, placing him as a ‗New Deal‘ 
Democrat during the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
178
 Like his father, Jack Reagan, 
prior to 1952 Ronald Reagan had consistently voted as a Democrat his entire adult life, 
considering himself to be a ‗true believer‘. This often resulted in heated political quarrels with 
his brother, Neil, who was a Republican. Neil‘s arguments after World War II that ‗big 
government‘ was encroaching upon civil liberties and that America‘s wartime ally Russia could 
not be trusted, sounded like nonsense to Reagan, who told his brother that he was merely 
‗spouting Republican propaganda‘.179 Yet, Reagan would soon begin to share his brother‘s 
convictions after he looked into communist ideology and discovered a growing communist threat 
in his own industry town, Hollywood. 
 ‗In Hollywood,‘ Reagan often said, ‗if you don‘t sing or dance, you become an after 
dinner speaker.‘180 In the late 1940s, with his movie career in decline, Reagan joined the 
speaking circuit in California, and spoke out against the threat of fascism, as then operating in 
Franco‘s Spain. After giving his usual address to the Men‘s Club at the Hollywood Beverly 
Christian Church, Reagan‘s pastor came up to him and said that while agreeing with his 
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warnings against fascism: ‗I think your speech would be even better if you also mentioned that if 
communism ever looked like a threat, you‘d be just as opposed to it as you are to fascism.‘181 
Reagan took the minister‘s advice, and not long afterwards gave a speech to a citizen‘s 
organization about fascism which he ended by saying:  
I‘ve talked about the continuing threat of fascism in the postwar world, but there‘s 
another ‗ism,‘ communism, and if I ever find evidence that communism 
represents a threat to all that we believe in and stand for, I‘ll speak out just as 




Reagan‘s speech was met with a ‗dead silence‘, and a few days later he received a letter from a 
woman in the crowd who wrote that she hoped Reagan would ‗recognize‘ what the silence 
meant: ‗I think the group is becoming a front for communists,‘ she wrote.  For Reagan it was a 
turning- point, and he recalled: ‗Thanks to my minister and that lady, I began to wake up to the 
real world and what was going on in my own business, the motion picture industry.‘183 Reagan 
soon became one of the leading opponents of communism in Hollywood, a struggle that would 
cost him personally, but would also open up new horizons. 
 Reagan became the ‗leading man‘ in a Hollywood drama that saw him battle against an 
alleged communist attempt to take over the movie industry. The saga began when several motion 
picture unions joined forces and formed the ‗Conference of Studio Unions‘ (CSU). Headed up by 
a man named Herb Sorrell, the CSU attempted to become the official representative of all set 
erectors, and wanted the International Association of Theatrical and Stage Employees (IATSE) 
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to renounce its jurisdiction over these workers. The CSU called a strike, and picketed outside 
studios, calling on the movie moguls to acknowledge them as the set erectors‘ sole 
representative. When the IATSE told its members to cross the picket line, conflict was 
inevitable.  
 As a member of the Screen Actors Guild (SAG), Reagan hoped to help end the strike by 
resolving the CSU‘s differences, but found instead that a simple power grab was being 
attempted. Acting as a peace broker, Reagan had called together CSU and IASTE representatives 
to find out what the underlying problems behind the strike were. He did not find any. Concluding 
that the strike was ‗a phony‘ and not designed to improve wages or working conditions, Reagan 
saw the CSU for what it was: a group attempting to take away IASTE members and consolidate 
its own power. A general meeting of the SAG was called, and Reagan was assigned the task of 
presenting his findings to its members. Several days before the meeting, however, he received a 
threatening phone call from an anonymous person who warned him against giving the speech. 
The caller said: ‗Your face will never be in pictures again‘; a threat that Reagan later discovered 
involved a hit squad that intended to attack his face with acid.
184
 Reagan was given police 
protection, began carrying a gun, and went ahead with his speech, the result of which was that 
the SAG voted 2,748 to 509 to walk through the picket lines. Their stand against the CSU did not 
come cheap, but it did end in triumph. 
 Reagan had known that the CSU strike was a power grab, but when he was informed that 
it was a communist plot to take over Hollywood, he was determined to see it destroyed. Visited 
one night by FBI agents, Reagan was told that their investigations had found that the CSU was a 
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front for the local communist party, which not only desired to control Hollywood‘s workforce, 
but also wanted to turn the motion picture industry into a propaganda tool.
185
 The FBI agents told 
Reagan of a meeting several nights earlier of the American Communist Party in downtown Los 
Angeles, during which one member asked: ‗What the hell are we going to do about that son-of-a-
bitching bastard Ronald Reagan?‘ Reagan accepted their request that he become an FBI 
informant and he received the code name ‗T-10‘.186 He also agreed to lead the resistance against 
the CSU, and despite violent protests, fire bombings and having to be bused into studios, the 
SAG stood firm and the CSU strike folded in 1947. However, the turmoil left Reagan a changed 
man.  
Reagan‘s struggle against communism in Hollywood caused major changes in his life, 
but it ultimately set him on a political course that would lead him to the White House. The first 
major change was very personal. His wife, Academy Award winning actress Jane Wyman, filed 
for divorce in 1948, citing ‗mental cruelty‘ and declaring in her divorce papers: 
In recent months, my husband and I engaged in continual arguments on his 
political views…finally there was nothing in common between us…nothing to 
sustain our marriage…Despite my lack of interest in his political activities, he 
insisted that I attend meetings with him and be present during discussions among 




  The second major change was Reagan‘s belief system: he would forever be an implacable 
opponent to communism. As Reagan wrote in his memoirs: 
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These were eye-opening years for me. When I‘d come back to Warner Brothers 
after the war, I‘d shared the orthodox liberal view that Communists—if there 
really were any—were liberals who were temporarily off track, and whatever they 
were, they didn‘t pose much of a threat to me or anyone…Now I knew from 
firsthand experience how Communists used lies, deceit, violence, or any other 
tactic that suited them to advance the cause of Soviet expansionism. I knew from 
the experience of hand-to-hand combat that America faced no more insidious or 




And the third major change during this period was that Reagan became a full time political 
figure. Reagan believed that due to his prominent anti-communist crusade, his acting career 
fizzled out to minor movie roles, and TV appearances. ‗There is no question my career suffered 
from anticommunism‘ Reagan later said. But with the close of one chapter in his life, came the 
opening of another. Robert Montgomery, President of the SAG resigned suddenly on 10 March 
1947 due to the strain that the CSU strike had on him.
189
 Reagan assumed his position as 
President of SAG, and served in that capacity for six years. As head of Hollywood‘s largest 
union, he honed his speaking and negotiating skills—tools that would serve him well when he 
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Reagan’s Anti-Communist Crusade: 1940s-1960s 
As Hollywood‘s ‗one man battalion‘190 against communism, Reagan remained outspoken about 
the threat that he believed communism posed to America‘s liberties. In speech after speech 
throughout the 1940s and 1950s, Reagan continued to warn against the assault that communist 
ideas could have on America‘s way of life. However, Reagan was no rabid ‗better dead than red‘ 
ideologue, and he condemned the excesses of McCarthyism.  
On 25 September 1947, Reagan received a summons to appear before the US House of 
Representatives Un-American Activities Committee. He stated that he ‗detested‘ communist 
philosophy and ‗their tactics,‘ but did not wish to see any ‗democratic principles‘ compromised. 
He testified: ‗We have spent 170 years in this country on the basis that democracy is strong 
enough to stand up and fight against the inroads of any ideology. I believe, as Thomas Jefferson 
put it, if all the American people know all the facts they will never make a mistake.‘191   
 It was Reagan‘s contention that if the pursuit of communists involved the destruction of 
civil liberties, then victory would be handed to the communists. Reagan believed that the good of 
America‘s traditions about freedom and democracy, could destroy the evil of communism. In an 
article he wrote in 1952 entitled, ‗How Do You Fight Communism?‘ Reagan said: 
The real fight with this new totalitarianism belongs properly to the forces of 
liberal democracy, just as did the battle with Hitler‘s totalitarianism. There really 
is no difference except the cast of characters. On the one hand is our belief that 
the people can and will decide what is best for themselves, and on the other 
(Communist, Nazi, or Fascist) side is the belief that a ‗few‘ can best decide what 
is good for all the rest…If we get so frightened that we suspend our traditional 
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democratic freedoms in order to fight them—they still have won. They have 
shown that the democracy won‘t work when the going gets tough.192 
 
During this period, it is clear, that Reagan was a ‗centrist‘ on the question of communism. As 
Edward M. Yager, in his book, Ronald Reagan’s Journey: Democrat to Republican notes of this 
period in Reagan‘s life: 
Overall, Reagan pursued a middle course in his reaction to communism. On the 
one hand he did not resist investigative efforts by the federal government (as 
some in Hollywood did) since he did cooperate with the FBI and the House on 
Un-American Activities investigating communist activities in Hollywood. On the 
other hand, Reagan‘s approach to opposing communism was significantly more 




Within ten years, however, Reagan‘s tone had substantially changed. In the Reagan archives 
there is a Monitor article that Reagan wrote, circa 1962, which he entitled ‗Our Eroding 
Freedom‘. In it, Reagan rejected the notion that ‗we are at peace, albeit an easy one, with 
Russia‘. Instead, he asserted: 
The truth of the matter is that we are at war. We are losing that war simply 
because we don‘t or won‘t realize that we are in it. It‘s a strange war, fought with 
unusual weapons and strategy, but nevertheless a war. In this struggle every move 
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Reagan pointed out that this was not just his opinion, because the Soviets themselves had 
‗declared war‘ through their writings stating that ‗communism and capitalism cannot exist in the 
world together‘.195  Reagan‘s article was reprinted and received a limited distribution around the 
country, but his views received national, prime-time prominence two years later, when Reagan 
was asked to speak for a presidential candidate. 
In 1964, Reagan‘s personal crusade against ‗big government‘ and communism made him 
a national political figure when he was asked to give a televised speech on behalf of the 
Republican Presidential challenger to Lyndon Johnson, Barry Goldwater. The television spot had 
been paid for by a group of wealthy party donors who felt that Reagan could articulate better 
than Goldwater, the principles of conservatism. However, Goldwater grew apprehensive about 
allowing Reagan to give the speech, because of Reagan‘s inclusion of an attack on Social 
Security, so he recommended instead that a tape be played showing himself meeting with former 
President Eisenhower. Recognizing that the political opportunity of a lifetime could slip away, 
Reagan refused to back down. In a telephone conversation with Goldwater, Reagan said flatly: 
Barry, I‘ve been making the speech all over the state for quite a while and I have 
to tell you, it‘s been very well received, including whatever remarks I‘ve made 
about Social Security. I just can‘t cancel the speech and give away the airtime; it‘s 
not up to me. These gentlemen raised the money and bought the airtime. They‘re 




Reagan went ahead with the speech, entitled A Time for Choosing, which aired nationally on 27 
October 1964. In so doing, Reagan showed that his allegiance was always to himself first, and to 
the party leadership second. Reagan‘s instinct was right: his speech propelled him to national 
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prominence as a political figure, and paved the way to the Governorship of California and the 
White House. Reagan‘s opinions had struck a chord with the American people, but read now, 
over forty years later, Reagan‘s world view comes across as puritanical, painting the contest 
against communism as a life and death struggle where the loss of Vietnam spelt doom and where 
rapprochement with the Soviets was treason.  
 Reagan in 1964 saw the communist world as a monolith, with communist states receiving 
their orders directly from the Kremlin, and gave no consideration to the underlying nationalist 
and economic causes of communist revolutions taking place around the world. Winning the war 
in Vietnam, therefore, was not only absolutely necessary for America‘s security, but was also a 
moral imperative. Reagan said: 
We are at war with the most dangerous enemy that has ever faced mankind in his 
long climb from the swamp to the stars, and it has been said if we lose that war, 
and in doing so lose this way of freedom of ours, history will record with the 
greatest astonishment that those who had the most to lose did the least to prevent 
its happening. Well, I think it‘s time we ask ourselves if we still know the 




Despite the fact that Australia, Western Europe and many other nations enjoyed democratic 
government, Reagan believed that his nation, the United States, stood alone as the sole hope of 
humanity saying:  ‗If we lose freedom here, there is no place to escape to. This is the last stand 
on Earth.‘ Whatever his rationale, Reagan considered any ‗accommodation‘ with the enemy to 
be treasonous: 
If you and I have the courage to tell our elected officials that we want our national 
policy based upon what we know in our hearts is morally right. We cannot buy 
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our security, our freedom from the threat of the bomb by committing an 
immorality so great as saying to a billion now in slavery behind the Iron Curtain, 
‗Give up your dreams of freedom because to save our own skin, we are willing to 
make a deal with your slave masters.‘ Alexander Hamilton said, ‗A nation which 
can prefer disgrace to danger is prepared for a master, and deserves one.‘ 198 
 
Reagan concluded his speech telling his audience: ‗You and I have a rendezvous with destiny. 
We will preserve for our children this, the last best hope of man on Earth, or we will sentence 
them to take the last step into a thousand years of darkness.‘199 The American people 
overwhelmingly rejected Barry Goldwater for President a few weeks later, and President 
Johnson won in the biggest landslide in American history. However, the speech did become a 
‗rendezvous with destiny‘ for Reagan, as it propelled him to the office of Governor of California 
in 1966,
200
 which inevitably meant a future run for the White House. 
 
Friend of Nixon, Foe of Ford 
As the Republican Governor of California, Reagan was a loyal and vocal supporter of President 
Nixon‘s foreign policy, despite the Nixon Administration‘s emphasis on strategic self-interest 
over ideology and its outreach to the communist nations of China and the Soviet Union. Perhaps 
it was Reagan‘s belief that he would become Nixon‘s successor as President in 1977 that made 
him ‗toe the party line‘, or maybe it was Nixon‘s wise decision to include Reagan in his 
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decisions, that made Reagan put aside his personal feelings and support the President‘s stance on 
issues controversial to conservatives. 
 As Nixon makes clear in his memoirs, he considered himself to be the centrist of his 
party, with Nelson Rockefeller on his left and Ronald Reagan on his right.
201
 With his aim to 
engage the two communist giants, the USSR and ‗Red China‘, Nixon‘s biggest fear was that 
Reagan would lead a right-wing revolt and challenge him for the 1972 Republican nomination. 
Consequently, Nixon decided to include Reagan in these contentious changes in policy, and 
enlisted Reagan as his personal envoy to ease concerns with allies that a closer relationship with 
communist nations did not mean an abandonment of old friends.  
Sent first to Taiwan, Reagan assured Chiang Kai-shek in October of 1971, that an 
opening with China did not mean a closure with Taiwan. Reagan argued along the same lines as 
he had used in a speech earlier  to the ‗Young Americans for Freedom‘, in which he said, ‗[The 
President] has been blunt in his declarations that he will not under any circumstances desert an 
old friend and ally…give anything away, or betray our honor. If I am wrong and that should be 
the result—time then for indignation and righteous anger‘.202 Similarly, to help ease concerns 
over America‘s rapprochement with the USSR, Nixon sent him as his envoy for an eighteen day 
European trip in July of 1972. Reagan met with the NATO General Secretary, with the Foreign 
Ministers of France, and Spain, and with the Prime Ministers of Denmark and England. Reagan 
also met with Pope Paul VI at the Vatican, and legendary figures Francisco Franco of Spain and 
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President Eamon de Valera of Ireland.
203
 In these meetings he assured America‘s allies that 
détente with the Soviets did not mean a lessening of the defense relationship with Europe.   
Reagan‘s support for détente ended, however, when Nixon left office and Gerald Ford 
became both President and presumed nominee for the 1976 Presidential election. Reagan, 
needing an issue to rally conservatives against Ford, chose to revert to strident anti-communism. 
It was a ploy that almost worked. 
 Reagan violated the ‗11th commandment‘ of ‗Thou shalt not speak ill of a fellow 
Republican‘ when he savaged President Ford‘s and Henry Kissinger‘s policy of détente during 
the 1976 Presidential elections.
204
 Reagan‘s insurgent campaign against Ford to take the party‘s 
nomination failed to win him a single primary, until he changed track in North Carolina and 
condemned the Ford and Kissinger policy towards the USSR as being immoral and ‗wandering 
without aim‘. Despite the fact that Reagan had not once expressed concern over the policy of 
détente when Kissinger had briefed him over the years,
205
 Reagan the candidate voiced 
widespread apprehension over the policy and questioned what it meant: 
Now we are told we are dropping the word détente but keeping the policy. 
Whatever we call it, the policy is what‘s at fault. Just what is our policy?... 
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We yield to demands by the Red Chinese and reduce our military presence 





Reagan‘s harshest criticism was for America‘s relationship with the USSR, and charged that 
Ford and Kissinger had accepted military inferiority: 
The evidence mounts that we are number 2 in a world where it is dangerous if not 
fatal to be 2
nd
 best…. Now we must ask if someone is giving away our own 
freedom.  
Dr. Kissinger is quoted as saying he thinks of the US as Athens and the 
Soviet Union as Sparta. The day ‗of the US is past and today is the day of the 
Soviet Union. My job as Secretary of State is to negotiate the most acceptable 2
nd
 
best position available.‘   
Ask the people of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Hungary and all the others what it‘s like in a world where the Soviet Union is 
number one. I don‘t want to live in that kind of world and I don‘t think you do 
either….207 
 
Reagan said he did not believe that the people he had met during the campaign were ‗ready to 
ensign this last island of freedom to the dust bin of history‘ and he asked if the USSR‘s strategic 
superiority was the reason for their policy of détente: 
 Is this why Mr. Ford refused to invite Alexander Solzhenitsyn to the White 
House? Why he traveled half way around the world to sign the Helsinki pact 
putting our stamp of approval on Russia‘s enslavement of the captive nations? We 
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By signing the Helsinki Accords in 1975, by accepting second place, Reagan insinuated that 
Ford and Kissinger were guilty of treason. In place of their détente, he proposed an alternative 
vision for America, one that harkened back to the Founding Fathers: 
Call it mysticism if you will, but I believe God had a divine purpose in placing 
this land between two great oceans to be found by those who had a special love of 
freedom and the courage to leave the countries of their birth. From our forefathers 
to our own modern day immigrants we have come from every corner of the earth, 
from every race and ethnic background and we‘ve become a new breed in the 




Reagan‘s attempt to wrestle the party‘s nomination from Ford failed, but Reagan through his 
radio addresses continued to call for a foreign policy that honored America‘s ideological and 
moral traditions. 
 
Reagan’s Radio Addresses: Advocating an Idealist Foreign Policy 
Using his radio addresses in the mid to late 1970s as a platform for his conservative message, 
Reagan sought to remind the American people of the moral nature of their struggle with the 
USSR.  He did this firstly by re-establishing in the mind of his listeners that the USSR was to be 
regarded as an enemy to be despised. In a May 1975 address entitled ‗Communism, the Disease‘ 
Reagan asked, ‗Mankind has survived all manner of evil diseases but can it survive 
Communism?‘ He then explained: 






When a disease like communism hangs on as it has for a half century or more it‘s 
good, now and then to be reminded of just how vicious it really is. Of course 
those who have the disease use all kinds of misleading terms to describe its 
symptoms and its effects. For example, if you and I in America planted mines on 
our borders, ringed the country with barb wire and machine gun toting guards to 
keep anyone from leaving the country we‘d hardly describe that as ‗liberating‘ its 
people. 
But we‘ve grown so used to communist doubletalk I sometimes think 
we‘ve lost some of our fear of the disease. We need frequent vaccination to guard 
against being infected until the day when this health threat will be eliminated as 




Reagan then gave examples of human rights violations behind the ‗Iron Curtain‘ in his attempt to 
show that the communists lacked all human sympathy. He detailed the story, reported in the New 
York Times, of a five year old boy who fell into the Berlin River, and died because East German 
soldiers denied any attempts to rescue him.
211
 To Reagan, this was an example of the inhuman 
qualities of communist nations, a common theme of his addresses. 
 Another common theme that Reagan spoke of was the Soviet‘s refusal to grant its citizens 
the right to immigrate.  
Russian law and the Universal Declaration of Human rights fully entitle a citizen 
of the Soviet Union to an exit visa—meaning permission to leave Russia and live 
in another country. As a matter of fact, that Helsinki pact they talked us into 
signing contains their pledge to let people live where they want to. Like 
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The Helsinki pact negotiated by Ford and Kissinger was to Reagan doubly iniquitous for it 
collaborated with Moscow‘s hypocritical assertions of honoring human rights, and it recognized 
the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.  Any formal American recognition of the Warsaw Pact 
nations was anathema to Reagan. He condemned Ford for doing this, and he condemned Carter 
when he did the same. 
When President Carter returned ‗St. Stephen‘s Crown‘ to the Hungarian government on 5 
January 1978, Reagan cried ‗foul‘. The crown, which tradition records was given by the Holy 
See to St. Stephen, King of Hungary in the year 1000, had become a symbol of legitimacy for 




Now the White House has declared this crown, which confers legitimacy and the 
blessings of Heaven upon the Hungarian government to be the rightful property of 
the godless, communist rulers of that captive land. 
At Teheran we sold a freedom not ours to sell. Now we give legitimacy 
not ours to give to an illegitimate government. Are we really serious about human 
rights?
214
 (Emphasis added.) 
 
Though the international community had long accepted the Warsaw Pact as a permanent fixture 
in Europe, Reagan still held the opinion that the ‗captive nations‘ should be freed of their 
satellite status. In 1977 Reagan quoted Leonid Brezhnev discussing the issue of borders relating 
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to the Israeli/Palestinian dispute. Brezhnev said: ‗We hold in particular, that in the final 
documents should be based on the principle of…the impermissibility of acquisition of territory 
by war.‘ Commenting on this, Reagan said: 
Then we must say to the Soviet Union by way of Mr. Brezhnev, ‗You of course, 
must get out of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia which you seized by force of arms.‘ 
And come to think of it, that means turning loose Finland, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany and Romania.‘215 
 
In addition to cataloging the bellicose nature of the USSR and its poor track record on human 
rights, Reagan pointed out to his listeners that when it boiled down to it, détente between the 
Superpowers was like trying to mix oil and water, for by the very nature of their governments, 
they were incompatible. He said:  
There‘s a worldwide struggle going on for the hearts and minds of mankind. For a 
time, we called it the Cold War; then ‗détente‘. Actually, the struggle has been 
going on for a century or more. It‘s a contest between capitalism and socialism.216 
 
And for Reagan, being capitalist was something that should not cause shame, because: 
Capitalism is what America‘s all about. Indeed, you can‘t have freedom without 
capitalism, for capitalism simply means your right as an individual to own things; 
to do what you will with your money you earn; to buy a piece of land, build a 
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To those who said that capitalism had failed and that socialism was the answer, Reagan pointed 
out that the Soviet Union had had over fifty years to ‗put into practice a completely socialist 
system‘, a nation with 250 million workers and a ‗great many natural resources‘.  Mockingly, 
Reagan outlined what it would take to ‗match their Socialist Utopia‘. He stated: 
It would take a little doing. We‘d have to cut our paychecks by 75%, move 60 
million workers back to the farm, abandon 2/3 of our steel-making capacity, 
destroy 40 million TV sets, tear up 14 out of every 15 miles of highway, junk 19 
out of 20 autos, tear up 2/3 of our railroad track, knock down 70% of our houses, 
and rip out 9/10 of our telephones. Then all we‘d have to do is find a capitalist 




And, thus, Reagan summed up his opinion of the Soviet Union: it imposed its ideology on 
nations by means of war; it denied its citizens basic human rights; and the purpose of it all—
communism—was not helping the average person, but making them live in substandard 
conditions on the verge of starvation. Détente with the Soviets was worthless in Reagan‘s view, 
and in 1977 he stated that he would not care if détente collapsed completely: 
In mid-March the Soviet Union warned us that ‗détente‘ would be endangered if 
American officials continue to criticize violations of human rights behind the Iron 
Curtain. I don‘t know about you, but I didn‘t exactly tear my hair and go into a 





This account of the history of Reagan‘s anti-communist beliefs leading up to his 1980 
Presidential bid demonstrates that he was indeed an ardent anti-communist, and that these beliefs 
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were his own. Reagan‘s anti-communism was not the result of Soviet actions in Eastern Europe 
following the Second World War (he dismissed his brother Neil‘s arguments), but rather his 
beliefs grew out of his experiences in Hollywood during the late 1940s. Coming up against an 
alleged plot by the Communist Party of America to take over the motion picture industry, 
Reagan confronted threats, intimidation, and violence. For a man who generally saw the world 
through ‗rose tinted glasses‘, it served as a ‗wake-up call‘ to the reality of the ideological 
struggle occurring around the world. While perhaps costing Reagan his marriage to Jane Wyman 
and crippling his acting career, it also opened up new opportunities in politics: first as President 
of the Screen Actors Guild, then as a sought after speaker at political events. From there, Reagan 
became the Governor of California, and then a presidential candidate. Both on the stump and in 
his radio addresses as he sought the Republican nomination in 1976, Reagan condemned the 
‗Kissinger-Ford‘ foreign policy of ‗détente‘ with the Soviet Union, and decried the replacement 
of morality with self-interest. Of course, Reagan‘s speeches were also self serving: he toned 
down his rhetoric while Nixon was in office, but brought it back with a vengeance when it served 
his political purposes while challenging Ford and Carter. Reagan was an ideologue, but also a 
pragmatist and when circumstances called for it, an opportunist. As the following chapter on 
Reagan‘s rhetoric while in office will demonstrate, this ability to change his tune according to 
the times would infuriate die-hard conservatives, but also would display that while Reagan truly 







MORAL CRUSADER  
 
“I made the „Evil Empire‟ speech and others like it with malice aforethought: I wanted to 





Throughout his eight years in the presidency, Ronald Reagan remained a crusader against the 
‗evils‘ of communism, even when he ‗changed gears‘ from implacable foe to partner in a 
renewed rapprochement. While his criticism of the regime in Moscow evolved over time, the 
moral tone of his public pronouncements did not.  
 This chapter demonstrates that the moral rhetoric of the ‗Great Communicator‘221 never 
wavered, but the emphasis did in fact transform over time. It is detailed that Reagan began his 
presidency with the firm intention of re-moralizing the Cold War conflict by condemning the 
USSR for its various abuses. As the above quote reveals, Reagan‘s ‗Evil Empire‘ speech and 
other denunciatory addresses had a definitive end towards which they were directed. However, 
as Reagan headed into fourth quarter of his first term in office, he decided that having certainly 
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accomplished his objective, it was time to change track and emphasize dialogue. When Mikhail 
Gorbachev came to power, Reagan began that process in earnest. Then, having established a 
partner for this renewed engagement, Reagan turned to the final stage of his moral rhetoric: 
challenging the USSR to implement true reforms that would further the cause of human liberty; a 
cause that was at the heart of Reagan‘s idealism. But in examining these three stages, these 
questions are asked: what role did Reagan play in the drafting of these speeches? Can it be said 
that they were his own, or the work of others? Was Reagan the ‗tool‘ of his speechwriters, of his 
conservative base, or did he decide what he wanted to say? And in the final analysis, to what 
extent can it be said that the moral rhetoric of the Reagan Administration was truly reflective of 
Reagan‘s beliefs about communism and the USSR?  
 
1981: Reagan Sets the Agenda 
Presidential inaugurations provide the newly sworn in President the opportunity to speak on the 
wide range of challenges that confront the nation at that moment in history, both domestic and 
foreign. Many Presidents, like Kennedy and Carter, used the occasion to address the international 
situation in their inaugural address, while Reagan, for whatever reasons, decided to focus almost 
entirely on domestic economic concerns.
222
 This left many questioning whether Reagan, now as 
President, would take a more moderate position regarding the Soviet Union and perhaps engage 
them in détente. The answer was given at the President‘s first press conference. 
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 Held nine days after his inauguration, Reagan‘s first press conference made clear in some 
of the least diplomatic language in the history of the Cold War that his moralistic rhetoric would 
remain. Asked by Sam Donaldson of ABC News about the long term intentions of the Soviet 
Union, and whether Reagan believed détente was possible,
223
 Reagan astounded his listeners 
with a scathing condemnation of both détente and of the Soviet Union.  
Labeling détente as nothing more than a ‗one-way street that the Soviet Union has used to 
pursue its own aims‘, Reagan then gave his interpretation of Soviet intentions based on his 
reading of their history. He said: 
I know of no leader of the Soviet Union since the revolution, and including the 
present leadership, that has not more than once repeated in the various communist 
congresses they hold their determination that their goal must be the promotion of 
world revolution and a one-world socialist or communist state, whichever word 
you want to use.
224
     
 
Then, turning to Donaldson‘s question about a possible détente with the Soviets, Reagan said: 
Now, as long as they do that and as long as they, at the same time, have openly 
and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is what will further 
their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, 
to lie, to cheat, in order to attain that, and that is moral, not immoral, and we 
operate on a different set of standards, I think when you do business with them, 
even at a détente, you keep that in mind.
225
 (Emphasis Added). 
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When criticism abounded for these remarks—and the first press conference was mentioned 
continually over the years—Reagan insisted that he was only quoting the writings of Lenin and 
the statements of the Soviet leadership. Privately, however, he had another intention: namely to 
let the leadership in Moscow know that ‗there was a new management in the White House‘.226 
The first salvo in the Reagan‘s ideological rhetorical war227 was unmistakably heard in the 
Kremlin and Reagan‘s private olive branch letter to Brezhnev sent following the assassination 
attempt in March that year, only served to send a mixed message.
228
 Publicly, Reagan‘s stinging 
criticism did not let up. From attacking the morality of the Soviet leadership, Reagan moved to 
predict its eventual downfall.  
 Reagan considered the USSR to be a state whose days were numbered, and when the 
leader of a Superpower says it publicly, it takes on a very ominous edge. In the early 1980s the 
general consensus was that the Soviet Union was a permanent fixture which would continue 
indefinitely into the future. As such, the USSR was seen as a fact of life that had to be 
accommodated. Reagan did not agree. On the contrary, he was of the opinion that due to the very 
nature of the communist system—its denial of human and religious rights and its economic 
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failures—it was a state doomed to implosion. In a commencement address at Notre Dame 
University on 17 May 1981, Reagan, the ‗hard-line romantic‘229 said emphatically: 
The years ahead are great ones for this country, for the cause of freedom and the 
spread of civilization. The West won‘t contain communism, it will transcend 
communism. It won‘t bother to…denounce it; it will dismiss it as some bizarre 





Of course, Reagan did continue to denounce the Soviet Union, despite his belief that it was 
nearing certain death.  The ‗Polish problem‘ permitted Reagan such an opportunity. 
The tense situation in Poland at the close of 1981, with the imposition of martial law and 
the threat of a Soviet invasion, caused Reagan to include a large section on Poland in his 1981 
Christmas Address. In it, Reagan pointed the finger of blame squarely at the leadership in the 
Kremlin and in doing so, drew attention again the moral failures of their state. Reagan said: 
The Soviet Union, through its threats and pressures, deserves a major share of 
blame for the developments in Poland. So, I have also sent a letter to President 
Brezhnev urging him to permit the restoration of basic human rights in Poland 
provided for in the Helsinki Final Act. In it, I informed him that if this repression 
continues, the United States will have no choice but to take further concrete 
political and economic measures affecting our relationship.
231
 (Emphasis added.) 
 
The Helsinki Final Act, which Reagan had considered worthless when it was negotiated by 
President Ford, was invoked to show the hypocrisy of the communist governments, for it had 
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promised to respect its citizens‘ human rights. Reagan wanted to demonstrate the moral 
inferiority of the Soviet Union, and sought to impress upon his audience that for the USSR, its 
involvement in Poland was business as usual.  
But what role did Reagan play in the drafting of this speech? A review of the original 
draft at the Reagan archives shows that Reagan was clearly involved in the writing of this 
speech, for in addition to his insertions about the birth of Jesus, Reagan rewrote the Christmas 
address linking the Polish problem to the ‗Brezhnev doctrine‘. Reagan‘s insertion (italicized) 
read ‗The tragic events now occurring in Poland almost two years to the day after the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan have been precipitated by the public and secret pressure from the Soviet 
Union.‘232 Reminding the American people of the brutal nature of the Soviet system, as 
evidenced by the Afghanistan invasion, was ‗vintage Reagan‘; the President wanted to denounce 
the Soviet Union as an aggressive and immoral nation. It was a theme he carried on into 1982. 
 
1982: The ‘Ash-Heap of History’ Prediction 
The new year began with Reagan addressing the ‗People of Foreign Nations‘ on television, and 
the President used the opportunity to attack the fundamental elements of communist beliefs, 
which he likened to Nazism: 
During my life time, I have seen the rise of fascism and communism. Both 
philosophies glorify the arbitrary power of the state. These ideologies held, at 
first, a certain fascination for some intellectuals. But both theories fail. Both deny 
those God-given liberties that are the inalienable right of each person on this 
planet; indeed they deny the existence of God. Because of this fundamental flaw, 
fascism has already been destroyed and the bankruptcy of communism has been 
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laid bare for all to see—a system that is efficient in producing machines of war, 
but cannot feed its people.
233
 (Emphasis added). 
 
That fascism had already been destroyed, and communism would soon follow the same fate was 
the message of Reagan‘s New Year Address. If the point had been lost on anyone, the 
President‘s major foreign policy address of that year, and perhaps of his entire Administration, 
spelt this out loud and clear. 
 Reagan‘s seminal address on America‘s struggle against the Soviet Union was his 1982 
speech before the British Parliament. This discourse, the first time that an American President 
had addressed both houses of the British Parliament,
234
 was meant to rally the democracies of 
Western Europe to a ‗crusade of freedom‘. The speech stands out in the history of the Cold War 
as a damning expose of the failures of communism, and as an accurate prediction of the eventual 
fall of the Soviet Union.  
 Reagan‘s speech was a powerful indictment of Marxist-Leninist theory in that it 
demonstrated that the governments who had attempted to implement these theories were far from 
achieving a ‗worker‘s paradise‘. Terming the early 1980s as a ‗turning point‘, Reagan said that 
‗in an ironic sense Karl Marx was right‘ for: 
We are witnessing today a great revolutionary crisis, a crisis where the demands 
of the economic order are conflicting directly with those of the political order. But 
the crisis is happening not in the free, non-Marxist West, but in the home of 
Marxist-Leninism, the Soviet Union. It is the Soviet Union that runs against the 
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Reagan then noted the ‗deep economic difficulty‘ that the USSR was undergoing as evidence of 
the ‗astounding‘ failure of their system: ‗A country which employs one fifth of its population in 
agriculture is unable to feed its own people.‘ Then, echoing a theme he had spoken of in his 
1970s radio addresses, Reagan pointed out that the, ‗tiny private sector‘ which made up ‗three 
percent of arable land‘ accounted for ‗nearly one quarter of the Soviet farm output‘. Capitalist, 
market driven farming experiments were successful, while ‗over centralized‘ communist systems 
with ‗little or no incentives‘ were causing ‗shrinkage of economic growth‘.   While the people 
were close to being ‗on the brink of famine‘, the ‗Soviet system‘ was pouring ‗its best resources 
into the making of instruments of destruction‘.  The ‗heavy strain‘ this was causing the  ‗Soviet 
people‘ was proof enough that Marxist theories had failed, for as Reagan concluded, ‗What we 
see here is a political structure that no longer corresponds to its economic base, a society where 
productive forces are hampered by political ones‘. Reagan then argued that communist systems 
did not represent the people, for they were totalitarian in nature. 
 The Soviet Union and other communist states did not represent the people they governed, 
Reagan said, because they were dictatorships without any form of democratic representation. 
This, Reagan believed, was evidence again that Marxist claims of being ‗for the people‘ were 
ludicrous. Echoing Winston Churchill‘s famous ‗Iron Curtain‘ speech, Reagan said: 
From Stettin on the Baltic to Varna on the Black Sea, the regimes planted by 
totalitarianism have had more than 30 years to establish their legitimacy. But 
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none—not one regime—has yet been able to risk free elections. Regimes planted 
by bayonets do not take root.
236
 (Emphasis added). 
 
Noting the strength of the Solidarity movement in Poland, Reagan joked that it demonstrated that 
the ‗Soviet Union would remain a one-party nation even if an opposition party were permitted, 
because everyone would join the opposition party‘.  When Solidarity swept Poland‘s 




The lack of democratic involvement in communist regimes, Reagan said, had caused 
uprisings against the ‗police state‘, and the President linked Solidarity to similar popular revolts 
in the past: ‗1953 in East Germany, 1956 in Hungary‘ and  ‗1968 in Czechoslovakia‘. However, 
the conduct of ‗Western democracies‘ would ‗determine whether this trend continues‘, Reagan 
said, adding, ‗We must take actions to assist the campaign for democracy‘.  
 To Reagan, the communist systems not only enslaved their own people, but were a threat 
that had to be eliminated. Noting that in 1982 they were ‗approaching the end of a bloody 
century‘, the President said the cause of its bloodshed was a ‗terrible political invention—
totalitarianism‘. The West, Reagan said, would be remembered in the history books for its 
‗consistent restraint and peaceful intentions‘. Yet, the West could not ignore the threat ‗to our 
very existence‘ that the USSR posed, for ‗if history teaches anything it teaches self delusion in 
the face of unpleasant facts is folly.‘  Accurately capturing the mood of the West in the early 
1980s, Reagan said: 




 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, p.241. 
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We see around us today the marks of our terrible dilemma—predictions of 
doomsday, anti-nuclear demonstrations, an arms race in which the West must, for 
its own protection, be an unwilling participant. At the same time we see 
totalitarian forces in the world who seek subversion and conflict around the globe 
to further their barbarous assault on the human spirit. What then is our course? 
Must civilization perish in a hail of fiery atoms? Must freedom wither in a quiet, 
deadening accommodation with totalitarian evil?
238
 (Emphasis added). 
 
Reagan said that ‗strong leadership‘ would ensure that ‗the forces of good ultimately rally and 
triumph over evil‘. The West, Reagan said, ‗must not hesitate to declare our ultimate objectives‘, 
which meant the overthrow of totalitarian regimes. This was Reagan‘s ‗ultimate objective‘, yet 
he made clear that any change of government would have to be indigenous:  
We cannot ignore the fact that even without our encouragement there has been 
and will continue to be repeated explosions against repression and dictatorships. 
The Soviet Union itself is not immune to this reality. Any system is inherently 
unstable that has no peaceful means to legitimize its leaders. In such cases, the 
very repressiveness of the state ultimately drives its people to resist it, if 
necessary, by force.
239
 (Emphasis added). 
 
Despite Reagan‘s emphasis that any overthrow of communist regimes would have to come from 
within those nations,
240
 the President made clear that the West would be there to assist this 
process. Reagan asked the Western nations to join him to ‗foster the infrastructure of democracy, 
the system of a free press, unions, political parities‘ and ‗universities‘ behind the Iron Curtain. 
Charges of ‗cultural imperialism‘ were without foundation, for ‗it would be cultural 
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condescension or worse to say that any people prefer dictatorship to democracy‘. Reagan‘s aim 
was to create a ‗world in which all people are at last free to determine their own destiny‘, but he 
made clear that for the USSR, this process would lead to its demise: 
What I am describing now is a plan and a hope for the long term—the march of 
freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of 
history, as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-
expression of the people.
241
 (Emphasis added). 
 
And, thus, Reagan had not only repudiated communist economic theory and the human rights 
record of the USSR and its surrogates, but he had also predicted that Marxism-Leninism would 
soon be eradicated and along with it the totalitarian regimes that denied their peoples‘ freedom. 
But what role did Reagan play in the creation of this speech?  
In the Reagan Archives there is no written proof of the President having written or re-
written this address. However, at an oral history project at the ‗Heritage Foundation‘ marking the 
20
th
 anniversary of this famous speech, White House speechwriter Anthony Dolan revealed that 
it was he who had written the Parliament address. He had done so despite the attempts of the so 
called ‗pragmatists‘ who had wanted to tone down Reagan‘s rhetoric and who had blocked his 
speech from reaching the President‘s desk. Reagan, displeased with the various drafts presented 
him, was angered to find out that Dolan had written a speech that he had been excluded from 
seeing. Even after ordering the speech be given to him, the ‗pragmatists‘ did not give the 
President the address, and it was only after the NSC advisor Bill Clark made some demanding 
phone calls that Reagan managed to view the draft. When he finally read it, he liked what he 
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saw, because as Dolan explained for the oral history, the speech was based on what Reagan had 
been saying for decades. He said: 
Well, yes, it had my name on it, but what Reagan saw there—the context, the 
message, the lines themselves—like the one about the nuclear monopoly and the 
map of Europe- [these were things he had said] way back in '68 or '67. He easily 
recognized the newer stuff too, the doom of communism theme…that was there. 
No wonder he chose it, [because it had]…Reagan [‘s] idioms and ideas.242   
 
Thus, it can be said to be Reagan‘s speech—even if he did not write it. However, Reagan‘s final 
speech of condemnation against the USSR was written by Reagan and came in response to one 
of the most brutal attacks on Western civilians in the history of the Cold War. 
 
1983: ‘Murder in the Air’243 
Reagan‘s moral invective against the Soviet Union reached its crescendo in 1983, the harshness 
of his tone causing the Soviets to compare him to Hitler and fearful that the President was set to 
start World War III.  As mentioned in Chapter 3, in March of that year he labeled the USSR an 
‗Evil Empire‘ in a speech to Evangelical Pastors; words that immediately raised the pressure of 
East/West relations to ‗boiling point‘. While Reagan had insisted that the controversial term 
remain within the text, it was again ghostwritten for him. The second major ideological speech of 
that year, however, was written by Reagan and thus further strengthens the argument that Reagan 
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operated from an ideological standpoint and that his other speechwriters took their cue from him, 
not the other way round. The speech in question was about the ‗Korean Air-line Massacre‘.  
 The confrontation began on 1 September 1983 when the Soviet Air-Force shot down 
Korean Airlines flight 007 for allegedly breaching its air-space. What caused such universal 
outrage and condemnation was the fact that the plane was civilian, and 259 innocent people, 
including US Congressman Larry McDonald, were killed. Reagan received word of the attack 
while at his ranch in California, and reacted immediately with an anger rarely displayed by the 
usually sunny President. The first statement from the President reflected this rage. He said:  
Our first emotions are anger, disbelief, and profound sadness. While events in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere have left few illusions about the willingness of the 
Soviet Union to advance its interests through violence and intimidation, all of us 
had hoped that certain irreducible standards of civilized behavior, nonetheless 




Reagan then said that the ‗terrorist act‘ demonstrated the ‗stark contrast that exists between 
Soviet words and deeds.‘245 The situation was considered so serious that the President‘s handlers 
insisted that he cut his ‗working vacation‘ short and fly to Washington immediately; a decision 
that Reagan called ‗heartbreaking‘ in his diary, and which no doubt added to his fury.246  
While the Soviets refused to apologize for their actions,
247
 Reagan continued to fume, 
and he put his feelings down on paper for a major address to the nation about the ‗massacre‘. 
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After mulling over the situation while swimming in the White House pool, Reagan got out, and 
still in his swimming trunks, wrote out his address to the nation on a yellow legal pad.
248
 In it, 
Reagan sought to portray the Soviet Union as a barbaric state without any human feeling. As 
such, Reagan set up the USSR to look like a nation that stood apart from the rest of humanity. He 
wrote: 
And make no mistake about it, this attack was not just against ourselves or the 
Republic of Korea; this was the Soviet Union against the world and the moral 
precepts which guide human relations among people everywhere. It was an act of 
barbarism, born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the 





Reagan articulated the nation‘s feelings of outrage against the USSR,250 but refused to de-rail 
arms negotiations talks as a result of the incident.
 
 As Reagan recalled in his memoirs, the 
downing of flight 007 ‗demonstrated how close the world had come to the precipice and how 
much we needed nuclear arms control.‘ 251 Most media commentary was positive about Reagan‘s 
‗moderate‘ response, however, his conservative critics said that Reagan was now the opposite of 
Teddy Roosevelt; for he ‗spoke loudly but carries a very small stick‘.252  Also unhappy were the 
members of the Soviet Politburo. 
                                                     
248
 Edmund Morris, Dutch, p. 493. 
249
 ‗Address to the Nation on the Korean Air-line Massacre‘ 5 September, 1983; PPPR. 
250
 Out of the 887 phone calls to the White House, 308 praised the speech, while 489 demanded stronger action 
against Moscow; White House Office of Records Management; James Baker, Box 10513 Communications (2 of 4); 
RPL.  
251
 Ronald Reagan, An American Life, p. 584. 
252
 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 59. 
128 
 
For the leaders in the Kremlin, Reagan‘s latest verbal assault was the last straw. On 28 
September Secretary General Andropov said that Reagan ‗risked war‘ with his ‗hypocritical 
preaching about morals‘ with ‗smears‘ and ‗obscenities‘.  The Soviet leader asserted that Reagan 
had ‗proclaimed a crusade against socialism as a social system‘.253 Furthermore, Andropov 
audaciously alleged that the downing of KAL 007 was a ‗sophisticated provocation 
masterminded by the United States‘; a statement that angered Americans even more than the 
deed itself.
254
   
The stinging criticism of the Kremlin, along with heightened threat of war,
255
 led Reagan 
to conclude that it was time for a change of tone. Reagan had accomplished his goal of 
confronting the USSR, and as Richard Perle told the author, this stage in his rhetorical approach 
towards the Soviets would have far reaching consequences, which were not clearly seen at the 
time: 
The ‗Evil Empire‘ speech and other speeches of a similar nature were intended to 
raise fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the Soviet dictatorship, and 
did. And I believe that was essential to ending the Cold War. It was essential to 
the Western victory. Because by silence, or worse, previous administrations had 
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Reagan had raised fundamental questions about the Soviet Union and its ‗empire‘, but having 
accomplished this goal, the rhetoric of condemnation shifted to the democratic ideal of 
constructive dialogue. 
 
1984: Reagan Changes his Tone 
1983 had been a dangerous year for US/Soviet relations, with the escalated rhetoric on both sides 
being a major cause of the heightened level of tension. Reagan himself recognized this, and at 
the close of that tumultuous year that had seen the deployment of INF missiles in Europe and the 
unveiling of SDI, the President decided that a change of tone was required.  
 Reagan‘s fear that the Soviets could misunderstand his rhetoric as being a harbinger of an 
actual attack, led him to conclude that a major address on US--Soviet relations, one that 
demonstrated America‘s peaceful intentions, was long overdue. As Reagan recorded in his diary 
on 18 November 1983, nuclear war and Soviet paranoia were on his mind: 
George Shultz & I had a talk mainly about setting up a little in house group of 
experts on the Soviet U. to help us in setting up some channels. I feel the Soviets 
are so defense minded, so paranoid about being attacked that without being in 
any way soft on them, we ought to tell them no one here has any intention of doing 
anything like that. What the hell have they got that anyone would want?...A most 
sobering experience with Cap W. & Gen. Vessey in the situation room—a 
briefing on our complete plan in the event of a nuclear attack. The Chiefs have 
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As a result of his discussion with Shultz, the State Department commissioned Soviet expert Jack 
Matlock to begin the drafting process of a major speech, with the aim to deliver before 1984, to 
avoid any perception that it was an election year stunt. By mid-December Matlock had 
completed his draft, which in turn was processed by the State Department and its head, Secretary 
Shultz. Finally the speech landed on the President‘s desk who declared it ‗pedestrian‘ and 
complained that it ‗contained no new ground‘.258 In the latter respect, Reagan was correct: 
elements of the address, with its heavy emphasis on dialogue as the best means of resolving 
differences, had been present in other foreign policy addresses, most notably his 9 May 1982 
address to Eureka College. What Reagan perhaps did not appreciate was that this address would 
be ‗a first‘ in that it would be free of the recriminations that had been included with his more 
‗peaceful‘ pronouncements of the past. After more back and forth discussion between Reagan 
and his speechwriters, the oration was ready for its delivery on 16 January 1984. And it came 
none too soon. 
 Reagan discovered in early 1984, to his horror, that 1983 had been the year when the 
Superpowers had truly moved ‗five minutes‘ to the midnight of nuclear Armageddon. The 
NATO war game, code named ‗Abel Archer‘ staged between 2—11 November 1983, was a 
dress rehearsal for a full scale nuclear attack on the USSR. To the Soviets, unnerved by Reagan‘s 
harsh rhetoric, the deployment of INF weapons, the invasion of Grenada and the unveiling of 
SDI, what was called a military exercise, they feared, was in fact preparations for total war. 
‗Operation RYAN‘259 instructed foreign agents to gather all information that could support this 
hypothesis, and Soviet forces were placed on alert. When CIA director William Casey informed 
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Reagan in early 1984 that the Soviets had feared an imminent invasion,
260
 the President‘s face 
went white. He asked, ‗Do you suppose they really believe that? I don‘t see how they could 
believe that—but it‘s something to think about.‘261 Reagan‘s instincts had been right—he knew it 
was time for the Superpowers to stand back from the brink. It was time to change the nature of 
their discourse. 
 In what would later be viewed as a major ‗reversal‘ for the President,262 Reagan outlined 
in his address on US/Soviet relations the need for a renewed dialogue with the USSR. Though 
noting that 1984 was a ‗time of challenges to peace‘ Reagan said that ‗America‘s highest 
aspiration has never wavered‘ and that the quest for a ‗lasting peace that enhances dignity for 
men and women everywhere‘ must proceed.  In order to achieve this peace, the Reagan 
Administration had invested the past three years in ensuring that ‗America‘s deterrence is more 
credible‘, resulting in a ‗safer‘ nation. However, while increasing the capacity to wage war was 
important to deter aggression, the achievement of peace required much more: 
Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but 
deterrence is not the beginning and the end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. 
We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as serious and constructive as 
possible—a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of 
the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working 
relationship.
263
 (Emphasis added). 
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Andropov had made clear in his statement the previous September that entering into a dialogue 
with Reagan was almost out of the question due to the President‘s abrasive rhetoric. Addressing 
this issue, Reagan said: 
I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don‘t know why this 
should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders who‘ve never shied from expressing 
their view of our system. But this doesn‘t mean that we can‘t deal with each other. 
We don‘t refuse to talk when the Soviets call us imperialist aggressors and worse, 
or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The 
fact that neither of us likes the other system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living 
in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.
264
 (Emphasis added). 
 
Reagan summed up the rational for his speech, and his desire to resume arms reduction talks 
with the USSR by saying:  
In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war, and especially nuclear 
war, is priority number one. A nuclear conflict could well be mankind‘s last... As 
I‘ve said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be 
banished from the earth.
265
 (Emphasis added). 
 
Though many hands drafted the speech, it is very clear that Reagan was the principal author, as 
the main ideas—the abolition of nuclear weapons, the fact that America had the sole nuclear 
monopoly after World War II but did not attempt to ‗dominate the world‘ and even a ‗folksy‘ 
story about a fictional Russian and American couple meeting and discussing their children—
were all his.
266
  The President summed up the speech in his diary that night, writing: 






 As Don Oberforfer notes, no-one but Ronald Reagan could have drafted the fictional story, contained in the 
speech, of a Russian couple, Ivan and Anya meeting Jim and Sally, an American couple, meeting and discussing 
hobbies, children, work etc and deciding to go out to dinner sometime. The point of the anecdote was that Russians 
and Americans , if they met with each other, would find that they had a lot in common. It was governments, not 
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The day really began when in the East room at 10:00 A.M when I went live on 
TV worldwide with [an] address on Soviet-U.S relations. The press, especially 
TV is now trying to explain the speech as politics. Etc. The speech was carefully 
crafted by all of us to counter Soviet propaganda that we are not sincere in 
wanting arms reductions or peace. It was low key & held the door open to the 




The door was indeed open, but the Soviets were, alas, still unwilling to walk in. Gromyko, a few 
days later in a speech in Stockholm summed up Reagan‘s ideas and agenda as: ‗Maniacal 
plans…criminal and dishonest methods…pathological obsession‘.268   Chapter 10 of this thesis 
will discuss in greater detail Reagan‘s attempts to be a ‗peacemaker‘ during this period, but at 
this point, the question needs to be asked: what role did Reagan‘s wife, Nancy, play in the 
change of rhetoric in 1984? 
 
The Role of Nancy Reagan 
In almost every account of the marriage of Ronald and Nancy Reagan, it is argued that without 
Nancy, Ronald Reagan would never have become President. Running a political campaign or an 
administration takes organization, and perhaps just as importantly, it means having a strong 
antenna when it comes to the selection of staff who can best accomplish the objectives of 
winning and governing. Nancy had an uncanny ability to detect when people were more 
interested in self-promotion, than they were for working towards the promotion of her husband‘s 
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interests. As such, she was often behind the scenes, plotting to oust those whom she considered a 
liability to her husband‘s agenda. Policy largely did not interest her—her primary interest, was 
protecting her husband and seeing that he prospered as a candidate and as a President. As James 
G. Benze writes in his study on Nancy:  
The first lady scripted various aspects of her husband's presidency, but never in 
her own interest. She was concerned not with specific policies, but with her 
husband's political success. She decided what was best for President Reagan's 
image, his reelection, and ultimately his legacy, and then convinced the 




The question arises, therefore, did this desire to promote her husband‘s image lead her to foray 
into the area of US/Soviet relations? 
 1984 was an election year, and Nancy Reagan knew that the one weak point that the 
Democrats were sure to exploit would be the President‘s apparent lack of success in dealing with 
the Soviets. It was around this time, according to administration insiders, that Nancy began 
pushing for movement on the Superpower dialogue. According to Mike Deaver, Nancy began 
asking him in 1983, ‗What are we doing about the Soviet thing?‘270 NSC Adviser Bud 
McFarlane further testifies: 
I have enormous respect for Mrs. Reagan. She and I would talk often. She would 
come up with ideas about ways in which a foreign undertaking, a trip, a letter, or a 
public position would benefit the President domestically. In 1984, an election 
year, she was nudging that his dialogue with the Russians go a little faster; that we 
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Nancy Reagan writes in her memoirs of often being unsuccessful when it came to influencing 
her husband‘s positions—be it on his visit to Bitburg in Germany, or firing David Stockman and 
Don Regan sooner—but she claims more success when it came to US/Soviet relations:  
I was somewhat more successful in encouraging Ronnie to consider a more 
conciliatory relationship with the Soviet Union. For years it had troubled me that 
my husband was always being portrayed by his opponents as a warmonger, 
simply because he believed, quite properly, in strengthening our defenses. Jimmy 
Carter had made this charge in the 1980 campaign, and it stuck to Ronnie for 
years… 
I knew that ‘warmonger’ was never a fair description of Ronnie’s position, 
but I also felt that this calling the Soviet Union an ‘Evil Empire’ was not 
particularly helpful in establishing a dialogue with the other side. The world had 
become too small for the two superpowers not to be on speaking terms, and unless 
that old perception about Ronnie could be revised, nothing positive was likely to 
happen. Some of his advisers wanted to keep up the tough rhetoric, but I argued 
against it and suggested that he tone it down…With the world so dangerous, I felt 
it was ridiculous for these two heavily armed superpowers to be sitting there and 
not talking to each other…So yes, I did push Ronnie a little.272 (Emphasis added). 
 
But was Nancy‘s ‗pushing‘ pivotal? In her own opinion, it was not. Nancy wrote: ‗As always, 
Ronnie listened to the various points of view and then made the decision that he thought was 
best.‘273 The evidence presented here (and in Chapter 10), would suggest strongly that the change 
in tone in 1984 was one that the President himself had decided upon through his own reading of 
the situation. In 1986, Reagan was ready to change the tone again.  
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Reagan Challenges Reform: 1986-1988 
After beginning the process of making peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
Reagan used the remainder of his second term in office to challenge the Soviet leadership to 
allow political and religious freedoms. ‗Peace through Strength‘, Reagan believed, had led the 
Soviets to ‗sue for peace‘. With the likelihood of hostilities waning, Reagan hoped to use his 
personal relationship with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to press hard for the implementation 
of civil liberties for those living behind the Iron Curtain. Returning home from the Geneva 
Summit in November 1985, the President declared that his Administration‘s policies had ‗caught 
the Soviet‘s attention‘ and stated that America had moved from being a reactor to world events 
to being a cause for revolutionary change: ‗We are in the forefront of a powerful, historic tide for 
freedom and opportunity, for progress and peace.‘274   
Though foreign policy experts had warned Reagan to keep human rights out of the 
discussion if progress were to be made, the President made the issue a centerpiece of his dealings 
with the USSR.
275
 Throughout 1986, Reagan continued to keep the pressure on Mikhail 
Gorbachev, beginning with a televised address to the Soviet people. In language never heard 
before over Soviet airwaves, Reagan spoke of his talks with Gorbachev in Geneva where he 
‗discussed the American people‘s strong interest in humanitarian issues‘. Explaining America‘s 
ideals, Reagan said: 
Our democratic system is founded on the belief in the sanctity of human life and 
the rights of the individual—rights such as freedom of speech, of assembly of 
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movement and of worship. It is a sacred truth to us that every individual is a 
unique creation of God, with his or her own special talents, abilities, hopes and 
dreams. Respect for all people is essential to peace, and as we agreed in Geneva, 
progress in resolving humanitarian issues in a spirit of cooperation would go a 
long way to making 1986 a better year for us all.
276
 (Emphasis added). 
 
Reagan‘s address, which was broadcast without edit or refutation, received a positive reaction by 
the Soviet people.
277
  Gorbachev did not reply so favorably: in an 11 January 1986 letter he 
informed Reagan that human rights were an internal affair of the USSR and in fact the Soviets 
had always acted ‗on the basis of humanism and taking into account the interests of the people 
concerned.‘ 278 Still, some progress was made when Soviet dissident Anatoly Shcharansky was 
permitted an exit visa on 11 February.   Reagan saw this development as a sign that his ‗quiet 
diplomacy‘ and his public statements were achieving results. At the Reykjavik Summit held in 
October that year, Reagan asked for more, presenting Gorbachev with a list of 1,200 Jews 
seeking exit visas and stating that ‗Soviet human rights policies were impeding the improvement 
of our relationship‘.279 But Reagan‘s greatest challenge to the USSR came the following year, 
when the President, standing in front of the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin, arguably made the 
best speech of his presidency.  
 President Reagan‘s Berlin Wall speech on 12 June 1987 represented the greatest 
challenge by an American leader to the Soviet Union to bring about real domestic and 
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international reform. While echoing John F. Kennedy‘s 1963 Berlin address,280 Reagan‘s 
language was considered too provocative by many in the State Department when he contrasted 
the success of the ‗free West‘ with the failures of the Soviet Union and the nations of the 
Warsaw Pact. Noting that in ‗in the 1950s Khrushchev [had] predicted, ‗We will bury you‘, 
Reagan pointed out that the West was enjoying ‗a level of prosperity and wellbeing 
unprecedented in all human history‘ while the communist world experienced ‗failure, 
technological backwardness‘ and ‗declining standards of health.‘ The ‗inescapable conclusion‘ 
of all this, he said, was that ‗freedom leads to prosperity‘.  By using the dramatic backdrop 
behind him, Reagan illustrated that despite Gorbachev‘s twin reforms of perestroika and 
glasnost, freedom was not enjoyed by all. He stated: 
Behind me stands a wall that encircles the free sectors of this city, part of a vast 
system of barriers that divides the entire continent of Europe. From the Baltic, 
south, those barriers cut across Germany in a gash of barbed wire, concrete, dog 
runs, and guard towers. Farther south, there may be no visible, no obvious wall. 
But there remain armed guards and checkpoints all the same—still a restriction on 
the right to travel, still an instrument to impose upon ordinary men and women 




Reagan stated that Gorbachev understood ‗the importance of freedom‘ albeit in a ‗limited way‘.  
Examples of this included the release of several political prisoners, freer economic 
experimentation and more freedom of information. ‗Are these the beginnings of profound 
changes in the Soviet State?‘ he asked, ‗Or are they token gestures, intended to raise false hopes 
in the West, or to strengthen the Soviet system without changing it?‘ The Soviet Union, Reagan 
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noted, found itself at a crossroad and faced a choice: ‗It must make fundamental changes, or it 
will become obsolete‘. And at that point in his speech, Reagan then ‗threw down the gauntlet‘. 
With the Berlin Wall behind him, and thousands of West Germans before him, Reagan said in 
thunderous voice: 
There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would 
advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary 
Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. 





The audience cheered rapturously at what was to become the most famous ‗sound bite‘ from the 
Reagan presidency.
283
 But again, what was Reagan‘s role in the crafting of this speech? 
Like the British Parliament address, the original drafts of the Berlin Wall speech are 
absent from the Reagan Archives, and so again history has to rely on the testimony of those who 
claim to have written the speech for answers to this question. And those who claim to have had a 
major role in doing so are numerous.
284
 Nevertheless, the most credible claim of authorship 
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belongs to Reagan‘s speechwriter, Peter Robinson, and like Anthony Dolan‘s experience with 
the British Parliament speech, he too had to overcome numerous hurdles within the White House 
before the President gave the address. As Robinson recalls: 
The speech was circulated to the State Department and the NSC three weeks 
before it was to be delivered. For three weeks, State and the NSC fought the 
speech. They argued that it was crude. They claimed that it was unduly 
provocative. They asserted that the passage about the Wall amounted to a cruel 
gimmick, one that would unfairly raise Berliners' hopes. There were telephone 
calls, memoranda, and meetings. State and the NSC submitted their own 
alternative drafts—as best I recall, there were seven…In each, the call for 
Gorbachev to tear down the Wall was missing.
285
 (Emphasis added). 
 
But President Reagan especially liked the ‗tear down the wall‘ line, and insisted that it would 
stay, arguing with the ‗pragmatists‘: 
‗Now, I‘m the President, aren‘t I?‘ 
‗Yes, sir!‘  
‗So, I get to decide?‘ 
‗Yes, sir!‘ 
‗Well, then the line stays in.‘286 
 And while Reagan did not write the speech, that central idea about the Berlin Wall coming down 
was his.  After all, he had first called on the Soviets to ‗tear down the wall‘ twenty years earlier, 
in a TV debate with Senator Robert Kennedy.
287
  Robinson freely admits that, ‗We, his 
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speechwriters, were not creating Reagan; we were stealing from him. Reagan's policies were 
straightforward—he had been articulating them for two decades.‘288  
In any event, the Soviet press agency Tass blasted Reagan for an ‗openly provocative, 
war-mongering speech‘.289 And yet, when Reagan visited Moscow the following year, the theme 
of Reagan‘s addresses, both public and private, continued to provide calls for radical reforms.   
 
Challenging Reform From Within the ‘Evil Empire’ 
The Moscow Summit, the final between Reagan and Gorbachev, was held in the summer of 1988 
(29 May-2 June). It was, above all else, a platform from which the President continued to 
challenge the Soviet Union to implement real reforms. However, by the time Reagan did visit the 
USSR, Gorbachev was facing internal revolt from party members who felt that his perestroika 
efforts were destabilizing and therefore extremely dangerous. He therefore welcomed Reagan‘s 
support, who was careful to temper his lecturing tone with praise for Gorbachev‘s efforts.  
 On the issue of religious freedom, Reagan‘s remarks were straightforward and to the 
point: everyone in the Soviet Union had the right to worship without state interference. Visiting 
the then recently restored Danilov Monastery in Moscow on the second day of the summit, 
Reagan said that he hoped that its restoration was ‗not an end in itself‘ but rather a sign of ‗a new 
policy of religious tolerance that will extend to all peoples of all faiths.‘290 The President singled 
out the still banned Ukrainian Catholic Church, a thorny issue especially to his Orthodox 
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audience, as an example where much more could be done.
291
 On the same day that Reagan 
addressed the religious issue, he forcefully defended other human rights. 
 Addressing a group of Soviet ‗dissidents‘ at the American Embassy, Reagan expounded 
his belief that human rights were universal, and consequently voiced his hope that the USSR 
would soon honor its obligations to its citizenry. The meeting had been organized in place of a 
visit to the home of Yuri and Tatyana Zieman—an appointment that, if kept, Reagan was 
informed, would doom their hopes for an exit visa.
292
 So, the meeting at the American Embassy 
was substituted instead. Reagan was sensitive to the embarrassment the meeting posed to the 
Soviet leadership, and was careful to praise the release of ‗300 political and religious prisoners‘ 
over the past three years and the increase in emigration from the USSR. However, despite this 
progress, he said that ‗the basic standards that the Soviet Union agreed to almost 13 years ago in 
the Helsinki Accords, or a generation ago in the Universal Declaration of Human rights, still 
need to be met‘.293 Reagan then quoted ‗chapter and verse‘ from that United Nations declaration 
and drew attention to the sections dealing with ‗Freedom of Religion‘, ‗Freedom of Speech‘ and 
‗Freedom of Travel‘.  After speaking personally with the dissidents gathered, Reagan concluded: 
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I came here hoping to do what I could to give you strength. Yet I already know 
that it is you who have strengthened me, you who have given me a message to 
carry back. While we press for human rights through diplomatic channels, you 
press with your very lives, day in, day out, year after year, risking your jobs, your 
homes, your all. You have the prayers and support of the American people, indeed 
of people throughout the world.
294
   
 
 Reagan‘s final challenge to the Soviets came on his last day in Moscow. In what the New 
York Times proclaimed to be ‗Reagan‘s finest oratorical hour‘295 his address to students at the 
Moscow State University walked a tight rope between ‗conciliation and subversion‘.296 In it, 
Reagan spoke of a tomorrow transformed by new technologies and of the virtue of a way of life 
marked by freedom of choice. His speech spoke of the ‗technological/information revolution‘ 
whose ‗emblem‘ was the ‗tiny silicon chip‘ that would ‗fundamentally alter‘ the world over the 
next decade.  ‗One individual with a desktop computer,‘ he said would be able to command 
‗resources unavailable to the largest governments just a few years ago‘.  To an audience raised to 
think that capitalism was about exploitation, Reagan painted an alternative picture of adventure: 
The explorers of the modern era are the entrepreneurs, men with vision, with the 
courage to take the risks and faith enough to brave the unknown.  These 
entrepreneurs and their small enterprises are responsible for almost all the 
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The key to the future, Reagan opined, was ‗freedom of thought, freedom of information and 
freedom of communication‘. And freedom, he pointed out, was about individualism, not 
government: 
 Freedom is the right to question and change the established way of doing things. 
It is the continuing revolution of the marketplace. It is the understanding that 
allows us to recognize shortcomings and seek solutions. It is the right to put forth 
an idea, scoffed at by the experts, and watch it catch fire among the people. It is 
the right to dream—to follow your dream or stick to your conscience, even if 
you‘re the only one in a sea of doubters. Freedom is the recognition that no single 
person, no single authority or government has a monopoly on the truth, but that 
every individual life is infinitely precious, that every one of us put on this world 
has been put there for a reason and has something to offer.
298
 (Emphasis added).  
 
Freedom: that was the essence of America‘s ideological origins, and the essence of 
Reagan‘s moral challenge to the USSR. The Moscow Summit‘s significance was not in 
any substantial arms agreements signed (the START I Treaty was not finalized), but 
rather the fact that Reagan had gone there in the first place and had from within 
challenged the Soviet people to move from state control to individual freedom. 
Considering the fact that freedom was about to sweep Eastern Europe the following year, 
and that the USSR itself would implode and embrace Western style capitalism and an 
increased amount of civil liberties, Reagan‘s words now seem prophetic. He was 
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The words condemn, engage, and challenge, could sum up the three phases of Reagan‘s 
ideological rhetoric against the USSR during his presidency. Of course, there were 
elements of all three at various times throughout Reagan‘s eight years in office, but in 
terms of the main emphasis of his speeches, this breakdown is apparent when looking at 
his major addresses and statements.  
For the first three years of the Reagan presidency, the main focus of his 
statements against the USSR was that of condemnation. From his first press conference 
where he painted the Soviets as willing to ‗commit any crime, to lie to cheat‘, to his 
statement that the communist system was ‗some bizarre chapter in human history whose 
last pages are even now being written‘, Reagan demonstrated in 1981 that the diplomatic 
niceties of the détente era were a thing of the past.  
In 1982 Reagan went further, asking the British Parliament, whether ‗freedom‘ 
would ‗wither in a quiet, deadening accommodation with totalitarian evil‘, or instead 
whether they would promote a campaign for democracy that would ‗leave Marxism-
Leninism on the ash heap of history‘.  
In 1983 this style of condemnation reached its zenith when the President labeled 
the USSR an ‗Evil Empire‘, and relations hit an all time low following Reagan‘s self-
written speech blasting the Soviets over the Korean Air-line ‗massacre‘; a speech where 
he painted the Soviets as unfeeling barbarians, stating that the attack was ‗the Soviet 
Union against the world and the moral precepts which guide human relations among 
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people everywhere.‘ Perhaps shaken with the thought that his rhetoric had made war 
more likely, (and nudged by his wife Nancy), Reagan changed his tone in 1984. 
 Reagan‘s January 1984 speech on US/Soviet relations marked the beginning of a 
new stage in Reagan‘s rhetoric, and was seen by most as a total ‗reversal‘ from the fiery 
language used in the past. While George Shultz believes that Reagan‘s speeches ‗never 
changed‘299 at all, this thesis argues that the emphasis did in fact transform over time, for 
the sections of his speeches prior that mentioned dialogue were drowned out by the other 
parts that spoke in denunciatory tones. No longer sending out ‗mixed messages‘, Reagan 
in his address demonstrated that he was willing to engage with the Soviets in a 
‗constructive dialogue‘. When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, Reagan had found his 
partner for this discourse, and that engagement was directed towards the cause of peace 
(as Chapter 10 will examine more closely). From engagement, Reagan moved to 
challenge. 
 Reagan was fortunate to be President at a time when the Soviet leadership was 
experimenting with internal reforms—the so called glasnost and perestroika—and he 
used this as leverage to push for an even greater transformation of Soviet society. Best 
summed up in the ‗Berlin Wall‘ address, Reagan challenged Gorbachev to be ‗serious‘ 
about reform; and if he was, then a process would begin leading to the dismantling of the 
divisions between East and West.  
 What this chapter demonstrates is that the rhetoric coming out of the White House 
during the Reagan years belonged to the President himself. In various cases, Reagan was 
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‗Speech-Writer-In-Chief‘, drafting his own addresses from start to finish, as was the case 
with his ‗Korean Air-Line Massacre‘ speech. In other situations, like his first press 
conference as President, Reagan held forth his ideological view of the Cold War conflict 
without any written guidance: he was simply stating his opinions. When speechwriters 
did write his addresses, Reagan played a key role in editing them, often inserting new 
ideas or re-writing them to sound much better (a skill he had developed over many years 
of writing radio addresses and delivering speeches). Finally, most of Reagan‘s 
speechwriters based their drafts on key ideas that the President himself had spoken of 
over past decades. As Robinson said, they ‗stole‘ from the President, not the other way 
round. And when controversial phrases like ‗ash-heap of history‘ and ‗tear down this 
wall‘ were vehemently opposed by the State Department and the NSC, Reagan chose to 
ignore the advice of the ‗pragmatists‘ and deliver the speech the way he wanted to. Thus, 
it can be concluded that the moral pronouncements of the Reagan presidency, which 
described the struggle with the USSR in ideological terms, were truly reflective of 
Reagan‘s beliefs and were either his own personal work, or the work of others that had 
his own imprimatur.  
 As Robert W. Tucker noted in Foreign Affairs at the end of Reagan‘s second term 
in office, the President was not the ‗rigid ideologue he was so regularly depicted as 
being‘, rather he ‗adjusted his vision to the circumstances conditioning and limiting the 
conduct of the nation‘s foreign policy.‘ This ‗adjustment‘  was not an abandonment of the 
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President‘s ‗vision‘, rather, ‗at the end of his presidency, Reagan could say, and 
apparently believe, that he had been entirely faithful to that vision.‘300 
 From Reagan‘s rhetoric, this study will now turn to the issue of Missile Defense 
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THE ORIGINS OF MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY 
 
“Advocates of the MAD policy (Mutual Assured Destruction) believed it had served a purpose: 
the balance of terror it created, they said, had prevented nuclear war for decades. But as far as 
I was concerned the MAD policy was madness. For the first time in history, man had the 
power to destroy mankind itself. A war between the superpowers would incinerate much of the 
world and leave what was left of it uninhabitable forever. There had to be some way to remove 





Of all the policies and initiatives that Ronald Reagan championed during his eight years as 
President, there was none that he held more precious than his stated desire to achieve an effective 
defense against nuclear missiles. To save the United States from the ‗terror of the bomb,‘ was to 
be Reagan‘s lasting gift to his fellow citizens. 
This chapter firstly reviews that the United States government began in 1983 a research 
program with the aim of accomplishing a technological breakthrough that would protect America 
from a nuclear weapons attack.  It examines the origins of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
technology, dating back to the presidency of Lyndon Johnson, and explores Reagan‘s personal 
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attachment to the idea of missile defense and the possible influences on him in this regard. It also 
looks at the re-emergence of missile defense in the 1980 Republican Party Platform and 
questions whether prior to becoming President, it was Reagan or his aides, who were more 
enthusiastic about putting ABM back on the national agenda.  
 
Missile Defense:  Reagan Administration Policy 
The development of missile defense technology was an enshrined goal of the United States 
Government in the 1980s. It was unveiled to the world on the night of 23 March 1983 when 
President Reagan, in a televised address to the nation on matters of national defense, told the 
watching audience that he had approved a program entitled the ‗Strategic Defense Initiative‘ 
(SDI) that sought ‗to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are 
defensive‘.302 To underscore the importance of this initiative, Reagan dedicated a segment of his 
second inaugural address on the topic (entirely written by the President), and on 21 January 1985 
declared: 
I have approved a research program to find, if we can, a security shield that will 
destroy nuclear missiles before they reach their target. It wouldn‘t kill people; it 
would destroy weapons. It wouldn‘t militarize space; it would help demilitarize 
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While many commentators considered Reagan‘s vision of making nuclear weapons ‗obsolete‘ 
absurd, and believed the science behind it to be ‗science fiction‘, it was not mere rhetoric for the 
American government. Reagan‘s National Security Decision Directive 85, signed on 25 March 
1983, started an expensive ball rolling: some $14.68 billion dollars was to be spent on research 
and development on missile defense between the years 1985-90.
304
  SDI was taken very seriously 
by the US government during the 1980s, to the extent that the National Security Council took the 
unusual and unprecedented step of releasing a ‗fact sheet‘ detailing the reasoning behind the 
controversial program. 
The 1985 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 172 was the most 
comprehensive explanation ever volunteered by the Reagan Administration for SDI. The 
document, released publicly on 1 June 1985, stated that the American government sought to 
achieve President Reagan‘s ‗vision‘ of a future where ‗national security did not rest upon the 
threat of nuclear retaliation, but rather on the ability to defend against potential attacks‘.305 
Research was to be conducted, it said, in a manner ‗wholly compatible with the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty‘ and indeed this would be a ‗hedge‘ against Soviet advancement in ABM 
technology.  Furthermore, it stated that ‗the aim of SDI is not to seek superiority‘, and that the 
program was not ‗offensive in nature‘. Rather, the ‗research program aimed at seeking better 
ways to ensure U.S. and allied security, using the increased contribution of defenses—defenses 
                                                     
304
  Weinberger, Fighting For Peace, p. 312. 
305




that threaten no one.‘306 But the document also made clear that, while the program was not 
offensive in nature, it would greatly enhance America‘s deterrent capability: 
Successful SDI research and development of defense options would not lead 
to abandonment of deterrence, but rather to an enhancement of deterrence and 
an evolution in the weapons of deterrence through the contribution of 
defensive systems that threaten no one. We would deter a potential aggressor 
by making it clear that we could deny him the gains he might otherwise hope 





Ultimately, however, the Reagan Administration‘s main aim with SDI was to give a sense of 
‗peace and freedom‘ to the American people, as hitherto there had been no defense against 
incoming missiles for the general population and only the ability to seek revenge through a 
reprisal nuclear attack. While ‗a general defense against ballistic missiles‘ would have 
‗technological options‘ that would ‗certainly also increase the survivability‘ of America‘s 
‗retaliatory forces‘, the main emphasis of SDI was ‗to provide the basis for eliminating the 
general threat posed by ballistic missiles.‘308 In this final regard, Reagan‘s ABM system was far 
more ambitious in scope than the systems proposed by the Johnson and Nixon Administrations 
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ABM under Presidents Johnson and Nixon  
The American missile defense programs prior to the Reagan presidency were proposed not for 
the purpose of achieving an effective defense against ballistic missiles, but rather to match Soviet 
advances in this field so that America might in the future use its ABM systems as a bargaining 
chip in arms limitation negotiations.  
 America‘s ABM program began in earnest during the Johnson Administration, and as the 
President made clear it was a program he considered a useless waste of time and money. 
Announced by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on 18 September 1967, the Sentinel 
program was publicly touted as a necessary expenditure to offset the threat of Chinese ballistic 
missiles. The reason why the USSR was not included as a factor was due to the limited nature of 
the deployment: critics could point out that all the Soviets needed to overwhelm such a system 
would be to launch more missiles at it. Also, McNamara explained that were the system to be 
deployed with the USSR in mind, it would spur a new arms race, which he considered insane 
saying:  ‗What the world requires in the 22nd year of its atomic age is not a race towards new 
armament‘ but rather a ‗new race towards reasonableness.‘309 President Johnson strongly agreed 
with McNamara, as his letter to Soviet leader Kosygin earlier that year had demonstrated. In it, 
Johnson advocated negotiations to achieve ‗an understanding‘ which would ‗curb the strategic 
arms race‘.  In particular, the President wished to stop a new arms race in the field of ABM 
systems. He wrote:  
I think you must realize that following the deployment by you of an anti-ballistic 
missile system I face great pressures from the Members of Congress and from public 
opinion not only to deploy defensive systems in this country, but also to increase 
greatly our capabilities to penetrate any defensive systems which you might establish. 
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If we should feel compelled to make such major increases in our strategic 
weapons capabilities, I have no doubt that you would in turn feel under compulsion 
to do likewise. We would thus have incurred on both sides colossal costs without 
substantially enhancing the security of our own peoples or contributing to the 




Unfortunately for Johnson, the USSR was not prepared to engage in meaningful discussions with 
a ‗lame duck President‘ during his final year in office, and thus decided to wait for his successor, 
Richard M. Nixon, to take the helm.  And what Johnson had hoped for, Nixon was able to 
achieve. 
 President Nixon shared Johnson‘s ‗game plan‘ in the hope of achieving the same result: 
continue with ABM deployment, and use it as a bargaining chip to halt any widespread missile 
defense program by the USSR. When Nixon became President in 1969, there were those who 
warned that a continuance of ABM research and deployment could endanger arms limitation 
talks with the Soviets. Nixon considered them to be naïve, and plain wrong.  He knew that the 
Soviets had begun the deployment of 40 ABMs around Moscow, in addition to installing 
advanced radar systems. Without any ABM system of their own, America could not negotiate 
away the Soviet‘s ABM system, without having to give up something else; perhaps something 
‗more vital‘.311 Nixon thus proposed a reduced ABM program that he re-named Safeguard, and 
engaged in an all-out White House effort to secure the Senate‘s support for funding. He achieved 
this, but only with Vice President Spiro Agnew casting the tie-breaking vote. As Nixon 
recounted: ‗I am absolutely convinced that had we lost the ABM battle in the Senate, we would 
                                                     
310
  Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 479-80. 
311
  Nixon, Memoirs, p. 416. 
155 
 
not have been able to negotiate the first nuclear arms control agreement in Moscow in 1972.
312
 
The ABM system funded, Nixon had his bargaining chip, and he would use it to negotiate away 
its existence.  
 The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972) signed by President Nixon and Soviet leader 
Leonid Brezhnev hoped to cement permanently a ban on any large scale missile defense 
program. The treaty limited each nation to two sites for ABM deployment,
313
 thereby leaving the 
rest of the population vulnerable to a possible nuclear attack. Nixon believed that this saved the 
United States a fortune, as he later wrote: ‗The ABM treaty stopped what inevitably would have 
become a defensive arms race, with untold billions of dollars being spent on each side for more 
and more ABM coverage‘.314 It also codified ‗Mutual Assured Destruction‘ (MAD) as the basis 
for America‘s security in the nuclear age. As Nixon recounted, the Treaty aimed to:  
make permanent the concept of deterrence through ‗mutual terror‘: by giving up 
missile defense each side was leaving its population and territory hostage to a 





MAD was the concept that were a nuclear power to launch an attack against another nuclear 
power, the other side would respond in a similar fashion, bringing about an equal level of 
destruction to the nation that had initiated the nuclear exchange. To order a nuclear strike, 
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therefore, would be suicidal.  A comprehensive missile defense program would make MAD less 
clear cut, for if a country had the ability to knock down incoming nuclear missiles, they might 
also be tempted to make a first strike without fear of reprisal.
316
  
Reagan was Governor of California when the ABM Treaty was signed, and any 
misgivings that he may have had about the policy were kept to himself. It was only when Reagan 
began to think of himself as the next Commander-in-Chief that he seriously looked at the issue of 
ABM technology and the concept of MAD. When Reagan began to think these matters through, 
others were there to take his musings and move towards making them policy. 
 
Reagan’s Visit to NORAD 
In the many writings about Reagan and the origins of SDI, one event remains central in all 
explanations for the President‘s later enthusiasm for missile defense technology: his so called 
‗epiphany‘ on Cheyenne Mountain. On 31 July 1979, Reagan, still an undeclared candidate for 
the presidency, visited the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), situated at 
Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. With him was Martin Anderson, an economics professor from 
the Hoover Institute and former adviser to President Nixon. As Anderson recounts in his book 
Revolution,
317
 Reagan was given an extensive briefing on the purpose of NORAD, which 
Anderson described as ‗the nerve centre of a far-flung, worldwide network of radar detectors that 
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alerts us to any surprise attack‘. After several hours of being informed about the respective 
strengths of the American and Soviet nuclear capabilities, Reagan and Anderson were brought 
into the command centre, where the reality of America‘s vulnerability to nuclear attack dawned 
on Reagan. 
Standing before a large screen, several stories high, with a digital map of the United 
States displayed, Reagan received a briefing about how a nuclear attack would be tracked with 
the latest in technology. Anderson described it as being like out of a ‗movie‘, with ‗young men 
and women‘ monitoring radar screens, looking for ‗the first sign of a nuclear attack.‘ As was 
explained to Reagan by General James Hill, any incoming nuclear missile would be detected by 
the radar system before them. At this point Reagan asked, ‗And what would happen then?‘ Hill 
informed Reagan that nothing could be done to intercept the incoming weapon; all that they 
could do would be to alert the President, and watch as a major American city was destroyed. 
Reagan shook his head in dismay. For him, this was simply unacceptable.  
 On the flight back to California, Reagan pondered what he had seen at NORAD, and it 
left him feeling disturbed.  He did not like the concept of a ‗naked‘ United States, unable to 
defend against a nuclear strike. Of course Reagan knew that the ABM Treaty had put an end to 
the idea of a national missile defense program and that the United States relied on the theory of 
‗Mutual Assured Destruction‘ to ensure its security. But having stood before the actual screen 
that would display an incoming nuclear attack and discussing the possible scenarios that would 
then unfold, Reagan had had an awakening. Nuclear defense in his mind had moved from the 
theoretical sphere to the plane of reality. And considering that Reagan believed himself to be the 
next man to sit in the Oval Office, those scenarios took on an added weight of seriousness. After 
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all, it could be Reagan receiving that phone call from NORAD informing him that a ‗nuclear 
Armageddon‘ was on its way.  
Examining the options available for a Commander-in-Chief when informed of a nuclear 
attack on the US, Reagan pondered the need for a return to a missile defense program. 
Discussing what General Hall had briefed him about, Reagan said that a ‗President has two 
untenable options‘ upon receiving the phone call from NORAD that a strike was imminent: 
‗One, sit back and watch a major city be destroyed or two, order a counter launch that would kill 
millions of innocent Russian civilians.‘ Reagan looked out the window and said, ‗There must be 
another way‘. The other way, obviously was defense and Reagan said to Anderson that there had 
to be ‗some way of defending ourselves against nuclear missiles‘. In response, Anderson raised 
the matter of the ABM Treaty, which placed severe limitations on such an endeavor. The two 
then discussed the possibility that since the 1972 ABM Treaty new technologies could make 
missile defense more plausible, and therefore, worth pursuing. Reagan agreed that it was an idea 
worth investigating, and instructed Anderson to get back to him about it. This conversation may 
have sown the seeds of what would become SDI four years later; in the very least, Reagan‘s visit 
to NORAD gave him something to think about, even if he was as yet still uncommitted to missile 
defense. 
  
Missile Defense and the 1980 Presidential Campaign 
Reagan‘s 1980 campaign for President was a tightly scripted affair; a script that included no 
discussion on missile defense technology. Reagan generally obeyed his manager‘s directives to 
stay ‗on message‘, deviating only once to talk about missile defense. Since Reagan had the 
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image of a ‗trigger happy cowboy‘, it was decided that it would be better for Reagan to speak 
about the general themes of ‗Peace through Strength‘ rather than going into the specifics of 
American nuclear strategy. However, Reagan‘s accessibility to reporters during his bus tour 
through New Hampshire during the primary season meant that Reagan could be questioned in 
depth regarding nuclear policy. It was then, and only then, that Reagan spoke about his 
experience at NORAD and the possibility that missile defense technology might be an endeavor 
worth pursuing. 
 Aboard Reagan‘s campaign bus in March 1980, Los Angeles Times reporter Robert 
Scheer had a rare, unscripted conversation with the candidate on the issue of nuclear missiles, 
and Reagan held forth his view that a security that rested on the MAD theory was unacceptable 
and that missile defense perhaps was a better alternative.  Scheer asked Reagan how many Soviet 
missiles would reach the US in the case of a nuclear attack, and Reagan gave a figure of ‗87 to 
96 percent‘.  When asked his source for this figure, Reagan informed his listener of his trip to 
NORAD, saying: ‗You know, we can track the missiles if they were fired, we can track them all 
the way from firing to know their time of arrival and their targets, and we couldn‘t do anything 
to stop the missiles.‘318 Reagan said that he was amazed by these tracking abilities, which 
included ‗tracking a glove lost by an astronaut that is still circling the earth‘, but that he was also 
struck by ‗the irony that here, with this great technology of ours, we can do all of this yet we 
cannot stop any of the weapons that are coming at us.‘ Turning to the ABM Treaty and the 
concept of MAD which underpinned it, Reagan said: 
They [the Soviets] violated and we kept to the promise that McNamara, in the 
original getting together [agreed to] and what resulted in doing away with our 
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antiballistic missile system, at a time when we were ahead of them in technology on 
that. The idea was the Mutual Assured Destruction plan—MAD, the MAD policy, it 
was called—and what this policy said was that if neither country defended its 
citizenry, then neither country could afford to push the button, because they would 
know that in an exchange of weapons, both countries‘ populations would be 
decimated. And they didn‘t hold to that…We paid no attention to the fact that the 
Soviet Union had put a high-ranking general, who was on the Politburo, in a high 
command, in charge of civil defense. And they had come to the conclusion that there 
could be a nuclear war and it could be winnable—by them…One of the first things I 
would do would be to turn to those who are knowledgeable in military affairs, 
knowledgeable in the weaponry that would be coming at us, and so forth, to find out 
what we could do. Now, it could well be that maybe there is another defense, maybe 
there is a defense through having superior offensive ability to keep them from doing 
this.  (Emphasis added). 
 
Scheer would later observe that Reagan was ‗longing for the ultimate anti-ballistic missile 
weapon‘, but nowhere in Reagan‘s somewhat rambling reply did he ever explicitly state this. 
Indeed, speaking of possessing ‗superior offensive ability‘ to keep the Soviets from attacking is 
classic nuclear deterrence, not missile defense. Reagan was clearly cautious.  Martin Anderson, 
on the other hand, was not hesitant at all: missile defense was going to be part of the Republican 
agenda, whether Reagan was 100% committed or not.  
 At the Republican National Convention of 1980, missile defense was again placed on the 
agenda, but it would take a long time for Reagan to pursue the idea with anything more than a 
passing interest. Anderson had not forgotten his conversation with Reagan following the 
NORAD visit the year earlier, and he confirmed in an interview with the author that the inclusion 
of missile defense in the party‘s platform, while his own work, was based on that conversation 
with Reagan.
319
 The Republican ‗plank‘ read that the US would pursue a ‗vigorous research and 
development of an effective anti-ballistic missile system, such as is already at hand in the Soviet 
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Union, as well as more modern ABM technologies‘. Considering that this was but one sentence 
in a document of over 34,000 words, the plank passed almost unnoticed by the media. But, 
Anderson had put a lot of thought into missile defense and he did not want to leave it with a 
single sentence in the platform: he wished to lay the intellectual foundation for the Reagan team 
to proceed with a missile defense program as soon as their man became President. 
 In a 1980 campaign memorandum for Reagan, Anderson advocated a renewed effort to 
establish an ABM system. The document represents the first written policy paper on such a new 
missile defense program, and demonstrates that Anderson, again, was the main proponent. He 
began his memo with a brief history of the ABM programs saying: ‗During the early 1970s there 
was a great debate about whether or not this country should build an anti-ballistic missile 
system‘. The result of that debate was that ‗the ABM lost, and is now prohibited‘. However, 
Anderson asked whether ‗it is now time to seriously reconsider the concept‘. He gave his reasons 
as follows: 
To begin with, such a system concentrates on defense, on making sure that enemy 
missiles never strike U.S soil. And that idea is probably fundamentally far more 
appealing to the American people than the questionable satisfaction of knowing that 
those who initiated an attack against us were also blown away. Moreover, the 
installation of an effective protective missile system would also prevent even an 
accidental missile from landing. Of course, there is the question of feasibility…but 
there have apparently been striking advances in missile technology during the past 
decade or so that would make such a system technically possible.  
If it could be done, it would be a major step toward redressing the balance of 
power, and it would be a purely defensive step. Taken in conjunction with a 
reasonable buildup in our conventional forces, and an acceleration in the 
development of cruise missiles, laser beam technology, and conventional nuclear 
missiles like the MX, the development of an effective protective missile system might 
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go a long way toward establishing the kind of national security that will be necessary 
in the 1980s.
320
 (Emphasis added). 
 
Upon receiving this memo from Anderson, Reagan was at first dubious: ‗Can we do it?‘ he 
asked. ‗Is the technology available?‘ Reagan also questioned how long it would take to build 
such a system, and at what cost to the tax payer.
321
  John Sears, Reagan‘s campaign manager, 
similarly remembers Reagan as being highly skeptical of missile defense at the time. As he 
relayed to author Francis Fitzgerald:  
There were a lot of ideal worlds in Reagan‘s mind, and sometimes he lived in them. 
But this one he’d argue himself out of quite quickly. He‘d quickly come back to 
reality…Of course, he was never for deterrence in the sense of two men with pistols 
pointed at each other‘s heads. It was simply his instinct that we should get the edge in 
all places, and the idea of a missile defense appealed to him along these lines...He 




Still, the ABM proponents did not relent, and continued to lobby Reagan to support their hopes 
for a missile defense program. Senator Malcolm Wallop, a Republican from Wyoming, who had 
sent Reagan a draft of his Strategic Review article on the benefits of missile defense technology 
in 1979, followed the matter up with Reagan when the two met at a barbeque hosted by Senator 
Laxalt of Nevada in 1980. Reagan, ever the gentleman, praised the Senator‘s article and 
promised that if elected, he would investigate the issue. However, this was without the assurance 
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that he would proceed with an ABM program.
323
 Similarly, Daniel O. Graham, a friend of 
Richard Allen, and former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, briefed Reagan on the 
findings of the ‗Team B‘ and went further than his briefing to propose that Reagan create a space 
based defense system. Reagan, according to Graham, was ‗very interested‘ and ‗started asking 
questions‘. But, Allen was not pleased: for as much as he himself supported ABM technologies 
he did not want the candidate talking about them.
324
 It does not seem as though Allen had to 
worry: Reagan was not talking about ABM systems anyway, as he only had a passing interest in 
the matter. It is clear that no-one, not even Anderson, held much sway in influencing Reagan to 
adopt a posture for missile defense. Accordingly, some have speculated that Reagan‘s later zeal 
for SDI had its origins not in Reagan‘s political past, but rather in his former career as a 
Hollywood actor. It is this notion that is explored next herein. 
 
SDI: A Hollywood Connection? 
Reagan‘s craft was acting, and his background was Hollywood. For most of Reagan‘s working 
life, his daily routine had revolved around movie sets, costumes, lights, cameras and above all 
else, learning one‘s lines. Reagan‘s entrance into politics had only come when his acting career 
was all but over, and his election as Governor of California came at an age when most men are 
contemplating retirement. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that his years in Hollywood 
had a profound and lasting impact on his life and continued to be a reference point when he left 
‗Tinsel Town‘ for Sacramento, and then Washington. As many people noted, when President 
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Reagan told stories from his past to make a point, it was inevitably a story from his days as an 
actor, and rarely from his days as Governor of California.  Did Reagan find inspiration for the 
SDI program not from a military briefing book but rather from a Hollywood script? Some would 
say yes. 
 The main advocate of this theory, Michael Rogin, a political scientist at the University of 
California at Berkley, proposed in the mid-1980s that President Reagan‘s background as a 
Hollywood movie star had had a profound impact on his thinking, and that SDI may have 
originated from Reagan‘s love of the cinema.325  
Reagan used lines and images from movies regularly. During the New Hampshire debate 
in the Presidential campaign of 1980 when the moderator instructed the technician to ‗turn Mr. 
Reagan‘s microphone off‘, Reagan shot back, ‗I‘m paying for this microphone, Mr. Breen!‘—
words originally spoken by Spencer Tracy who played a Presidential candidate in Frank Capra's 
1948 movie State of the Union.  Later, as President, Reagan started to compare himself to 
Sylvester Stallone‘s movie character ‗Rambo‘326, and quoted Clint Eastwood‘s famous line, ‗Go 
ahead: make my day‘.327  But looking at SDI in particular, Rogin began his research into the 
Hollywood connection by first examining in detail all the movies that Reagan had starred in, for 
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if Reagan was to be using lines from a script, it made sense that it would be those scripts that he 
had been compelled to memorize.  
While watching Reagan‘s 1940 movie ‗Murder in the Air‘, a Warner Brothers spy movie 
in which Reagan played the role of a secret agent who was commissioned to protect the ‗Inertia 
Projector‘ weapon, Rogin found an uncanny resemblance to SDI‘s purpose and the language 
Reagan would later use to describe it. In the film, the ‗Inertia Projector‘ uses supersonic 
technology to paralyze all enemy aircraft and it is claimed that in doing so it ‗not only makes the 
United States invincible in war, but, in doing so, promises to become the greatest force for world 
peace ever discovered‘.  Reagan would later describe SDI in a similar vein, writing: ‗If I had to 
choose the single most important reason, on the United States side, for the historic 
breakthroughs…in the quest for peace and a better relationship with the Soviet Union, I would 
say it was the Strategic Defense Initiative…‘328 Rogin also discovered another movie about 
missile defenses, namely Alfred Hitchcok‘s 1966 film, Torn Curtain, from which Reagan 
undoubtedly drew material from.  
In Torn Curtain, Paul Newman‘s character, ‗Professor Michael Armstrong‘, uses 
language directly linked to Reagan‘s 1983 SDI speech. In one scene, ‗Armstrong‘ promises: ‗We 
will produce a defensive weapon that will make all nuclear weapons obsolete, and thereby 
abolish the terror of nuclear warfare‘.  The term ‗obsolete‘ would make its way into Reagan‘s 
1983 SDI speech when one of the speechwriters re-wrote the main section relating to it, to 
declare that SDI, if successful, would render nuclear weapons ‗impotent and obsolete’. The 
speechwriter? Ronald Reagan. The unconventional source for this term did not go unnoticed in 
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the White House, as various Hitchcock fans picked up immediately from where Reagan had 
lifted it from.  
Were Hollywood movies the source for Reagan‘s thinking about missile defense? The 
record would suggest not: if Reagan was so enamored with the idea of missile defense because of 
these movies, then he would have been a strong supporter of ABM systems for decades before 
becoming President. As this account demonstrates, even in the year of his election to the 
presidency, Reagan remained uncertain about a missile defense program.  However, a strong 
case can be made that the language Reagan later used to describe SDI, found inspiration from his 
background in Hollywood. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has established that an American missile defense program did not originate during 
the Reagan presidency, but rather found its genesis during the Johnson and Nixon 
Administrations. However, as the historical record testifies, both Johnson and Nixon had no 
desire to create a national missile defense system, and their programs—Sentinel and Safeguard—
were established as ‗bargaining chips‘, so that the US could negotiate away their existence with 
the USSR.  Inherent in this thinking was a reliance on the MAD doctrine for security, and a 
belief that ABM technologies would spur on an expensive arms race, which would be 
counterproductive. The Reagan Administration‘s stated objective of a nationwide missile defense 
program moving away from MAD, therefore, was a dramatic departure from precedent.  
 The origins of Reagan‘s 1983 embrace of defensive technology can be found only in 
musings on the topic following his 1979 visit to the NORAD facility in Colorado. There, Reagan 
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saw the reality of America‘s vulnerability to a ballistic missile strike—a vulnerability that caused 
him to question whether better technology would make a defensive program more feasible. 
However, they remained only ruminations, and despite the intensive efforts of Martin Anderson 
and others to convince Reagan to jump aboard the ‗missile defense wagon‘, he refused to do so.  
Consequently, the following chapter will investigate how SDI later came to such prominence in 
the Reagan Administration, and will ask: did the missile defense proponents finally convince 















Chapter 6  
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 
 
“The Strategic Defense Initiative was not a „bargaining chip‟ and we were going to stick with 





The term ‗fanatical‘ cannot be applied to Ronald Reagan regarding his pursuit of any part of his 
domestic or international policies, save one: the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). When it came 
to SDI, Reagan was fanatically attached to the program with a zeal that none could diminish nor 
take away; not even when the stakes were the highest; not even when Reagan was offered a 
nuclear-free world in exchange for his ‗dream‘ of missile defense.  
As the preceding chapter demonstrates, Reagan had no such passion for an ABM 
program before becoming President, and as this chapter documents, during the first two years of 
his presidency, he remained uncommitted to the idea. But, by March of 1983 something had 
changed, and the man who was indifferent to missile defense suddenly became its most ardent 
advocate. It was at that time when Reagan circumvented the entire system of checks and 
balances that exists within the executive branch, and announced to the world that missile defense 
was going to become the centre-piece of his strategy to make nuclear weapons ‗impotent and 
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obsolete‘. Reagan, who usually allowed decisions to come to him, stunned his advisers by this 
assertive action and the news caught the international community, and the Soviets in particular, 
off guard. This chapter determines why Reagan became the most enthusiastic and fervent 
proponent of missile defense, and will detail how he remained dedicated to the cause for the 
remainder of his presidency, despite the most heated of exchanges with Mikhail Gorbachev.  
 
Rumblings within the Administration 
During the Reagan years, those within the administration felt empowered by the President‘s 
passivity to undertake whatever action they felt was best if they had received but the slightest 
nod of approval from Reagan, and missile defense was no exception. As Reagan aide John Sears 
related, the President largely gave his subordinates a free hand: 
You could do almost anything you wanted and you didn‘t have to check with 
anybody. You could do all these amazing things…Reagan wasn‘t involved…He 
let everybody—as long as they stayed within a little bit of framework—do 
anything they wanted…What he was doing in his speeches was stating limits in 
the form of principles. He didn‘t like to retreat from those, but in the application 
of them he was ready for anybody around him to tell him, ‗Well, this is an 
exception.‘ Or ‗This is a little different application.‘ And he‘d say, ‗OK, fine!‘ As 





 Candidate Reagan‘s musings about his abhorrence for a security that was based on the MAD 
doctrine led others to conclude that, as President, Reagan would pursue a missile defense 
program, despite the fact that whenever the topic was raised, Reagan himself would ‗shoot 
down‘ the idea by questioning its costs and the possibilities of existing technology. However, 
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with a condescension that often treated America‘s oldest President as a mere Dauphin to be 
handled by his court,
331
 members of Reagan‘s Administration engaged in a concerted effort to 
get missile defense back on the agenda, with the hope of eventually convincing the President to 
put aside billions of dollars of tax payers‘ money to fund what was then only considered a 
‗science fiction fantasy‘. 
Despite the need to restore existent military power, both conventional and nuclear, and 
despite the President‘s own emphasis on implementing first an ‗economic stimulus program‘, 
within weeks of Reagan‘s inauguration missile defense enthusiasts within the Administration 
began putting together what would be the foundations of SDI. It began, as many things did 
during that period, with Richard Allen.  
As the President‘s National Security Adviser, Richard Allen held the position once 
occupied and made famous by Henry Kissinger, and before Al Haig as Secretary of State had 
destroyed his ambitions,
332
 Allen was determined to use that position to enact massive changes, 
just as Kissinger had done a decade before him. Again enlisting General Daniel Graham as his 
expert in the field, Allen had Graham give a presentation to Chief Counselor to the President, 
Edwin Meese III on missile defense. Graham, at that time was heading a non-profit missile 
defense lobby group called ‗High Frontier‘, whose members included the famous nuclear 
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 and former undersecretary of the Army Karl Bendetsen. Graham‘s 
presentation was a preview of an article he was writing for the 1981 spring issue of Strategic 
Review entitled, ‗Toward a New U.S Strategy: Bold Strokes Rather Than Increments‘.334 In that 
article, Graham spoke of what he hoped for from a Reagan presidency: an end to security based 
on MAD, and a rejection of the 1970s policy of détente which he labeled a ‗graceful 
accommodation to the power of adversaries‘. As the title of the article suggests, Graham also 
condemned an incremental arms race that would be self defeating (as the Soviets could catch up 
with relative ease) and called instead for a ‗bold‘ move in the area of space weaponry that would 
leave the Soviets so far behind, that they would be unable to match American technical 
superiority any time soon. Graham‘s overall pitch impressed Meese, even if his example of a 
spaced based system involving ‗space cruisers‘ in constant orbit awaiting a Soviet missile 
launch, did not.  After the meeting, Meese asked Allen to prepare a memo on space defenses, 
which Allen did, arguing that Reagan could use the issue to rally the American people behind his 
leadership with the chant, ‗Defense, defense!‘. 335 Meese then gave the go ahead to proceed, 
albeit in an unconventional manner.  
 Though two of the most powerful men in the White House, the Chief Counsel to the 
President and the National Security Adviser, both backed missile defense research, they 
advocated an investigation into its feasibility by experts outside of government. As Martin 
Anderson explains in his book, the usual procedure would have been to place the matter before 
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the Defense Department to study the issue in depth, and they would then make a judgment as to 
whether or not they wished to re-visit ABM technology nearly a decade after they had shelved it. 
The chances of the Pentagon coming back with a positive view, however, seemed slim. 
Consequently, an outside committee funded by private donations had to be used, and which 
group would be better utilized than the ‗High Frontier‘ lobbyists already in existence? Meese 
helped them out by asking Reagan‘s campaign supporters to make additional payments towards 
this new endeavor and had regular meetings with them throughout 1981 to gauge the progress of 
their investigations. Meanwhile, as mentioned in Chapter 2, NSDD-12, which came into effect in 
October 1981, included a small section on developing ‗air and space defenses‘—a clear sign that 
Allen and Meese were hoping that the President would react favorably to the ‗High Frontier‘ 
investigation then under way. By the end of 1981, the commission had canvassed various experts 
in the field, written a comprehensive report and was prepared for a face to face meeting with the 
President to sell its proposal. 
 The meeting was a flop. After weeks of silence from the White House following the 
tabling of their report in November, Edwin Meese gave into complaints and hastily arranged a 
fifteen minute audience with the President. Graham and Bendetsen were called on 7 January 
1982 and were told to come to the Oval Office the following day—Edward Teller, for some 
inexplicable reason, was not invited. Armed with a condensed version of their report for Reagan 
to read (one and a half pages, as instructed) the two came to the Oval Office with high hopes. 
But their presentation was nothing new: the Soviets, they claimed, were on the verge of a 
significant advancement of anti-ballistic missile technology, and should the United States not 
begin its own research and development effort, the Soviets would possess a ‗first strike 
capability‘ that would seriously undermine the strategic balance between the Superpowers. The 
173 
 
defense posture of the United States, they said, should be to move beyond ‗mutual assured 
destruction‘ and towards ‗assured survival‘. This could only occur if the President took a 
momentous step towards this future by taking the course that they promoted: a full blown and 
intensive government funded project that would give America the ability to defend itself against 
nuclear attack.  
The President was gracious, and listened intently. However, as he had done during the 
campaign, he raised two roadblocks: existing technological potential and costs. The meeting 
broke up with Reagan as uncommitted as ever: he promised to consult with Secretary of Defense 
Caspar Weinberger, thus putting the issue back in the Pentagon where Graham and Bendetsen 
knew that investing in ABM had already been ruled out.
336
 Disappointed, the two left the White 
House wondering why the conservative Republicans in office were less interested in missile 
defense than Jimmy Carter had been. It would be over a year later that they would find that their 
hopes had not been as displaced as they then imagined: Reagan was going to ‗do a 180‘ and 
become the President that they had hoped and envisioned he would be. 
 
1983: SDI Emerges 
There are two accounts of just how missile defense was put back on the agenda, and both revolve 
around a meeting the President had with the Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff (JCS). According to Reagan‘s 
account, it was he who, somewhat out of character, presented the military with a proposal and 
asked them to get to work on it. This is how Reagan recalls the event in his memoirs:  
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Early in my first term, I called a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—our military 
leaders—and said to them: ‗Every offensive weapon ever invented by man has 
resulted in the creation of a defense against it; isn‘t it possible in this age of 
technology that we could invent a defensive weapon that could intercept nuclear 
weapons and destroy them as they emerged from their silos?‘ 
They looked at each other, then asked if they could huddle for a few 
moments. Very shortly, they came out of their huddle and said, ‗Yes, it‘s an idea 
worth exploring‘. My answer was, ‗Let‘s do it.‘ So the SDI was born….337 
 
Caspar Weinberger, in his memoirs, has a different recollection of how SDI came to be, and 
again, it surrounds a meeting with the Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff. He wrote: 
My own feeling is that the issue was finally and completely decided in the 
President‘s mind after a meeting in the Cabinet room that he and I had with the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 11, 1983. At that meeting we discussed the 
ABM Treaty, my own basic objections to it, and the vulnerable position in which 
I thought it had left us. My concerns had only grown as we learned more and 
more about the Soviet‘s unilateral program to develop very comprehensive 
strategic defenses—ones that threatened increasingly to render our missiles 
ineffective.  
At that meeting of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral James Watkins and General 
Jack Vessey, the Chairman, both advised the President of the importance in their 
eyes of our developing a defensive system. Admiral Watkins, Chief of Naval 
Operations, and now Secretary of Energy, summed it up in a memorable phrase; I 
knew from the President‘s immediate reaction that it would stay in his mind as the 
ultimate and complete justification for proceeding with such a system. 
After discussing the possibilities of our obtaining such a system, Admiral 
Watkins asked rhetorically, ‘would it not be better if we could develop a system 
that would protect, rather than avenge, our people’?  
‗Exactly,‘ said the President. I knew then that the President would want us 
to work intensively to obtain that system. Admiral Watkin‘s phrase had summed 
up most succinctly and simply the great hopes that the development of such a 
system would bring. 
338
 (Emphasis added) 
 
                                                     
337
  Reagan, An American Life, pp. 547-548. 
338
  Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 304. 
175 
 
Weinberger‘s account has the President responding to what Admiral Watkin‘s said; not the other 
way round. Watkins, it seems, had met with Edward Teller in early January and had run past the 
idea of missile defense to the other Chiefs, who had concurred with him to include the matter as 
one of five options dealing with America‘s strategic position to present the President with.339 
Reagan‘s diary account, written the day of the meeting, seems to agree that it was Watkins and 
not the President who floated the idea at the meeting. He wrote:  
An almost 2hr. lunch with Joint Chiefs of Staff. Most of time spent on MX & the 
commission, etc. Out of it came a super idea. So far the only policy worldwide on 
nuclear weapons is to have a deterrent. What if we tell the world we want to 
protect our people, not avenge them; that we‘re going to embark on a program of 
research to come up with a defensive weapon that could make nuclear weapons 
obsolete? I would call upon the scientific community to volunteer in bringing 
such a thing about.
340
 (Emphasis added). 
 
‗Out of it came a super-idea‘, Reagan wrote, not ‗they responded to my idea‘. Did Reagan‘s gift 
of storytelling prompt him to exaggerate his role in the formulation of SDI so as to make himself 
the main protagonist, the ‗leading man‘ of the drama? Perhaps not. According to Anneleise 
Anderson, a former member of the Reagan Administration who has co-written a biography on 
the President, both accounts are correct: Reagan raised the idea with the Joint-Chiefs- of Staff 
who several months later came back to him agreeing that it was time to look anew at missile 
defense technology. According to Anderson, Edwin Meese confirmed this as he was present at 
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 Furthermore, Shultz mentions this version of events in his memoirs, (though 
his account is vague).
342
 Also, the day following the announcement of SDI, Reagan said: 
I‘ve been having this idea, and it‘s been kicking around in my mind for some time 
here recently. And constantly I have thought about the fact that the nuclear missile 
seems to be one of the only major weapon systems in history that has never 
produced or brought about a defense against itself. And I brought this up one day 
in a meeting [at] which the Chiefs of Staff were present and others, and we talked 
about it and discussed it and then discussed it some more.
343
 (Emphasis added). 
 
If one ascribes to the theory that the earliest account is generally the most authentic, then these 
remarks would seem to confirm that Reagan did originally raise the matter with the JCS. 
Furthermore, in a l986 letter to his friend Laurence Beilenson, Reagan again gave his version of 
events, describing how the JCS responded to his idea to ‗devise a weapon that could destroy 
missiles as they came out of their silos‘.344  Whatever the case, Reagan took the idea and ran with 
it. As soon as the military brass gave him the ‗thumbs up‘, he wanted to announce the idea to the 
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The SDI speech: Reagan’s Role 
Reagan deserves full credit for making missile defense the major issue it became during the 
1980s, because it was he and no other member of the Administration that made the idea 
operational policy. It was Reagan‘s Hollywood skills that moved the spotlight onto an issue that 
had until then been a rather esoteric matter. Reagan raced ahead, and used the powers of the 
presidency to force everyone else to catch up with him. The reality is that Reagan had taken what 
was something of an offhand optional musing and turned it into a ‗revolution in strategic affairs‘ 
as Shultz termed it at the time.
345
 
 The Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff had not intended for Reagan to seize so quickly on missile 
defense following their presentation, and what followed shocked them. It seems that missile 
defense was raised in a rather hypothetical fashion, and that Reagan had misinterpreted their 
interest as a green light to move ahead with a Presidential initiative. According to later 
interviews with participants Admiral Watkins, General Vessey and General E. C Meyer, they 
were taken by surprise by the subsequent actions of the President, as they had had no intention of 
presenting an overhaul of America‘s nuclear strategy. General Vessey recalled: ‗There was no 
program definition. It was the idea that defenses might enter into the equation more than in the 
past‘. That mere suggestion took on ‗a life of its own‘, and as General Meyer later observed, 
there had been no study into how missile defense would be achieved: ‗I don‘t think any of us had 
a clear vision of what form this strategic defense would take. The issue needed to be debated at 
the very highest level by people concerned with policy and people concerned with 
technology‘.346   But there would be no debate about the merits of the issue: the idea had been 
                                                     
345
  Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 250. 
346
  Hedrick Smith, Power Game: How Washington Works, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), pp. 609-10. 
178 
 
firmly planted in the President‘s mind and try as many would, it could never be dislodged. 
Reagan had been elected President—everyone else had merely been appointed and could be fired 
by him at will. Therefore, when the President told his staff to prepare the world for his 
announcement on missile defense, they did as they were told. Reagan was excited about the idea, 
and wanted to speak out about it as soon as possible. And speak out he did. 
 The lead up to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speech was something of a singular 
example of Reagan acting in a very Nixonian fashion: defense and foreign policy were the 
domain of the President, and Reagan‘s orders would be executed secretly and exactly as he 
instructed. Reagan was ‗in the driver seat‘, and just as Nixon had employed his NSC adviser 
Kissinger to conduct clandestine negotiations with the Chinese leading up to the China initiative 
(leaving Secretary of State Rogers in the dark),
347
 so too Reagan used his NSC adviser Bud 
McFarlane to secretly prepare an announcement of his missile defense initiative (also leaving his 
Secretary of State, George Shultz, in the dark). This was out of character. As Martin Anderson 
said of Reagan‘s usual management style: ‗He makes no demands and gives no instructions…He 
made decisions like an ancient king…He just sat back in a supremely calm manner and waited 
until important things were brought to him. And then he would act, quickly, decisively, and 
usually, very wisely‘.348 This time, however, Reagan was making demands and giving 
instructions, and he was in no mood to wait.  
Following the assessment by the Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff that ABM technology was an 
option worth investigating, Reagan instructed McFarlane to start drafting an insert into an 
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upcoming defense speech that would include the announcement of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative. McFarlane balked. Suddenly realizing that the President was deadly serious, he began 
to make objections and advocated putting the proposal through various hoops: like getting Brent 
Scowcroft‘s Commission on MX basing to liaise with Congress on the matter, or sending it 
through the usual bureaucratic processes of the State and Defense Departments. Reagan knew 
that any such action would stall SDI for many more years; vetoing the suggestion, he ordered the 
draft done ASAP. Obeying the Presidential directive, McFarlane commenced the drafting, 
leaving the two men most responsible for its ramifications—Shultz and Weinberger—out of the 
loop. They were in for a shock. 
 President Reagan proceeded with his SDI speech leaving America‘s allies out of the 
picture, and his Secretaries of State and Defense in the dark. George Shultz had dined with 
President Reagan on the evening of 12 February 1983 and listened as the President discussed his 
abhorrence for the MAD doctrine and his desire to one day protect America from nuclear 
missiles with the eventual goal of achieving total nuclear abolition. Shultz, according to his own 
account of the dinner, did not reply to the President‘s ideas; rather, he records thinking of the 
‗huge, perhaps insuperable problems‘ that a missile defense system would present.349 Reagan 
knew how to read his audience, and Shultz‘s concern must have registered on his face, because 
Reagan then decided not to include his own Secretary of State in the drafting of the address 
announcing SDI.  Shultz only found out about the speech on 21 March—two days before Reagan 
was set to deliver it. And when he did find out about it—not from Reagan but from NSC staffer 
Larry Eagleburger—he ‗blew his top‘. ‗We don‘t have the technology to do this!‘ he thundered.  
To Bill Clark he questioned the assessment of the Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff, saying: ‗They are in no 
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position to make what amounts to a scientific judgment!‘ Shultz was also worried about the 
effect on the Western Alliance and their lack of inclusion in what he termed a complete change 
of the ‗whole strategic view and doctrine of the United States‘.  ‗This is so sweeping that it must 
be carefully considered‘ he said. ‗It could hit the allies right between the eyes. This is the year 
when we especially need a cohesive alliance in our negotiations.‘ 350 It would be Secretary of 
Defense Weinberger, who was in the unenviable position of informing the allies what was in 
store for them. 
Unfortunately for Weinberger, he was actually at a NATO conference accompanied with 
Richard Perle when he received word of the impending speech less than 24 hours before its 
delivery. Again, he received the news not from the President, but from one of his ‗friends‘ from 
the White House who gave him a ‗hurried and surreptitious call‘.351 To say that Shultz and 
Weinberger were ‗blindsided‘ by the President is an understatement.352  When Perle was asked 
by the author about this incident and the belief that Reagan had acted this way to prevent SDI 
from being ‗killed‘ by the interagency process, he replied: 
Well, he was probably right about that I was probably wrong. Although I still 
think that we could have… Weinberger could have been authorized, but wasn‘t, to 
say ‗The President is going to announce...‘ Now if he‘d said that much in advance 
it would have leaked out of the NATO ministers meeting and it wouldn‘t have 
been a good thing. We should have timed it for simultaneous release. That is 
Weinberger should have said, ‗In a few minutes the President is going to give a 
speech in which he is going to say the following…‘353 
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Weinberger managed to contact a few NATO defense ministers before the speech, but not 
enough: they were left as angry about the snub as he was. But Reagan did not want anyone 
scuttling his speech, and his ‗hands on‘ role extended to editing the draft himself. 
 President Reagan‘s re-write of the Defense speech from techno-speak to flowing 
language reflected the true genius of the ‗great communicator‘ and demonstrated that he wanted 
total message control. Various drafts of the speech, which dealt with matters of defense, made its 
way to his desk, and as he noted in his diary, he had to ‗do a lot of re-writing‘ to ‗change 
bureaucratese into people talk‘.354   For example, the section dealing with the nuclear freeze 
movement had somewhat bluntly stated that their goal would make America ‗less, not more 
secure‘. Reagan crossed it out and substituted it with the more thoughtful: ‗I know that all of you 
want peace, and so do I.  I know too that many of you seriously believe that a nuclear freeze 
would further the cause of peace. But a freeze now would make us less, not more, secure….‘ 
Reagan also crossed out an entire paragraph and substituted it with his thoughts on war: 
Now this is not to say that the Soviet Union is planning to make war on us. Nor 
do I believe a war is inevitable—quite the contrary. But what must be recognized 
is that our security is based on being prepared to meet any contingency… We 
can‘t afford to believe we will never be threatened. There have been two world 
wars in my life time. We didn‘t start them and indeed did everything we could to 
avoid being drawn into them. We were ill-prepared for both….355 
 
Reagan made several other corrections and re-writes that significantly lifted the standard of the 
speech and gave it its most memorable phrases. For example, a sentence dealing with the need 
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for nuclear arms reduction had originally said, ‗We simply must succeed in this endeavor‘. 
Reagan crossed this out and wrote instead, ‗We are engaged right now in negotiations with the 
Soviet Union to bring a mutual reduction of all weapons‘; an addition which demonstrated that 
America was already taking steps to achieve this outcome. Clumsy sentences like: ‗In short, how 
much better it would be if we could begin to shift from a strategy of deterrence with offensive 
weapons to a strategy of forward defense‘ were excised entirely from the speech as was the 
hindering sentence: ‗Let me emphasize again, such defense is no near term panacea‘. Similarly: 
‗It will take years, indeed decades of efforts‘ was replaced with: ‗It may take years, even 
decades…‘.356 But the most important part of the speech that Reagan re-wrote dealt with SDI 
itself.  
Reagan‘s re-write of the key section of the speech that dealt with the announcement of 
SDI demonstrates that the speech was truly Reagan‘s. He took what was uninspiring, and made it 
work. The original had read: ‗I call upon the Nation, our men and women in uniform, our 
scientists and engineers, our entrepreneurs and industrial leaders, and all our citizens—to join 
with me in taking a bold new step forward in defense to ensure a more peaceful and stable world 
of the future‘. This was replaced with the masterful: ‗I call upon the scientific community, who 
gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents to the cause of mankind and world peace; to 
give us the means of rendering these weapons, impotent and obsolete’. 357 
As Kissinger later noted in Diplomacy, the words, ‗impotent and obsolete, must have had 
a chilling ring in the Kremlin‘.358 Why? Because the USSR was a Superpower because of its 
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nuclear stockpile, and if these weapons were made redundant, they would cease to be much more 
than a failed—morally and financially—bankrupt state. In short, they would cease to be a 
Superpower. 
 As technical infeasibility would continue to demonstrate, SDI‘s potency was the idea of 
what it could be, not what it was.
359
 SDI was a psychological lever for diplomacy with the 
Soviets, and it was with words that Reagan wielded his sword. And with the SDI speech, the 
most cutting words came from Reagan himself. For this he deserves most of the credit, as he 
does for the tenacity with which he continued to hold onto his beloved program, for the 
remainder of his presidency. 
 
Ignoring the Critics 
As stated above, Reagan was a stubborn man with firmly held convictions, and once he was 
convinced about something, he rarely, if ever, changed his mind.
360
 Reagan‘s grip on SDI was 
the greatest example of this personality trait, and he would not let go of it, no matter the 
criticisms or the incentives. The criticisms came first. 
 Reagan‘s SDI speech registered like a nuclear bombshell in the USSR, and they minced 
no words in their denunciation of it. Condemnations came first through the various state 
sponsored mouthpieces. Tass, the government office of communication, was quoted as saying 
that SDI was: ‗a new attempt by the United States to achieve superiority in strategic arms over 
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the Soviet Union and to upset the existing rough balance of power‘. The Government newspaper 
Izvestia said, the ‗destabilizing idea‘ of accelerating research on new defenses against missiles 
was slipped in ‗just before the curtain‘. Furthermore, it reported: ‗The speech thus underscored 
that the White House has no desire of retreating from its unrealistic positions‘ and  ‗this stubborn 
unwillingness to get out of the rut of the Cold War increasingly transforms Washington into a 
dangerous breeding ground for thermonuclear confrontation.‘361 But these sharp words were 
nothing compared to what the Soviet leader Yuri Andropov had to say on the matter. As the 
Washington Post quoted him saying: 
My answer will be short and forthright: The incumbent US administration 
continues to tread an extremely perilous path. The issues of war and peace must 
not be treated so flippantly. All attempts at …military superiority over the Soviet 
Union are futile. The Soviet Union will never allow them to succeed. It will never 
be caught defenseless by any threat. Let there be no mistake about it in 
Washington. It is time that they stopped devising one option after another in the 
search of the best ways of unleashing nuclear war in the hope of winning it. 
Engaging in this is not just irresponsible, it’s insane…Washington’s actions are 
putting in jeopardy the entire world.
362
 (Emphasis added).  
 
Such protests had little to no effect on Reagan, who said: ‗I didn‘t expect them to cheer‘.363 Also 
not affecting Reagan was the torrent of criticism that swept in from the Democrats in Congress, 
and the media, most of whom agreed with the New York Times that labeled it a ‗pipe dream‘.364 
Opinion polls however, showed that the vast majority of Americans were solidly behind the 
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 as were most of Reagan‘s conservative base. A simple letter to the President 
reflected this:  
Dear Mr. President,  
That was the best statement I have ever heard from any President.  





Reagan, it seemed, had hit his mark, and had devised a policy that seemed to be the ‗answer to 
all his prayers‘. SDI would solve the issues surrounding MX basing, would pull the rug out from 
under the nuclear freeze critics,
367
 and would consolidate support from his conservative base. It 
was an initiative that Reagan was most proud of, and one that he was not about to budge from, as 
demonstrated by his performance during the subsequent Superpower summits held in Geneva 
and Reykjavik. 
 
The Geneva Summit: Reagan Holds His Ground on SDI 
It seems that with the announcement of SDI the Soviet and American arms negotiators had two 
very different objectives. For the Soviets, it was to get rid of SDI at all costs. For the Americans, 
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it was to use SDI as a lever, a bargaining chip that could get the Soviets to make as many 
concessions as possible. It appears that the Americans had more success than the Soviets in their 
strategy: arms reduction talks, halted after the November 1983 INF deployment, resumed in 
early 1985 and without the earlier preconditions set by the Soviets—namely that SDI research 
and INF deployments cease. But the Soviets thought that they might have a better chance to 
convince Reagan to do away with SDI when the first Superpower summit held between Reagan 
and a Soviet leader occurred in Geneva in November 1985. After all, the brilliant Mikhail 
Gorbachev would be the man up against Reagan, and as widely expected, he would ‗run circles‘ 
around the ageing ex-actor President. Unfortunately for the Soviets, they had badly misjudged 
America‘s President. 
Superpower summits were always an opportunity for each leader to meet with their 
counterpart on the opposite side of the ideological divide, discuss matters of bi-lateral 
importance and test their opponent‘s mettle: to see what they really believed. Many times it was 
a game, where each leader spoke cryptically and wore many masks. But in the case of the 
Reagan/Gorbachev dialogue, each man spoke their mind freely, and there could have been no 
doubt where each stood on SDI or the fact that Reagan would never, under any circumstances, 
give up his research program. 
As the transcripts from the Summit demonstrate, SDI dominated the conversation from 
the first plenary session onwards. Tuesday, 19 November 1985 was a gray, cold and gloomy day 
in Geneva, but nothing could have dampened the enthusiastic debate that began between Reagan 
and Gorbachev on the subject of missile defense technology. Gorbachev‘s initial presentation 
had avoided specific topics, and focused instead on the broad issue of improving bi-lateral 
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relations. Reagan, however, began the dialogue on SDI and made his position very clear.  As the 
‗Memcons‘ read: 
The President continued that today he wanted to talk about one specific question. 
Gorbachev had said that the United States had indicated an interest in achieving a 
first strike capability by having an anti-missile shield which would destroy missiles 
before they hit the target.
368
 The United States did not know whether this would be 
possible. The United States had a research program. The Soviet Union had the same 
kind of program. The United States has some hope that it might be possible. If both 
sides continue their research and if one or both come up with such a system then 
they should sit down and make it available to everyone so no one would have a fear 
of a nuclear strike. A mad man might come along with a nuclear weapon. If we 
could come up with a shield and share it, then nobody would worry about the mad 
man. He didn‘t even want to call this a weapon; it was a defensive system.369   
 
Gorbachev‘s response to Reagan‘s presentation was to ask whether he should be given an 
opportunity to respond now, or stick to the schedule. Reagan, a man devoted to punctuality, 
replied that as it was lunchtime, they should stick to the timetable, but promised that Gorbachev 
would have the floor when they re-adjourned. When they did, Gorbachev spoke of his absolute 
distaste for SDI. As the ‗Memcons‘ record, Gorbachev said: 
[We] Soviets think SDI can lead to an arms race in space, and not just a defensive 
arms race but an offensive arms race with space weapons. Scientists say any 
shield can be pierced, so SDI cannot save us. So why create it? It only makes 
sense if it is to defend against a retaliatory strike. What would the West think if 
the Soviet Union was developing these weapons? You would react with horror.   
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Gorbachev then said that the USSR‘s missile defense program was done for ‗peaceful purposes‘ 
while the US had ‗military aims‘. How this distinction was made, Gorbachev did not elaborate. 
But he did threaten two things if the US continued with SDI: one, no reduction of any weapons; 
and, two, a ‗response‘. The promised ‗response‘, was not made clear, but was most likely a threat 
to deploy more Soviet nuclear missiles to counter an ABM system. With all this talk of future 
systems of defense, and counter measures, Gorbachev painted an apocalyptic picture of a world 
doomed by computer technology: 
It will require automatization which will place important decisions in the hands of 
computers and political leaders will just be in bunkers with computers making the 
decisions. This could unleash an uncontrollable process. You haven‘t thought this 





Reagan followed by slamming Soviet foreign adventurism in Third World conflicts, and by 
giving a convoluted ‗Chinese fable‘ about fighting with ‗spears and shields‘ which he likened to 
SDI.  Gorbachev replied that ‗weapons‘ floating in space, be they shields or spears, were 
military.
371
 Reaching an impasse at this point, Reagan invited Gorbachev to join him one-on-one 
at the pool house for a private discussion. Here, too, the conversation was centered on SDI. 
 The ‗Fireside Chat‘ that Reagan would later paint as an important turning point in the 
thawing of the Cold War, was in fact marked by something of a terse exchange over SDI. Seated 
before a roaring fire, Reagan handed Gorbachev a Russian version of the US arms proposal on 
eliminating INF weapons in Europe and a 50% reduction of their nuclear arsenals, to be applied 
globally. Gorbachev read the papers over for a few minutes, and then began raising his 
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objections. Not surprisingly, they centered on SDI. Why, Gorbachev asked, was there no 
mention of the January 1985 agreement, which placed arms reduction talks side-by-side with a 
discussion about ‗halting an arms race in space‘? Where had the ‗interrelationship‘ gone? 
Gorbachev noted that ‗here it seems to have evaporated‘. 372 Reagan again repeated his mantra 
that he ‗did not see these defensive weapons as constituting a part of the arms race‘ as ‗they 
would be shared with everyone involved in nuclear weapons‘.373 Gorbachev was not convinced: 
if Reagan did not believe him when he promised that the Soviet Union would never be the first to 
launch a nuclear attack on the US, then why should he believe Reagan‘s promise to share SDI 
technology? Reagan respectfully pointed out that neither Gorbachev nor he would forever be 
leaders of their countries, and therefore could not make those types of guarantees. Emphatically, 
Gorbachev asked: ‗If the goal was to get rid of nuclear weapons, why start an arms race in 
another sphere‘? 374 As the ‗Memcons‘ record, Reagan gave quite a convincing reply: 
The President asked Gorbachev to remember that these were not weapons that kill 
people or destroy cities, these were weapons that destroy nuclear missiles. If there 
were agreement that there would be no need for nuclear missiles, then one might 
agree that there would also be no need for defenses against them. But he would 
also urge Gorbachev to remember that we were talking about something that was 
not yet known, and that if it were known, that would still be years away. Why 





Unfortunately for Reagan, it seemed that he was talking to a man as obstinate as himself; 
Gorbachev replied that they should: ‗announce to the world that President Reagan and General 
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Secretary Gorbachev had declared firmly in official statements that both countries would refrain 
from research, development, testing and deployment of space weapons and that such agreement 
would be subject to appropriate verification‘. 376 Reagan pointed out that: ‗in this city of Geneva 
all of the countries that had participated in World War I had met and had reached agreement not 
to use poison gas warfare. Nevertheless, all had kept their gas masks‘. Gas masks were the 
insurance in case nations reneged on their agreement, and SDI was an insurance policy against 
future use of nuclear weapons. Gorbachev stated that on a human level he understood how SDI 
could have: ‗captivated the President‘s imagination‘, but he had to be realistic—since any 
defense shield could be overcome by bombarding it with more missiles, SDI could only work 
with a first strike. That is, the US would strike the USSR, taking out most of its silos, and the few 
Soviets missiles left to be launched would be stopped by the ‗shield‘ of missile defense. At this 
stage, Reagan decided to break up the meeting, but not before adding that ‗people 
overwhelmingly wanted this defense‘. 377  
SDI, obviously, was not to be decided at the Geneva Summit. Furthermore, the Soviets 
were surprised by the Reagan that they had encountered and concluded that there were, in fact, 
‗two Reagans‘. A Soviet foreign policy advisor present for the Summit said: 
[Reagan] was inattentive when the subject didn‘t interest him. He let it go. But as 
soon as Shevardnadze or Gorbachev touched some point of interest to the 
President he immediately came out with an extremely good, spontaneous delivery. 
He would deliver a good piece, strong on conviction, strong on facts, emotionally 
charged. He was another guy immediately.
378
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Despite Reagan‘s emphatic defense of SDI, Gorbachev did not think that the matter was finished. 
In Reykjavik he would try his hand again, and put everything on the table in the hope that 
Reagan would fold on missile defense.  
 
The Reykjavik Summit: the Showdown on SDI 
The Reykjavik Summit, held in October 1986, represented a final, last ditch attempt by the 
Soviet Union to halt an arms race in the field of anti-ballistic missile systems, and it all hinged 
on Reagan‘s acceptance of their generous arms reduction offer in exchange for SDI. Reagan did 
not budge. His rejection was not so much a belief in extant technology—SDI was then and now 
largely non-operative—but rather because his vision of a non-nuclear world was poles apart from 
Gorbachev‘s.   
 This section of the thesis will not seek to examine in detail the arms reduction proposals 
detailed in Chapter 8, but will merely look at Reykjavik to demonstrate that the continuance of 
SDI as an American defense objective was truly the result of Reagan‘s personal attachment to 
the policy.  
 As can be seen from the transcripts of the Geneva Summit, Mikhail Gorbachev‘s overall 
aim in US/Soviet arms negotiations was to bring a complete halt to anti-ballistic missile research. 
Already at Geneva he called for an agreement that would limit ABM research to the laboratory. 
Reagan was non-committal, and called for discussions to continue on nuclear arms reduction and 
missile defense simultaneously, but separately.  Reagan never had any intention of doing away 
with his now beloved SDI, and hoped that Gorbachev was not serious when he threatened to 
terminate any arms reduction treaty if SDI continued. The general theme of Geneva that each 
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side sought to project was one of dialogue and renewed hopes for peace; it was not the setting for 
a showdown on SDI. Reykjavik, however, was the place and Gorbachev planned the showdown 
of all showdowns. 
 Summits between the Superpowers were traditionally scripted long in advance by 
bureaucrats, who set the agenda, wrote the talking points, and largely completed the final 
communiqué, without the leaders having had much say at all. Reagan, despite his background in 
the movie industry where he was merely handed a script and read without objection, was 
completely against this process. It was he who reformed the schedule at Geneva to make the 
meeting as much as possible a spontaneous interaction between himself and the General 
Secretary, with a blanket ban on press briefings until proceedings were completed.
379
 It was a 
format that appealed greatly to Gorbachev, who despite lacking the executive authority of 
Reagan (he served at the pleasure of the Politburo, who expected full involvement) embraced it. 
The Geneva summit had been a success: Gorbachev had seen that Reagan, like himself, was a 
man who wanted action. Also, they had had frank discussions and had not held back. Gorbachev 
had agreed with Reagan‘s observation that they would be able to achieve what those below them 
could not, and it was in this spirit that he called Reagan to the snap summit held in Reykjavik in 
the winter of 1986. Reagan, who had been frustrated by the failure of arms negotiators to make 
any headway since the last time he sat down with Gorbachev, welcomed a return to summitry, 
and despite the short notice, he was ready. Depending on one‘s point of view, what followed was 
either Reagan‘s finest hour, or his biggest life failure.  
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  Meeting in the Icelandic capital of Reykjavik in a small room overlooking the sea, 
Gorbachev laid down a set of proposals that were astonishing in their breadth, but all of which 
depended on an American renunciation of SDI. 11 October 1986 was the big day, and 
negotiations began a little after 10:30 in the morning. Firstly, Gorbachev agreed to the 50% 
reduction of strategic weapons, as spoken about in Geneva. Secondly, on the question of INF, 
Gorbachev agreed to complete European elimination with the concession that the question of 
French and British arsenals would be dropped. The issue of Asian INF weapons could be debated 
separately. On SDI, Gorbachev called for a strict adherence to the ABM Treaty for ten years, 
limiting any research to the laboratory. Shultz could not believe his ears: these were major 
concessions to the American position; much more than he had ever dreamed was possible. 
Reagan was less impressed. ‗The point is that SDI should make the elimination of nuclear 
weapons possible‘ he said.380   With Reagan unmoved, it fell to Gorbachev to sweeten the deal; 
to put all his cards on the table in the hopes that Reagan would fold. What occurred the next day 
was, undoubtedly, a moment in Cold War negotiation history when the stakes could not have 
been higher: Reagan‘s resolve would be tested. 
 Reagan‘s absolute devotion to SDI was demonstrated as never before when he turned 
down his cherished dream of total nuclear abolition in order to keep the missile defense program 
alive. It was a heartbreaking, maddening moment for the man who had worked more than any 
other for a world without nuclear weapons, but it was something that Reagan felt he could not be 
swayed on.  Following the proposals tabled the day earlier, the negotiating teams from each side 
had stayed up all night seeking to bring the two sides together. They had made much progress, 
but not enough, and Reagan and Gorbachev were disappointed. Nonetheless, they both met again 
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on the morning of 12 October and began once more. They were both in for the ‗ride of their 
lives‘.  
 First off, the floor belonged to Reagan, and in addition to stating the American position 
on INF and START, he laid out where the US stood on SDI. In Reagan‘s view, there were three 
matters that needed consideration. Firstly, how would they ‗synchronize‘ SDI and the 
elimination of ballistic missiles? Secondly, what were the ‗conditions and time frame‘ for an 
increased reliance on ‗strategic defenses‘? And finally, what to do with the ABM treaty until the 
first two objectives—the abolishment of ballistic missiles and the deployment of missile 
defense—were achieved?381  
Gorbachev replied that in preparing the Soviet position, he had ‗taken into account the 
President‘s attachment to the SDI program‘.382 Furthermore, the 10 year confinement of research 
to the laboratory was ‗not a strict limitation on SDI‘, in fact it would ‗pose neither political, 
practical nor technical impediments to the President‘s program‘.383 The ten year limitation was 
necessary to bring about the reductions discussed earlier: without the limitation, there could be 
no reduction .With this Reagan began to lose his cool. 
Raising his voice in anger, President Reagan began attacking Gorbachev‘s attachment to 
the ABM Treaty, an attachment he considered ludicrous. Exposing for perhaps the first time his 
utter disdain for the ABM Treaty and the theory of MAD which underpinned it, Reagan asked 
why any limitations on SDI research were required. As the ‗Memcons‘ record, Reagan‘s 
language was argumentative: 
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Why the hell should the world have to live for another ten years under the threat 
of nuclear weapons if we have decided to eliminate them? The President failed to 
see the magic of the ABM regime, whose only assurance of safety was the 
doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. It would be better to eliminate missiles 
so that our populations can sleep in peace. At the same time, the two leaders could 
give the world a means of protection that would put the nuclear genie back in his 
bottle. The next generation would reap the benefits when the President and 




Gorbachev commented that it was ‗clear‘ that Reagan would ‗not give up SDI‘ and that is why 
he had sought to ‗accommodate it‘. 385 The ten year adherence to the ABM treaty was necessary, 
and Gorbachev added, ‗the Soviets had proposed a package, and that individual elements of their 
proposals must be regarded as a package‘. 386 Reagan said that it need not be this way, and 
Gorbachev responded by saying that the ‗connection had been disrupted‘. Reagan asked whether 
they had to depart ‗with nothing‘. Gorbachev said that if acceptance of the package could not be 
made, then ‗that was the case‘,387 and moved the discussion to humanitarian concerns, and other 
loose-end topics. Then, for no apparent reason, the two sides agreed to a break and a final 
meeting. It would be the most dramatic moment in US/Soviet diplomatic relations since the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. 
 The two sides came back from their break at 3pm and compared the different proposals 
on nuclear reduction and SDI, finding that their differences were profound. The American 
position held to Weinberger‘s plan of abolishing all ballistic missiles within a ten year period: 
the first half in the first five years, and the second half in the remaining. During this period, the 
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US was free to test SDI in accordance with the ABM Treaty. After the ten year period, they were 
free to deploy. The Soviet proposal incorporated the ten year period that the Americans sought, 
and instead of ballistic missiles it spoke of the abolition of all ‗strategic nuclear missiles‘. During 
this ten year period, SDI research was to be confined to the laboratory, and after the ten year 
period talks would begin about what to do next. For America it might be to proceed with SDI, 
while for the USSR other options might be pursued. Upon hearing this Reagan said that it 
seemed that they were very ‗close‘ to an agreement. But the two were not. Secretary Shultz 
interjected that Gorbachev was talking about all nuclear weapons, while the US was only talking 
about ballistic missiles. There was also some confusion as to what would happen to the ABM 
Treaty after the ten year period. After more back and forth between Reagan and Gorbachev it 
was agreed that there be another break, and this one, lasting an hour between 4:30pm and 
5:30pm saw Reagan‘s team agree that the limitation of SDI to the lab was unacceptable. 
 Meeting with his advisers in the ‗bubble‘, so as to avoid electronic surveillance, Reagan 
asked everyone around him for their view on the ten year limitation to the lab. Shultz said that it 
should be accepted, with the details worked out later. Richard Perle, who was present as an 
adviser, did not think it could work, and said so. According to author Jay Winik, Reagan was 
hoping that Perle‘s support would have given him political cover with the conservatives. In an 
interview with the author, Perle rejected this assessment of Reagan‘s question: 
He wasn‘t, at that moment, he certainly wasn‘t thinking about that. He was 
thinking about whether SDI could continue. He believed in SDI. He believed that 
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Reagan had made up his mind: Gorbachev‘s position was unacceptable. He went into the final 
meeting and hoped that one last ditch attempt could convince Gorbachev to back down.   
Reagan presented his proposal; Gorbachev noted that ‗laboratory‘ had been left out. Was 
this on purpose he asked? Reagan replied that yes, it ‗had been left out on purpose‘. Turning to 
the text‘s differentiation between ‗ballistic‘ and ‗strategic‘ weaponry, Reagan agreed with 
Gorbachev that all types of nuclear weapons in the triad of air, land and sea, could be covered. 
Reagan was then explicit saying that it ‗would be fine with him if we eliminated all nuclear 
weapons‘. Gorbachev replied ‗we can do that. We can eliminate them‘. Reagan replied: ‗Let‘s do 
it‘. 389 
 Gorbachev was then insistent: SDI had to be confined to the lab. Reagan was beginning 
to get very angry. The ‗Memcons‘ record Reagan‘s feelings at this time and quote him saying: 
We had come a long way, and what the hell difference did it make. Ten years 
down the road some country might come along with a madman who wanted to 
build nuclear weapons again. The President said they could be proud of what they 
had done. We may not build SDI in the end; it might be too expensive, for 
instance. But he had promised the American people he would not give up SDI. 
The Soviets now have ten years. We have an agreement we can be very proud 
of.
390
   
 
Gorbachev was not budging and neither was Reagan. The President said that he ‗would not 
destroy the possibility of proceeding with SDI‘ as ‗he could not confine work to the laboratory‘. 
                                                     
389
  Ibid., p.11. 
390
  Ibid., p.12. 
198 
 
Gorbachev asked if this was the President‘s ‗final position‘. Reagan replied ‗yes‘.391 The talk 
then turned emotional. 
 Gorbachev waived the prospect of being a ‗great President‘ before Reagan, and asked 
him to sign on the dotted line. ‗If this were not possible‘ he said, ‗they could say goodbye‘.  
After all, Reykjavik represented a ‗last opportunity‘, and if Reagan agreed with him, then the 
‗world would cheer‘. Reagan, Gorbachev said, had come to the summit and merely pocketed 
Soviet concessions without making ‗a single, substantial, major step‘ in his direction.392  Reagan 
said that the Right Wing in his country would ‗kick his brains out‘ if he agreed to what 
Gorbachev proposed and asked him to ‗do this one thing‘ for him, to do this ‗favor‘. Gorbachev 
would not back down, and neither would Reagan. The meeting was over. Reagan got up and 
walked out on Gorbachev.  
For perhaps the only moment in world history, the real possibility of eliminating all 
nuclear weapons had been raised, but shot down. A world without nuclear weapons was on offer, 
but the price tag—a 10 year limitation on SDI that could lead to its demise—was too high a price 
for Reagan to pay. For a man who believed passionately in nuclear abolition, it is clear that when 
it came to SDI, Reagan‘s attachment was so absolute that he could not give it up. There could be 
no more doubts about Reagan‘s involvement with US policy in this regard. Of all the initiatives 
of his government, Reagan‘s identification with SDI was the greatest: he was its principal 
proponent and its fiercest guardian.  Whether Reagan‘s actions at Reykjavik were his finest 
moment, or his biggest blunder, is open to debate. What is not debatable is that for Ronald 
Reagan, SDI had fused itself to him, and the two were almost a single entity. 
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The Strategic Defense Initiative‘s origin within the Reagan White house remains somewhat 
murky, with differing recollections and accounts about how it came to be. However, what is not 
in doubt was President Reagan‘s attachment to the concept following a meeting with the Joint-
Chiefs-of-Staff in February, 1983. Having received the go-ahead to pursue missile defense 
technology, Reagan moved quickly to formulate a speech announcing in grandiose terms his 
vision of a world protected from the threat of the bomb. He promised an initiative that could 
render nuclear weapons ‗impotent and obsolete‘. As archival evidence demonstrates, the main 
parts of that historic speech were written entirely by Reagan, as was the sizable segment of his 
second inaugural address which further expanded on his belief in SDI.  
At the Geneva Summit Reagan steadfastly and passionately defended his dream for SDI, 
notwithstanding Gorbachev‘s pleas that ‗an arms race in space‘ be halted at its ‗inception‘. In 
Reykjavik Reagan again stood by his initiative, despite being offered the biggest arms reduction 
package in the history of the Cold War. When the ante was upped to include total nuclear 
abolition in exchange for SDI research being limited to the lab for just 10 years, Reagan, with 
great anguish, simply said no. There can be no doubt whatsoever from pursing the evidence, that 
SDI was truly a Reagan policy and that he, more than anyone else in his Administration, was 
responsible for its pursuit and its continuation.   
 Today, over twenty years since Reagan refused to give up his missile defense program, 
the United States continues to spend billions of dollars in research and development on the 
project to make Reagan‘s dream a reality.393 The Bush Administration pulled out of the ABM 
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Treaty in December 2001 so that limited deployment could proceed,
394
 much to the consternation 
of Russia, which remains as opposed to missile defense now as it was during the Gorbachev era. 
However, with the emerging threat of ballistic missile capability from ‗rogue nations‘ like Iran 
and North Korea, the NATO alliance is firmly committed to the establishment of an effective 
SDI program.
395
 Missile defense remains a Reagan legacy, as does his quest for nuclear arms 
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“I intend to search for peace along two parallel paths: deterrence and arms reductions. I 





The nuclear bomb, it can be argued, became in many ways the defining feature of the Cold War 
conflict. Because of its existence, the Superpowers refrained from direct military confrontation 
with each other, choosing instead to fight proxy wars through other nations, for example, Korea 
and Vietnam. The existence of nuclear stockpiles created a standoff between the United States 
and the Soviet Union and thereby brought a certain level of stability to their relationship, as each 
understood that to launch a nuclear attack would be to invite a counter attack; an attack that 
would be mutually suicidal. Though a small number of nuclear weapons were enough to 
obliterate the major cities of each nation, fears still abounded, that if the other side possessed 
more nuclear weapons, they would be tempted to launch a pre-emptive first strike. Consequently, 
an arms race developed costing trillions of dollars over the decades and heightening the fear of 
nuclear war. While talks between the Superpowers during the Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter 
years sought to limit nuclear arsenals, the Reagan Administration rejected a mere limitation of 
                                                     




the arms race, supporting instead the policy that the nuclear powers must actually reduce extant 
stockpiles. Furthermore, President Reagan advocated an even more radical proposition: the total 
abolition of all nuclear weapons. 
 This chapter firstly demonstrates that the Reagan Administration‘s official policy 
throughout the 1980s was that the nuclear stockpiles had to be reduced and that the eventual 
elimination of all nuclear weapons was a stated goal towards which all its negotiations were 
directed. From there, it examines the other Cold War administrations that preceded Reagan‘s, 
and will endeavor to ascertain if nuclear arms reduction and elimination were ever seriously 
considered by these. Next, returning to the central question of this thesis—Reagan‘s personal 
role in the formulation of his government‘s Soviet policy—his view towards nuclear arms 
limitation and reduction prior to becoming President is investigated, in particular his criticism of 
the SALT II Treaty in the late 1970s. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to uncover possible 
influences on Reagan in this regard. Finally, it is argued that while Reagan was certainly not a 
lone voice criticizing arms limitation, his belief that nuclear weapons should be abolished was 
unique among conservatives of that era. 
 
Nuclear Arms Reduction: Official Administration Policy  
State of the Union addresses are the vehicle by which presidents lay out a national vision and set 
the agenda for the year to come. In his 1984 address, President Reagan used the platform to 
testify to America‘s peaceful intentions towards the USSR and to announce his government‘s 
destination point for nuclear arms reduction talks. He said: 
203 
 
Tonight, I want to speak to the people of the Soviet Union, to tell them it‘s true 
that our governments have had serious differences, but our sons and daughters 
have never fought each other in war. And if we Americans have our way, they 
never will. 
People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy for your country 
and mine, to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot 
be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing 
nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then, would it not be 
better to do away with them entirely?
397
 (Emphasis Added). 
  
This view, that nuclear weapons should one day be completely eliminated, became an official 
foreign policy goal of the Reagan Administration when it was incorporated into the National 
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 153 on 1 January 1985. The document, a collaborative 
effort by the President, the National Security Council and the Departments of Defense and State, 
presented a ‗roadmap‘ for this objective.  It stated: 
During the next ten years, the US objective is a radical reduction in the power of 
existing and planned nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship 
between offensive and defense nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. We are 
even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with 
greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based 
upon...the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive 
nuclear arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of 
all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an 




The document further stated that ‗for the long run…both sides seem to be agreed that with 
respect to nuclear weapons as a whole, the objective should be their total elimination. This 
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should be worldwide and agreed to by all nations.‘399 For the first time in the history of the Cold 
War, the total abolition of all nuclear weapons had become not just a utopian dream sounded out 
by Presidents, but an actual working goal. On the path to the realization of this goal, the Reagan 
Administration also advocated nuclear arms reduction. 
 In contrast to the administrations which had preceded it, the Reagan Administration ruled 
out talks that sought to limit an arms race, and advocated instead a dialogue with the Soviet 
Union with the aim of achieving a real reduction of each nation‘s respective nuclear arsenals. 
Talks about nuclear arms and their limitation had only truly begun in earnest during the period of 
Nixon‘s détente (1969-1974), and had resulted in the SALT I Treaty, signed during the Moscow 
Summit of 1972. President Jimmy Carter, building on the work of Nixon and Ford, negotiated 
the SALT II Treaty, signed in 1979. Both treaties had placed limits on the growth of the arms 
race, without actually stopping it; let alone reducing the amount of nuclear weapons on each 
side.  To Reagan, this approach seemed counterproductive as it permitted the continuance of the 
balance of terror and thereby increased the likelihood of a nuclear war. Therefore, he insisted 
that his government‘s policy would be to only negotiate an arms control treaty with the Soviets 
that would see the standing down and destruction of nuclear weapons. In his second inaugural 
address, entirely written by Reagan, the President articulated his strategy for peace, and while 
reiterating the need for a strong ‗defense capability‘ he advocated the usefulness of a diplomacy 
that could further his nuclear abolitionist views. He said: 
There is only one way, safely and legitimately, to reduce the cost of national 
security, and that is to reduce the need for it. And this we are trying to do in 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. We’re not just discussing limits on a further 
increase of nuclear weapons; we seek, instead, to reduce their number. We seek 










Reagan‘s dream of a world free of nuclear weapons was bold and visionary. Though he was not 
the first President to imagine or even articulate such an outcome, (as the history of American 
Presidents and nuclear abolition confirms below), he was the first President to actually believe 
that he could accomplish such an audacious feat. 
 
History of American Anti-Nuclear Beliefs at the White House  
Throughout the history of the nuclear age, American Presidents had understood the grave danger 
that the existence of nuclear weapons posed to humanity, and spoke from time to time about their 
desire to see nuclear power used for peaceful purposes, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons 
and even their future abolition.   
 President Eisenhower‘s vision for a world in which the nuclear ‗genie‘ was already ‗out 
of the bottle‘, was that the international community should unite in the common purpose that 
nuclear energy be employed solely for benign enterprises.
401
 On 8 December 1953, Eisenhower 
gave his ‗Atoms for Peace‘ speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In it, he 
condemned the continuance of a nuclear arms race which would ‗confirm the hopeless finality of 
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a belief that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a 
trembling world‘. Eisenhower said that the United States ‗would seek more than the mere 
reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes‘,402 and proposed that the 
nuclear powers of the world contribute fissionable materials in a joint venture of peace.  
According to Eisenhower‘s model, the nuclear powers, acting under the aegis of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, would send nuclear material and scientists to study what 
uses for the common good nuclear atoms could be expended. For example, the energy shortages 
of the world could be solved and thus ‗the contributing powers would be dedicating some of their 
strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind‘.403  
Eisenhower‘s speech received a thunderous shout of approval by the UN members 
gathered, however it has been argued that Eisenhower‘s plan actually led to the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, for by expanding the knowledge of how to harness nuclear energy, it inevitably 
led to a continuance of the enrichment program leading to weapons grade material.
404
 And 
because Eisenhower had downplayed nuclear abolition as a ‗mere‘ thing, it‘s clear that a world 
free of nuclear weapons was never seriously considered. Eisenhower‘s successors, Kennedy and 
Johnson, worked for a nuclear test ban treaty and sought to limit the arms race, but it was not 
until Eisenhower‘s Vice President, Richard M. Nixon, sat in the Oval Office, that nuclear 
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abolition would again be stated publicly as a goal towards which the US government should 
work towards. 
 President Nixon famously signed the first nuclear arms limitation treaty with the Soviet 
Union and even at one time spoke of a world without nuclear weapons; but the evidence 
indicates that Nixon believed that nuclear weapons were a permanent reality.  Nixon and his 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger are remembered for their practice of realpolitik, and when it 
came to nuclear weapons there was no exception. As stated above, on his visit to the Soviet 
Union in 1972, Nixon and Soviet leader Brezhnev signed the SALT I Treaty, an interim 
agreement by both Superpowers to cap the number of nuclear weapons that could be produced. 
Also signed at Moscow was the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), which banned a national 
missile defense program in the belief that leaving their populations vulnerable to a nuclear attack 
would be the best guarantee that nuclear weapons would never be launched. Nixon‘s 
statesmanship worked at slowing the arms race in the interests of greater trade and cooperation, 
but nonetheless recognized that nuclear weapons would remain and actually contribute to the 
cause of peace by deterring war. However, on the night Nixon announced his resignation from 
the presidency, 8 August 1974, in addition to reviewing his various claims of contributions to 
world peace, he spoke of a future without nuclear weapons. As he explained to his chief speech 
writer Raymond Price during the drafting process: 
We have ended America‘s longest war, but the goals ahead are ultimately greater 
and more important. We‘ve started to limit nuclear arms between the US and the 
USSR. But our goal must be not just limitation of nuclear arms, but these terrible 
weapons that could destroy civilization as we know it must be destroyed. What 
208 
 
I’m getting at is reduction, not just limitation—so the terrible danger as we know 
it must not hang over the world.
405
 (Emphasis Added). 
 
Farewell addresses can be moments when leaders take the opportunity to share their true 
feelings, but they can also be an extremely emotional experience, even under the best of 
circumstances. Did Nixon‘s emotions get the better of him? Apparently they did, as in the 1980s 
he condemned Reagan‘s goal of a nuclear free world writing: ‗If we are to meet our 
responsibilities in the 21
st
 century, we must disabuse ourselves of some seductive myths about 
how the real world works: We are not going to be able to abolish nuclear weapons.‘406 Nixon‘s 
nuclear abolitionism, therefore, was merely a utopian dream. It was never operational policy, 
never a realistic goal.  But can the same be said of Nixon‘s successor, President Carter, who also 
spoke about nuclear abolitionism? 
 President Jimmy Carter‘s inaugural address, which advocated nuclear arms reduction and 
eventual elimination, may have been inspired by Nixon‘s farewell address, but was he as 
insincere as his predecessor was in turning high sounding rhetoric into a reality?   When running 
for the presidency, Carter had promised that he would promote a ‗government as good as its 
people‘,407 and the speech he gave immediately upon assuming the Executive Office was full of 
                                                     
405
 Raymond Price, With Nixon (New York: Viking Press, 1977), p. 343. Nixon‘s directive made its way into the 
resignation speech when he said, ‗Together with the Soviet Union we have made the crucial breakthroughs that have 
begun the process of limiting nuclear arms. But we must set as our goal not just limiting but reducing and finally 
destroying these terrible weapons so that they cannot destroy civilization and so that the threat of nuclear war will 
no longer hang over the world and the people.‘  ‗Address to the Nation Announcing Decision To Resign the Office 
of President of the United States.‘ 8 August  1974, Public Papers of President Richard Nixon.   
406
 Richard Nixon, ‗On World Leadership‘s Indispensable Ingredient‘ Life Magazine (October, 1987), p. 31.  
407
 Later the title of a book by Carter that was a compilation of his major speeches throughout his political life, A 
Government As Good As Its People  (Little Rock: University of Arkansas Press, 1996)  
209 
 
down to earth platitudes. Turning to the nuclear question (which his daughter Amy would later 
consider the most important
408
) Carter said: 
The world is still engaged in a massive armaments race designed to ensure 
continuing equivalent strength among potential adversaries. We pledge 
perseverance and wisdom in our efforts to limit the world’s armaments to those 
necessary for each nation‘s own domestic safety. And we will move this year a 
step toward our ultimate goal—the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this 





‗I will never lie to you‘410 was another promise that Carter made during the campaign, and to be 
fair to him, he did send his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Moscow with an arms control 
proposal that included actual nuclear arms reductions, only to be rebuffed by Brezhnev.
411
 But 
Carter‘s easy acceptance of ‗no‘ for an answer, and the secondary proposal of another arms 
limitation treaty, demonstrates that nuclear arms reduction was merely the initial offer and that 
Carter was more accurate when he promised in his inaugural address to ‗limit the world‘s 
armaments‘.412     
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In this regard Reagan was different from all his predecessors: he truly wanted to 
eliminate all nuclear weapons and sought to achieve this feat. He rejected totally the idea that 
there could be a SALT III Treaty: for him, it would be nuclear arms reduction or nothing.  
 
Reagan’s Anti-Nuclearism 
Reagan‘s anti-nuclear views stretched back to the dawn of the nuclear age, and remained with 
him up to and including his time as President of the United States. While fiercely conservative 
when it came to the fight against communism, Reagan in Hollywood was a liberal Democrat like 
most of his fellow actors. As such, he often engaged in political rallies or supported causes that 
were left of centre. One of these concerned the American acquisition and use of the nuclear 
bomb. Reagan, recognizing the huge threat that this weapon posed to humanity, and fearing the 
onset of a nuclear arms race, was willing to go on record for his opposition to nuclear weapons. 
In December of 1945, Reagan had intended to speak at an anti-nuclear rally in Hollywood, where 
he was set to read a poem that he had written against the bomb. Being under contract by Warner 
Brothers, however, proved a hindrance: reading a poem was a ‗performance‘, and therefore a 
violation of his contract. The real reason behind it, however, was political: the 1940s were still a 
time in America when movie stars were told to keep their political opinions to themselves, and 
the studio did not want Reagan upsetting Washington D.C. But it did not stop Reagan from being 
against nuclear weapons, and he supported the somewhat naïve idea that the US should yield the 
bomb to the United Nations, which would regulate the technology for peaceful purposes.
413
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Naïve or not, the evidence shows that Reagan was thinking about the bomb from the genesis of 
the nuclear age, and to him nuclear weapons were an evil that ought to be abolished.  
Committed to the fight against a ‗one world communist‘ state, Reagan‘s nuclear 
abolitionist views were not heard again publicly until the 1970s, when Reagan was attempting to 
be the one person in America who could potentially launch a nuclear war. Perhaps the enormity 
of that responsibility gave Reagan pause for thought, and his hatred for the bomb again came to 
the fore. 
      At the 1976 Republican National Convention Reagan spoke from the heart on an issue 
that meant more to him than any other: the threat of nuclear war.  The background to the speech 
was that Reagan had narrowly lost his party‘s Presidential nomination to the incumbent, Gerald 
R. Ford. After his acceptance speech, Ford, hoping to unite a badly fractured party, invited 
Reagan up to the stage for a speech. The Reagan camp, seated far up the back of the auditorium, 
was taken off guard, not expecting the invitation. Reagan, turning to his wife Nancy said: ‗What 
am I going to say? I don‘t know what to say!‘414  To the chant of ‗We want Ron‘, Reagan made 
his way to the stage and gave an impromptu address, focusing especially on the nuclear issue. 
Reagan began by saying that he had been recently asked to write a letter for a time 
capsule that would be opened in the year 2076, America‘s Tri-centennial. ‗They suggested‘, 
Reagan said, ‗I write something about the problems and issues of the day.‘ Reagan shared how 
driving down the beautiful Californian coastline, and thinking through those problems, he had 
concluded that the greatest threat of 1976 remained the nuclear bomb. He stated: 
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We live in a world in which the great powers have poised and aimed at each other 
horrible missiles of destruction, nuclear weapons, that can in a matter of minutes 
arrive at each other’s country and destroy, virtually, the civilized world we live 
in. 
 And suddenly it dawned on me, those who read this letter a hundred years 
from now will know whether those missiles were fired. They will know whether we 
met our challenge. Whether they can have the freedoms that we have known up 
until now will depend on what we do here. 
 Will they look back with appreciation and say, ‗Thank God for those 
people in 1976 who headed off that loss of freedom, who kept us now a hundred 
years later free, who kept our world from nuclear destruction?’ 
This is our challenge; and that is why…we must go forth from here united, 




    
But what was the ‗victory‘ that Reagan spoke of? Was it merely the election of Ford in his own 
right as President, with a continuation of the policies that Reagan had been so critical of during 
the Presidential primaries? Was it a military victory over the Soviet Union, which in the nuclear 
age was an impossibility? Taking into account the spirit of the speech and Reagan‘s later 
abolitionist views expressed while President, it could be inferred that ‗victory‘ for Reagan was a 
world without nuclear weapons. On the path to this world, Reagan wished to begin the process of 
not merely slowing the nuclear arms race, but achieving actual arms reductions. 
      The change of US policy from seeking nuclear arms limitations agreements to actual 
reductions in nuclear weaponry came primarily from Reagan. As already stated, throughout the 
1970s, the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations had sought through arms control talks to limit 
the growth of the arms race, placing ceilings on various types of missiles. Nixon and Carter had 
negotiated the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties.  The thinking behind this was all wrong to 
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Reagan. As recounted by Reagan aide Martin Anderson, during a flight in the late 1970s Reagan 
turned to those with him and said, ‗How about instead of the SALT talks we have the START 
talks?‘ Inquiring what START stood for, Reagan explained: ‗Strategic Arms Reduction Talks‘.416 
Reagan was not the first American leader to propose nuclear arms reduction, but he was the first 
to coin the new acronym that all arms negotiations during his presidency were conducted under. 
Those who were with Reagan privately knew that he was thinking ahead, and that he was 
thinking ‗outside of the box‘. But Reagan also publicly shared his views on arms control in his 
radio addresses, and here too he gave a ‗blueprint‘ that was to be used during his presidency. 
 
 Reagan’s Arms Control Positions 
From Reagan‘s radio addresses of the 1970s, which he often used to weigh in on President 
Carter‘s arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, we can see the main elements of what 
would later become the American position for the START talks.  
 Jimmy Carter had been hard at work, seeking to achieve a SALT II Treaty with the 
Soviets, but despite his best of intentions, he received widespread criticism from political 
opponents, even from members of his own political party. And of course, Carter could always 
rely on Reagan to undermine him on the airwaves. That is not to say that Reagan did not support 
the overall agenda of arms control. He did believe strongly that the Superpowers should meet 
and negotiate a treaty on nuclear arms, but he laid down criteria of an acceptable treaty that set 
him apart from the Carter Administration. These differences were not merely an exercise in 
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polemics: Reagan‘s outline of what an arms control treaty should include became the guidelines 
for American negotiators for the START Talks of the 1980s.  
  Firstly, Reagan advocated nuclear arms reduction. ‗Do arms limitation agreements—
even good ones—really bring or preserve peace?‘ Reagan asked his listeners in 1978.  
Answering his own question, he said ‗History would seem to say no‘. Reagan then pointed out 
that following World War I the London Treaty of 1930 had placed limitations on the weight of 
battleships and other naval vessels, which only resulted, he said, ‗in improved technology‘ and 
the emergence of ‗aircraft carriers‘ the result of which was ‗an ability to strike first—as we found 
out at Pearl Harbor.‘ Perhaps more dangerously, Reagan said ‗The treaties also tended to lull the 
people of our own land and of Great Britain so that Hitler‘s military buildup took place with 
most of us refusing to admit it was happening.‘417 Limitations did not work, Reagan argued, and 
instead he proposed not a limitation of armaments, but a true reduction. As he said in an address 
entitled ‗SALT II‘ in December of 1978: 
I‘m sure all of us would like nothing better than to see the two great superpowers, 
the US and the Soviet Union, agree to a real and effective reduction of 
armaments; a reduction that would not be one sided, one that would increase not 
decrease, our hope for lasting peace. 
418
 (Emphasis added). 
 
A second major feature of Reagan‘s arms control agenda was that the terms of the treaty must be 
subject to a stringent, on the ground, verification. It was Reagan‘s contention that the Soviets 
simply could not be trusted to abide to the letter of their agreements, and indeed he alleged that 
the Soviets had flagrantly violated the SALT I Treaty.  Reagan said: 
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The SALT II agreement…must be accepted on faith. The whole matter of ‗right to 
verify whether promises are being kept‘ has been scrapped. No wonder Gromyko 
describes negotiations as ‗businesslike and useful‘. Translated from the Russian 
that means ‗Uncle Sam has been skinned again‘.419 
 
America had ‗been skinned‘ because satellite surveillance, to Reagan, simply was not good 
enough: 
Yes our reconnaissance satellites can keep a reasonable count on how many 
missiles the Soviets have on hand. But there is no way without on- site inspection 
(which the Russians will never agree to) to verify whether the Soviets are indeed 
complying with the treaty. Satellites cannot tell us whether the treaty is being 





In addition to the criteria of seeking actual nuclear reductions that could be verifiable, Reagan 
endorsed three other ‗specific‘ elements which he considered essential to the success of any arms 
control agreement:  
1) ‗To establish equal nuclear capabilities for the US and the Soviet Union‘; 
2) To ‗Stabilize the situation between the two countries so that neither would be 
tempted to strike first during an international crisis‘; and 
3) ‗Reduce the effect of nuclear weapons on world politics‘.421 
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These, Reagan said, were the original objectives that the American delegation had sought to 
achieve with the Soviets.  SALT II met none of these criteria and Reagan asked, ‗Why then 
should our Senate waste even five minutes debating the SALT II agreement?
422
 Reagan rejected 
the SALT II Treaty, and using a pun he said, ‗Too much salt we‘re told is bad for us—causes 
hardening of the arteries or something.  We may be getting another kind of SALT right now, and 
it could be fatal.‘423  But where was Reagan getting his ideas from? Who was influencing him? 
 
Influences on Reagan 
When it comes to evaluating Reagan‘s nuclear abolitionist views, a researcher would be hard 
pressed to find any major political figure who seriously advocated the complete elimination of all 
nuclear weapons. As stated above, other Presidents had spoken of it, but it was never an actual 
operational policy. Certainly no conservative publication, the type that Reagan devoured, ever 
contained pieces on why America should ‗ban the bomb‘. Unless further evidence is brought to 
light, it would seem that Reagan‘s belief that the world powers should take the road of nuclear 
abolition was his own personal opinion, which he had arrived at through his own contemplation 
on the nuclear question. The same cannot be said when it comes to evaluating Reagan‘s views on 
arms control treaties, as the amount of commentary on the SALT II Treaty in the 1970s, the 
majority of which was negative, is voluminous. From studying Reagan‘s radio addresses on the 
topic, it is easy to track ideas back to their origin, as Reagan was prone to quote verbatim from 
his sources. 




 Reagan, ‗SALT‘ (8 November 1977); Ibid., p.75. 
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 First and foremost, Reagan‘s skepticism of treaties found its source in a book entitled The 
Treaty Trap: a History of the Performance of Political Treaties by the United States and 
European Nations,
424
 written by Laurence W. Beilenson. The author, a friend of Reagan‘s since 
their time working together at the Screen Actors Guild, was by profession a lawyer.  Reagan 
quotes from Beilenson on various occasions during his radio addresses, and in a 1975 address  
says: ‗What Laurence Beilenson wrote in his book, The Treaty Trap is true: Nations that place 
their faith in treaties and fail to keep their hardware up don‘t stick around long enough to write 
many pages in history.‘425 Reagan learnt much from Beilenson, but he did not limit himself to 
one source. 
  Another major source of information for Reagan came from members of the Defense 
community, past and present. Reagan was a firm supporter of the military, and while a believer 
that civilians should remain in control lest a ‗military dictatorship‘ should arise,426 he nonetheless 
held that when it came to security issues, they were the authority on the matter, not politicians. 
America‘s failure to win a decisive victory in Korea and Vietnam, he said, was due to Presidents 
Truman and Johnson not giving the military the freedom to pursue their objectives.
427
 Likewise, 
when it came to the Soviet Union, Reagan turned to the analysis of the military to help form his 
opinions concerning arms control. 
   One of the sources that Reagan turned to was President Nixon‘s initial Secretary of 
Defense, Melvin Laird. During Nixon‘s first term, when détente was conceived and birthed 
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successfully, Laird had headed the Pentagon, and while not involved with the inner workings of 
Nixon and Kissinger‘s foreign policy, he nonetheless had supported the SALT I Treaty. 
However, he had revaluated his position considerably by the time Carter was negotiating the 
successor treaty, SALT II, charging that the Soviets had not lived up to their side of the bargain. 
Reagan quoted from an article that Laird had written, in which he said: 
The evidence is incontrovertible that the Soviet Union has repeatedly, flagrantly 
and indeed contemptuously violated the treaties to which we have adhered…This 
evidence has been withheld from the Congress, the press and the public. I believe 
there is no longer any excuse for denying the American people and their 




In addition to quoting Laird, Reagan was keen to cite those within the Carter Administration who 
were breaking rank with the President; especially if they were military.  
 One such case was the Pentagon‘s Chief-of-Staff, General Brown, who used the moment 
of his departure from government to take a swipe at his Commander-in-Chief, charging the 
President with failing to secure America by a weakened military potential; SALT II was 
obviously, many believed, a dangerous document.  Commenting on the matter, Reagan said, ―It 
is no secret that this President has overridden the advice of the Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff or ignored 
their opinion on various occasions.‘429 Reagan took the military‘s opinions seriously, as he did 
those members of Carter‘s own political party who broke rank to denounce Carter‘s arms 
negotiations. 
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 Criticism of a President from the opposition is to be expected, but when it comes from 
within party ranks, it is generally a sign that some very serious disagreements over policy are 
occurring. This was the situation that faced President Carter when he attempted to negotiate the 
SALT II Treaty with the Soviets, and Reagan was eager to exploit the mutiny within the 
Democratic Party, in support of his own conservative agenda. Chief among the defectors was 
Senator Henry ‗Scoop‘ Jackson, a Democrat from Washington state and former competitor 
against Carter for his party‘s Presidential nomination.  
 Jackson was an expert on all matters military—and had actually been Nixon‘s first choice 
as Secretary of Defense.
430
 However, he became the staunchest opponent of détente in the United 
States Senate, becoming a constant headache for President Nixon and Ford with his linkage of 
Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status for the USSR with the issue of Jewish immigration.
431
 
When Carter came into office, the issue became arms control. He was considered something of a 
menace to those in the White House, holding important Superpower relations hostage for the 
perceived advancement of his own Presidential aspirations.
432
 To Reagan, however, he was a 
hero: a man of integrity willing to stand up to the appeasers of the ‗Evil Empire‘. (As President, 
Reagan honored Jackson after his death by posthumously giving him the Presidential Medal of 
Freedom on 26 June 1984.)
433
 Reagan dedicated an entire radio address to recounting Jackson‘s 
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strident opposition to the SALT II Treaty in 1979, and in particular a vehement attack Jackson 
had made on President Carter on the eve of his Summit with Brezhnev. Reagan said: 
When historians look back at the debate over SALT II, I suspect a certain speech 
by Senator Henry Jackson will be among the most quoted documents. The speech 
I am referring to is the Senator‘s address on SALT II to a Democratic political 
group in June, in which he compared American policy towards the Soviet Union 





Reagan might have been impressed by Jackson‘s attacks, but the New York Times was not, which 
commented on the same speech: ‗Where is the decency that once dictated respect for a President 
as he carried out negotiations abroad even if the results merited challenge upon his return? In 
politics and diplomacy, there are some things worse than error.‘435 In the nuclear age, however, 
error could be catastrophic, and Reagan thought that the disloyalty towards the President by 
members of his own party was a display of political courage: putting patriotism above 
partisanship. Another rebel within the Democratic Party that Reagan cited for his arguments was 
a Congressman from California, by the name of Charles Wilson. 
 Wilson, (later made world famous by Tom Hanks‘ portrayal of him in the 2007 movie 
Charlie Wilson’s War)436 had visited the American arms negotiating team in Geneva, and 
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returned to the United States as an ardent critic of the Carter Administration‘s position. In a 
March 1978 radio address, Reagan reported on what Wilson had said, saying:  
He described the Soviet team as made up of tough, hardnosed negotiators who‘ve 
been doing this same job since 1969 when SALT I was passed. By contrast, our 
team has only two members with previous experience in any kind of Soviet 
negotiations…He was equally forthright in declaring that our negotiators seemed 





Reagan was listening to all these dissenters, and he was also learning: as President he would 
appoint a Democrat, Paul Nitze, as his chief arms negotiator, despite reservations from arch-
conservatives, because Nitze was the most experienced in the field. 
 As these radio addresses demonstrate, Reagan was obviously drawing inspiration and 




As the evidence above demonstrates, when it came to nuclear arms control, Ronald Reagan 
believed that a reduction of armaments, not a limitation, should be the objective of the US 
government in its talks with the USSR, and that such an agreement should be verified by on-site 
inspections. Furthermore, Reagan believed that the nuclear bomb was inherently pernicious, and 
therefore ought to be abolished. His criticism of the SALT II Treaty in the late 1970s provides 
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evidence about Reagan‘s thinking on the matter, and his quotes from various experts from both 
political parties, demonstrates that he was influenced by these members in holding these 
opinions. However, no evidence has come to light to show that when it came to the question of 
nuclear abolition, that Reagan was influenced by anybody, as his viewpoint was heretical to the 
conservative political establishment, despite the times when other Presidents, most notably 
Nixon and Carter, had sounded out the idea.   
 Reagan was a man who had the ‗courage of his convictions‘, and despite the conventional 
wisdom being that nuclear weapons were a necessary evil to maintain deterrence, Reagan as 
President would choose instead to follow his own beliefs and push for a world free from the 
‗terror of the bomb‘. As the following chapter will demonstrate, this ‗revolutionary‘ idea would 
be resisted by those within his own Administration, but Reagan held fast to his convictions, and 
came closer than anyone before, or since, to achieving his goals. 











THE NUCLEAR BOMB: REDUCTION AND ELIMINATION 
 
“The only value in possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they can't be used ever. I know 
I speak for people everywhere when I say our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons 





The presidency of Ronald Reagan achieved more in terms of nuclear arms reduction than any 
before or since, and it also came tantalizingly close to pulling off what was once considered an 
impossibility: the total abolition of all nuclear weapons.  That Reagan achieved such momentous 
feats seemed unbelievable to many commentators and historians of the day. After all, was not 
Reagan merely a ‗washed up movie star‘? Did he not merely read the ‗talking points‘ provided 
him by the White House staff on three-by-five inch cards? Was he not ‗hopelessly naïve‘ when it 
came to the mechanics of arms control? 
Yet, as the preceding chapter demonstrates, Reagan held quite a nuanced view on nuclear 
arms control prior his election to the presidency. Furthermore, Reagan had some very strong 
views on nuclear weapons, which he considered to be dangerous, an unnecessary madness, and 
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 Reagan‘s dream when he assumed office, therefore, was for a world free of 
the menace of ‗the bomb‘.440 Few at the time knew of Reagan‘s abolitionist views, and as they 
slowly emerged, most dismissed them as nothing more than a utopian dream.  Yet, Reagan‘s 
vision and objectives prevailed. The American government and the international community 
were to learn over the eight years of the Reagan presidency that he was, in the words of Martin 




 This chapter examines how Reagan implemented his policy of a de-nuclearized world, 
through nuclear arms reductions, and how he pursued his ultimate objective of a world without 
nuclear weapons. It examines the various proposals that were floated by Reagan‘s team within 
government, and investigates how the President navigated between the various opinions, 
choosing the course that best reflected his own philosophy. Furthermore, Reagan‘s negotiations 
with Mikhail Gorbachev are presented in some detail, with the aim of establishing the level of 
Reagan‘s involvement in the intricacies of nuclear arms reduction.  The overall question posed 
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Nuclear Arms Reduction: The Zero-Option 
Reagan had made clear prior his campaign for the presidency that any treaty that permitted the 
continuance of the arms race was useless. The only treaty that he would ever sign with the 
Soviets would be one that actually reduced the stockpile of nuclear weapons possessed by each 
Superpower. Only in this way could the world move away from the terror of the bomb, which 
Reagan said was ‗keeping the world on the precipice of disaster‘.442  The opportunity to present 
this stance began with the continuing NATO crisis surrounding INF missiles in Europe.  
 As stated earlier, Reagan had inherited from President Carter the dilemma of how to 
respond to the Soviet Union‘s attempts to upset the nuclear balance in Europe. The Soviet 
deployment of SS-20 missiles was seen as a ploy to drive a wedge between the United States and 
Western European nations via nuclear blackmail. The Soviet Union, being a totalitarian state, did 
not need the approval of its citizens to deploy new weapons, but its leaders understood very well 
that this was not the case in Western Europe. Fanning the flames of nuclear hysteria among the 
general European population and promoting a ‗nuclear freeze‘ that would cement Soviet nuclear 
superiority, Moscow hoped to use public opinion against the democracies in order to topple any 
government that dared to deploy new nuclear weapons in response. Reagan had to tread carefully 
in 1981 if he were to keep the NATO alliance a cohesive unit and defeat the Soviets at their own 
propaganda game. The evidence shows that the Reagan Administration rose to the challenge. 
 The Reagan White House response to the INF crisis—the unveiling of the so- called 
‗Zero-Option‘ in November 1981—was a diplomatic masterstroke that blunted much of the 
nuclear freeze movement‘s arguments and began the process that would lead to the first nuclear 
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arms reduction treaty in history. Richard Perle, known as the ‗Prince of Darkness‘ in the halls of 
power, surprisingly was the author of the concept.
443
 In an interview with the author, Perle 
explained his reasoning behind his proposal: 
Well, the idea had been kicked around, but, mostly when people referred to it 
before we tabled it as a proposal it meant ‘zero’ for us. Nobody, I don‘t know of 
anyone who was suggesting that the SS-20 program be abandoned. Yes, it seemed 
to me that we were in a very difficult political position because there was a great 
deal of opposition to our deployment.  
And I didn‘t think that it was an entirely valuable deployment. The system 
seemed vulnerable to me.  In theory, they achieved survivability by their mobility 
but in practice it seemed to me very unlikely that we could utilize their mobility 
because to do that we clearly were not to keep these weapons in constant motion, 
so it was intended that they would be at fixed places and move on alert. Well, 
when you start moving large numbers of nuclear weapons on alert, you create a 
crisis if there hasn‘t been one already. And if there has been one already the 
argument is against deepening the crisis by moving them.  
So I thought we were deploying sitting ducks. And there was an illusion 
that they were survivable. And in the context of deterrence the last thing you want 
is to provide the incentive to the other side to act preemptively. So I was quite 




Furthermore, Perle reflectively rejects the idea that it was a mere propaganda ploy saying: ‗No it 
was a real proposal with an unusual characteristic which was, if we didn‘t get it [Soviet 
acceptance] we were still ahead of the game because it would help us politically. And if we did 
get it, we were ahead of the game, because I didn‘t think the weapons were very useful.‘445 
Moreover, by proposing ‗zero‘ INF weapons in Europe, Reagan was seen as the reasonable 
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player in the drama. This created the image that the United States did not want to deploy new 
weapons, and its intentions were entirely peaceful.  
As mentioned earlier, Secretary of State Alexander Haig vehemently opposed the ‗Zero-
Option‘, as he explained in his memoirs: 
The fatal flaw in the Zero-Option as a basis for negotiations was that it was not 
negotiable. It was absurd to expect the Soviets to dismantle an existing force of 
1,100 warheads, which they had already put into the field at the cost of billions of 
rubles, in exchange for a promise from the United States not to deploy a missile 
force that we had not yet begun to build and that had aroused such violent 




Perle, in an interview with the author, commented on Haig‘s position: 
Well, the State Department‘s reaction was typical. They are always interested in 
getting an agreement. And this was such a bold and aggressive proposal that they 
immediately concluded that there was no chance. And therefore, if we proceeded 




Perle understood all that Haig argued, but believed that the proposal had huge merit in that it 
would take the heat off the Reagan Administration while allowing it to move forward with plans 
to deploy American INF weapons on European soil. Reagan was no political naïf; he too 
understood that it was a public relations bonanza. However, he also believed firmly that ‗zero‘ 
INF weapons in Europe was a goal worth achieving; after all, it played into his dream for a treaty 
that actually reduced nuclear weapons. As Reagan recounted in his diary, the announcement of 
the ‗Zero-Option‘ was an event that the world stopped to watch: 
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Today was the big day—the speech to the National Press Club. It really was to the 
world. I‘m told it was the largest network ever put together—all of Europe, China 
& I don‘t know how many other places. It has been wonderfully received 
worldwide except for Russia—Tass is screaming bloody murder. I asked Russia 
to join us in total elimination of all medium range nuclear weapons in Europe. 
Funny—I was talking peace but wearing a bullet proof vest. It seems Kadaffi [sic] 
put a contract on me & some person named Jack was going to try for me at the 




Reagan was serious about the ‗Zero-Option‘, and as the seven years following his announcement 
of the proposal demonstrate, he continued to work at it long after the original public relations 
strategy no longer held any importance. 
 
Sticking with Zero 
If the ‗Zero-Option‘ was merely propaganda designed to give the United States a cover for INF 
deployment, then the proposal would have been dropped the instant that NATO began installing 
the controversial weapons in 1983. Instead, Reagan kept the ‗Zero-Option‘ alive over many 
years until it was finally codified in a treaty.   
November 1983 was the deadline for arms negotiators from the US and the USSR to 
resolve the SS-20 crisis. If a solution could not be found, then the US would go ahead with the 
deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles. Six months before D-Day, Reagan reiterated that 
‗zero‘ was the American stance on European INF weapons, telling reporters that this was a 
position that would not change following deployment: ‗I believe that deploying on schedule, 
when the time comes later this fall,‘ he said, ‗will be the thing that will bring the Soviets 
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legitimately into negotiations.‘449 Though at times hopelessly idealistic, Reagan could also be a 
clear eyed realist: he understood that the Soviets only negotiated in good faith when confronted 
with a strategic challenge. If a ‗Zero-Option‘ was to be negotiated, then Reagan would first have 
to deploy the weapons. And deploy he did. 
Despite massive protests and widespread anxiety that deployment would produce a 
heightened risk of nuclear confrontation between the Superpowers, President Reagan was single-
minded in his determination to match the INF threat posed by the Soviets with his own counter-
threat. ‗Peace through Strength‘ meant that deterrence had to be achieved.  When the deadline 
came, Reagan was not about to allow a further delay: he gave the go-ahead for deployment to 
begin. In response, the Soviets made good on their pledge, and dramatically walked out on the 
Geneva Arms Talks on 23 November 1983, saying that ‗no date‘ had been set for their 
resumption.
450
 Throughout the world an amplified feeling of fear was palpable, as many believed 
that the likelihood of a nuclear conflict between the Superpowers was at its greatest since the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. However, Reagan took the opportunity to again paint America as the 
crusader for peace and arms reduction. 
Following the NATO deployment of INF weapons in November 1983 and the 
cancellation of Superpower arms talks, President Reagan made an impassioned plea for the 
Soviets to join him in the cause of nuclear arms reduction. Instead of reproaching the Soviets for 
their refusal to take seriously the ‗Zero-Option‘, or glorifying his own resolve in going ahead 
with the threatened deployment, on the morning of the Soviet walkout, Reagan chose instead to 
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take the tone of the humble peacemaker. Rejecting what he called ‗false pride‘ on behalf of the 
American delegation, Reagan told the White House press corps: 
I don‘t think that I‘m surprised by what they did this morning, but I am 
disappointed. And I can‘t believe that it‘s going to be permanent. We‘ll be ready 
to continue negotiations at any time that they want to come back….We will do 




The formal statement from the White House that day read: 
The United States will never walk away from the negotiating table. Peace is too 
important…We have no higher priority than the reduction of nuclear 
weapons…The people of the world deserve and want our negotiations to succeed. 
We look forward to the day when the Soviet Union hears their call and returns to 




Many considered Reagan‘s words, and the White House statement, to be merely a ‗performance‘ 
aimed at blunting criticism for their provocative deployment of INF weapons on the doorstep of 
the USSR, while hardliners applauded his actions. Deterrent capability was being achieved, the 
nuclear imbalance was being addressed and the Soviet Union was being put in its place.
453
 
Reagan agreed with those latter sentiments, but for him it was a necessary evil that he did not 
enjoy. The President seemingly was genuinely dedicated to achieving zero INF weapons in 
Europe as he continued to insist that America‘s position had not changed; the US was willing to 
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codify with the USSR the total dismantling of the nuclear weapons in question. In the face of 
harsh Soviet criticism, Reagan remained steadfast. 
From the time of the INF deployment to the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet 
leader, President Reagan continued to push for the ‗Zero-Option‘. As mentioned in Chapter 2, on 
16 January 1984, Reagan astounded many commentators by an apparent reversal in US foreign 
policy concerning the Soviets when he gave a speech that emphasized the importance of 
dialogue. One of the issues raised in the speech was the INF ‗Zero-Option‘, which Reagan linked 
to his detestation of nuclear weapons: 
A nuclear conflict could well be mankind's last. And that is why I proposed over 2 
years ago the Zero-Option for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was and 
continues to be to eliminate an entire class of nuclear arms. Indeed, I support a 
Zero-Option for all nuclear arms. As I've said before, my dream is to see the day 





However, despite this ‗olive-branch‘ extended to the Soviet leadership, Reagan received a 
brusque letter from Soviet leader Andropov on 28 January 1984 which said: 
If one must state today that the affairs between our two countries are 
taking on, to put it frankly, an extremely unfavorable shape, then the 
reason for it is not our policy—we did not and do not want it to be so…We 
are prepared to accept very deep reductions both of the strategic and 
European weapons…However, the United States has destroyed the very 
basis on which it was possible to seek an agreement...Let us be frank, Mr. 
President, there is no way of making things look as if nothing happened. 
There has been a disruption of the dialogue on the most important 
questions. A heavy blow has been dealt to the very process of nuclear 
arms limitation.
455
  (Emphasis added). 
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Within two weeks of this letter, Andropov was dead. But did this represent an opportunity for a 
‗fresh start‘ with his successor, Konstantin Chernenko? In his Saturday radio address on 11 
February, Reagan again asked the Soviets to return to the arms negotiation table, saying: 
America is ready. We would welcome negotiations. And I repeat today what I’ve 
said before: We’re prepared to meet the Soviets halfway in the search for 
mutually acceptable agreements. I hope the leaders of the Soviet Union will work 
with us in that same spirit. I invite them to take advantage of the opportunities at 
hand to establish a more stable and constructive relationship. If the Soviet 




In his diary, Reagan wrote of his aspiration to meet with the new Soviet leader and ‗talk to him 
about our problems man-to-man and see if I could convince him there would be a material 
benefit to the Soviet‘s if they would join the family of nations‘.457 However, on the very next 
day, 23 February, Reagan was bitterly disappointed when he received a letter from Chernenko 
which said: 
I would like, Mr. President, that you and I have a clear understanding from the 
very beginning on the central matter of the relations between the USSR and the 
USA. We are convinced that it is impossible to begin to correct the present 
abnormal, and, let’s face it, dangerous situation and to speak seriously of 
constructive moves, if there is a continuation of attempts to upset the balance of 
forces and gain military advantages to the detriment of the security of the other 
side...
458
 (Emphasis added). 
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Meanwhile, the Soviets continued in their attempt to drive a wedge between the US and its 
European allies, and on 4 May Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi suggested a halt in INF 
deployments if the Soviets resumed negotiations. Reagan was opposed to giving into Soviet 
threats, and wrote the Italian PM, opposing what Shultz called a ‗significant break without any 
consultation with our NATO position‘.459 The Dutch coalition government, similarly, decided to 
delay a vote on INF deployment when the realization occurred that there were not enough votes 
to approve the action at that time.   
Relations had stalled, and Reagan was convinced that the Soviets were attempting to 
sabotage his chances of re-election by rebuffing his every move towards them. As Reagan noted 
in his diary after reading a harsh letter from Chernenko: ‗They are going to be cold and stiff for 
awhile. But we must not become supplicants. We‘re trying to get agreement on a few lesser 
matters‘.460 But Chernenko understood that he could not continue being obstinate forever, and he 
reached two critical conclusions that permitted the resumption of the Geneva Arms Talks. First 
was the realization that, barring a miracle, Reagan would be overwhelmingly re-elected President 
over Walter Mondale in 1984. The second was that Andropov‘s position that the US would first 
have to remove its INF weapons as an ‗entry fee‘ into negotiations was simply never going to 
happen. 
461
 As such, in 1984 the Soviets slowly moved towards Reagan‘s position. 
The Soviet strategy during the first half of 1984 had been to paint Reagan as a leader in 
the mold of Hitler, who would bring about a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union if he 
were re-elected president. Was this merely character assassination, or did the Soviets actually 
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fear a second Reagan term? Whatever their motivations, it was a stratagem that was 
counterproductive. Therefore, in August of that year, Secretary Shultz began to receive ‗feelers‘ 
from the Soviet foreign ministry that Andrei Gromyko wished to meet with Reagan during his 
trip to New York in September for the opening of the UN. Such diplomatic visits had been 
standard practice prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, after which such meetings had been 
cancelled. When Shultz raised the possibility of a Reagan/Gromyko Summit and warned that it 
would take place without any change regarding Afghanistan, Reagan dismissed concerns and 
said, ‗It‘s the right thing to do. Try to work it out‘.462 Reagan recorded his reasoning for 
approving the meeting in his diary on 28 July 1984: 
I lunched with Bud [McFarlane] and George S[hultz] & we looked at the Soviets 
from several directions. I approved asking Gromyko to the W.H if he comes as he 
usually does to N.Y for the U.N General Assembly opening.  
I have a feeling we’ll get nowhere with arms reductions while they are 
suspicious of our motives as we are of theirs. I believe we need a meeting to see if 
we can‘t make them understand we have no designs on them but think they have 
designs on us. If we could once clear the air maybe reducing arms wouldn’t look 
so impossible to them.
463
(Emphasis added). 
    
The meeting took place on 28 September 1984, with a full flurry of media attention. Reagan 
tackled the issue of nuclear arms reduction talks, and proposed a formula that would include both 
defensive and offensive technologies. Gromyko spoke of the dangers of each Superpower sitting 
on a mountain of weapons, and surprised Reagan by saying that the Soviet Union wished to 
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reduce their numbers. Reagan responded to this by saying, ‗My dream is for a world where there 
are no nuclear weapons‘.464  
 The Reagan/Gromyko mini-summit broke the ice, and paved the way for a full 
resumption of nuclear arms reduction talks. Eleven days after Reagan‘s triumphant re-election, 
on 17 November, the Soviets agreed to a resumption of arms reduction talks. A letter from 
Chernenko arrived which said, ‗We are prepared to seek most radical solutions which would 
allow movement toward a complete ban and eventually liquidation of nuclear arms‘.465 
Announced publicly on 22 November, Thanksgiving Day, it was a victory for Reagan personally, 
and proof that the Soviet Union felt it needed to reign-in America‘s re-armament program. For 
Shultz, it was a sign that ‗we were smack in the middle of what was ever more clearly shaping up 
to be the endgame of the Cold War‘. 466  However, there was still a long way to go. 
On 8 January 1985 Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko met in Geneva and 
agreed to the terms of the resumed arms control talks. Firstly, the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI) would not be the sole point of discussion, as the Soviets had originally wished. And 
secondly, the United States was not required to remove their INF missiles or even halt further 
deployments as an entry fee for negotiations. Instead, the talks would proceed looking at so 
called ‗strategic‘ weapons (long range, ICBM missiles), short range missiles (INF), and ‗space 
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weaponry‘ (meaning SDI).  On 22 January, one day after his second inauguration,467 Reagan met 
with his arms control negotiators, and released a statement to the world which said: 
I view the negotiating commitments we undertook two weeks ago with the 
Soviets in Geneva with the utmost seriousness. I have no more important goal 
than reducing, and ultimately, eliminating nuclear weapons….I look forward to 





And Reagan did work closely with his arms negotiators, pushing them towards an agreement that 
would see massive reductions in nuclear armaments, with the eventual goal of total elimination. 
As Reagan recorded in his diary about a meeting held on 4 March 1985:  
We had an NSC meeting with our arms talks leaders looking at various options 
for how we wanted to deal with the Soviets. It‘s a very complicated business. I 
urged one decision on them—that we open talks with a concession. Surprise! 
Since they have publicly stated they want to see nuclear weapons eliminated 





The talks scheduled for 12 March, however, were disrupted when the Soviet leader Chernenko, 
after a long illness, died on 11 March.  Seizing the initiative of yet another change in leadership, 
Reagan immediately wrote to the new leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, and proposed a Superpower 
Summit to be held in Washington ‗at your earliest convenient opportunity‘.470 Gorbachev replied 
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on 24 March, agreeing to a Summit, ‗the question of the place and time‘ left for further 
discussions. The letter was largely philosophical, with an emphasis on letting each social system 
exist undisturbed, but Gorbachev did note that in terms of the Superpower dialogue, ‗the central 
priority area is that of security‘. Addressing the Geneva arms reduction talks directly, Gorbachev 
wrote: 
The negotiations under way in Geneva require the foremost attention of the two of 
us. Obviously we will have to turn again and again to the questions under 
discussion there. At this point I do not intend to comment on what is going on at 
the talks—they have just started. I shall say though, that some statements which 
were made and are being made in your country will, with regard to the talks, 
cause concern. I would like you to know and appreciate the seriousness of our 
approach to the negotiations, our firm desire to work though positive results there. 
We will invariably adhere to the agreement on the subject and objectives of those 
negotiations. The fact that we were able to agree on this in January is already a 




Gorbachev‘s conciliatory tone was not to last, however. In June he sent Reagan a letter calling 
for a complete halt on SDI research in addition to a total moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. 
It was a deft propaganda move: the Soviets had just completed their round of nuclear testing, and 
the Americans were just beginning a new round of theirs. Gorbachev was going to be a wily 
opponent, confirming what Reagan had written in his diary in April: ‗I believe that Gorbachev 
will be as tough as any of their leaders. If he wasn‘t a confirmed ideologue he never would have 
been chosen by the Politburo.‘472 In July Gorbachev stepped up the pressure all the more, 
condemning Reagan‘s qualified support for the SALT II Treaty, and lambasting the INF 
deployment. He wrote: 
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The US deployment in Western Europe of new missile systems designed to 
perform strategic missions is a clear circumvention, that is, noncompliance by the 
American side with regard to the SALT II treaty. In this, Mr. President, we see an 
attempt by the United States to gain a virtual monopoly on the use of weapons in 




It was a strange thing for Gorbachev to say, considering that the NATO deployment was in 
response to the Soviet SS-20 deployment, and thus a very strong analogy did in fact exist. 
Gorbachev also demanded a complete halt of the ‗Star Wars program‘ which he said was 
‗destabilizing‘, ‗dangerous‘ and if ‗not corrected‘ would be met with a militant Soviet response: 
‗We shall have no choice but to take steps required by our security and that of our allies‘, he 
said. Gorbachev also claimed to have an insight into Reagan‘s strategy, saying: 
Why mince words, the objective is quite different: to cast aspersions on the policy 
of the Soviet Union in general, to sow distrust towards it and to create an artificial 
pretext for an accelerated and uncontrolled arms race. All this became evident to 




The letter from Gorbachev might have been viewed as a new freeze in the Cold War, had it not 
also included a major diplomatic breakthrough: his agreement to a Superpower Summit, to be 
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Negotiating Positions Leading up to Geneva 
The lead-up to the Geneva Summit confirmed that Gorbachev was serious about changing his 
country‘s foreign policy towards the West, however his positions remained flawed in that they 
were generally one-sided and self-serving.  
The major change began with the announcement on 5 July 1985 that the Soviet foreign 
policy establishment was to receive a major shakeup: Andrei Gromyko, who had been foreign 
minister for decades, was appointed to the ceremonial post of President of the USSR (as he had 
wanted), and Eduard Shevardnadze replaced him as the Foreign Affairs minister (an outcome 
that Gromyko had not anticipated).
475
 Shevardnadze‘s appointment, a man who had nil 
experience in international relations, was a sign that Gorbachev planned on being his own 
Foreign Affairs minister.
476
 When Shevardnadze came to the White House on 27 September 
1985, he had brought with him the Soviet position paper for the upcoming arms control 
negotiations. 
 Gorbachev‘s proposal to Reagan on nuclear arms reduction constituted a breakthrough in 
that it was the first time that the Soviets spoke about nuclear arms reduction and not just 
limitation. But as the saying goes, ‗the devil was in the details‘. The Soviet‘s proposed a 50% 
reduction of ‗offensive strategic weapons to a level of 6,000 charges‘, and defined this as an 
explosive weapon that would hit the territory of the other side.  As Shultz informed the President, 
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the proposal ‗was clever‘ but was ‗weighted heavily‘ against the United States. As Shultz 
explained in his memoirs: 
The 6,000 charges would include the intermediate-range missiles we had 
deployed in Europe but not Soviet missiles of similar range, since these would hit 
our allies, not the United States. It would cover all such weapons on carriers at 
sea, but the Soviets had no carriers. Our bomber weapons would be covered, but 
the Soviets had relatively few of these weapons. It would ban our Midgetman but 
permit the Soviets SS-24s and SS-25s. The 6,000 limit would not touch 70 




Reagan was still suspicious of the Soviets, and wrote of his meeting with Shevardnadze in his 
diary: 
He‘s a personable fellow, but we had our differences. My goal was to send him 
back to Gorbachev with a message that I really meant ‗arms reductions‘ and I 





What Shultz took away from the proposal was that it did include the arms reductions goal that 
Reagan insisted upon, even if ‗the specifics were not remotely acceptable‘.479 As such, it was a 
breakthrough in terms of principle that could be worked on at the Geneva Summit.  
In the meantime, Reagan replied to Gorbachev with his own counter-proposal. On 31 
October, the President wrote to Gorbachev laying out his negotiating position. On the 50% 
reduction of strategic weapons, Reagan stated that his government ‗agrees with the objective‘. 
But, he said: ‗Our proposal builds on this, applying the fifty per cent principle in a manner that is 
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both equitable and can enhance stability.‘ On INF, Reagan said: ‗I continue to firmly believe that 
the best outcome would be the complete elimination of intermediate range missiles on both 
sides,‘ but he mentioned that he was willing to negotiate how that would be accomplished. 
Reagan ended his letter by saying that he was ‗looking forward‘ to his meeting with Gorbachev 
in the hope that it would ‗be able to set our countries on a less confrontational and more 
cooperative course in the years ahead‘.480  
 
The Geneva Summit: 50% Reduction Agreed To 
The Geneva Summit of 1985 saw, for the first time in the history of the Cold War, a real 
dialogue between the Superpowers on the issue of nuclear arms reduction. It began on the 
morning of 19 November and lasted three days. Those three days were a turning point in the 
Reagan presidency, and the beginning of real progress to halt the arms race and reduce the 
stockpile of nuclear weapons of both Superpowers. 
 Reading the transcripts of the Geneva Summit, it is clear that nuclear arms reduction was 
an issue of utmost importance, with Gorbachev interested in the mechanics of arms control, 
while Reagan took a more philosophical approach. It was Gorbachev, in the first plenary 
meeting, who turned to the specifics of arms reduction. As the ‗Memcons‘ record for the 
‗Plenary Session‘ of ‗11:27AM-12:15pm‘, Gorbachev concluded his ‗overview of the world‘s 
situation‘ by saying: 
…the Soviet Union believes that the central question is how to halt the arms race 
and to disarm. For their part the Soviet Union would not put forward proposals 
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which would be detrimental to the United States. They are for equal security. If 
anything detrimental to the United States was proposed, this would not be 
acceptable to the Soviet Union because it would not make for stability. The Soviet 
Union has no ulterior motives. What the President said about equal security, no 
superiority and movement toward halting the arms race were the conditions for 
building a cooperative relationship.
481
    
 
Reagan began his reply by noting again that ‗if the two sides are to get down to reducing the 
mountains of weapons, that both must get at the cause of the distrust which had led to them.‘482 
The ‗Memcons‘ report that the President continued: 
…This is the first time that the United States is seeking with the Soviet Union to 
actually reduce the mountains of these weapons. The other meetings, 18 so far, 
merely addressed regulating the increase in these weapons. In 1980 the President 
had said he could not support this approach. He would stay as long as needed 




Reagan then returned to the issue of who was to blame for the arms race, and pointed the finger 
squarely at the Russians who had spoken of ‗a one world communist state‘ and had further 
increased tensions by ‗inspiring revolutions around the world‘. Reagan also pointed out that the 
Soviet military capability was superior to that of America, being ‗the largest in history‘. And so, 
the matter again rested on ‗trust‘, for:  
If the two sides just get in bargaining over a particular type of weapon we will just 
go on trying to keep advantages. But if we can go on the basis of trust, then those 
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Reagan was doing what he did best: leaving the details aside and sticking to the big picture. ‗We 
don‘t mistrust each other because we are armed,‘ he said to Gorbachev, ‗we are armed because 
we mistrust each other. It‘s fine that the two of us and our people are talking about arms 
reductions, but isn‘t it also important that you and I should be talking about how we could reduce 
the mistrust between us?‘485 
 
Geneva: The Second Plenary Meeting 
Gorbachev, during the second plenary meeting of the Geneva Summit, rejected Reagan‘s charge 
that the USSR enjoyed a nuclear superiority and called for a reduction of each nation‘s 
respective stockpiles. Calling attention to the fact that in the 1960s the US enjoyed ‗four times as 
many strategic delivery systems‘ than the USSR, he said it was natural that they took steps to 
‗establish parity‘. And that level of parity, he said, still existed as the ‗ISS in London‘ had 
concluded. But, Gorbachev elaborated: 
[The] Soviet Union wants parity at a lower level. We are for equal security and 
agreed to embark upon the negotiations in Geneva. We must meet each other 
half way if we are to find a way to reduce strategic weapons. We know the US 
can meet any challenge from us and we can meet any challenge from you. But 
why not make a step which would permit lowering the arms level?
486
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However, Gorbachev made clear that any possible reduction of nuclear weapons was contingent 
upon the US agreeing to a total cessation of the SDI program. ‗If the US embarks on SDI,‘ 
Gorbachev said, then there would be ‗no reduction of offensive weapons‘. 487 
Reagan‘s remarks following those of Gorbachev spelt out the difference of opinion 
regarding various regional conflicts, and the President said that SDI should not be a hindrance to 
negotiating arms reductions. When Gorbachev asked what they should instruct their arms 
negotiators to achieve, Reagan responded by saying ‗that they could be given guidelines to 
reduce nuclear weapons, say, by 50%.‘488 But neither side was budging on the issue of SDI. 
In the private one-on-one meeting that followed immediately after, Gorbachev again 
argued that the US must halt a new ‗arms race in a new sphere‘ with a declaration that ‗both 
countries would refrain from research, development, testing and deployment of space weapons 
and that such an agreement would be subject to appropriate verification‘.489 Reagan pointed out 
that any possible SDI program ‗was not yet known, and that if it were known, it would still be 
years away.‘ Reagan then asked, ‗Why then should we sit here in the meanwhile with mountains 
of weapons on each side?‘490 Agreement on SDI would not be made at the Geneva Summit, but 
the two Superpowers did commit themselves to nuclear arms reduction. As the Joint Soviet--
American statement at the conclusion of the Summit read: 
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Noting the proposals recently tabled by the US and the Soviet Union, they called 
for early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including 
the principle of 50% reductions in the nuclear arms of the US and the USSR 




   
In Reagan‘s remarks to the world‘s media following the release of this statement, he said that 
‗the real report card on Geneva will not come in for months or even years, but we know the 
questions must be answered‘.492 In particular, Reagan asked, ‗Will we join together in sharply 
reducing offensive nuclear arms and moving to non-nuclear defensive strengths for systems to 
make this a safer world?‘493 The answer was ‗yes‘—but Geneva was only a beginning, and there 
were ‗many miles to go‘. 
 
Climbing to another Summit: 1986 
Despite the goodwill and high expectations generated by the Geneva Summit, relations between 
the Superpowers remained somewhat rocky in 1986, and no movement was made in agreements 
on nuclear arms reductions. It seemed to some commentators that each side was ‗playing to the 
crowd‘, making bold statements and even bolder proposals, but what was lacking was a sincere 
effort to find an agreement that was mutually acceptable.   
The propaganda moves began in earnest in January 1986 when Gorbachev announced 
publicly a three-tiered proposal that included the elimination all INF weapons in Europe, an end 
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to nuclear testing, and the complete abolition of all nuclear weapons by the year 1999.
494
 Reagan 
resented how his ‗Zero-Option‘ was made to appear as though it were a ‗Soviet idea‘ and the fact 
that the media was all abuzz about Gorbachev‘s nuclear abolitionism further incensed the 
President, as he had been saying the same thing for years. As a consequence, the White House 
released a statement pointing out that Reagan had proposed this radical idea before Gorbachev. 
Speaking in the President‘s name, it began: ‗In 1983 at the Japanese Diet, I called for the total 
abolition of nuclear weapons.‘ The second paragraph began: ‗Now the Soviet Union has 
responded with a proposal which builds on some of the elements we had previously set 
forth.‘(Emphasis added).495  
It was, in Reagan‘s view ‗one hell of a propaganda move‘ as he recorded in his diary,496 a 
conclusion also reached by many of his team since Gorbachev had violated the ‗private channel‘ 
between himself and the President by making the proposals public.  Evidence today reflects that 
Reagan and his team were correct in their analysis, as William D Jackson observes: 
Highly doubtful that the Reagan administration would fundamentally alter its 
policies toward the Soviet Union, Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership were 
inclined to pursue a diplomatic strategy that discounted the prospects of 
reestablishing a detente relationship with the hardline Reagan administration. 
They sought to isolate the Reagan administration and thereby increase pressure 
on it to alter its policies by enticing Western Europe with bold new disarmament 
proposals…By demonstrating a willingness to make concessions in the name of 
peace, the Soviet Union would improve its own image and at the same time 
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Nonetheless, while Reagan believed Gorbachev‘s motives to be questionable, he forbade his 
Administration to voice their misgivings publicly, as his diary records on 4 February 1986: 
NSPG time in the situation room re: Gorbachev‘s proposal to eliminate nuclear 
arms. Some wanted to tag it as a publicity stunt. I said no. Let’s say we share their 
overall goals and now want to work out the details. If it is a publicity stunt this 
will be revealed by them.
498
 (Emphasis added). 
 
Reagan also privately asked: ‗Why wait until 2000?‘ to abolish nuclear weapons.499 The 
Administration, however, was in near mutiny, with the National Security Agency, the State 
Department and the Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff aghast at the concept of a world without nuclear 
weapons. However, Reagan had a firm ally in his Secretary of State, George Shultz, who 
enforced the President‘s decision to forward a counterproposal to Gorbachev that shared the 
same goals. 
Leading up to the Reykjavik Summit, there was no one person in the Reagan 
Administration next to the President more responsible for America‘s nuclear arms reduction 
policy than George Shultz. Meeting the President in the Oval office on 24 January 1986, he 
informed him that ‗your arms control community disagrees with your desire to get rid of nuclear 
weapons‘. Consequently, Shultz suggested the creation of a ‗special group‘ of experts that could 
circumvent the ‗petrified, stultified, inter-agency process.‘500 Reagan gave the go ahead, but he 
did not understand the opposition within his own Administration to the cause of nuclear 
abolitionism. ‗If any nation is likely to conduct a first strike‘, he said, ‗it is the Soviet Union. So 
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why isn‘t this a problem we want to get rid of?‘501  The major problem was, of course, that the 
Soviets enjoyed a huge advantage in terms of conventional military power, and the concern was 
that if each side divested itself of nuclear weaponry, there would be no deterrent to stop Soviet 
tanks from rolling into Western Europe. When this issue was raised at Shultz‘s ‗special group‘ 
meeting, Shultz replied that a ‗staged approach‘ was required that incorporated ‗the powerful 
vision the President has projected‘502 and would include agreements on conventional weapons 
reduction down the road. However, forces within the US government were determined to 
undermine that vision, and Shultz was forced to walk a tightrope between the President‘s 
‗idealist‘ position, and the more ‗realist‘ stance taken by his subordinates. 
President Reagan‘s desire to negotiate a nuclear arms reduction treaty with the USSR was 
aggressively opposed by members of his own Administration, and it was only the President‘s and 
George Shultz‘s leadership that kept the team in line. Immediately following the beginning of 
Shultz‘s ‗special group‘ meetings, ‗unnamed sources‘ began placing calls with the governments 
of Japan and France, seeking their help in undermining any attempt to negotiate an INF Treaty. 
Furthermore, the National Security Council draft letter from President Reagan to Gorbachev 
purposely omitted INF from even being mentioned, despite the fact that Reagan clearly wanted 
this issue to be ‗center- stage‘ in any upcoming summit. Reagan ordered the NSC letter to be re-
written to include INF, and stated that contacts with foreign governments was ‗a despicable act‘, 
ordering an investigation of the Pentagon and the dismissal of the offender. Weinberger said that 
he would punish the culprit, but no action was taken.
503
 Nevertheless, Reagan sent a message to 
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any would-be saboteur within his government: opposition to his agenda would result in 
termination of employment. Perhaps Weinberger got the message, because he then proposed a 
radical arms reduction scheme of his own. 
At a special meeting held in the White House ‗Situation Room‘ on 12 June 1986, 
Secretary of Defense Weinberger proposed to the President that the US work towards the total 
elimination of all ballistic missiles. Shultz, who was present at the meeting with a handful of 
others, was taken aback by the fact that Weinberger, of all people, was advocating such a 
proposal. After all, he was the person who had set up obstacles to all of the arms negotiation 
positions that had been floated prior. But the idea was not Weinberger‘s; rather it had originated 
with Fred Ikle, a Swiss-born arms control expert, who as early as 1973 had voiced his concerns 
about the dangers of the fast moving missiles in a Foreign Affairs article.
504
 Ikle believed that if 
ballistic missiles were eliminated, then the most dangerous aspect of nuclear weaponry—the 
ability to strike quickly and without warning—would be removed. He ran the idea past Richard 
Perle and, finally, Weinberger, who, being convinced of the merits of the argument, brought it to 
the President.
505
 Reagan, who had been proposing total elimination of all nuclear weapons for 
quite some time, did not see anything radical in Weinberger‘s plan, and his diary account of the 
meeting does not even mention Weinberger at all. Instead, Reagan recounts how he summed up 
the meeting: 
I finally proposed that we offer a reduction of ICBMs and at the same time an 
agreement that both of us should continue research on a possible defense against 
them. If and when such tests should indicate such a defense weapon is possible 
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both of us observe ‗tests‘ and we agree that deployment must follow the 
elimination of all ICBMs and then the defense be made available to all. I think our 
team bought it.
506
 (Emphasis added). 
 
The importance of Weinberger‘s proposal, therefore, was not its substance: it was the fact that 
both the Pentagon and the State Department had finally united behind Reagan‘s vision of 
massive reduction of nuclear armaments.  Reagan went with this unity to the Reykjavik Summit 
ready to make history with Gorbachev. 
 
The Reykjavik Summit: The Most Sweeping Arms Reduction Proposals in History 
On 11 October 1986, the two most powerful men in the world sat down face-to-face and began 
two days of extraordinary discussions; discussions that achieved the basic terms of the INF and 
START nuclear reduction treaties, and permitted the two Superpower leaders to look beyond the 
Cold War into a new era where nuclear weapons could be abolished. 
 The summit took place in Hofdi House, which overlooked the Icelandic ocean, and 
Reagan and Gorbachev began proceedings seated at a table looking out at the arctic landscape. 
Apart from interpreters and note-takers, the leaders were alone. The ‗Memcons‘ record that the 
meeting, which began at 10:40am, started with Reagan expressing his pleasure at Gorbachev‘s 
idea for the Summit; Reagan then stated his desire that agreement on reducing the nuclear 
stockpiles by 50% could be realized, as ‗the world is watching in the hope that this will be 
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achieved.‘507 Gorbachev then began to unveil his new arms reduction proposals, only to be 
interrupted again by Reagan who said that any treaty must include agreement on ‗effective 
verification‘ and that this, too, ‗would be a great step and the world would applaud.‘508 After 
several more exasperating interruptions by the President, Gorbachev decided that it was time to 
call in Shultz and Shevardnadze. 
  With the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister joining them, Gorbachev unveiled 
the most far reaching arms reduction proposals in history, moving far closer to America‘s 
positions than had ever been anticipated. Firstly, Gorbachev agreed to the 50% reduction of 
strategic arms first proposed at Geneva,  stating that he had ‗taken the US view into account‘ and 
made the ‗concession‘ of including only long range missiles.509 Secondly, Gorbachev accepted 
Reagan‘s ‗Zero-Option‘ for INF weapons in Europe, and dropped the requirement of British and 
French disarmament. It was a ‗huge compromise‘ to the American side, Gorbachev said. The 
question of medium-range missiles in Asia, Gorbachev continued, should be withdrawn by the 
American side ‗in [the] spirit of compromise,‘ or at least referred to the Geneva arms negotiation 
teams.
510
 Turning to the ABM Treaty, Gorbachev proposed that both sides commit to observe it 
‗strictly and in full,‘ with a firm agreement of non-withdrawal for a period ‗not less than ten 
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years‘ during which all SDI testing would be confined to ‗laboratories‘.511 He added that a 
moratorium on nuclear testing would follow, and ‗on-site‘ verification was acceptable.512  
As Gorbachev was unveiling this package, Reagan wondered if the Chernobyl disaster, 
which had happened in April that year, was behind the Soviets‘ willingness to offer such far-
reaching reductions. After all, the radiation released there was less than the amount that would be 
emitted by a single nuclear bomb: ‗Has Chernobyl made Gorbachev think about the effects of a 
missile with ten nuclear warheads?‘ Reagan wondered.513 Despite being amazed by the Soviet 
proposals, Reagan quickly countered. 
 Reagan was no master of details, but he quickly grasped Gorbachev‘s sweeping arms 
reduction proposal and informed the Soviet leader that on INF and SDI, the Soviets‘ position was 
unacceptable. Despite Gorbachev‘s request that the question of INF weapons in Asia be put aside 
in a ‗spirit of compromise‘, Reagan pointed out that because Soviet INF missiles were mobile, 
moving them to Asia would make no difference, as their long range capability meant that they 
could still target Europe.
514
 On SDI, Reagan said that a new treaty, one ‗which would supersede 
the ABM Treaty‘, should be drafted which would permit research and testing ‗in the presence of 
representatives‘ of each country; and when a system is deployable, then it would be shared with 
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each side. ‗The reason for this‘, Reagan explained, ‗is that we can‘t guarantee in the future that 
someone—a madman like Hitler, for example—might not try to build nuclear weapons‘.515  
Gorbachev was displeased by Reagan‘s reply, and said that he ‗hoped that these were 
preliminary remarks on the President‘s part‘ and that Reagan and his team would ‗give them 
appropriate attention.‘ In other words, he hoped that Shultz would talk some sense into Reagan. 
But, while Shultz at one time had lectured Reagan on his failings over the Iran-Contra scandal,
516
 
when it came to arms control, his approach was always deferential to the President and his 
position. Reagan was leading the way, and setting the tone. Shultz‘s role was to help work out 
the details. And so he did: as Reagan and Gorbachev slept that night, negotiating teams from 
both sides began an all-night session that sought to bring the two side‘s positions closer together. 
By morning they were ready for a showdown. 
   
Reykjavik: Day Two 
President Reagan and Gorbachev awoke on Sunday 12 October to find that a lot of work was cut 
out for them: the American and Soviet delegations had failed to reach agreement on INF and 
ABM during the previous night‘s negotiations. Disappointed, the two Superpower leaders sat 
down with the realization that whatever could be accomplished that day would be up to them. 
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 Gorbachev began by noting that according to the Bible, the world had been created in 
seven days and Reagan and he were ‗only on their second day‘ with a long way to go until they 
reached the seventh.
517
 Reagan replied that the day being Sunday, the two should actually be 
resting. Gorbachev then gave the floor to Reagan, who gave a ‗run down‘ of the American 
negotiating position for arms reduction. 
Reagan began by stating that on START he was ‗proud‘ of the agreed 50% reduction in 
strategic arsenals that had been tabled.
518
 On INF, Reagan stated that any agreement had to be 
‗global‘ in nature, to avoid removing weapons from Europe and re-deploying them to Asia. 
‗These were not new arguments‘, Reagan remarked, ‗but they were real concerns‘ to him and to 
America‘s allies. An interim agreement, perhaps limiting each side to 100 INF weapons on the 
road to zero, could be accomplished, as a compromise.
519
 On ‗defense and space‘, Reagan said 
that he ‗recognized‘ that Gorbachev at that time ‗was not prepared to agree with him‘, and he 
informed Gorbachev that he too ‗was not prepared to move from the course that he believed 
correct‘. However, negotiators should be given instructions to investigate how SDI research 
could proceed under the guidelines of the ‗ABM Treaty‘.520 As he listened to Reagan, Gorbachev 
grew angrier by the second, and when it was his time to talk, Gorbachev ‗let fly‘ at the President. 
 Gorbachev‘s response to Reagan‘s presentation demonstrated how annoyed he was with 
the President‘s refusal to accept Soviet proposals. He had come to Reykjavik, he said, with 
proposals that were ‗highly constructive‘, both in terms of ‗spirit‘ and in terms of details. The 
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USSR, he said, ‗had made real concessions to the US‘, seeking ‗conditions for reducing and 
eliminating nuclear weapons‘. But, instead of giving an ‗impulse‘ to move the discussions 
forward, ‗the US was trying to drag things backward‘.521 Gorbachev reiterated the reason behind 
the entire meeting, namely that: 
The Geneva negotiations prior to the current meeting had reached an impasse. 
New approaches were needed, as were political will and an ability to think in 
broad terms, to escape this dead-end. The Soviets had crafted their proposals with 
this in mind. They had expected the same from the Americans.
522
   
  
On INF, Gorbachev rejected an ‗interim agreement‘, saying he ‗was not interested in palliatives 
or make-shift solutions‘.523 When Reagan again explained his misgivings, Gorbachev snapped: 
‗It is clear that nothing would come of this discussion!‘524   
Reagan, seeking to diffuse Gorbachev‘s temper, invited him to make some suggestions of 
his own. Gorbachev replied that Reagan ‗was not at a press conference‘ and could therefore stop 
speaking in ‗banalities‘. Instead, he asked that they ‗speak frankly‘.525 Reagan replied that the 
US and the USSR alone were the great nuclear powers, and if they both began ‗the process of 
reducing their own nuclear forces to zero‘, they would then ‗stand shoulder-to-shoulder in telling 
other nations that they [too] must eliminate their own nuclear weapons.‘ Gorbachev agreed, but 
stated that the opportunity would not last, and that ‗Reykjavik would be simply a memory‘.  
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Reagan replied by saying that they should therefore use ‗the time available to contribute 
something to the world—to free the world from the nuclear threat‘.526  
Placated by Reagan‘s display of obvious sincerity to create a world free of nuclear 
weapons, Gorbachev moved back to INF and said that he was willing to adopt the American 
position of zero in Europe and a limitation of 100 weapons each in Asia. Reagan replied that he 
agreed with the proposal that Gorbachev had just described.
527
 While pleased that the INF issue 
was thus settled, Gorbachev then pointed out that the USSR had made many concessions 
throughout the Summit, while the US had made none. On the question of missile defense and the 
ABM Treaty, therefore, he expected movement.
528
  
 Gorbachev‘s position on the ABM Treaty and SDI was clear: the Treaty not only had to 
be maintained, but strengthened, and missile defense technology research had to be confined to 
the laboratory. If this were to occur, then the elimination of nuclear weapons could proceed over 
a ten year period. This ‗strengthening‘, he said, was to ensure that ‗one side could not act behind 
the back of the other‘.529 Reagan replied that he had no intention of violating the ABM Treaty, 
but that research had to continue and that this was a position that he would ‗not retreat from‘.530 
When Secretary Shultz asked for further clarification as to what the Soviet leader meant by 
‗strengthening‘, Gorbachev elucidated that ‗there could be testing, even mock up‘, but that this 
could not go beyond the framework of laboratory research‘. Strangely, Gorbachev said that this 
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requirement would ‗ensure against the appearance of a nuclear madman of the type the President 
had often mentioned‘.531  
With that, it was Reagan who lost his cool and asked ‗what the hell was it that we were 
defending‘? Stating that he ‗failed to see the magic of the ABM regime, whose only assurance of 
safety was the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction‘, Reagan said that the reduction of 
nuclear weapons should proceed with a stepped-up research and development program so that 
‗the nuclear genie‘ would be put ‗back in his bottle‘.532  Gorbachev replied that according to an 
American expression, ‗it takes two to tango‘, meaning that the American side had to make 
concessions, and ‗was the President prepared to dance?‘533 After more debate, each camp agreed 
to a break as the two teams attempted to bridge the differences on the ABM Treaty. 
 
The Final Showdown 
Returning at 3:25pm, President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev sat down for a final showdown, 
and during the following three and a half hours, had the most extraordinary exchange between 
two Superpower leaders in the entire history of the Cold War. 
 Both began by reading their country‘s negotiating position, each side noting the 
difference over one word: laboratory. Reagan said that he had met Gorbachev‘s request for a 10 
year period, and did not see why it should go beyond that.
534
 Gorbachev replied that after 10 
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years America might decide that SDI was not the solution, so he was not about to tie arms 
reductions to a system that was an unknown quantity. Reagan replied that if both sides had 
eliminated nuclear weapons, ‗then there was no longer any threat‘ so ‗why would there be any 
concern if one side build a safeguard, a defensive system against non-existent weapons in the 
case there might be a need for them in the future?‘535 Reagan said that in 10 years he would 
come to Iceland and ‗each of them would bring the last nuclear missile from each country‘ and 
have ‗a tremendous party for the whole world‘. Jokingly, Reagan said that he would be so old at 
that point that Gorbachev would not recognize him, with Reagan saying, ‗Hello, Mikhail‘ and 
Gorbachev responding, ‗Ron, is that you?‘.536  Gorbachev replied that he did not know if he 
himself would live that long as he was at the most ‗dangerous‘ time period of his life, while 
Reagan had passed the dangerous point and ‗would live to be 100‘.  Reagan replied that ‗he 
wouldn‘t live to 100 if he had to worry every day about being hit by a Soviet missile‘.537  
 Gorbachev then reiterated his SDI proposal, saying that it was designed so that there 
would not be a ‗winner and a loser‘, and that the massive reductions proposed were contingent 
upon agreement in this matter, otherwise ‗there was no package‘.538 Reagan again responded that 
he did not understand opposition to defensive systems if there were to be no nuclear weapons 
left.  
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Bizarrely enough, at this moment Secretary Shultz asked for a clarification on what 
category of weapons were being discussed under the proposal to eliminate them during the 10-
year period. Though intense negotiations had been going on for two days, Shultz was still under 
the impression that the ‗strategic‘ category of weapons discussed only included ballistic missiles, 
as the Weinberger proposal stated. Gorbachev then replied that all types of weapons were 
included in this. Dissatisfied with this answer, Shultz asked for a break,
539
 after which he 
returned with a proposal that clearly stated that the American side was only talking about 
ballistic missiles, and not missiles launched by submarines or dropped by planes. When 
Gorbachev asked where the ‗aircraft are‘, and said that the term ‗strategic‘ had long included the 
entire triad of land, sea and air missiles, Reagan replied that he ‗was ready to include all the 
nuclear weapons we can‘. Gorbachev replied, ‗we should use the whole triad‘.540  
After another interjection by Shultz that the American side was only talking about 
ballistic missiles, Reagan asked whether they would be ‗reducing all nuclear weapons—cruise 
missiles, battlefield weapons, sub-launched and the like‘. Because if they were, then it ‗would be 
fine with me if we eliminated all nuclear weapons‘. 
Gorbachev responded in the affirmative saying, ‗We can do that. We can eliminate them.‘ 
Reagan replied immediately, ‗Let‘s do it!‘541 
Reagan‘s dream of a world free of nuclear weapons was within reach. He proposed that 
the negotiating team should draw up a treaty that would see the total elimination of all nuclear 
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weapons within a 10 year period. Reagan had therefore moved far ahead from his own 
negotiating team, who had only approved and discussed the eradication of ballistic missiles. 
However, the possibility of doing away with all nuclear weapons was before him, and he was not 
about to let the opportunity pass. Seizing the moment, Reagan was proposing something that 
many of his own experts were unwilling to accept, either then or now.
542
  
Gorbachev then turned to the issue of the ABM Treaty, and Reagan began to implore 
Gorbachev not to destroy what they had accomplished over one word—‗laboratory‘. ‗We have 
an agreement we can be very proud of,‘ he said with emotion. 543  When Gorbachev persisted that 
it ‗was a matter of principle‘, Reagan said that he ‗could not give in‘, as he had ‗promised the 
American people‘ not to cash-in SDI, and that unlike Gorbachev he had to contend with ‗right 
wing‘ critics back in the US.544 
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 Gorbachev said that Reagan was ‗three steps away from becoming a great President‘, but 
if he could not agree to the laboratory limitation, then they ‗could say goodbye, and forget 
everything they had discussed‘ as it was ‗a last opportunity‘.545 
The Soviet foreign minister, Shevardnadze interjected at this point that ‗the two sides 
were so close to accomplishing a historic task, to decisions of such historic significance, that if 
future generations read the minutes of these meetings, and saw how close we had come but how 
we did not use these opportunities, they would never forgive us.‘546 
 Reagan then begged Gorbachev twice to do ‗this one thing‘ for him, as it was ‗just one 
word‘ and ‗this should not be turned down over a word‘.547  Gorbachev replied that were it 
something as simple as asking the USSR to import more grain from America, he might be 
willing to oblige him, but to proceed with SDI would be to ‗permit the US to destroy the Soviet 
Union‘s offensive nuclear potential‘. Therefore, such a favor ‗could not be met‘, as it was not a 
matter of ‗words, but of principle‘. Gorbachev made it clear that he was not going to budge and 
concluded that his ‗conscience was clear‘. 548 
With this, Reagan knew that the meeting was over, and passed a note to Shultz asking, 
‗Am I wrong?‘ Shultz whispered back, ‗No, you are right‘549  
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With that, Reagan got up and walked out on Gorbachev. ‗I don‘t know what more I could 
have done‘ Gorbachev said as the two reached their limousines, ‗You could have said yes!‘ 
Reagan snapped. 
‗Damn it!‘ Reagan said as he slumped into the car, ‗we were that close to eliminating all 
nuclear weapons!‘  
As Reagan flew home on Air Force One, his team of speechwriters were at a loss as to 
how to explain the President‘s stubborn refusal to give up SDI even for the abolition of all 
nuclear weapons. Shultz had done his best to brief the press earlier, but the disappointment that 
he expressed, summed up by Sam Donaldson of ABC—‗Shultz looks like his dog has just been 
run over by a truck‘550—had only made the PR problem worse. The President sat down and 
penned out his own thoughts, and summed up the summit by saying: ‗I went to Reykjavik 
determined that everything was negotiable except two things—our freedom and our future.‘ The 
speechwriters agreed that Reagan was the best writer in the White House. Reagan added that he 
was ‗still optimistic‘ that an agreement could be found and said ‗the door is open, and the 
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Gorbachev Backs Down over SDI: The INF Treaty  
Following the disarray of the Reykjavik Summit, two things became crystal clear: firstly, the 
international community shared none of Reagan and Gorbachev‘s enthusiasm for abolishing all 
nuclear weapons
552
 and, secondly, Reagan would never give up SDI under any circumstances.
553
 
Gorbachev therefore had to make a decision: whether to remain obstinate over missile defense 
and tie all arms reductions to its limitation, or to proceed with nuclear arms reduction and leave 
the question of SDI aside. With nothing to show for the two summits that had occurred, and 
fearing the full deployment of INF weapons on the USSR‘s border, Gorbachev decided to accept 
President Reagan‘s 1981 ‗Zero-Option‘ without any qualifications.554 
 Gorbachev‘s acceptance of the American INF proposal was a major victory for President 
Reagan‘s Soviet policy. In a letter dated 15 September 1987, Gorbachev wrote the President and 
accepted the ‗Zero-Option‘, stating: 
I think you and I were right when last October we arrived at what was virtually a 
concurring view that our meeting in Reykjavik had been an important landmark 
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along the path toward specific and urgently needed measures to genuinely reduce 
nuclear arms….  
Today, our two countries stand on the threshold of an important 
agreement which would bring about—for the first time in history—an actual 
reduction in nuclear arsenals. Nuclear disarmament being the exceptionally 
complex matter that it is, the important thing is to take a first step, to clear the 
psychological barrier which stands between the deeply rooted idea that security 
hinges on nuclear weapons.
555
 (Emphasis added). 
 
 On 30 October Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited the White House and officially 
announced the INF agreement and the upcoming visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to Washington to 
sign it. A reporter shouted at Reagan and the foreign minister, ‗Look‘s like you‘ve won Mr. 
President. Didn‘t you win?‘ Reagan replied, ‗There are no winners and losers, yet‘.556 But it was 
a major accomplishment for Reagan, which he took personal pride in, telling his Chief of Staff 
Howard Baker: ‗See, they underestimated me again. They thought that they could persuade me, 
they could beat me, and by staying the course, I brought Gorbachev and the Soviets to the table. I 
got the INF Treaty‘.557 Reagan was very proud of this victory, as evidenced by his words at the 
signing ceremony at the Washington Summit. 
On 8 December 1987, Gorbachev arrived in Washington and signed the INF Treaty, with 
Reagan making clear that it was a personal triumph for him. After signing the INF Treaty in the 
East Room of the White House, Gorbachev said that the treaty held ‗universal significance for 
mankind, both from the standpoint of world politics and from the standpoint of humanism‘. He 
further added that the day would ‗become a date that will be inscribed in the history books, a 
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date that will mark the watershed separating the era of a mounting risk of nuclear war from the 
era of a demilitarization of human life.‘558 Reagan declared in his statement that the ‗ceremony 
and treaty‘ were ‗both excellent examples of patience‘, and pointed out that: 
It was over 6 years ago, November 18, 1981 that I first proposed what would 
come to be called the Zero-Option. It was a simply proposal—one might say 
disarmingly simple….Unlike treaties in the past, it didn‘t simply codify the status 
quo or a new arms buildup; it didn‘t simply talk of controlling an arms race. 
For the first time in history, the language of ‘arms control’ was replaced 
by ‘arms reduction’—in this case, the complete elimination of an entire class of 
US and Soviet nuclear missiles.
559
 (Emphasis added). 
 
President Reagan‘s persistence had paid off with the Soviets, and the vision that he had 
articulated prior to becoming President, had been realized. As Reagan said in the statement 
above, the treaty that he had helped to negotiate was not yet another arms limitation agreement: 
it was an arms reduction accord that actually eliminated a weapons system that had seriously 
destabilized the nuclear equilibrium in Europe. In addition to this, it included on-site 
verification—something that had never been agreed to before, and something that Reagan had 
always insisted was mandatory for any treaty.  Reagan had been successful in achieving an INF 
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The START Treaties 
Reagan had wished to stay on as President into a third term, but the 22
nd
 amendment to the 
Constitution made that an impossibility. Not only did the President feel that he needed another 
four years to fully enact his ‗Reagan Revolution‘ domestically, but he felt that the process he had 
begun with Gorbachev was unfinished and needed completion. In particular, Reagan sought to 
finalize a follow up treaty to the INF, the so called START Treaty. 
 At the Washington Summit of 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev attempted to bridge the gap 
over START, but each fell back into the same arguments. Gorbachev, again, wanted the US to 
begin making concessions in his direction. He had folded on INF, and as he explained to Reagan, 
that had not been an easy task. He said: 
The Supreme Soviet is even larger than the [US] Senate…2,000 members…It 
[raised] many questions. There was the question of why the Soviets had been so 
generous towards the Americans. They were eliminating four times as many 
missiles [in the INF Treaty]…It was not easy to make the first step towards 
disarmament. People asked how it was possible to have disarmament with the US 
when the Soviet Union was ringed by US bases. People asked how Gorbachev 




This time Gorbachev wanted Reagan to bow to him, and again, it surrounded Gorbachev‘s desire 
to ‗strengthen‘ the ABM Treaty. Again, SDI was holding them back. Reagan replied: ‗It would 
be better not to link the two concepts. One issue [START] should not be made hostage to the 
other [ABM]‘.  Gorbachev replied that a ‗ten year non-withdrawal‘ agreement on ABM should 
proceed, and that Reagan should stop trying to make things ‗foggy‘. Reagan began to lose his 
cool, as the Memcons record: 
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The President replied (with some feeling) that it was not he who was making 
things ‗foggy‘. He wanted to make things clear. He did not want to talk about 
links to SDI, about 50 percent reductions, about how the hell the two sides were to 
eliminate half their nuclear weapons. He wanted to talk about how the two leaders 
could sign an agreement like the one they had signed the day before—an 
agreement that made everyone in the world so damned happy it could be felt in 
the room at dinner the night before. ‗Let‘s get started.‘561 
 
Gorbachev said that he was ‗ready‘. Shultz interjected that they agreed with a 10 year adherence 
to the ABM Treaty, but that what was permitted during that period, in terms of research and 
testing, needed to be worked out. ‗Good‘, Gorbachev said, ‗[This] was a good conversation.‘562 
Gorbachev obviously enjoyed sparing with the ‗old lion‘ as a Russian note-taker called 
Reagan.
563
 Nonetheless, START was not worked out in Washington. 
 In his State of the Union address of 1988 President Reagan said:  ‗We're within reach of 
an even more significant START agreement that will reduce U.S. and Soviet long-range 
missiles—our strategic arsenals by half‘.564  But it proved to be unattainable for Reagan, as he 
simply did not have enough time. Reagan and Gorbachev spent much of the Moscow Summit 
(1988) attempting to bridge the gap between each nation‘s positions on START, but arms control 
being the arcane subject that it is, and the proposed treaty being far more complicated than the 
INF Treaty, neither was able to accomplish this goal. It would be up to Reagan‘s successor, 
President George H.W Bush, to complete the START talks and sign the START Treaties. 






 A Soviet note-taker at the summit shared with ambassador Jack Matlock that Reagan reminded him of an ‗old 
lion: lazily watching an antelope on the horizon, taking no interest, dozing a bit. He doesn‘t move when the antelope 
stops only ten feet away, that‘s too far. At eight feet, the lion suddenly comes to life!—Reagan, the negotiator, 
suddenly fills the room.‘ As quoted in Reeves, President Reagan,p.333. 
564
 ‗Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union‘, 25 January 1988, PPPR. 
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 When President Bush signed the START I and II Treaties with the Russian leadership, he 
was finalizing agreements that had been settled in principle by Reagan and Gorbachev several 
years earlier. START I, signed in Moscow by Bush and Gorbachev on 31 July 1991, and START 
II, signed by Bush and Boris Yeltsin on 3 January 1993, represented the most extensive arms 
control treaties in history. START I was successfully implemented, resulting in the standing 
down and destruction of half of America‘s and the USSR‘s (later Russia‘s) nuclear weapons. 
START II, however, which furthered reductions, stalled throughout the 1990s and was retired by 
Russia in light of the 2001 American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. President George W. 
Bush‘s desire to pursue missile defense deployment was as unpopular with President Putin as it 
had been with Gorbachev; demonstrating that for all the radical changes in world affairs since 
the 1980s, some things never changed. The Reagan legacy, both in terms of arms reduction and 
the Strategic Defense Initiative, therefore, continues to reverberate two decades after his last year 
in office.  
 
Conclusion 
Returning to the central question of this thesis, Reagan’s role in the formulation and execution of 
American Soviet policy, this chapter demonstrates that Reagan, to a surprising degree, was very 
much involved in the implementation of his views on arms control. As the preceding chapter 
detailed, Reagan was opposed to a mere limitation of the arms race, wanting instead to reduce 
stockpiles, and his ultimate objective, which became clearer as the years of his presidency 
unfolded, was for a world without nuclear weapons. It was on this basis that Reagan oversaw the 
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his arms negotiating team, giving them clear guidelines, choosing sides on debates, and in the 
setting of the Superpower summits, arguing forcefully and making the final decisions.  
 Reagan made perfectly clear from the outset of his Administration that he would push the 
Soviets for actual nuclear arms reductions. His first major opportunity to do so was the so called 
‗Zero-Option‘, devised by defense expert Richard Perle, as the American means of going 
forward with INF deployment if the Soviets did not agree to the removal of their SS-20 missiles. 
Despite the strongest of arguments by his assertive Secretary of State, Al Haig, Reagan agreed 
with the ‗Zero-Option‘ because it reflected his belief that each side should in fact reduce their 
weapons to the level of zero.  
 The INF issue, however, pushed US/Soviet relations to breaking point, and when the 
Americans deployed on schedule in the fall of 1983, the Soviets walked out on the Geneva arms 
talks, without setting a date for their resumption. For the hardliners within the Administration it 
was a moment of rare triumph in the Cold War: America had stood nose-to-nose with the 
Soviets, and they had not only stared down the threats of nuclear war, but they had also begun to 
achieve European nuclear parity with the USSR, thus strengthening the nuclear equilibrium. 
This, they said, helped to ensure peace. But President Reagan was not jubilant: his goal was still 
the elimination of this class of weapons, and talks between the Superpowers to reduce the 
nuclear stockpiles, had to continue, no matter the difficulties involved.  
 Thanks to the diplomatic efforts of President Reagan and Secretary Shultz, America 
achieved a breakthrough with the USSR that allowed for the resumption of the START Talks at 
the close of 1984, without the end of the SDI program or the halting of INF Deployments, which 
the Soviets had formerly stipulated was an ‗entry fee‘ to the talks. With the ascendancy of 
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Mikhail Gorbachev as the General Secretary of the Communist Party and thus leader of the 
USSR, these talks received added impetus. And it was at the Geneva Summit of 1985 where 
Reagan and Gorbachev finally had the opportunity to discuss arms control in a substantive 
manner. 
 The talks held in Geneva saw President Reagan emphasizing the need to establish trust 
between each other before arms reductions could proceed. As he himself summed up, America 
did not mistrust the Soviets because they were armed, they were armed because they mistrusted 
each other. Reduce the mistrust, and hence reduce the need for weapons. The two, he said, 
flowed from each other. Perhaps naïve to most observers, it nevertheless rang true to Mikhail 
Gorbachev, who had a similar view that relations between the Superpowers could be vastly 
improved if they established a dialogue based on trust. The two leaders departed Geneva with the 
general agreement that both sides should reduce their nuclear stockpiles by 50%: a momentous 
initial achievement of principle, even if the details had to be worked out later. 
 In Reykjavik, in 1986, the two leaders got down to the details of arms control. In 
exchange for a limitation of Reagan‘s missile defense program for ten years, Gorbachev offered 
the most sweeping arms control proposals in history. Accepting America‘s position on INF 
weapons in Europe and Asia and re-committing to the objective of halving each nation‘s nuclear 
stockpiles, the two leaders both moved beyond the consensus of their governments and even 
contemplated a truly radical proposition: the total abolition of all nuclear weapons. The fact that 
Reagan agreed to this should come as no surprise—he had been speaking in earnest about his 
dream of a world free of nuclear weapons since the beginning of his presidency. But Reagan and 
Gorbachev‘s vision of a world free of nuclear weapons simply could not coalesce, as Reagan tied 
it to the deployment of SDI as an ‗insurance policy‘, while for Gorbachev abolition would only 
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occur if SDI were done away with. As such, the Reykjavik Summit broke down, and with it 
perhaps the only opportunity in world history where abolition could have been realized. 
Nonetheless, Reykjavik was not the total failure it appeared to be at the time. 
 In negotiations, once a proposal has been tabled, the other side knows how far their 
counterpart is willing to go, and thus knowing their ‗bottom line‘, they can ‗pocket‘ these 
concessions in any future dialogue. This the American negotiating team did in regards to 
Gorbachev‘s acceptance of Reagan‘s ‗Zero-Option‘, which was not tied to British and French 
nuclear stockpiles, as it originally had been, and limited INF weapons in Asia to 100 on each 
side. Gorbachev‘s willingness to withdraw the INF proposal from his ‗package‘, a package that 
limited SDI to the laboratory for ten years, permitted the agreement to be codified in the INF 
Treaty, signed in Washington DC in December of 1987.  
The INF Treaty was a major victory for Reagan because it mirrored his own philosophy 
about nuclear arms control which he had placed on the record prior to becoming President. 
Namely, that any arms control treaty had to reduce, not limit a nuclear stockpile, that equal 
ceilings had to be agreed to, and that the terms of the pact were subject to on-site verification. All 
this was achieved, with the added bonus that in the case of INF, the reduction was to the point of 
zero, and thus accomplished the beginning of what Reagan hoped would be a process that would 
lead one day to his dream of a world without nuclear weapons. 
Though not codified during his presidency, the START Treaties, which cut the 
Superpowers‘ nuclear stockpiles in half, were agreements based on Reagan‘s ideas and the 
diplomatic efforts of his Administration. For starters, the very acronym START was created by 
Reagan when he was a candidate for President in 1980. Second, the ground-breaking figure of 
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reducing the nuclear arms of each nation by 50% was first proposed by the President. The ‗broad 
strokes‘ were painted by Reagan, accepted by the Soviets, and the many esoteric details were 
filled in by teams of nuclear arms specialists over many years. It was the combined effort of both 
the American and Soviet governments, but in the final analysis, it was Reagan who set the 
overall theme and goals.
565
 
Much credit, therefore, belongs to President Reagan‘s leadership for turning a world ‗on 
the precipice of disaster‘, into one where the likelihood of nuclear war has been greatly 
reduced.
566
 Much credit also belongs to Gorbachev, his partner in this endeavor, for without a 
Soviet counterpart willing to engage in a serious and constructive dialogue, nothing could have 
been accomplished in the field of arms reduction. Their actions, together, replaced a poisonous 
Superpower relationship on the brink of war, to one where trust, communication and indeed 
peace had been achieved.  
The following, penultimate chapter, therefore, will examine Reagan‘s dream of making 
peace with the USSR, and will determine whether he had, as he did with arms reduction, a set 
agenda in this regard, when he became President in 1981. 
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THE CAUSE OF WORLD PEACE 
 





The American political tradition asserts that the United States is an ‗exceptional‘ nation, one set 
apart from the ‗Old World‘ with its pursuit of self interest (often through war), and acting instead 
as a ‗beacon‘ of freedom. America was the exception.568 Part of this mythology is that the United 
States is never the aggressor in a war, and in fact, its supreme interest is the preservation of its 
moral purity.
569
 If the United States does enter a conflict, it does so reluctantly, and never for self 
interest: the safeguarding of some higher moral principle must always be at stake.   
Of course this is a romanticized mythology that no serious student of history could ever 
accept. For, while the United States does justify itself in moral or ideological terms, like all other 
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nations its primary interest is to further its interests.
570
 Ronald Reagan was not your average 
student of history, however, and he ‗bought into‘ the mythologized national identity and became 
its most ardent evangelist. Inconvenient truths never cluttered Reagan‘s mind or made him lose 
the clarity of his vision; for him, the United States was ‗the spiritual leader of the free world‘, the 
‗most moral nation on earth‘ and as such had a special responsibility to pursue the age old dream 
of ‗world peace‘.571  
 This chapter demonstrates that making peace with America‘s primary foe during the 
1980s—the Soviet Union—was in fact a stated goal of the Reagan Administration, and thus, 
official US foreign policy. From there, the history of this goal throughout the Cold War is 
examined to show that Reagan was not the first President who spoke of his desire to achieve a 
lasting peace with the Soviet Union. Finally, the record of Reagan‘s adherence to this belief prior 
to assuming the presidency is detailed, and it will be proposed that Reagan‘s sense of pre-
destination to be a great peacemaker was only strengthened by the 1981 assassination attempt on 
his life, which occurred only 70 days into his presidency.  
 
Making Peace: Reagan Foreign Policy 
For the first three years of Reagan‘s presidency, making peace was not as important as averting 
war. The Soviet Union, the American people were constantly reminded, was a serious threat and 
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as such the United States had to stand tall through a program of ‗military modernization‘ that 
could deter aggression. This posture was understandable: after all, Nixon, Ford and Carter had 
engaged the Soviet Union in a so called ‗détente‘, negotiating arms control measures with 
Brezhnev, only to see him order in 1979 the invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas, of all days. A 
period of re-armament and harsher rhetoric was perhaps required, as talking about ‗peace‘ with a 
country which at that time was engaged in war crimes, would not have gone down well with an 
American public whose mood had soured considerably towards the USSR.  
But, by 1984 the Administration was ready to change its message considerably: after all, 
Reagan was up for re-election, and while he received high marks for his handling of most issues, 
the highest negatives were linked to his foreign policy, with a large proportion of the population 
still fearful that Reagan could lead them to war.
572
 The belligerent words about the ‗Evil Empire‘ 
were left behind, and the White House began a public relations campaign designed to change 
Reagan‘s image from warmonger, to peacemaker.  The change in Reagan‘s script was not done 
gradually; rather, as stated earlier, on 16 January 1984 Reagan dramatically tossed out the old 
performance of dire warnings about the USSR, and instead spoke of a ‗constructive dialogue‘. 
His political handlers might have rubbed their hands together in glee as Reagan ‗neutralized‘ an 
issue that the Democrats were sure to use during the campaign,
573
 but the former Hollywood star 
was not acting: Reagan‘s words were a real indicator of his sincere desire to turn the page, and 
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begin down the path of a peaceful end to the Cold War conflict.
574
 In fact, Reagan was so 
confident of his mission for peace that he began declaring, somewhat pre-maturely, that America 
was already at peace. In his 1984 acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention, 
Reagan reviewed the progress made since 1980 and said: 
We came together in a national crusade to make America great again, and to make 
a new beginning. Well, now it's all coming together. With our beloved nation at 
peace, we're in the midst of a springtime of hope for America. Greatness lies 
ahead of us.
575
 (Emphasis added).  
 
Reagan further asked that the American people join him to ‗move us further forward on 
the road we presently travel… the road leading to prosperity and economic expansion in a world 
at peace’. 576(Emphasis added).  Reagan, obviously, wished to be seen as a peacemaker not only 
for America, but for the entire world. 
That Reagan‘s 1984 speeches were not just a campaign gimmick is demonstrated by the 
fact that his efforts for peace intensified significantly after his second term was secured at the 
ballot box, and particularly so when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. As Reagan spelt out in 
an address to the nation on the eve of his 1985 Geneva Summit with the Soviet leader, he wanted 
to be a peacemaker:  
My mission, stated simply, is a mission for peace. It is to engage the new Soviet 
leader in what I hope will be a dialogue for peace that endures beyond my 
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presidency. It is to sit down across from Mr. Gorbachev and try to map out, 
together, a basis for peaceful discourse even though our disagreements on 
fundamentals will not change. It is my fervent hope that the two of us can begin a 
process which our successors and our peoples can continue—facing our 
differences frankly and openly and beginning to narrow and resolve them; 
communicating effectively so that our actions and intentions are not 
misunderstood; and eliminating the barriers between us and cooperating wherever 
possible for the greater good of all.
577
 (Emphasis Added). 
  
Reagan was not the first President to have endeavored to seek peace with his Soviet counterpart, 
as the same address just quoted made clear. Giving an over-view of US--Soviet relations prior to 
his presidency, Reagan said:  
The history of American-Soviet relations, however, does not augur well for 
euphoria. Eight of my predecessors—each in his own way in his own time—
sought to achieve a more stable and peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union. 
None fully succeeded; so, I don‘t underestimate the difficulty of the tasks ahead. 
But these sad chapters do not relieve me of the obligation to try to make this a 
safer, better world. For our children, our grandchildren, for all mankind—I intend 
to make the effort.
578
 (Emphasis added). 
 
These ‗sad chapters‘ Reagan referred to should be looked at in some detail, because they 
demonstrate that not all were considered ‗sad‘ at the time, and most of them began with the same 
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Summits for Peace? Superpower Summits from Truman to Carter 
The first president who ingenuously ambled towards peace with a Soviet leader during the 
nuclear age was Harry S. Truman, and he brought with him the same conviction that Reagan 
would later hold; namely, that if the two leaders of the Superpowers could talk as friends, then 
there could be peace. Truman approached his first Summit with a Soviet leader with some 
trepidation; after all, he had to fill the ‗big shoes‘ left by his legendary predecessor, Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt. President Roosevelt had not only steered America through the shoals of the 
Great Depression, but he had also charted the course for the United States during the Second 
World War, overseeing the defeat of fascist Germany. Furthermore, Roosevelt had built solid 
and enduring relationships with his partners in the war, Winston Churchill of Great Britain and 
Joseph Stalin, of the Soviet Union. Truman had hoped to build on the work of Roosevelt, and 
manage the alliance as successfully in the immanent post-war period as his predecessor had 
during the war. As Truman‘s biographer David McCullough explains, his hopes rested not on 
strategic geopolitical realties, but on something far more basic—friendship: 
As American as anything about this thoroughly American new President was his 
fundamental faith that most problems came down to misunderstandings between 
people, and that even the most complicated problems really weren‘t as 
complicated as they were made out to be, once everybody got to know one 
another. He knew also the faith Roosevelt had in personal diplomacy as a 




Truman came to the Potsdam Summit (16 July—2 August 1945) determined not to be 
intimidated, as he said in an interview at the time: ‗Haven‘t you ever been overawed by a 
secretary, and finally, when you have reached the man you want to see, discovered he was very 
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human?‘580 Taking this belief with him as he met Stalin, Truman attempted an air of familiarity 
with the Soviet despot, affectionately calling him ‗Uncle Joe‘. Relations were cordial enough, 
and Truman seemed to get along with Stalin, falsely believing that he was a man he could do 
business with. As Truman said of his intentions with Stalin:  
I wanted to convince him that we are ‗on the level‘ and interested in peace and a 
decent world, and had no purposes hostile to them; that we wanted nothing for 
ourselves, but security for our country, and peace with friendship and 
neighborliness, and that it was our joint job to do that. I ‗spread it on thick‘, and I 




But Truman was soon to learn that despite his best intentions and the appearance of a warm 
grandfatherly figure before him, Stalin was a ‗cutthroat leader‘ who shrewdly exploited 
everything to his advantage. The interests of his totalitarian regime were to be furthered, 
regardless if he was on friendly terms with his democratic counterpart. It did not take long for 
Truman to ‗wise up‘ about Stalin, as he reneged on agreements to hold fair elections in the 
Soviet-occupied territories, and the Cold War began in earnest. Stalin and the Soviet Union were 
‗enemies of freedom‘, and only a policy of ‗containment‘—assistance to those resisting 
communist subversion, coupled with economic aid—would stop Soviet expansionism.582 The 
success of democratic liberalism required an American shrewdness that matched strength with 
strength.  Still, the lesson that Truman learnt was unlearnt by his successor, Dwight D. 
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Eisenhower, for he also believed that friendship could prevail over the inherent ideological 
hostility of the two Superpowers. He, too, would have to learn. 
Eisenhower should have known better. After all, he was the Commander of Allied forces 
during the Second World War against the scourge of Nazism, and the NATO Commander at the 
onset of the Cold War. The hostilities between the Superpowers had nothing to do with 
misunderstandings: they had everything to do with the understanding that capitalism and 
communism, democracy and totalitarianism, were diametrically opposed. The Soviets only 
respected strength, and American sentiment about world peace, for them, was to be taken 
advantage of, not engaged with.  
Ten years after the end of the World War II US /Soviet alliance may have been too short 
a time-frame for an objective look at the nature of Soviet Union. Eisenhower still hoped that he 
could re-kindle the old partnership, misunderstanding that the Soviets had aligned themselves to 
fight the common enemy of Hitler, and once that enemy was gone, so too was their ‗friendship‘. 
America had become a strategic threat to Soviet expansionism, and with the advent of nuclear 
weapons, to its very existence. Still, Eisenhower believed that if he ignored the glaring 
differences between the two countries and focused instead on developing the right ‗spirit‘, then 
perhaps he could find a way out of the morass of the Cold War. As he said in an address to the 
nation prior his 1955 Geneva Summit with Khrushchev:  
Our many postwar conferences have been characterized too much by attention to 
details, by an effort apparently to work on specific problems, rather than to 
establish a spirit and attitude in which to approach them. Success, therefore, has 
been meager.
583
(Emphasis added).  
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In this way, Eisenhower was ‗different‘ from Truman, and indeed ‗different‘ from all 
diplomats before him, because apparently Eisenhower was the first to take a ‗human‘ approach 
to his Soviet interlocutors, and that this had been the ‗ingredient‘ that had been ‗missing‘ all 
along. Elaborating on this, he said: 
I mean an intention to conciliate, to understand, to be tolerant, to try and see the 
other fellow‘s viewpoint as well as we see our own. I say to you, if we can change 
the spirit in which these conferences are conducted we will have taken the 
greatest step towards peace, toward future prosperity and tranquility that has 




The greatest step towards peace….in all of human history! This outlandish statement by 
Eisenhower was perhaps matched by his address upon his arrival at Geneva‘s airport, when he 
pointed out that America‘s wartime military colossus paled in comparison to American good 
will. He stated: 
Some eleven years ago…I came to Europe with an army, a navy, an air force, 
with a single purpose: to destroy Nazism. I came with the formations of war and 
all of the circumstances of war surrounded that journey at that time. 
 This time I come armed with something far more powerful: the goodwill of 





The results of the Summit, however, did not live up to Eisenhower‘s expectations, and he 
returned from Geneva somewhat chastened, and admitted: 
We must never be deluded into believing that one week of friendly, even fruitful, 
negotiation can wholly eliminate a problem arising out of the wide gulf that 
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separates, so far, East and West. A gulf as wide and deep as the difference 
between individual liberty and regimentation, as wide and deep as the gulf that 
lies between the concept of man made in the image of his God and the concept of 
man as a mere instrument of the State.
586
(Emphasis added).  
 
Eisenhower had learnt his lesson, but still pledged himself to the cause of peace, as elusive as 
that may have been. Even when the 1960 Paris Summit with Khrushchev fell apart over the U-2 
‗spying‘ incident, Eisenhower said to the nation: ‗Fellow Americans, long ago I pledged to you 
that I would journey anywhere in the world to promote the cause of peace. I remain pledged to 
pursue a peace of dignity, of friendship, of honor, of justice.‘587 His immediate successor, 
however, never for a moment lost sight of the realities of the US/Soviet relationship. 
John F. Kennedy declared in his 1961 inaugural address that America was living through 
‗a hard and bitter peace‘ and his opinion did not change leading up to his one summit with a 
Soviet leader, the Vienna conference with Nikita Khrushchev. Kennedy knew that Khrushchev 
was a bully, and indeed the Vienna conference (3-10 June 1961) was marked by the older Soviet 
leader trying to browbeat his younger American counterpart into a final settlement on Berlin. 
The summit was the least successful in the history of the Cold War, with Kennedy telling the 
Soviet leader at the close of their meetings, ‗Mr. Chairman, there will be war. It will be a cold 
winter.‘588 Not a pleasant way to end a summit, and considering the Cuban Missile Crisis of 
1962, his words were almost a self fulfilling prophecy. President Johnson at least attempted to 
keep the mood lighter. 
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 President Lyndon Johnson, fighting a war with the Soviet armed North Vietnamese and at 
odds with the USSR‘s policy during the Arab-Israeli ‗Six Day War‘ (1967), certainly did not 
believe that his summit meeting with the Soviet leader could bring peace: but it did not stop him 
from talking the language of peace. Meeting at Glassboro, New Jersey on 23 June 1967, Johnson 
and Soviet leader Alexey Kosygin found huge differences in their opinions, but were united on 
one front: each were grandfathers, and wished to leave a world of peace to their grandchildren. 
As Johnson recounts his first meeting with Kosygin in his autobiography The Vantage Point:  
As we walked toward the house, the Chairman and I chatted amiably. He 
congratulated me on becoming a grandfather two days earlier. ‗I have been one 
for eighteen years,‘ he said with a grin, ‗and I have no regrets‘.589 
  
Inside, the two continued to talk in the same vein: 
We spoke of our grandchildren and of our hopes that they would grow up in a 
world of peace. He described his experiences in Leningrad through the long 
German siege of that great city during World War II. The memory of war‘s horror 




With nothing to show for the summit, Johnson said upon arrival back at the White House that 
‗meetings like these do not themselves make peace in the world‘, but still efforts like his were 
always valuable because it helps ‗to sit down and look at a man right in the eye and try to reason 
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with him, particularly if he is trying to reason with you‘.591 Nixon, Johnson‘s successor, was not 
going to have any of this ‗nonsense‘.  
President Nixon liked to consider himself as having a clear eyed view of the world. He 
was a realist, after all, and if peace were to be achieved, it would be through hard-nosed policies 
that recognized the strategic interests of each party involved. Rhetoric about peace simply 
‗wouldn‘t cut it‘. In a somewhat ungracious review of the summits which preceded his 1972 
Moscow Summit, Nixon jetting off for the meeting, wished to demonstrate that things were 
different with him. He said: 
As you know, the visit that we will be making to the Soviet Union is the first state 
visit that a President of the United States has ever made to that country. It is a 
visit that will be different from those that have occurred on previous occasions 
between American Presidents and the leaders of the Soviet Union. The others 
were important, but they did not deal primarily with substance. That is why we 
often hear them referred to as the ‘spirit of Camp David,’ or the ‘spirit of 
Vienna’, or the ‘spirit of Geneva’, or the ‘spirit of Glassboro’. 
 In this case we are not going there simply for a better spirit, although that 
is important, and we think that may be one of the results of the trip. But we are 
going there for substance, very important substantive talks.
592
 (Emphasis added). 
 
Richard Nixon had said in his 1969 inaugural address that ‗the greatest title that history can 
bestow, is the title of peacemaker‘.593 He also sought to create a ‗structure of peace‘ that would 
lead to a ‗generation of peace‘. Realism was to underpin these efforts for peace, but with the 
Watergate scandal draining him of power, Nixon resorted to the rhetoric of peace based on 
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friendship between Superpower leaders, just as his predecessors had done. In an intimate dinner 
with Leonid Brezhnev at his San Clemente home in 1973, Nixon raised his glass for a toast 
saying: 
As you can see, Mr. Chairman, this is not a large house, but it is our home. On 
such an occasion our thoughts turn way from the affairs of state to our families 
and loved ones wherever they may be. I want our children to grow up in a world 
of peace, just as I am sure you want your children and grandchildren to grow up 
in a world of peace. What the meetings that you and I have had last year and this 
year have done is contribute to that goal I only hope that Russians and Americans 
in future generations may meet as we are meeting in our homes as friends because 
of our personal affection for each other, and not just as officials meeting because 
of the necessity of settling differences that may exist between our two countries. 
Therefore I propose this toast of course to your health, and that of our other 
guests, but even more to Mrs. Brezhnev, to your children and our children and all 
the children of the world who, we trust, will have a happier and more peaceful 
future because of what we have done.
594
 (Emphasis added). 
 
With these words, Brezhnev‘s eyes ‗filled with tears‘ and he rose and ‗threw his arms‘ around 
Nixon giving him a ‗bear hug‘. However, it did not stop him from calling a surprise meeting at 
10:30pm that very night and attempting to ‗browbeat‘ Nixon into a settlement for the Middle 
East.
595
 The gulf between high sounding platitudes and the reality of the US--Soviet relationship 
was again made starkly apparent: self interest would always come before the hopes of peace. But 
again, that did not stop Nixon‘s two immediate successors from also trying their hand at the 
cause of peace. 
 Gerald R. Ford also sought to be a peacemaker. In his address upon assuming the 
presidency he said that Nixon had ‗brought peace to millions‘, and he pledged ‗an uninterrupted 
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and sincere search‘ himself for world peace.596 Meeting with Leonid Brezhnev in Vladivostok in 
November of 1974 he worked on the Helsinki Act (finalized in 1975) and the SALT II Treaty. 
Returning from this trip Ford declared: ‗I believe we accomplished what we set out to achieve 
and perhaps more. And in that process, I pray that we have done all we could to advance the 
cause of peace for all Americans and for all mankind‘.597 Ford, defeated at the ballot box, was 
unable to further this peace cause, and it would be Jimmy Carter who would take on this task and 
preside over the end of détente.  
 Jimmy Carter was a man of great idealism and spoke of the cause of peace, but like 
Kennedy and Johnson before him, he always grounded his words in realism. By the time that 
Carter left America to meet Brezhnev for the 1979 Vienna Summit, he had had enough 
experience of Soviet intransigence to know that what lay ahead would not be easy. After all, 
various SALT II proposals—including a package that included actual nuclear arms reductions—
were rejected out of hand by the Soviets. Carter therefore chose his words very carefully. In an 
address to the nation prior his departure for the Summit he said: 
The only way to have peace in the end is to wage peace constantly from a position 
of constant and sustained national strength….I approach this summit in Vienna 
with hope, but without any false expectations. The goals which lie at the heart of 
my mission today—improving our own Nation‘s security and enhancing the 
prospects for world peace and the avoidance of nuclear war—transcend all other 
issues that I will ever face in my own life in public service.
598
 (Emphasis added). 
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Even at Carter‘s moment of triumph—the signing of the SALT II Treaty, the Sunday school 
teacher turned President refrained from speaking of ‗swords being beaten into plowshares‘, and 
instead gave a somber assessment of their work. Carter pointed out that the ‗most powerful 
currents of history‘ were usually ‗the ones which swept nations to war‘. Looking at this reality, 
Carter pointed out that a ‗more watchful course, even a small careful shift‘ could have averted 
the catastrophe of conflict, and instead re-directed the course of events towards ‗the ways of 
peace‘.  Carter then simply said, that ‗this is the purpose of what we have done here today in 
Vienna in signing this treaty‘.599  Yet Carter‘s cautious words are not what are remembered from 
that Summit: rather the awkward attempt at European custom when Carter took Brezhnev in his 
arms and kissed him on both cheeks. It was a moment that Carter would rather forget, for just six 
months later, the man to whom he gave the ‗kiss of peace‘, ordered the invasion of Afghanistan 
and thus destroyed détente between the US and the Soviet Union.
600
 
 This was the history of US--Soviet relations and the seven Presidents before Reagan, all 
of whom attempted in their own way to achieve peace. Despite some successes, most notably the 
agreements signed by Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter, peace remained as elusive as ever when 
Reagan ran for president in 1980. In fact, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it could 
be said that the Cold War had heated up considerably, and that it was more likely that the two 
Superpowers would be at war in the decade ahead, than making a lasting peace. Still, Reagan 
believed that he was the man who could pull off this colossal task; in fact he held that he was 
destined to do so. 
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Reagan’s Destiny?  
Reagan believed that he was destined to end the Cold War. Where this belief came from, remains 
a mystery. What is known is that Reagan was a man with a streak of romantic idealism and a 
belief in Providence and pre-destination. That idealism led him to believe that world peace could 
be achieved, and that religious belief guided him to act under the assumption that he was God‘s 
instrument to bring about this peace. 
The idealism of pacifism was not unusual for a man who came of age in pre-World War 
II America. This period of time was marked by revulsion of war, an extreme isolationism and a 
belief that war itself could be ‗outlawed‘. Indeed, the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact did make war 
illegal. This document was a reflection of the philosophy that peace is the natural order for 
humanity, and that war is always an aberration, usually foisted on peace loving people by 
governments and arms manufacturers who place their self-interest and greed above the common 
good. Reagan shared the view that people were generally pacifists and that governments were to 
blame for all wars. But Reagan took his belief about the innate goodness of humans a step 
further: since governments were made up of people, even ‗evil‘ regimes had men and women of 
goodwill at the top. If good people were carrying out acts of evil, it must be because they had 
been poisoned by ideology. This led to Reagan‘s scandalous remark that the Nazi SS soldiers 
buried at Bitburg were ‗victims, just as surely as the victims in the concentration camp‘.601  
Adolph Hitler to Reagan was ‗a madman‘, mentally deranged and therefore himself an 
aberration. If the leader of the Soviet Union were sane, then Reagan believed he could reason 
with him. And if he could only get him alone in a room, the two could talk to one another as 
human beings, appeal to their natural desire for peace, and undo the ‗misunderstandings‘ that 
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were at the heart of the Cold War conflict. Then, with the Soviet leader and he walking out of the 
meeting ‗arm in arm‘ in agreement, no ‗bureaucrat‘ below them could undo what had been 
accomplished.
602
 Peace would be achieved. It was as simple as that! Add to this Reagan‘s belief 
that he was destined to be President and therefore in a position to carry out this fantasy, then the 
two flow together. 
 Reagan felt destined to be the President of the United States of America. Again, where 
this belief came from, remains a mystery. Freud would perhaps call it a ‗Messiah complex‘, a 
condition defined as believing that you alone were called to save the world.
603
 What is clear is 
that Reagan had presidential aspirations from the start of his political career. So confident was he 
in his destiny that he ran for President in 1968, just one year after becoming the Governor of 
California. Then came the ‗prophecy‘ that only re-enforced his sense of destiny. As Reagan‘s 
biographer Lou Cannon relates: 
In 1970, singer Pat Boone brought evangelical ministers Harald Bredesen and 
George Otis to visit the Reagans at their residence in Sacramento. They prayed 
together, with the prayer led by Otis…During the prayer Otis was seized by what 
he took to be a visitation of the Holy Spirit. The tone and message of his prayer 
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changed, and he prophesized that Reagan would become president. A participant 
in the meeting who was clasping Reagan‘s hand felt ‗a bolt of electricity‘ run 
through it. Otis‘s own hand was shaking uncontrollably at the time. When he 
subsequently learned that Reagan‘s hand had also been shaking, he regarded it as 
an authentication of the prophecy. Reagan also accepted the prophecy as valid.
604
 
(Emphasis added).  
 
Reagan was a popular Governor who had run for President before and was the presumed front 
runner for the 1976 election; so it did not take much of an imagination to predict that Reagan 
could become President. Supernatural experience or not, as Cannon notes, for the deeply 
religious Reagan, it was a ‗sign‘.605 That sign, no doubt, fed his sense of pre-destination. 
 Reagan inherited from his devoutly Christian mother Nelle Reagan a belief that each life 
on earth had purpose and meaning:
606
 for him, it was to be President of the United States and to 
end the Cold War. Nelle, a member of the Disciples of Christ Church, instilled in her son a belief 
that he could achieve anything he set his mind to and that when setbacks occurred, he should 
take heart, for later he would look back and realize that had that misfortune not occurred, then 
something better would not have followed. It was all ‗part of God‘s plan‘.607 According to 
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longtime aide Michael Deaver, Reagan felt that ‗God‘s plan‘ for him was to be President, end the 
Cold War, and abolish nuclear weapons. Deaver said: 
This was a guy who believed in pre-destination, who believed that there was a 
purpose for everybody‘s life and we had to fulfill it. And that was his 
purpose…He was running for President because he believed he was destined to do 
away with nuclear weapons. And I don‘t know how long it will take before [that] 




Bud McFarlane, who served as one of Reagan‘s national security advisers, also recalled 
Reagan‘s willingness to engage the Soviets as stemming from a ‗a self confidence that he was an 
historic figure …He had enormous self-confidence in the ability of a single heroic figure to 
change history.‘609  
For a man who believed firmly that he was destined to be an ‗historic figure‘ and end the 
Cold War, being elected President would serve as a huge confirmation. After all, in America‘s 
204 year history up to that point, only thirty-eight out of hundreds of millions of people had risen 
to join that most select of clubs. But even then, one could doubt, and think that maybe it was a 
‗fluke‘—even Reagan admitted that it only became ‗real‘ when he saw his own furniture in the 
White House.
610
 It is only human to doubt why a person happens to be in the situation in which 
they find themselves, and consider what forces placed them in that position. Sometimes only one 
thing can make a person absolutely certain about who they are and what they must accomplish, 
and that is coming face to face with death. 
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A close brush with death and one‘s own mortality often dramatically changes one‘s 
perspective, especially for a religious person. A near death experience, even devoid of a mystical 
occurrence or religious meaning, can make a person realize how fragile life is, and that they must 
make ‗the most‘ of the life they have before death comes for good. But for a religious person, 
and especially for one who does experience something ‗mystical‘, a near death experience is not 
so much about cheating death, as having been saved through Divine Intervention. If from a 
medical standpoint the odds were stacked against a recovery, and yet a full recovery occurs, the 
person believes that something or someone was at work and saved them, for a reason. Indeed, 
former President Nixon‘s close brush with death following his resignation, it has been argued, 
helped him make the most of his ‗second chance‘ at life, to begin yet another improbable 
comeback.
611
 If being ‗spared‘ empowers, then it is especially true if one overcomes death 
through an assassination attempt. 
 
The Assassination Attempt: Reagan’s Narrative 
This thesis has sought to understand what beliefs Reagan brought to the presidency, and how 
involved he was in seeing that these were implemented. When it comes to whether Reagan felt 
destined to be a great peacemaker before becoming President, his former aides are divided on the 
question. However, all are in agreement that following the assassination attempt on him only 70 
days into his presidency, Reagan did in fact feel destined to end the Cold War. Such consensus is 
                                                     
611
 When former President Nixon, suffering from a severe case of phlebitis, slipped into toxic shock in 1974 and 
came within ‗an inch of his life‘, he experienced what he called was an offer from an outside source: whether to 
continue life, or pass on. Nixon chose to fight on and made a remarkable recovery, both of his health, and his 
standing as an ‗elder statesman‘. Some have theorized that Nixon was able to make this recovery because he felt that 
he had received this second ‗pardon‘. See Robert Sam Anson, Exile: The Unquiet Oblivion of Richard M. Nixon 
(Simon and Schuster, New York: 1984), p. 84. 
293 
 
not surprising: Reagan tells us himself in his memoirs that this was his interpretation of his 
experience.  Analysis of this work, therefore, sheds light on Reagan‘s own belief about his role 
in bringing about the end of the Cold War. 
In Reagan‘s 1990 autobiography, An American Life, the ex-president framed his 
assassination attempt in the context of the Cold War drama in which he found himself as he 
began his presidency. He did this with a definite purpose in mind: he wished the reader to 
understand that he had been spared through Divine Intervention to help bring about the end of 
the Cold War. Writing after his presidency, when the revolution in US/Soviet relations had 
occurred and the Cold War was almost universally agreed upon as being over, Reagan was 
seeking to impress a cause and effect relationship between his having been spared, and the end of 
the Cold War. Of course, Reagan is too humble to say this directly, but as a gifted story teller 
with a background in Hollywood, he knew how to set up a storyline for the audience to draw the 
same conclusions as he did.  
 Reagan begins his narrative on the day preceding the assassination attempt, and the first 
scene has him at ‗The Presidents Church‘ across from the White House. Reagan writes, ‗Sunday 
was a beautiful spring day and in the morning we went to St. John‘s Episcopal Church‘. Reagan 
noted that the choir ‗sang beautifully and looked and sounded so right that I felt everyone in the 
church that morning must have felt good about their country‘.612 Reagan then records that he 
spent that Sunday afternoon in the White House residence thinking about ‗those people I‘d seen 
in church, the future of America and the ‗MAD‘ policy.‘613  
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 Reagan then elaborated about the theory of Mutual Assured Destruction, reminding his 
readers that the world in 1981 was forever on the precipice of nuclear destruction. Demonstrating 
that he carried ‗the greatest responsibility‘ of ‗any human being‘ on earth, Reagan wrote: ‗As 
President, I carried no wallet, no money, no driver‘s license, no keys in my pockets—only secret 
codes that were capable of bringing about the annihilation of much of the world as we knew 
it‘.614 Reagan pointed out the limitations of a world being constantly on the brink—he would 
only have six minutes to respond to a submarine launched nuclear attack on the US. ‗Six minutes 
to decide how to respond to a blip on a radar scope and decide whether to unleash Armageddon!‘ 
Reagan lamented adding, ‗How could anyone apply reason at a time like that?‘ For Reagan, there 
had to be another way. 
 To rid the world of the terror of the bomb and to bring peace between the Superpowers—
this, Reagan would have his readers believe, was on his mind on the eve of the attempt on his 
life. Stating that the MAD theory was ‗madness‘, Reagan said, ‗There had to be some way to 
remove this threat of annihilation and give the world a greater chance of survival‘.615  As Chapter 
5 of this thesis demonstrates, Reagan did not have much enthusiasm for a missile defense system 
in 1981, yet in this narrative, Reagan informs the reader that he was in fact thinking of such a 
system that day. He writes: ‗I wondered if it might be possible to develop a defense against 
missiles other than the fatalistic acceptance of annihilation that was implicit under the MAD 
policy‘. In light of the evidence presented in Chapter 5, Reagan‘s recollection is perhaps 
questionable.  What is more credible is that Reagan was concerned about the issues of war and 
peace. He concludes his account of the day preceding the attempt on his life saying:  




 Ibid., p. 258. 
295 
 
We couldn‘t continue this nervous standoff forever, I thought: we couldn‘t lower 
our guard, but we had to begin the process of peace. As the afternoon of March 29 
passed, I spent a lot of time wondering what I could do to get the process started. 
(Emphasis added). 
 
Reagan ends Chapter 41 with these words, while Chapter 42 begins with the assassination 
attempt at the Washington Hilton on 30 March 1981. Thus, Reagan had set up the scene: a 
Churchgoing President pondering nuclear war and his sense of responsibility to lead America out 
from under the cloud of nuclear annihilation and towards defense and peace almost gets killed.  
 On 30 March 1981, Reagan was shot and almost killed by a lone crazed gunman, 
John Hinckley Jr. The attack came as Reagan exited the Hilton, where he had just given a speech 
to union leaders. As the President waved to some onlookers, Hinckley crouched into a shooting 
position, and discharged six shots in two seconds. Four people were hit, including the President 
as he was pushed into the waiting limousine by Secret Service agent Jerry Parr. ‗Jerry, get off, I 
think you‘ve broken one of my ribs!‘ the President said, in excruciating pain.616 When Reagan 
coughed up red, frothy blood, Parr believed that he might be right, as an initial search of the 
President‘s body detected no bullet wound. ‗Rawhide not hurt‘, Parr lied over the radio, using the 
President‘s codename, while ordering the driver to take Reagan to the closest hospital.617        
Returning to Reagan‘s narrative of his assassination attempt, the President continues in 
his memoirs with the theme of Divine Intervention as the location moves to the hospital. 
‗Someone was looking out for us that day‘, Reagan writes, explaining that a medical conference 
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had been held at George Washington University Hospital and therefore ‗the room was full of 
specialists in virtually every medical field‘.618  Lying naked on the gurney, as the doctors 
searched for the bullet hole and placed an oxygen mask over his face, Reagan recalled in his 
diary praying for his assailant: 
I focused on that ceiling and prayed. But I realized I couldn‘t ask for God‘s help 
while at the same time I felt hatred for the mixed up young man who had shot me. 
Isn‘t that the meaning of the lost sheep? We are all God‘s children and therefore 
equally beloved by him. I began to pray for his soul and that he would find his 




In his memoirs, Reagan concluded: ‗God, for some reason, had seen fit to give his 
blessing and allow me to live a while longer.‘ 620 This sense of being spared endowed Reagan 
with a sense of obligation. He ends his chapter with an excerpt from his diary in which he said: 
‗Whatever happens now I owe my life to God and will try to serve him in every way I can.‘621  
For Reagan, obviously, coming so close to death was a religious experience that endowed him 
with a religious sense of mission. 
What is interesting is that Reagan‘s experience and the conclusions which he drew from 
this were parallel with another famous assassination attempt which occurred just six weeks after 
his own: the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II. By briefly looking at this case, we can gain 
an even stronger understanding of Reagan‘s sense of destiny.  
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Pope John Paul II, before embarking on an ecclesiastical career, like Reagan, was an 
actor. Like Reagan, his journey to the pinnacle of power was unlikely,
622
 and like Reagan, he had 
a dramatic sense of his position on the world stage. On 13 May 1981, the Pope was shot in St. 
Peter‘s Square by Mehmet Ali Agca, the bullets just missing vital organs. Not surprisingly, the 
Pope, like Reagan, believed that Divine Intervention had saved his life. Reflecting on what 
occurred in 1993, the Pope said: ‗Agca knew how to shoot, and he certainly shot to kill. Yet it 
was as if someone was guiding and deflecting that bullet’.623 (Emphasis added).  Like Reagan, 
John Paul saw the attempt on his life in the context of the Cold War struggle of his times, but 
unlike Reagan, he believed that his assassin was working on direct orders from the Kremlin. 
Calling it ‗one of the final convulsions of the arrogant ideologies unleashed during the twentieth 
century‘ he added, ‗Both fascism and Nazism eliminated people. So did communism.‘624 Like 
Reagan, John Paul clearly thought that he had been spared to play a role in the ending of the 
Cold War, saying,  ‗It would obviously be ridiculous to claim that the Pope brought down 
communism single-handedly‘625; a statement, which in itself demonstrates that the Pope certainly 
believed that he had played a very significant role indeed. And finally, the Pope, like Reagan, 
forgave his assailant, both believing that their would-be assassins were merely bit players in the 
larger drama swirling around them: between the very forces of good and evil.
626
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And so, at the dawn of his presidency, Ronald Reagan felt he had been destined to be a 
peacemaker. He had overcome incredible odds to become President and then survive an 
assassin‘s bullet, and being a religious person, he took his recovery as a sign of Divine 
Intervention that endowed purpose. That purpose would be the cause of ending Cold War 
hostilities and averting nuclear war. Like Pope John Paul, Reagan saw himself as the major 
player in this epic quest. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has detailed that beginning in the election year of 1984, America‘s policy towards 
the USSR was directed towards the goal of achieving peace. That this was not merely a 
campaign tactic, can be demonstrated that the peace rhetoric only intensified in Reagan‘s second 
term, in particular once Mikhail Gorbachev had become the Soviet leader.  
This chapter established that Reagan was not the first President to have sought such an 
outcome: nearly all of his Cold War predecessors, beginning with Truman, had hoped to speak 
on a human level with the Soviet leader, reducing mistrust and misunderstanding, and re-
establishing the wartime partnership. Despite their failure to end the Cold War, and even with his 
own intense anti-Communist ideology, Reagan believed that he could accomplish what the 
others had been unable to do. 
Evidence has been presented here that would lend credence to the theory that Reagan felt 
destined to be President, and once in that position, to play the ‗leading role‘ in ending Cold War 
tension. Reagan was a man who believed in pre-destination, and it had been ‗prophesized‘ by 
Evangelical Pastors that his destiny was to be President. According to Michael Deaver, Reagan 
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ran for President to accomplish his goal of nuclear abolitionism. While Deaver‘s theory was not 
substantiated here by any other intimates of the President, Reagan‘s own writings demonstrate 
that following the attempt on his life, he did in fact feel destined to end the likelihood of nuclear 
war. 
An analysis of Reagan‘s 1990 memoirs has demonstrated that the former President 
wished the reading audience to draw the same conclusions about his brush with death as he did: 
namely, that he had been spared by Divine Intervention to end the Cold War. Carefully 
constructing the events preceding and following the attempt on his life, Reagan painted the 
picture of a President determined to bring peace having been saved, against all odds, to do just 
that. Thus, Reagan began his presidency with a sense of mission.  
The following chapter will examine what Reagan did with that sense of mission: how he 












REAGAN THE PEACE-MAKER 
 
“Here you and I are, two men in a room, probably the only two men in the 
world who could bring about World War III. But by the same token, we may be 
the only two men in the world who could perhaps bring about peace.” 




Ronald Reagan believed that he could act as a global peace-maker. As the preceding chapter 
demonstrates, nearly all of America‘s Presidents of the Cold War era also felt that peace could be 
achieved and pursued it in their own way. But Reagan was different from his predecessors in that 
he actually felt destined to realize this historic outcome. As President, he would work towards 
his goal of a world free from the terror of nuclear warfare, and undertook to accomplish a lasting 
peace with the USSR.  
Just seventy days into his presidency, however, Reagan‘s agenda, both domestic and 
foreign, came close to an untimely end with the assassination attempt on his life. Had Jerry Parr, 
the head Secret Service officer in the limousine with Reagan, not ordered the driver to head 
immediately to the hospital rather than returning to the White House, Reagan undoubtedly would 
have died. The fact that he did survive was interpreted by Reagan as evidence of some sort of 
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‗Divine Intervention‘, and the President felt that he should devote the remainder of his 
presidency to ‗doing God‘s will‘; which he interpreted as being to end the Cold War. 
This chapter assesses Reagan‘s ambitious attempt to make peace between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, and examines in particular the various overtures that the President 
made to the Soviet leadership—both in correspondence, through speeches and in person. The 
influence of Presidential handlers who wished to remold Reagan into the image of peacemaker is 
investigated, and this chapter examines Reagan‘s commitment to the cause of peace and how he 
overcame much in-house opposition from those within his administration who believed that 
continual offensive was better than dialogue.  
The argument over whether Reagan ‗won‘ the Cold War is left entirely out of this thesis. 
Rather, the question is posed: did Reagan seek to be a peacemaker, and what role did he 
personally play in attempting to bring this about?  
 
Following the Assassination Attempt: An Olive Branch to Brezhnev 
As the previous chapter detailed, Reagan‘s account of his close brush with death following the 
attempt on his life in 1981 is structured and written for the reader to conclude as Reagan did, that 
his life had been spared for a purpose: to end the Cold War. This chapter continues with what 
followed that dramatic opening to Reagan‘s presidency, to ascertain whether his 1990 account of 
what he believed he was called to do, was actually something that Reagan felt at the time and 
followed through on. 
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Recuperating at the White House in April of 1981 following surgery to remove a bullet, 
Reagan‘s sense of obligation to bring peace became palpable, resulting in the President‘s first 
personal olive branch being extended to the Soviet leadership. His work load drastically cut-back 
on the orders of his wife Nancy, Reagan began the process of recovery either lying in a ‗hospital-
style bed‘ in the Lincoln bedroom or ‗relaxing in robe and pajamas in the solarium‘, where he 
had in his own words ‗lots of time to think about the problems our country faced and the things 
we could do to deal with them‘.628 While Reagan pondered getting his ‗economic recovery‘ 
program through Congress, he spent most of his time, he claims ‗recalling those thoughts I‘d had 
on the Sunday before the shooting about the MAD policy‘. Reagan saw what he had to do: 
‗Perhaps having come so close to death made me feel I should do whatever I could in the years 
God had given me to reduce the threat of nuclear war; perhaps there was a reason I had been 
spared.
629
 (Emphasis added). Reagan therefore decided that he would reach out to Soviet leader 
Leonid Brezhnev by writing him a personal, heartfelt letter. 
 Reagan‘s letter to Brezhnev, which he commenced work on one week after leaving 
hospital, was his attempt to begin the process for peace. With a yellow legal pad in hand, Reagan 
wrote sincerely about his desire to improve relations and bring about peace. He wrote: 
Mr. President, in writing the attached letter I am reminded of our meeting in San 
Clemente a decade or so ago. I was Governor of California at the time and you 
were concluding a series of meetings with President Nixon. Those meetings had 
captured the imagination of all the world. Never had peace and good will among 
men seemed closer at hand. When we met I asked if you were aware that the 
hopes and aspirations of millions and millions of people throughout the world 
were dependent on the decisions that would be reached in your meetings. You 
took my hand in both of yours and assured me that you were aware of that and 
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that you were dedicated with all your heart and mind to fulfilling those hopes and 
dreams. The people of the world still share that hope.
630
 (Emphasis added). 
 
This segment was the centerpiece of the letter, but for Secretary of State Haig, it was not 
acceptable. As the original draft at the Reagan archives shows, Haig crossed out this entire 
section and insisted that he, and not Reagan, should compose any correspondence to the USSR.  
Informing his aide Mike Deaver of this development, Reagan was told by his old friend to 
‗screw‘ Haig, after all, ‗he wasn‘t elected President: you were‘. Reagan agreed, thanked 
Deaver,
631
 and told Haig that he would send his own correspondence and took the deleted section 
and made it the opening of the letter.
632
 In addition to conveying his peaceful purposes, Reagan 
also sought to revisit the origins of the Cold War, to illustrate that, according to Reagan, 
America‘s intentions had always been pure. 
Reagan‘s letter to Brezhnev included the President‘s interpretation of the genesis of the 
Cold War and, of course, America was blameless. Reagan pointed out that when ‗World War II 
ended‘ the US ‗alone had the ultimate weapon‘ the nuclear bomb, and therefore could have 
‗sought world domination then‘. Instead, the US used its ‗power and wealth to rebuild the war-
ravaged economies of the world‘.633 This benign and perhaps simplistic view of American power 
seemed naïve to Haig, however he consented to Reagan‘s letter being sent, but said that he would 
                                                     
630
 Original draft Executive Secretariat NSC: Head of State File: Records, 1981-1989, RPL. 
USSR: Gen. Sec. Brezhnev (8190057), Box. 38. RPL. 
631
 Strober and Strober, Reagan, p. 116. 
632
 Haig‘s attitude towards the President reflected a disdain for the intellectual powers of Reagan. He said: ‗His 
staying power is zilch. He isn‘t a mean man. He‘s just stupid‘. As quoted in Reeves, President Reagan, p. 111. 
Eventually, Reagan had had enough of Haig and terminated his services on 25 June 1982.  
633
 Original draft Executive Secretariat NSC: Head of State File: Records, 1981-1989, RPL. 
USSR: Gen. Sec. Brezhnev (8190057), Box. 38. RPL. 
304 
 
send a separate letter, this one drafted by himself. The second letter, however, contradicted the 
first in that its tone was bombastic and threatening and Reagan‘s team had to re-write it 
extensively. 
 As National Security Adviser Richard Allen‘s Memo to the President on the Haig letter 
demonstrates, the Secretary of State seemed determined to undercut Reagan‘s peace initiative. 
Labeling Haig‘s draft, ‗fundamentally negative‘ and pointing out that the ‗first formal exchange 
of correspondence‘ between the two countries required ‗more careful thought‘,634 Allen gave a 
litany of abuses that had to be corrected. For starters, instead of fostering Reagan‘s desire to 
reach out to the USSR, Allen said that the letter came across as a ‗brush off‘ compared to 
Brezhnev‘s ‗statesman-like air‘ in his first letter to Reagan, sent in early March. Secondly, Haig 
had totally ignored issues raised in Brezhnev‘s letter, such as the Middle East and Asia; these 
needed to be addressed. Also, Haig‘s accusation that Soviet arms proposals were ‗designed for 
propaganda purposes‘ in Allen‘s view crossed a line that ‗violate[d] accepted diplomatic usage‘. 
Warning that Haig‘s language sounded ‗deliberately insulting‘, Allen said: ‗We have behind us 
five centuries of diplomatic experience, during which norms have been evolved to convey such 
messages more politely.‘635 Reagan agreed with Allen‘s recommendation that the letter be 
‗redrafted‘, and the letter was significantly re-written, with an emphasis on a willingness to 
engage in ‗dialogue‘. However, Reagan did not find Brezhnev to be the ‗partner in peace‘ that he 
had hoped for. 
 Brezhnev‘s reply to Reagan‘s letter was the first sign to the President that his dream to 
bring peace between the Superpowers was not going to be accomplished in the short-term. The 
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six-page letter was mainly devoted to refuting Reagan‘s claims of America‘s benevolent foreign 
policy following World War II.  Firstly, Brezhnev said that it would be hard for him to find 
‗many people‘, ‗those familiar with that time‘ either through ‗experience‘ or through ‗serious 
study‘, who would agree with Reagan‘s interpretation of history.  ‗The US did the maximum it 
could, using a wide array of military, political and economic means‘ to ‗restructure the world the 
way it wanted to be‘, via a so called ‗Pax Americana’, Brezhnev said. Though Nazi Germany 
and Imperial Japan had been conquered, the US created NATO, a ‗closed military block‘ against 
the USSR, and its economic assistance was only given to those countries willing to ‗submit their 
policy to foreign interests‘.636 Reagan later recalled that the letter was ‗icy‘ and said, ‗So much 
for my first attempt at personal diplomacy‘.637 But perhaps Reagan was overlooking the many 
positive aspects of Brezhnev‘s letter. 
 Brezhnev made clear to Reagan in his letter that he was willing to join with the President 
in the cause of peace. ‗I gave careful thought to your personal letter‘, Brezhnev had begun, and 
said ‗just as you do, I recall our brief conversation at the reception given by President R. Nixon 
at Casa Pacifica in June 1973‘.638 Echoing Reagan‘s words to him then, Brezhnev said: ‗Today, 
as we did at that time, all Soviet leadership and I commit our hearts and minds to the realization 
of hopes and aspirations of all the peoples of the world for peace, quiet life and confidence in 
their future‘.  Again quoting Reagan, Brezhnev said: ‗You indicated that peace and goodwill 
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among men never had seemed closer at hand‘ and Brezhnev gave the reason for this: the 
successful policy of détente. Recounting that policy, he stated: 
Our two countries took the path of reaching agreements which marked a radical 
turn for the better not only in Soviet American relations but in the international 
situation as a whole. Those were the years when the USSR and the USA actively 
and not without success set about to solve the task of limiting arms, first of all 
strategic arms, when they started seeking in common solutions to acute 
international problems when mutually beneficial bi-lateral ties and cooperation 




Brezhnev then put forward his lengthy version of events as to why relations had soured since 
then, but he did not want Reagan to come away from his letter thinking that that it was a 
‗dressing down‘. Rather, ‗The main idea though that I would like to convey through my letter is 
that we do not seek confrontation with the USA or infringe upon American legitimate interests. 
What we seek is different: we seek peace, cooperation, a sense of mutual trust, benevolence, 
between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.‘ If Reagan wanted to, he and 
Brezhnev could work together to ‗search for mutually acceptable solutions to practically all 
major questions between us—be it restraining of the arms race, elimination of most of the 
dangerous sources of tension in various areas of the world, or measures for confidence building.‘ 
Promising there was ‗no ruse or any ulterior motives‘ Brezhnev concluded that his was, ‗thus a 
policy for peace‘.640    
However, Reagan chose to focus on the ‗dressing down‘ part of the letter, and due to 
Brezhnev‘s failure to address the key issues of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and its SS-20 
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missiles in Europe, the language about peace rang somewhat hollow. Reagan could no more 
make peace with Brezhnev than Carter could: and when on Christmas Day 1981 Brezhnev sent a 
cable to Reagan accusing him of ‗defaming our social and state system‘, and adding that 
Reagan‘s foreign policy was ‗thoroughly amoral‘, Reagan had to conclude at the close of 1981: 
As I thought back on that letter to Brezhnev after the shooting, I realized I hadn‘t 
made much progress with the Russians in reducing Cold War tensions during my 





Andropov and Chernenko: Failed Attempts at Peace 
On 10 November 1982, Leonid Brezhnev died. His tenure as leader of the USSR had seen 
détente and its discontents; from the heights of the summitry under Nixon with its arms 
limitation agreements, to the depths of the invasion of Afghanistan, and SS-20 deployments 
under Carter. Perhaps with Brezhnev gone, it was hoped, the relationship could be marked less 
by depths and more by heights. Possibly Reagan had a chance to bring peace. As he recounted in 
his memoirs: 
I had made no progress with Brezhnev. Now there was a new leader in the 
Kremlin, Yuri Andropov, former head of the KGB. I didn‘t expect him to be any 
less of a doctrinaire Communist than Brezhnev, but at least there was a clean 
slate.
642
 (Emphasis added).  
 
Onto this ‗clean slate‘, Reagan chose to use the language of peace and extended anew an olive 
branch, albeit with caution. At a press conference held 11 November, Reagan said:  
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I want to underscore my intention to continue working to improve our relationship 
with the Soviet Union. Our two nations bear a tremendous responsibility for 
peace in a dangerous time—a responsibility that we don't take lightly…I want to 
reconfirm that we will continue to pursue every avenue for progress in this effort. 
But we shouldn't delude ourselves. Peace is a product of strength, not of 
weakness—of facing reality and not believing in false hopes.643 (Emphasis 
added).  
 
But 1983 was not to be a year of peace between the Superpowers: indeed, it was probably the 
most dangerous year since 1962, which saw the near disastrous Cuban Missile Crisis. Reagan‘s 
first written response from the new Soviet leader Andropov was in the President‘s view, icier 
than Brezhnev‘s, saying, ‗His letters were stiff and as cold as a Siberian winter‘.644 On 11 July 
1983 Reagan pushed harder with his language of peace, suggesting in another letter that they 
correspond ‗privately and candidly‘. If Andropov wanted direct communication, he said that: 
‗you will find me ready. I await your reply.‘645  Andropov, already gravely ill from kidney 
failure,
646
 did reply in a positive tone, saying ‗thank you for your personal letter‘ and expressing 
‗satisfaction‘ at the ‗assurances that the US government shares a devotion to the cause of peace 
and the elimination of the nuclear threat‘.647  But Andropov was unwilling to make any 
substantial move towards peace.  
In his letter, Andropov ignored Reagan‘s concerns about Soviet ‗subversion‘ of Third 
World countries saying that those nations had the right to be ‗masters of their own fate‘. And on 
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the critical issue of INF weapons in Europe, Andropov took the dishonest position that the USSR 
was only responding to British and French nuclear arsenals, and asked, somewhat audaciously, 
‗Is this not an honest and moderate position?‘648 Reagan was not pleased, but decided to keep the 
tone conciliatory in a 4 August 1983 letter that took a more realist approach to the issues raised.  
But events soon overtook them both, and the relationship was poisoned, terminally. 
‗And make no mistake about it, this attack was not just against ourselves or the Republic 
of Korea‘ Reagan said with anger, ‗This was the Soviet Union against the world and the moral 
precepts which guide human relations among people everywhere‘; thus said Reagan in an 
address to the nation on 5 September 1983 concerning the Korean Airline ‗massacre‘. It was the 
final straw for Andropov: he had put up with Reagan‘s ‗Evil Empire‘ speech in March, his 
announcement of SDI, and now this. Reagan, he felt, had gone too far. Lashing out against the 
President, he said that Reagan ‗risked war‘ and ruled out any agreements while Reagan remained 
in office: ‗Even if someone had illusions as to the possible evolution for the better in the policy 
of the present American Administration,‘ Andropov said, ‗the latest developments have dispelled 
them.‘ Relations went from bad to worse: the Soviets walked out of the Geneva arms talks in 
November, and with the ‗Able Archer‘ NATO military exercises, the Kremlin placed their forces 
on nuclear alert. 1983, therefore, ended with the prospect of nuclear war. Reagan‘s peace 
initiatives were a dismal failure; a failure that Reagan was determined to turn around in 1984. 
President Reagan publicly demonstrated his commitment to peace at the dawn of his re-
election year in a major speech on US--Soviet relations which centered on the need for a 
‗constructive dialogue‘. On 16 January 1984 Reagan gave his address which he hoped would 
close the chapter on ‗the year of the bomb‘, and begin a new chapter that would move 





Superpower relations away from confrontation, and instead in the direction of peace. As stated 
previously, Reagan said: 
We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as serious and constructive as 
possible—dialogues that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the 
world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.
649
    
 
‗Our challenge,‘ Reagan added, ‗is peaceful‘. However, Andropov was not taking up Reagan‘s 
challenge. As stated earlier, on 28 January 1984 Reagan received his final letter from the ailing 
Soviet leader, in which he said: 
If one must state today that the affairs between our two countries are taking on, to 
put it frankly, an extremely unfavorable shape, then the reason for it is not our 
policy—we did not and do not want it to be so…We are prepared to accept very 
deep reductions both of the strategic and European weapons….However, the 
United States has destroyed the very basis on which it was possible to seek an 
agreement. Let us be frank, Mr. President, there is no way of making things look 
as if nothing happened. There has been a disruption of the dialogue on the most 
important questions. A heavy blow has been dealt to the very process of nuclear 
arms limitation.
650
 (Emphasis added).  
 
After this unpleasant letter, Reagan must have felt little sorrow upon hearing on 9 February 1984 
that Andropov was dead—when asked if he wanted to attend the funeral, Reagan said: ‗I don‘t 
want to honor that prick‘.651 Nonetheless, in a radio address to the nation two days later, Reagan 
publicly extended another olive branch to the new leader Konstantin Chernenko in his quest to 
fulfill his dream for peace. He said:  
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At this time of transition in the Soviet Union, our two nations should look to the 
future. We should find ways to work together to meet the challenge of preserving 
peace. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we talk to each other, 




‗America is ready‘ Reagan said, and asked that the Soviets ‗take advantage of the opportunities 
at hand.‘ Demonstrating his heartfelt desire for peace, Reagan ended his address saying, ‗If the 
Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be peace‘.653 
 Reagan felt that with Brezhnev and Andropov gone, he might actually have the chance to 
meet with a Soviet leader who could join him in his quest to end the Cold War. As Reagan‘s 
diary records for 22 February 1984, the President was hopeful and wanted a summit: 
I have a gut feeling I‘d like to talk to him about our problems man to man and see 
if I could convince him there would be a material benefit to the Soviets if they‘d 
join the family of nations etc. We don‘t want to appear anxious which would 
tempt them to play games and possibly snub us. I have our team considering an 
invitation to him to be my guest at the opening of the Olympics, July in LA. Then 
he and I could have a session together in which we could start the ball rolling for 
an outright summit on arms reductions, human rights etc. We‘ll see.654 
 
It did not take long for Reagan‘s hopes to be dashed again. Two days after this diary entry, he 
received his first letter from the new Soviet leader. In it Chernenko described US--Soviet 
relations as being ‗abnormal, and let‘s face it, dangerous‘. Furthermore, he accused America of 
seeking to ‗gain military advantages‘ and slammed criticism of Soviet human rights abuses 
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stating that the Soviets ‗believe it is wrong and even dangerous to subordinate our relations to 
ideological differences‘.655 Reagan, however, was not going to give up.  
 Reagan‘s 7 March 1984 letter to Chernenko demonstrated yet again his determination to 
bridge the divide between the US and the USSR, and again, the President believed that the 
personal touch would be key. Attempting to ‗use the old actor‘s technique of empathy, to 
imagine the world as seen through another‘s eyes and try to help my audience see it through my 
eyes‘, 656 Reagan wrote about Soviet wartime miseries. In particular, Reagan drew attention to 
the massive casualties sustained by the Soviet people in its struggle to destroy the Nazi war 
machine during World War II. Also, recalling Chernenko‘s words to Vice President Bush at 
Andropov‘s funeral that ‗we should take steps to insure that history recalls us as leaders known 
to be good, wise and kind‘, Reagan said, ‗Nothing is more important to me, and we should take 
steps to bring this about‘. A handwritten postscript to the letter further stated Reagan‘s ‗profound 
commitment‘ to achieving a ‗lasting reduction of tensions between us‘.657 But again, the Soviets 
were not moved. 
 Chernenko‘s response to Reagan‘s letter and his subsequent pledge to boycott the 
Olympics being held in Los Angeles, plunged US--Soviet relations into deep freeze. Turning 
Reagan‘s ‗actor‘s technique‘ against the old thespian, Chernenko‘s letter said: ‗It appears to be 
an American idiom to put somebody in someone else‘s shoes‘, asking Reagan to realize that 
from their perspective, ‗the Soviet Union is encircled by a chain of American military bases‘. 
Chernenko ruled out being Reagan‘s guest at the opening of the Olympics, and on 8 May 1984, 
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the Kremlin announced that the Soviet team would not be participating at all—they were 
boycotting the Olympics.
658
  Chernenko went as far to say that the Reagan Administration: ‗has 
chosen terrorism as a method of conducting affairs with other states and peoples‘.659 At a press 
conference on 22 May reporter Helen Thomas put Reagan on the defensive. As this exchange 
shows, Reagan was made to look like the man responsible for the toxic Superpower relationship: 
Thomas: Mr. President, Senator Byrd says that our relations with the Soviet 
Union have reached the lowest point in 20 years. Did you misjudge the Russians? 
Are your hard-line policies responsible for the boycott of the Olympics, the break-
off of arms negotiations, stepped-up offensive in Afghanistan, more missiles off 
our coast?  
 
 Reagan: No, Helen, I don‘t think I‘m responsible for any of those things… 
 
Thomas: Would you admit there‘s a heightened sense of belligerency? And six 
eminent world leaders today said that we‘re headed for global suicide. What are 
you going to do about it with this arms race? 
 
Reagan: I don‘t think we are, and I don‘t think we‘re any closer or as close as we 
might have been in the past to a possible conflict or confrontation that could lead 
to a nuclear conflagration. I think the very fact that we‘re stronger—yes, the 
Soviet Union is unhappy. They‘re unhappy because, for the first time in a couple 
of decades, we are preserving our security ability. We‘re building up our military, 
and we‘re not unilaterally disarming while they continue their massive arms 
buildup. And I‘m sure this makes them a little unhappy about that, that things 
aren‘t as easy as they once were. But when they‘re ready to come back to the 
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table, it probably—or might not be till after the election, I don‘t know. But I think 




Reagan felt that placing the blame on him, was wrong. As he wrote in a letter to an old friend: 
The Soviets shoot down a plane, they walk out of disarmament talks, boycott the 
Olympics and the press asks, ‗Why don‘t you do something‘? Actually we have 
done everything we could quietly to let them know the door is open. We do have 
one reservation. We won‘t make some offer that would look as if we were 
rewarding them for walking out. Just between us I think they are going to be this 




The President was right: the Soviets were hoping that by taking a hard-line stance, they would 
spoil his chances of being re-elected.
662
 However, by the fall, even the Soviets saw the writing on 
the wall, that barring the unforeseen, Reagan would be re-elected President by a landslide. Thus, 
despite Reagan‘s off the cuff joke about bombing Russia that was caught on an open 
microphone
663—the Soviets sent out signals that their foreign minister Gromyko would be 
willing to meet with Reagan during his annual visit to the UN in September. When Secretary 
Shultz raised the idea with Reagan, he immediately agreed to the meeting.  
 Gromyko‘s meeting at the White House was the earliest indicator that the Soviets were 
now ready to engage with Reagan‘s peace initiative. It was the first such visit in four years, and 
the media covered the event as though the General Secretary himself had arrived. While both 
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sides expressed a desire to end the arms race, the most memorable exchange occurred between 
Gromyko and the First Lady, when the usually dour minister asked Nancy:  
‗Does your husband believe in peace‘?  
‗Of course‘ Nancy replied.  
Gromyko then said, ‗Then whisper the word peace in his ear every night‘.  
‗I will‘ Nancy said, ‗And I‘ll whisper it in your ear too‘ she said, leaning in and 
whispering ‗peace‘. Gromyko, for the first time in memory, cracked into a smile.664 
 
Both sides also agreed that the arms race was seriously out of control, and that sitting on 
‗mountains of weapons‘ was counterproductive to the interests of each nation and the cause of 
world peace. Reagan recorded in his diary: ‗I kept emphasizing that we were the two nations that 
could [either] destroy or save the world‘.665 The President was delighted with the outcome of the 
talks: the Soviets had finally come to terms with the fact that he would be President until 1989, 
and they were in agreement that hostilities needed to be replaced with co-operation. When 
Reagan won 49 out of the 50 states in the November election, the Soviets sent a telegram of 
congratulations to which Reagan replied: 
I share your hope that the coming years will be marked by improved relations 
between our countries. Despite our different political beliefs and perspectives on 
international problems, I am confident we can make progress on strengthening 
peace and resolving our differences through discussions and negotiations. We 
hope you will join us in the critical work needed to reduce international tensions 
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1985: the Rise of Gorbachev  
Reagan‘s second term began with a propitious announcement: the United States and the Soviet 
Union would resume arms negotiation talks without any preconditions set. For the first time 
since the fall of 1983, the Superpowers were talking to each other again. Reagan‘s dream for 
peace was slowly but surely moving in the right direction. That process would be dramatically 
intensified when Reagan at last achieved what he had long hoped for: a man willing to engage in 
a constructive dialogue of peace leading the USSR. The ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev to the 
position of General Secretary meant that for the first time since the Nixon/Brezhnev partnership, 
US--Soviet relations would be marked by collaboration on a wide range of bi-lateral issues. And 
this time there would be no souring of relations: Gorbachev was as committed to ending Cold 
War tensions as Reagan was. 
  On the morning of 11 March 1985 President Reagan and his wife Nancy were awoken at 
4am by a telephone call. The message? Chernenko was dead. ‗How am I supposed to get any 
place with the Russians,‘ he asked Nancy, ‗If they keep dying on me?‘667 Again there was a new 
leader to deal with, and again, Reagan felt optimistic that it could mean a greater chance for 
peace. The White House released a statement by the President, sending Reagan‘s condolences, 
but also extending anew the olive branch for peace. It read: ‗At this solemn time, I wish to 
reiterate the strong desire of the American people for world peace. Although the problems which 
divide our countries are many and complex, we can and must resolve our differences through 
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dialogue and negotiation.‘668 Already it was clear that Mikhail Gorbachev would be Chernenko‘s 
replacement, and Reagan wasted no time—the moment had arrived for a Superpower summit. 
 In the Reagan/Gorbachev partnership, it was Reagan who made the first move. Perhaps 
encouraged by Margaret Thatcher‘s assessment that Gorbachev was ‗a man you could do 
business with‘,669 Reagan wrote a letter to him on 13 March 1985, which was handed to the new 
leader at Chernenko‘s funeral by Vice President Bush. It read: 
You can be assured of my personal commitment to working with you and the rest 
of the Soviet leadership in serious negotiations. In that spirit, I would like you to 
visit me in Washington at your earliest convenient opportunity. I recognize that 
arriving at an early answer may not be possible. But I want you to know that I 
look forward to a meeting that could yield results of benefit to both our countries 
and to the international community as a whole.
670
 (Emphasis added).  
 
 Gorbachev replied that he had a ‗positive attitude‘ towards a Summit, and called for US--Soviet 
relations to take the path of ‗peaceful competition‘. Seeking a ‗peaceful, calm development‘, the 
new leader stressed his desire for ‗an atmosphere of greater trust between our countries‘.671 They 
were off to a good start, and after a series of letters over several months, they had finally agreed 
to a summit to be held in Geneva. But not everyone in Reagan‘s Administration shared the 
President‘s enthusiasm for such an event. 
 Ronald Reagan, the ardent anti-communist, the man who had decried the USSR as an 
‗Evil Empire‘ was all set for a meeting with the new Soviet leader and led by Secretary of 
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Defense Casper Weinberger, the conservatives who supported him began a revolt. Weinberger, 
whose own ardent anti-communism now seemed out of place in Reagan‘s second term, had been 
excluded from the Geneva Summit and he was none too pleased. As Reagan left for Geneva on 
Air Force One, an unnamed source in the Pentagon leaked a letter that Weinberger had written to 
the President in an attempt, in the opinion of Bud McFarlane, to ‗sabotage the Summit‘.672  The 
letter to the President urged him not to accept any restrictions on his SDI program, to refuse to 
agree to continue the flawed SALT II Treaty, and to avoid any communiqué that glossed over the 
fact that the Soviets were serial violators of past treaties.
673
 Shultz, McFarlane and others in the 
Reagan Administration were livid, and wanted Weinberger fired. Reagan refused, and recorded 
in his diary: 
The press is excited about the leak of a letter to me from Cap on why I shouldn‘t 
be trapped into endorsing continued observance of SALT II. It is a great distortion 
and is not as the press would have it: an in-house battle. I agree with Cap and 




Reagan the peacemaker may have seen that having a hard-line Secretary of Defense helped him 
diplomatically, as it demonstrated to the Soviets that there were forces within the Administration 
who were only too eager to return to Cold War tensions if the renewed dialogue was 
unsuccessful.
675
 Reagan‘s re-assurances to Weinberger and other conservatives, that he would 
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not ‗sell the shop‘, was part of his negotiations strategy: he had to convince his own political 
base that he had not changed if he were to avoid a right wing revolt and thereby achieve any 
meaningful peace with the Soviets. 
 
The Geneva Summit: Undoing the Mistrust 
On the eve of the Geneva Summit, Reagan addressed the nation saying, ‗My mission, stated 
simply, is a mission for peace‘.676 Finally Reagan would fulfill his dream to sit down one- on-one 
with a Soviet leader, and try out his theory that the Cold War was above all else a 
misunderstanding: that if he could just convey America‘s peaceful purposes and gain the trust 
and friendship of the Soviet leader, then peace could be achieved. Reagan had thought long and 
hard about this for many years and he prayed privately: ‗Lord, I hope I‘m ready and not over 
trained‘.677 Publicly, he asked that God would grant ‗guidance for all of us at Geneva, so that the 
cause of true peace among men will be advanced and all of humanity thereby served‘.678  
 Reagan had ‗crammed‘ hard for the Summit, being schooled by the experts on Russian 
history and its new leader, Gorbachev. Reagan thoroughly enjoyed his readings on Russian 
culture prepared by Jack Matlock, and he shared the memos with the Vice President and his wife 
Nancy. Recognizing the historic importance of what he was about to undertake, Reagan recorded 
in a memo to himself his thoughts on the Soviet leader.  He wrote:  
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I believe Gorbachev is a highly intelligent leader totally dedicated to traditional 
Soviet goals.  He will be a formidable negotiator…He is dependent on the Soviet 
communist hierarchy and will be out to prove to them his strength and 
dedication…He will wish to reduce the burden of defense spending that is 
stagnating the Soviet economy…[This] could contribute to his opposition to SDI 
since he doesn‘t want to face the cost of competing with us.679  
 
The Summit was a moment that Reagan had long anticipated, and the importance of that day is 
demonstrated by the fact that Reagan‘s prologue to his autobiography begins with that first day 
in Geneva. Revealing his peace theory based on an interpersonal relationship, Reagan wrote:  
I believed that if we were ever going to break down the barriers of mistrust that 
divided our countries, we had to begin by establishing a personal relationship 
between the leaders of the two most powerful nations on earth. During the 
previous five years, I had come to realize there were people in the Kremlin who 
had a genuine fear of the United States. I wanted to convince Gorbachev that we 




Reagan, therefore, had gone to ‗Geneva with a plan‘, to ‗see Gorbachev alone‘. Upon arriving in 
Geneva, Reagan had set aside a pool room with a roaring fire for their one-on-one meeting. 
Reagan knew what he wanted to say, and it was there that he wanted to say it. Reagan would get 
to begin that personal relationship, but it did not unfold exactly as he later described it. 
 From the first moment of Reagan and Gorbachev‘s ‗Super-Summit‘,681 each saw in the 
other leader an opportunity for a constructive dialogue leading towards peace. As Reagan 
recalled: ‗That morning, as we shook hands and I looked into his smile, I sensed I had been right 
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and felt a surge of optimism that my plan might work‘.682 Gorbachev, had a ‗warmth in his face‘ 
Reagan observed, ‗not the coldness bordering on hatred I‘d seen in most senior Soviet officials 
I‘d met until then.‘683 Reagan was delighted by this pleasant surprise.684 Gorbachev, similarly, 
stated that he too felt something positive about Reagan from the first moment of their meeting, 
telling Reagan‘s biographer Edmund Morris that he saw, ‗Sunshine and clear sky‘ in the 
President, and felt immediately that he was dealing with someone of ‘lincnost’ (authenticity) and 
kalibr (caliber).
685
 It was the first time in six years, since Carter‘s meeting with Brezhnev in 
Vienna in June of 1979, that the leaders of the Superpowers had met. There was an air of 
excitement not only in the press pool, but also around the world. And no-one was more excited 
by the opportunity than Reagan; an excitement that made him get a little carried away.  
When Reagan first met Gorbachev, he was so eager to begin work on his ‗personal 
diplomacy‘, that he did not wait for his one-on-one fireside chat as planned, but proceeded 
immediately to speak from the heart the words he had chosen to convey America‘s peaceful 
nature. As the Memcons record, as soon as Gorbachev was ushered into the residence, Reagan 
sat next to him on the couch and began to use the material he had prepared beforehand: words 
that in his later recollection, he would claim were spoken at the fireside-chat held later in the 
day. But the Memcons do not lie, and Reagan‘s words were spoken as aides chatted in the 
background, and with Reagan‘s egotistical Chief of Staff Don Regan leaning in between them. It 
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was hardly as intimate as Reagan‘s setting, ‗beside the blazing hearth, just the two of us‘.686 
Nonetheless, Reagan‘s account of the personal talk held between the two is correct, if his 
recollection of the setting is not. The Memcons record that in that initial meeting, Reagan: 
…indicated that both he and the General Secretary had come from similar 
beginnings which were quite different from their current positions. He, Reagan, 
was born and began his life in a small farming community,
687
 and now the two of 
them were here with the fate of the world in their hands, so to speak. The US and 
the Soviet Union were the two greatest countries on Earth, the superpowers. They 
were the only ones who could start World War III, but also the only two countries 
that could bring peace to the world.
688
 (Emphasis added).  
 
In that effort to make peace, Reagan wished to get to what he considered the heart of the Cold 
War: the mutual mistrust between the two nations. ‗Mr.  General Secretary,‘ he said, ‗we don‘t 
mistrust each other because we‘re armed; we are armed because we mistrust each other‘.689 
Reagan stated that arms reductions would be discussed in great detail but ‗he wondered if the 
primary aim between them should not be to eliminate the suspicions which each side had of the 
other. The resolution of other questions would follow naturally after this.‘ Explaining his 
reasoning, Reagan said: ‗To talk about arms while such suspicions exist is an empty exercise as 
both sides are defensive‘. Instead, Reagan hoped ‗that in the meetings the two sides could get at 
the sources of the suspicions which exist.‘690 Gorbachev replied positively, stating that the US 
and the USSR had co-operated in the past, and that there was no reason why this could not be 
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true of the future, stating ‗in the USSR there was no enmity toward the United States or its 
people.‘691 
Picking up the American idealist belief that human beings are inherently peace-loving, 
and that it is only governments who start wars,  Reagan said, ‗There was no question but that the 
Soviet and American peoples, if they learned more about each other, would find that they had 
many things in common, and that friendship between them would grow. Unfortunately, it was 
not people but governments that created arms‘.692  Gorbachev did not take up this Wilsonian 
concept, so foreign to Marxist theories of class warfare, but he did say that both old and young 
hoped with him that the Summit would address ‗the central issue of the present time, that is, the 
question of war and peace‘.693 Gorbachev added, ‗Perhaps the President was aware that a slogan 
had been used during the time of this meeting in Geneva which said that Reagan and Gorbachev 
should bear in mind that the world did not belong only to the two of them.
694
  Reagan replied he 
was not aware of this saying. And thus ended their initial tête-à-tête.  
Reagan‘s personal outreach to Gorbachev in the quest for a better relationship, continued 
throughout the remainder of the Summit and a friendly rapport was established between the two 
leaders. As planned, Reagan asked Gorbachev to walk with him down to the pool room for a 
private conversation. Reagan‘s invitation came at the end of the second plenary session, and 
Gorbachev ‗leaped out of his chair‘ according to Reagan at the suggestion. It is a good thing that 
Reagan did make this gesture: because up until that point, Gorbachev said that Reagan was a 
                                                     
691
 Ibid.,pp. 2-3. 
692




 Ibid.,p. 5. 
324 
 
‗political dinosaur‘.695 Walking down to the boathouse at the Villa Fleur d’Eau, the Soviet leader 
asked questions about Reagan‘s Hollywood career, their conversation aided of course by the use 
of interpreters.  The banter between the two men was relaxed, with Gorbachev asking, ‗What‘s it 
like, to see yourself so young on the screen?‘  Using a well used one liner, Reagan replied, ‗Like 
meeting a son you never knew you had.‘696  
Once inside, Gorbachev noted that the setting, with the fire, actually did create a warmer 
atmosphere for discussions.
697
 Though the two discussed a nuclear arms reduction treaty and 
argued intensely over SDI, they did not allow their tone to become mean spirited. They disagreed 
strongly over the idea of missile defense technology, but underneath their strong words, there 
remained a basic understanding of each other. At one point during the conversation, Gorbachev 
said that he could ‗understand the President on a human level‘ and how ‗the idea of strategic 
defense had captivated the President‘s imagination‘.698 The two agreed to disagree, but the 
friendly rapport continued between the two leaders. This was demonstrated by Reagan‘s 
invitation on the walk back to the main house that Gorbachev must visit him in Washington for a 
follow up summit. The General Secretary agreed immediately, and similarly invited Reagan to 
visit him in Moscow the following year. The personal relationship between the two had already 
borne fruit: they had agreed to two further summits, thus creating a schedule for continued 
dialogue.  
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On the second day of the Summit, Reagan had another one-on-one discussion with 
Gorbachev, and the topic of conversation was human rights. Reagan had long linked human 
rights to the cause of peace, believing that a nation that breaks its covenant with its own people, 
was likely to break it with other nations. However, as Reagan‘s diary account shows, the 
President attempted to use his old negotiation skills to make Gorbachev believe that Reagan was 
trying to help him:  
We went to the Soviet mission and he took me into a small room with interpreters. 
This was my chance to have at human rights. I explained that I wasn‘t telling him 
how to run his country—I was asking for his help; that I had a better chance of 
getting support at home for things we‘d agreed to if he would ease some of the 
restrictions on emigration, etc. I told him I‘d never mention what he was doing 
out loud but he‘d find that I could better meet some of his requests for trade etc. 
He argued back sort of indicating that he thought they treated their people better 
than we did ours. He quoted statements made by some of the feminist extremists 
to prove we were unkind to women. I fought back—only time will tell if I made 
any headway.
699
   
 
The personal relationship established by Reagan and Gorbachev, with the firm 
commitment to the continuance of dialogue, was the great success of the Geneva Summit. The 
hours spent together, including the two state dinners, helped each side see the human dimension 
of the other. The summit, by all accounts, was a great success. It ended with a joint statement 
that that summed up the central question of peace: 
The sides, having discussed key security issues, and conscious of the special 
responsibility of the USSR and the U.S. for maintaining peace, have agreed that a 
nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any 
conflict between the USSR and the U.S. could have catastrophic consequences, 
they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether 
nuclear or conventional. (Emphasis added)
700
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‗Nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought‘ was a Reaganism, a phrase that 




Returning to the United States, the President, as Nixon and Carter had done before him, 
immediately addressed a Joint Session of Congress, where he received a thunderous welcome, 
with Reagan writing in his diary: ‗I haven‘t gotten such a reception since I was shot. The 
galleries were full and the members wouldn‘t stop clapping and cheering‘.702 The mood among 
the Congressman and Senators was truly representative of how the American people rated 
Reagan‘s performance at Geneva, with 83% of respondents to a CBS poll approving of Reagan‘s 
handling of the Summit. 
703
 In the President‘s report to the Congress, he dubbed Geneva the 
‗fireside summit‘ and spoke of the cause of peace: 
We know that peace is not just the absence of war. We don’t want a phony peace 
or a frail peace. We didn‘t go in pursuit of some kind of illusory détente. We 
can‘t be satisfied with cosmetic improvements that won‘t stand the test of time. 
We want real peace.
704
 (Emphasis added).  
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Privately, Reagan was satisfied with the Geneva Summit, while still holding some reservations 
about Gorbachev. Writing to his friend George Murphy, who had compared Reagan‘s role in 
Geneva to starring in a blockbuster movie, the President wrote: 
Thanks for your letter and that most generous review of my performance in 
Geneva. I must say I enjoyed playing the part and the show did have something of 
a happy ending. Maybe I should say—‗tune in next year for the second 
installment‘. 
Seriously, it was worthwhile but it would be foolish to believe the leopard 
will change its spots. He is a firm believer in their system (so is she) and he 
believes the propaganda they peddle about us. At the same time he is practical and 
knows his economy is a basket case. I think our job is to show him he and they 
will be better off if we make some practical agreements without attempting to 
convert him to our way of thinking.
705
      
           
  
Gorbachev certainly was not going to be ‗converted‘ to American capitalism, but he concurred 
with Reagan that the Summit had been a success. Writing to the President he said that Geneva  
had helped them to ‗overcome a serious psychological barrier which for a long time has hindered 
a dialogue worthy of the leaders of the USSR and the USA‘. Furthermore, Gorbachev said that 
he felt that the Superpowers could ‗set aside our differences and get down to the heart of the 
matter‘, improved relations. ‗I agree with you, Mr. President,‘ Gorbachev wrote, ‗In the final 
analysis, no one besides us can do this‘.706  But improved relations continued to stall after 
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The Rocky Road from Geneva to Reykjavik  
‗More than four months have passed since the Geneva meeting,‘ Gorbachev wrote Reagan, 
asking, ‗what is the reason for things not going the way they, it would seem, should have gone? 
Where is the real turn for the better?‘707 Gorbachev‘s frustration was evident, and he felt that the 
US government had dismissed his arms reduction proposals—including the goal of total nuclear 
elimination by 2000—as ‗propaganda, as a desire to score high points in public opinion.‘708 
 Two weeks after this letter, relations continued to sour when the US bombed Libya, a 
state sponsored by the Soviet Union. A Soviet official described Qaddafi as ‗heroic‘ and Soviet 
foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze cancelled a planned meeting with Shultz to discuss the 
promised summit. Then came Chernobyl. 
 On 25 April 1986, the Soviet nuclear power plant at Chernobyl went into meltdown, and 
the reality of the destructive threat of nuclear weapons became ever more apparent, giving fresh 
impetus to the US--Soviet quest for peace. President Reagan was aboard Air Force One on his 
way to Indonesia and Japan for a thirteen-day trip when it was reported to him that abnormally 
high radioactive readings over Europe pointed to something catastrophic occurring in the USSR. 
Unable to cover up the incident because of these readings, the Soviet news agency Tass reported 
the accident.
709
 Reagan offered to send experts to assist with the cleanup, and used the incident to 
push for greater effort in the stalled Geneva talks. He wrote Gorbachev:  
Mr. General Secretary, our recent history provides ample evidence that if you wait 
for an ideal moment to try and resolve our differences; we are unlikely to resolve 
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anything. We should take advantage of it since it is a time of historic and possibly 




On 26 June 1986, the Geneva arms talks ended without any consensus on moving towards the 
goals set by Reagan and Gorbachev. The momentum begun at the Geneva Summit seemed to 
have hit a ‗brick wall‘. With no success among the arms negotiators, the likelihood of a summit 
in 1986 seemed remote. Then came what appeared to be the death blow: the Nicholas Daniloff 
affair.  
 On 4 September 1986 US News and World Report journalist Nicholas Daniloff was 
seized by the KGB in Moscow and accused of spying. Reagan was furious: Daniloff was no spy, 
and it was obvious that the capture was in response to the American arrest of Soviet UN mission 
member Gennadi Zakharov a few weeks earlier. Reagan had had about enough of Soviet 
duplicity, but what offended him the most was the fact that despite his personal assurances to 
Gorbachev that Daniloff was not an agent of espionage, the Soviets refused to release him.
711
 
How could Gorbachev be Reagan‘s partner in peace, if he did not even believe him? As 
Reagan‘s diary records: ‗Word came the Soviets were going to officially charge Daniloff with 
espionage. Gorbachev‘s response to my letter was arrogant and rejected my statement that 
Daniloff was no spy. I‘m mad as hell.712 
                                                     
710
 Reagan, An American Life, p. 665. 
711
 The Soviets may have had reason to believe that Daniloff was a spy, because while not technically an agent of the 
CIA, he did act in a covert manner: violating Soviet law by delivering letters from Soviet citizens to the American 
embassy, where at least one letter went to the CIA and sending ‗top secret‘ Soviet documents to the US News & 
World headquarters. Also, according to Shultz, Daniloff was ‗compromised‘ by the CIA when his name was 
mentioned by them to a Soviet dissenter—a conversation recorded by the KGB. As quoted in Reeves, President 
Reagan, p. 334.  
712
 Diary entry for 7 September 1986, Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, p. 435. 
330 
 
Meanwhile, Shultz was behind the scenes, working out a deal to release the Soviet spy 
Zakharov in exchange for Daniloff, and seeking to find a way to make it not appear to be what it 
was: a hostage swap. Shultz was anxious to resolve the matter, because he believed that 
Daniloff‘s actions in the USSR—which included forwarding mail from Soviet citizens to the US 
embassy—could technically be defined as espionage according to Soviet law. (In correspondence 
with the author, Danlioff said that Soviet law was so broad that a ‗ham sandwich could have 
been prosecuted!‘)713 As all this was going on, Gorbachev was ready to move the peace process 
forward, and sent his foreign minister to the White House with a proposal for a snap summit. 
 On 19 September 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met with 
President Reagan and delivered a letter from Gorbachev proposing a summit to break the 
impasse in relations between the Superpowers. But before Reagan would receive the letter, he 
crossly gave the Soviet foreign minister a lecture over the ‗Daniloff affair‘. Reagan recounted in 
his diary: 
I let the Foreign Minister know I was angry and that I resented their charges that 
Daniloff was a spy after I had personally given my word that he wasn‘t. I gave 
him a little run down on the differences between our two systems and told him 
they couldn‘t understand the importance we place on the individual because they 
don‘t have any such feeling. I enjoyed being angry.714 
 
When Reagan finally did accept the letter and read it, he saw that Gorbachev addressed 
the Daniloff issue, which he claimed had been exploited to launch a ‗massive hostile campaign‘ 
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against the USSR. Still, trying to spin the incident in a positive light, Gorbachev said that it was 
an example of how: 
sensitive relations between the USSR and the United States are and how 
important it is for the top leaders of the two countries to keep them constantly 





What had begun at Geneva needed ‗a major impulse‘ otherwise the stalled relationship would 
continue to ‗mark time‘. Gorbachev therefore called for meeting between the two leaders to be 
held either in London or Reykjavik, with the purpose of being able to ‗find solutions‘ to the 
problems between the two countries, and thus prepare for a ‗really productive and fruitful‘ 
summit to be held later in Washington D.C. Reagan announced, on 30 September, that a summit 
was to be held in less than two weeks in Reykjavik, following Shultz‘s earlier announcement that 
day that the Daniloff affair had been resolved.   
 On 9 October, in his remarks while departing the White House for the Summit, Reagan 
outlined the goals of his meeting with Gorbachev, which he articulated within the general theme 
of making peace. After claiming that credit for the success of the Geneva summit ‗belongs to the 
American people‘ for their ‗unified support‘, Reagan spoke of how summitry can help bring 
peace: 
I’ve long believed that if we’re to be successful in pursuing peace, we must face 
the tough issues directly and honestly and with hope. We cannot pretend the 
differences aren‘t there, seek to dash off a few quick agreements, and then give 
speeches about the spirit of Reykjavik. In fact, we have serious problems with 
the Soviet positions on a great many issues, and success is not guaranteed. But if 
Mr. Gorbachev comes to Iceland in a truly cooperative spirit, I think we can 
make some progress. And that‘s my goal, and that‘s my purpose in going to 
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Iceland. The goals of the United States, peace and freedom throughout the 
world, are great goals; but like all things worth achieving, they are not easy to 
attain. Reykjavik can be a step, a useful step; and if we persevere, the goal of a 




Reykjavik: A Breakthrough for Peace 
As the previous chapters demonstrate, Reykjavik, far from being a ‗preparatory meeting‘ for a 
summit, turned out to be the most remarkable summit of the Reagan Administration, if not of the 
entire Cold War period. It was a conference marked by incredible drama, with Reagan and 
Gorbachev proposing what most still consider unthinkable: a world without nuclear weapons. 
The sticking point of course was the limitation of the Strategic Defense Initiative to the 
laboratory for a ten year period, a demand that Reagan simply could not accept. Reykjavik, 
therefore, represented a lost opportunity. But while total nuclear abolition was not accomplished, 
something more intangible was: both Superpower leaders got to see beyond the confines of the 
Cold War conflict into a new era free of the terror of nuclear warfare, and in seeing beyond those 
boundaries, both saw in each other a true partner for peace. 
 Gorbachev knew that Reagan wanted to be seen as a ‗peacemaker‘. During the Reykjavík 
Summit, when Gorbachev realized that his proposals were slipping away due to Reagan‘s 
intransigence over SDI, the Soviet leader, as though hanging a carrot before the President said, 
‗You are this far away from being known as a great peacemaker!‘  Gorbachev was correct in his 
estimation of Reagan: he did wish to be known as a peacemaker, but he was wrong about how 
Reagan sought to achieve this.  
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In Reagan‘s vision for a world at peace, each side would begin the process of nuclear 
abolition while at the same time deploying missile defense technology as a sort of ‗insurance‘ 
against cheating and the emergence of new leaders in the mold of ‗Hitler‘. Once SDI was fully 
operational, each side would destroy the last nuclear weapon, and share defensive technology 
with the world. Gorbachev‘s vision for peace—abolition without SDI—did not make sense to 
Reagan, and therefore, he simply could not accept it. SDI was central to his vision of a world 
free from the bomb: take SDI away, and peace would remain as precarious as ever. Of course, 
even Reagan‘s vision also had major holes in it: SDI would only protect against intercontinental 
ballistic missiles; it was never a defense against weapons launched by submarine or dropped 
from airplanes. When put to Secretary Shultz in an interview by the author the contradictions and 
problems inherent with each side‘s position, Shultz replied: 
If you start down the road of abolishing nuclear weapons, if you start to do that, 
you realize how many important difficult steps need to be taken as you try to get 





Historians will always ponder whether more flexibility on either side could have led to the 
beginning of that process, but even so, much was accomplished at that summit. Firstly, each side 
had shown all their cards, and in doing so, revealed the limits of their negotiating position. Even 
though the summit ended in apparent failure, both the Inter-Mediate Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty of 1987 and the START Treaties of 1991 and 1993 were agreed to in principle in that 
meeting; agreements that were not contingent on America giving up SDI, as the Soviets finally 
understood that Reagan or Bush would never do so, no matter how sweet their offer was. These 
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agreements were made possible not because SDI was no longer an issue—the Soviets still 
condemned it as dangerous—but because they no longer viewed the United States as the threat 
that it once was.  
 By demonstrating his willingness to go all the way on nuclear abolition, Reagan had 
convinced the Soviet leadership that America, far from plotting a first strike against the USSR, 
was actually desirous of an end to the threat of nuclear warfare. Reykjavik therefore was an 
important ‗psychological breakthrough‘: the same breakthrough that Reagan had spoken of 
saying, ‗We don‘t mistrust each other because we are armed; we‘re armed because we mistrust 
each other‘. It seems that the walls of mistrust were broken down during those two days of 
intense negotiation and replaced with a trust that both men were on the same page when it came 
to the issues of war and peace. Whereas before Gorbachev had mocked Reagan as a ‗dinosaur‘, 
he came away from Reykjavik with a great amount of respect for the American President. 
Reagan too, saw Gorbachev in a new light—before the Summit Reagan had watched Gorbachev 
on TV speaking of his hopes for peace and said out loud: ‗When you stop trying to take over the 
world, then maybe we can do some business.‘718 Afterwards he realized that Gorbachev, like 
himself, had no such desire.  Something fundamental in the relationship between the two men—
and therefore between their nations—had changed. Years later, Gorbachev said that the turning 
point towards the end of the Cold War had been Reykjavik and gave his reasoning as follows: 
For the first time the two leaders really had a deep conversation about everything. 
We really exchanged views, and not just about peripheral things, [but also] about 
the central things, and that was what was important about Reykjavik…Reykjavik 
is really the top of the hill. And from that top, we saw a great deal.
719
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Three weeks after the ‗failed‘ summit, it had truly ‗sunk in‘ to Reagan just how 
significant Reykjavik had been, and in a radio address to the nation he declared: ‗I believe that 
prospects for strengthening peace between our country and the Soviet Union have become better 
than at any time in the last 40 years.‘720 Peace, Reagan was intimating, was at hand. From there, 
the summits of Washington and Moscow were demonstrations that Reagan believed that peace 
had been finally achieved. 
 
Washington, Moscow and New York: Cold War Over? 
The general theme that Reagan sought to project in his final three meetings with Gorbachev was 
that his goal of peace had been achieved. This was to be his legacy, his bequest to mankind, the 
fulfillment of his belief that he was pre-destined and saved to end the Cold War.  
 The Washington Summit held in December of 1987, was Reagan‘s chance to showcase to 
the world that his policies had worked, and that peace had been achieved. For Reagan it was a 
dream come true: for the first time since Leonid Brezhnev‘s visit in 1973, a Soviet leader was 
again on American soil, and this time, Reagan was positive that a lasting peace, not a détente, 
had been accomplished. On the eve of the Summit, Reagan declared in his thanksgiving address 
that: ‗America is at peace‘.721 It was a statement that infuriated his conservative base, who 
believed that Reagan had been taken in by Gorbachev‘s charisma, and that the USSR remained 
as immense a menace as ever. At a press conference held on 3 December 1987, Reagan brushed 
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aside this criticism with the Russian proverb, ‗Dovorey no provery: trust but verify‘.  The proof 
would be seen in actions, but the point of the statement was that Reagan did in fact trust 
Gorbachev, itself a startling admission considering Reagan‘s former denunciation of the Soviet 
leadership. But the critics were not as trusting. 
 Reagan‘s outreach to Gorbachev in the quest for peace came at the cost of losing his 
conservative political base, who believed that Reagan, desperate to cement a legacy, had lost the 
plot. Over the years, as Reagan moved closer to Gorbachev, the conservatives blamed those 
around the President for the apparent change in policy—it must be Nancy Reagan, or George 
Shultz, or Mike Deaver—they thought. But when the Washington Summit rolled around, they 
pointed the finger of blame squarely at the President—painting him as an idiot actor. The New 
Republic wrote:  
At the beginning of his administration, Reagan knew exactly one thing about the 
Soviet Union: it was the ‗Evil Empire‘, the bad guys. And you fight bad guys at 
every step. What rendered Reagan suddenly conciliatory in mid-administration 
wasn‘t any dramatic change in Soviet behavior…What changed Reagan‘s tune, 
rather, was the cue he‘s always responded to: applause. Mikhail Gorbachev had 
been winning global acclaim by talking peace. Reagan wanted some of the 
action. It‘s that simple.722  
 
Conservative Caucus member Howard Phillips said that Reagan was: ‗Nothing more than a 
useful idiot for Soviet propaganda‘723. And George Will wrote that Reagan‘s INF treaty was an 
example of ‗intellectual disarmament‘, saying that the day the INF Treaty was signed—
December 8—‗will be remembered as the day the Cold War was lost‘.724 These statements, with 
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the passage of time demonstrating that Reagan was not merely playing to the crowd and that he 
was correct in his estimation of Gorbachev, now look somewhat ridiculous for being so off the 
mark. Furthermore, while conservative pundits might have been scathing of the INF Treaty, the 
vast majority of conservative citizens trusted Reagan‘s judgment.725 Nonetheless, the controversy 
does demonstrate that Reagan was ‗marching to the beat of his own drum‘, and had moved 
beyond conventional conservative wisdom in his belief that Gorbachev could be trusted. On 8 
December 1987, that trust was there for all to see, as Reagan welcomed Gorbachev to the White 
House. 
 Despite lingering differences over SDI and a testy exchange on the issue of human rights, 
the Washington Summit was an occasion for Reagan to persist in his quest to fulfill his perceived 
destiny: to end the Cold War. Gorbachev was received by the American people as something of a 
mix between a religious figure and a rock star. Riding with Vice President Bush down 
Connecticut Avenue, the Soviet leader looked out at the throngs of people lining the streets 
hoping to get a glimpse of him. When Bush said how unfortunate it was that he could not meet 
with the people, Gorbachev ordered ‗Stop the car!‘726 Plunging into the crowd like an American 
politician, Gorbachev shook hands and signed autographs—‗Gorby mania‘ was gripping those 
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 ‗I‘m still shaking‘ one young woman said after meeting Gorbachev, ‗It was like the 
coming of the second Messiah!‘728 Reagan had messianic ideas of his own.  
 Reagan had ordered made especially for his meeting with Gorbachev a gift that he hoped 
would express his belief that the two were leaders were fulfilling a pre-ordained destiny: a pair of 
cufflinks with the image of swords being beaten into plowshares. It is an image that originated in 
the prophetic literature of the Bible, and the books of Isaiah and Micah both prophesy: ‗They will 
beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation will not take up 
sword against nation, nor will they train for war anymore.‘729 The ‗Messianic‘ era of peace 
foretold, to Reagan, was being fulfilled, and he and the General Secretary were the agents of its 
fulfillment. Reagan was a man with a private obsession with Biblical prophecy, in particular the 
apocalyptic forecast of ‗Armageddon‘, which Reagan believed he had helped to avert or at least 
postpone. For as Reagan had said in his first inaugural address: ‗I do not believe in a fate that 
will fall on us no matter what we do. I do believe in a fate that will fall on us if we do 
nothing‘.730  
Reagan had been so excited by the gift of cufflinks, that whenever he was briefed on the 
upcoming Summit, he raised the issue of the cufflinks and their meaning.
731
 On the first day of 
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the Summit, Reagan handed the General Secretary the gift and with a twinkle in his eye, waited 
to see Gorbachev‘s reaction. Gorbachev, however, failed to see their significance: as a man 
raised in atheistic communism, he was probably unaware of the Biblical image, and as one who 
eschewed the symbols of the bourgeois, he did not wear cufflinks. Taking the gift and putting it 
in his pocket with a curt ‗Thank you‘,732 Reagan‘s feelings were hurt. 
Bruised feelings aside, the summit was a huge success, in particular the signing of the 
INF Treaty and Gorbachev‘s personal agreement with Reagan to end Soviet shipment of arms to 
Nicaragua, and agreeing to move towards a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
733
 The joint 
communiqué echoed that of Geneva and declared: 
The President and the General Secretary…continued to be guided by their solemn 
conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They are 
determined to prevent any war between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military 
superiority. 
 
And like Geneva, the ‗human element‘ again had had a profound impact on the participants, 
particularly Gorbachev. Ambassador Matlock observed: ‗You know what mattered for 
Gorbachev? It wasn‘t seeing our prosperity—he expected that—it was being applauded by 
Americans. It was not the Manichean world he had grown up studying. He saw that the 
Americans didn‘t hate him‘734.  Gorbachev said as much to the Politburo: ‗In Washington, 
probably for the first time, we clearly recognized how much the human factor means in 
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international politics.‘ Americans, he said, were ‗guided by the most human motives and 
feelings‘.735 Reagan felt just as positive, writing in his diary, ‗Well, at last it‘s over. They‘ve 
departed, and I think the whole thing was the best summit we‘ve ever had with the Soviet 
Union.‘736 Moscow would be part two.737 
 The Moscow Summit of 1988, to many, was the symbolic end of the Cold War conflict, 
as Reagan and Gorbachev stood together in Red Square, and Reagan declared that he no longer 
considered the USSR an ‗Evil Empire‘. Rumblings of this declaration were heard six days before 
Reagan left for the summit, when he was asked if he considered Mikhail Gorbachev a ‗real 
friend‘. Reagan replied, ‗Well, I can‘t help but say yes to that because the differences between 
him and other previous leaders that I have met is that we can debate, and we disagree…but there 
is never a sense of personal animus when the arguments are over‘.738 
Reagan‘s dream of having a Soviet leader that he could talk to ‗man to man‘, and ‗undo 
the mistrust‘ had been accomplished at Geneva and Reykjavik. Washington had been the 
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crowning moment when the INF Treaty had been signed, and Reagan demonstrated that he felt 
that both he and Gorbachev were fulfilling a pre-ordained course for peace. In Moscow, Reagan 
ended all speculation when he was asked in Red Square whether he considered himself to be in 
an ‗Evil Empire‘. Reagan replied, ‗No‘, and said that he had been talking about ‗another time in 
another era‘.739 The Cold War Warrior had come full circle,740 and peace it seemed had been 
accomplished. As Gorbachev later said of this declaration: 
This statement, I think, really focused, concentrated, all the changes that happened 
to Ronald Reagan, himself. It means that even a person who had a kind of bias 
and who was at an age when it's not easy to change, he showed that he was able 
and ready to change his position, to change his evaluation. So he is really a very 




Had Reagan changed? Reagan said no, and stated: ‗If anything, the world was changing...and 
changing for the better.‘742  
On the final day of the summit Reagan had been unwilling to accept Gorbachev‘s term 
‗peaceful co-existence‘ for the final communiqué, (as it seemed too much like détente era 
language), but it no longer seemed important: Reagan had said that the USSR was no longer an 
‗Evil Empire‘. Everything had changed. ‗We had a great time‘, Gorbachev said in their final 
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meeting, putting his arm around Reagan‘s shoulder like an old friend, and leading him to his 
limousine.
743
 A Cold War had been replaced by a warming peace.  
 
Conclusion 
Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev met one last time while both were in office together, at 
Governor‘s Island in New York City on 7 December 1988. Gorbachev had come to the United 
States to address the United Nations General Assembly, and had agreed to meet with Reagan as a 
courtesy. It was to be a nostalgic meeting, as Reagan had less than a month and a half before his 
Vice President, George Bush, was to be sworn in as his successor. At the lunch, Reagan gave 
Gorbachev a framed photograph of the two of them walking together at Geneva, and inscribed 
that: ‗We have walked a long way together to clear a path for peace: Geneva, 1985—New York, 
1988‘. Another other famous photograph was taken that day: of Reagan, Gorbachev and Bush 
looking out at the skyline of New York City, as Reagan pointed out the Statue of Liberty. Its 
symbolism, from today‘s perspective, is that the Cold War era had passed, and that Reagan and 
Gorbachev had been instrumental in this regard. The third man in the photo, George H.W Bush, 
would preside with Gorbachev over the peaceful break-up of the Warsaw Pact, the re-unification 
of Germany and the end of the communist USSR. These momentous changes, to Reagan, were 
the loose ends: the real change had begun during his presidency. Indeed, as Ronald Reagan flew 
in a helicopter over the White House on his last day as President, he declared out loud to no-one 
in particular, ‗The Cold War is over‘. Reagan had achieved his goal, and peace was his.  
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Yet returning to that photograph in New York City, the three men stand with the World 
Trade Centre in the background: its twin towers pointing to another future where war and 
conflict would again plague international relations.
744
  Peace, it seems, is always a lull before 
another war. Yet the threat of an all out thermonuclear war, in which the Superpowers would, in 
the words of Jimmy Carter, unleash a ‗World War II every second‘745 is now a thing of the past. 
War still exists, but the likelihood of humanity destroying itself completely, seems like a very 
remote possibility indeed—thanks to the efforts of Ronald Reagan, and Mikhail Gorbachev.  
 This chapter has examined whether Reagan aspired to be a peacemaker and the evidence 
would suggest strongly that following the assassination attempt on his life in March 1981, he did 
in fact feel obligated to take on such a role, particularly when it came to ending the Cold War 
conflict and its related threat of nuclear warfare. He began in earnest with a personal letter to 
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, and did the same to his two successors, Andropov and 
Chernenko. It should be noted that these olive branches were extended prior to the ascension of 
Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of General Secretary and before his 1984 election campaign 
when his political handlers wished to re-mold Reagan‘s image to one more palpable to the 
American people.  As such, the thesis that ‗Reagan the peacemaker‘ came about as a reaction to 
Gorbachev or as a re-election gimmick is incorrect. Reagan was committed to the cause of peace, 
and pursued it from the earliest days of his presidency. Of course, for the first three years of his 
administration he did so privately while publicly using harsh rhetoric, like his speech which 
promised to leave Marxist-Leninism on the ‗ash-heap of history‘. And while it is true that 
                                                     
744
 Terrorism was an issue confronted by the Reagan Administration, from the Beirut bombing to the hijacking of 
numerous commercial airplanes. For a history of this 1980s ‗war on terror‘ see David C. Martin and John Walcott, 
Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America’s War Against Terrorism ( New York: Touchstone, 1989).  
745
 President Carter‘s Farewell Address to the Nation, 14 January 1981. The Public Papers of President Carter. 
344 
 
Reagan changed his public posturing in the election year of 1984, and while it is also true that 
Gorbachev became his partner in the peacemaking process, these two realities should not obscure 
the fact that Reagan did in fact believe in peace and sought it before 1984 and before Gorbachev. 
 This chapter demonstrates, nonetheless, that the Reagan/Gorbachev partnership was, in 
the President‘s estimation, the means for achieving his cherished hopes for peace. Considering 
Gorbachev a ‗friend‘, Reagan declared in Red Square Moscow that he no longer considered 
himself to be in an ‗Evil Empire‘. Reagan had come to such an opinion through the Geneva and 
Reykjavik Summits, where the President had worked to ‗undo the mistrust‘ between the two 
nations, by speaking frankly about America‘s position on a wide range of issues and clearly 
spelling out that the United States posed no threat to the USSR‘s survival. By proposing total 
nuclear abolition, it seems, Gorbachev was convinced that Reagan was genuine, as the two 
contemplated a future without the terror of the bomb. The removal of this psychological barrier 
permitted the agreement on the INF Treaty, and for the first time in the history of the Cold War, 
the Superpowers began to dismantle and destroy some of their nuclear arsenal. Political scientists 
and historians can debate and argue how and why the Cold War ended, but what is important for 
this thesis is to conclude that for Reagan, the Cold War was over by the time he left office, and 
he believed that he, along with Gorbachev, had played the leading roles in this most 
extraordinary of dramas.      
Therefore it can be concluded that Reagan did in fact relish the idea of being seen as a 
peacemaker on a global scale, and that he took on this role with more passion than any other 
performance in his life. It was, to use the words of Lou Cannon, the role of a lifetime. 
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On the morning of 20 January, 1989, President Ronald Wilson Reagan went down to the 
Oval Office for one last time. Though there was no official business to conduct, Reagan wished 
to say farewell to the office that he had coveted for so long, and had enjoyed holding so much. 
The office had been stripped bare of all of Reagan‘s personal items, and the President looked 
around the room wistfully, alone in his thoughts. When official photographers came in to capture 
Reagan‘s final moments, National Security Advisor Colin Powell also joined them, giving the 
President his final daily briefing by saying simply: ‗Mr. President, the world is quiet today.‘746 
And so it was. As Reagan flew out to California that day, as ‗the twentieth century's fourth 
president of achievement and its first conservative one‘,747 he did so content with the knowledge 
that on his watch as President, a world on the brink of nuclear war had been replaced with one in 
which the Cold War was all but over. Peace, it seemed, had been achieved. ‗Not bad‘, Reagan 
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This dissertation has examined the role that America‘s 40th President, Ronald Wilson Reagan 
(1981-1989), played in the formulation and execution of American Soviet policy. Specifically, 
the author proposed five key ideas that, in his estimation, summed up Reagan‘s policy and can 
broadly be described as the ‗Reagan Doctrine‘. These were: 
1) ‗Peace through Strength‘—that military might is required to deter aggression; 
2) That the Cold War was a moral conflict, and had to be fought with ideas expressed 
through Presidential oratory; 
3) That the theory of Mutual Assured Destruction was not a sound basis for national 
security, and that actual missile defense technology was required to secure the 
population; 
4) That the superpowers should reduce, not limit their nuclear arsenals, and that the ultimate 
goal for both sides should be total nuclear abolition. And; 
5) That the Cold War nuclear standoff was keeping the world on the precipice of disaster, 
and had to be replaced not with a détente, but with a lasting peace between the 
Superpowers. 
This dissertation assessed these key ideas in their origin and their history in the Cold War 
preceding Reagan‘s presidency, and sought to determine whether Reagan held these views prior 
to becoming the President. 
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Primary source materials, in particular Reagan‘s hand-written radio addresses from the 
1970s, were scoured and they demonstrate that Reagan was a man conceptualizing ideas, and 
drawing from a wide range of materials in order to buttress his arguments. The influences on 
him, mainly from conservative publications, indicate that Reagan sought out those who held the 
same ideological views as he and shared his concern about America‘s military position, vis-à-vis 
the Soviet Union.  What was gleaned from these materials was that Reagan was no mere mouth-
piece for Republican speechwriters. Rather, Reagan was writing his own material, thinking 
through the major issues of the day, and articulating his views in a manner that could be 
comprehended by the average citizen.   Since many of the issues discussed were those that he 
himself had to confront as President, it can be argued that Reagan was in fact laying a ‗blue 
print‘ for his own administration, as he seemed to fully believe that ultimately he would become 
the next President of the United States. 
The five key ideas were then each examined in their implementation, again the key 
question being asked: What was Reagan‘s role? Far from finding a President disengaged from 
his government‘s policy towards the Soviet Union, this research has determined that Reagan was 
actually ‗in the driver‘s seat‘. While by no means an expert in the arcane details of arms control, 
for example, Reagan knew what he wished to accomplish and laid out his bold agenda and 
expected his staff to implement his directives. He was, if you will, painting the broad strokes, 
and left the details to others. The major policy decisions of the Reagan Administration were 
examined, and in addition to the use of memoirs, primary source materials from the Reagan 
archives such as National Security paperwork, speech drafts and other materials were utilized, 
seeking to determine how the decisions were made, and how involved Reagan was. In particular, 
Reagan‘s recently released diary and the Memorandums of Conversation from the four 
348 
 
Superpower summits, demonstrate, more so than any other evidence, the role that President 
Reagan played. If Nixon‘s tapes were the ‗smoking gun‘ proving his involvement in the 
Watergate cover-up, then these materials represent Reagan‘s ‗smoking gun‘, confirming that 
Reagan was, to a degree not generally known, very much involved in his government‘s Soviet 
policy. Thus, the evidence has demonstrated that the Reagan Doctrine, encompassing the five 
elements proposed, is rightfully named after the President, because the ideas and the 
implementation bore Reagan‘s imprint of authorship and engagement.  
 
Review of Chapters and Research Questions 
Chapter one of this thesis, examined the concept of deterrence, and sought to reveal  whether  
Reagan was a firm adherent to the view that ‗peace‘ comes through ‗strength‘, and if he 
advocated an arms buildup before becoming President. After firstly establishing that this was 
official US foreign policy during the 1980s, the chapter detailed the history of deterrence in the 
Cold War leading up to the Reagan presidency. From there it examined the speeches and radio 
addresses that Reagan authored in the 1970s that touched on this subject.  
 Fearful that the Soviet Union had achieved military superiority over the United States, 
Reagan suggested that what was occurring in the West was reminiscent of its failure to deter 
Nazi aggression in the 1930s, and unless action was taken, a similar catastrophic outcome would 
ensue. Reagan therefore called for America to begin a massive re-armament program, both in 
conventional and nuclear weapons. Reagan‘s criticisms over the Carter Administration‘s 
cancellations of the B-1 bomber and the Hydrogen Bomb also show a certain level of 
sophistication when it came to the details of the weapons programs under discussion.  This 
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chapter evidenced that Reagan was a firm believer in ‗Peace through Strength‘ and the idea of 
deterrence that underpinned it. He was an outspoken supporter of new weapons programs which 
he believed were required to regain American military superiority. Later charges that Reagan 
was some sort of pawn to the ‗military-industrial‘ complex were shown to be inaccurate—
Reagan had his own very strong opinions on the matter and, while certainly not alone in those 
beliefs at the time, Reagan was the most vocal proponent of a ‗military modernization‘ program. 
Chapter 2 looked at the question of Reagan‘s role in the rebuilding of America‘s military 
strength in the 1980s. It firstly confirmed that in choosing Caspar Weinberger as Secretary of 
Defense, Reagan had selected a man who saw eye-to-eye with him on the need to restore 
America‘s position of military parity with the USSR, no matter the cost. This appointment, more 
so than any other decision of Reagan‘s, assured that his beliefs about ‗Peace through Strength‘ 
would become operational, because Weinberger took on his role at the Pentagon with a 
determination that he himself admitted allowed for thought about little else.  Just as Reagan had 
promised during the campaign, when it came to new military programs, what Carter had 
cancelled, Reagan reinstated.  Others helped in this process. The MX missile program was put 
back on track, thanks to a bi-partisan commission that resolved the matter of basing. The Navy 
came close to achieving the 600 ship goal that Reagan had set for it, thanks to Admiral Lehman‘s 
‗Reagan Maritime Strategy‘ which won Congressional funding. The Air Force adopted the 
‗shock and awe‘ strategy in large part because of the introduction of the Stealth bomber. Also, 
due to Reagan‘s leadership as Commander-in-Chief, as demonstrated in the Grenada invasion, 
morale was restored to the armed services, and the Soviets and others were given pause for 
thought. According to Richard Perle, Caspar Weinberger‘s right hand man at the Pentagon, ‗the 
ideology, the ideas, and the framework‘, came from Reagan, and Weinberger ‗implemented‘ 
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them. While the exorbitant cost of the military modernization program can be questioned and 
Reagan could be criticized for failing to rein in spending, there can be no doubt that when it 
came to the execution of ‗Peace through Strength‘ Reagan was at the top, giving the green light 
to proceed.  
 Chapter 3 questioned the origins of Reagan‘s ideological views on communism, and 
demonstrates that he had been engaged in a moral struggle against this belief system and its 
adherents since the late 1940s. The ‗Evil Empire‘ address, and others like it during the Reagan 
presidency, reflected a journey that began when Reagan battled what he viewed to be a 
communist attempt to take over the motion picture industry. In many respects, this period in 
Reagan‘s life marked him both personally, and as a politician. Reagan‘s political activity on 
behalf of the Screen Actors‘ Guild, which he served in the capacity of President for six years, 
was cited by his wife Jane Wyman as the reason for their divorce. Reagan also believed that his 
activism undoubtedly affected his standing as an actor, resulting in him being passed over for 
prominent roles.  But out of these apparent setbacks, came new opportunities: Reagan became a 
sought after speaker around the country, and as GE spokesman, he honed his skills in 
communication, and went from the gilded cage of Hollywood to factories and towns all around 
the country, where he got a feel for the hopes and concerns of ‗Main street USA‘. This 
apprenticeship served him well, for after his ‗Time for Choosing Speech‘ in 1964, Reagan ran 
for the Governorship of California, and his ability to articulate to and connect with the average 
citizen, led to his electoral success.   
 The evidence presented in Chapter 3 also demonstrates that while Reagan was an 
ideologue, he was also a pragmatist and an opportunist. When Barry Goldwater wanted Reagan 
to cancel his prime-time address because of his concerns over what Reagan would say about 
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Social Security, Reagan refused, and went ahead and gave his speech—including the offending 
section on Social Security. When Reagan became Governor of California, he willingly allowed 
himself to be used by President Nixon as an envoy of his outreach to the two communist giants, 
the USSR and China. Then, in 1976 when he had failed to win a single presidential primary 
against Gerald Ford, Reagan polished off his ardent anti-communist speeches, and went on the 
attack against the détente of ‗Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Ford‘. It was a strategy that almost worked, 
with Reagan coming close to defeating Ford for the nomination.  When Carter became President, 
Reagan continued to argue against the de-moralizing of the Cold War conflict, and spoke 
passionately on human rights abuses behind the Iron Curtain and his distaste for all things 
détente. As the perused records show, this mix between ideological rhetoric, pragmatism and 
opportunism was clearly evident in Reagan‘s political career prior his becoming President. It 
should come as no surprise, therefore, that the pattern repeated itself when Reagan assumed the 
presidency. 
 Chapter 4 examined Reagan‘s rhetoric as President, and argued that while the moral tone 
of his speeches did not waver, the emphasis indeed did, and could be carved up into three distinct 
periods: that of confrontation, engagement, and challenge. Reagan purposely sought, from his 
first press conference as President onwards, to confront the USSR on its ideology and practices 
and in doing so, in his words, to let the leaders in the Kremlin know that there was ‗new 
management‘ in Washington.  The key addresses of this period, lasting from 1981 to the end of 
1983 were not authored by Reagan; nonetheless, the testimony of the speechwriters demonstrates 
that they had based their writing on Reagan‘s own ideas, and that he had been key in keeping the 
more memorable (and controversial) sections included, over the objections of the so-called 
‗pragmatists‘ in the White House. The last major denunciatory address, on the Soviet shoot down 
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of the Korean airliner, however, was written by Reagan, and judging from the reaction of the 
Soviets, it was this speech that ‗brought matters to a head‘.  
While Reagan‘s political handlers, his wife Nancy, and others argued that it was time to 
change tracks and emphasize dialogue (particularly since 1984 was an election year), the 
evidence shows that Reagan himself had come to this conclusion, based on his desire to improve 
relations.  ‗The Reagan reversal‘, as one author called it, was not actually a turnaround: Reagan 
had always been privately speaking to the Soviets and engaging in a dialogue.  However, with 
terms like ‗ash heap of history‘ being excised from addresses, Reagan was no longer sending out 
mixed messages. This period of engagement lasted through 1984, and beyond the election into 
the first two years of Gorbachev‘s leadership of the USSR. Then, in 1987, beginning with the 
‗Tear down this wall‘ speech, Reagan moved from engagement to extending a challenge to 
Gorbachev.  If the new Soviet leader was serious about change, Reagan argued, then he needed 
to improve human rights behind the Iron curtain, and allow unrestricted immigration and 
religious and political rights.  
Reagan‘s 1988 visit to Moscow was, in effect, a series of lectures on basic human 
freedoms, a culmination of Reagan‘s journey of forty years. The man who in the 1940s had been 
a ‗one man battalion‘ against communism in Hollywood, who had risen to the office of President 
on the back of his rhetoric, and who had warned against ‗the aggressive impulses of an Evil 
Empire‘ in his first term, now stood on Soviet soil, and urged its peoples to insist on their 
freedoms. It was an extraordinary journey, and within Reagan‘s journey, could be written the 
history of the Cold War in America: the ‗red menace‘ of the 1940s and 1950s; the conservative 
worldview of the early 1960s that saw communism as a monolith; détente and its discontents in 
the 1970s; and finally, Reagan‘s leadership of the US in the 1980s that saw Superpower relations 
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hit rock bottom, and then, surprisingly a rapprochement of peace and a true challenge for reform. 
It was Reagan‘s journey, and the words, even when written by others, were his. 
 Chapter 5 examined the origins of American Missile Defense technology, including the 
systems attempted by the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, and assessed Reagan‘s own 
attachment to the idea of a national defense program. The history detailed that missile defense 
did not begin with Reagan‘s 1983 announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative, but that the 
US government had proposed two systems—Sentinel and Safeguard—in the 1960s and 1970s. 
However, as the evidence indicated, these two programs were very different from the one later 
proposed by Reagan, for they were, in reality, nothing more than bargaining chips created for 
negotiations with the Soviets. Indeed, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, negotiated between 
Nixon and Brezhnev in 1972, banned a national defense system and tied American security to the 
theory of MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction).  By leaving their own nation vulnerable to 
nuclear annihilation, they believed, the Superpowers had created the greatest incentive for 
avoiding war. The research probed for evidence that Reagan longed for a national defense 
program before his presidency, and while the record shows that Reagan had thought about the 
idea and was surrounded by missile defense proponents (in particular Martin Anderson), he 
remained uncommitted to the concept before his election as President. 
 Chapter 6 moved from an investigation of missile defense prior to Reagan‘s presidency to 
looking at how the Strategic Defense Initiative came to be in 1983. While there is some 
confusion as to who first resurrected the idea—was it Reagan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or was 
it the other way around?—what is clear is that Reagan took the idea and ran with it. Acting in a 
manner without parallel in his entire presidency, Reagan purposely kept his Secretaries of State 
and Defense in the dark and circumvented the entire government, to ensure that his 
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announcement would not be obstructed. Proposing a program that he believed could render 
nuclear weapons ‗impotent, and obsolete‘, Reagan sought to achieve a technological 
breakthrough that would save America from the fatalistic acceptance of MAD. The records of 
Reagan‘s conversations with Gorbachev on SDI at Geneva also give great insight into how 
attached Reagan was to his initiative. And when it came to Reykjavik, where the President 
rejected a world free of nuclear weapons because of Gorbachev‘s insistence on a 10 year 
restriction on missile defense, there could be no more doubt about Reagan‘s ownership of SDI. 
The two, it seemed, had fused together: SDI and Ronald Reagan were a single entity. No 
incentive, or argument, could move Reagan to abandon his treasured program. 
 Chapter 7 examined the research question concerning the issue of nuclear arms 
limitation, reduction and elimination with the aim of determining Reagan‘s views on the matter 
prior his becoming President. After giving a history of nuclear arms negotiations up to and 
including the SALT II period, the research found that Reagan already possessed a rather nuanced 
view on arms control before his presidency. Firstly, it detailed that Reagan did not support more 
arms limitations treaties, but instead favored agreements that actually reduced the levels of 
nuclear arms. Indeed, the acronym START—Strategic Arms Reduction Talks—was coined by 
Reagan during this period. Furthermore, the evidence shows that Reagan was of the view that 
any agreement had to achieve equal ceilings of weapons numbers, and that it had to be verifiable 
by onsite inspections.  Also, while there is no direct evidence that Reagan was an advocate of 
nuclear abolition before his presidency, his speech at the 1976 Republican Convention and his 
early involvement in anti-nuclear protests in Hollywood, strongly suggest that Reagan always 
detested nuclear weapons and wished to see their elimination. 
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 Chapter 8 focused on what Reagan‘s presidency achieved concerning arms control 
measures, and found that the President‘s role was of critical importance. Firstly, the 1981 ‗Zero-
Option‘, proposed by Richard Perle, received the support of the President over the objections of 
Secretary of State Al Haig, because it reflected the President‘s philosophy on arms reduction, 
and because he knew from his experiences as a union negotiator that it was a good diplomatic 
strategy. And while the evidence shows that Reagan relied on the expert advice of the arms 
specialists when navigating his government‘s response to various Soviet arms proposals, the 
minutes of the Superpower Summits show that Reagan was well aware of the major pillars of the 
American positions, and was able to articulate these to Gorbachev with relative ease. On the 
issue of abolishing all nuclear arms, the analysis demonstrates that no-one else in the White 
House shared any enthusiasm for such a radical idea, and therefore authorship for that position 
belongs solely to the President. Nonetheless, George Shultz‘s involvement was absolutely vital 
in keeping the ‗ship of state‘ a cohesive unit in seeking a staged implementation of the 
President‘s vision. At Reykjavik, Reagan‘s willingness to negotiate a treaty eliminating all 
nuclear weapons in 10 years, despite the fact that his own negotiators would only contemplate 
the less ambitious idea of eliminating all ballistic missiles, shows that the President was no one‘s 
puppet. Furthermore, the INF Treaty of 1987 and the START Treaties (1991 and 1993), it was 
shown, owed their existence to the work of the Reagan Administration—and of President Reagan 
in particular. 
 Chapter 9 examined the idea of peace in the Cold War era, and asked if Reagan felt 
destined to be a peacemaker from the outset of his presidency. Firstly, in reviewing all the 
Superpower summits held prior to Reagan, it was revealed that numerous American Presidents 
had sought to make a lasting peace with the USSR, and had attempted, as Reagan later would, to 
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establish a personal relationship with the Soviet leader in the hope that this would aid such an 
enterprise. The failures of these leaders, it seems, did not deter Reagan, as evidence would 
suggest that Reagan felt both destined to be President and peacemaker. A close reading of 
Reagan‘s 1990 account of the attempt on his life, revealed a President anxious to share with his 
reading audience his belief that he had been spared to fulfill a quest for peace. This text, more so 
than any other evidence or testimony, pointed to a President determined from the beginning of 
his presidency to be a peacemaker on a global scale and end the Cold War standoff with the 
related risks of a nuclear Armageddon. 
 In addressing the research question, ‗What actions did Reagan take to make peace with 
the USSR?‘ Chapter 10 detailed the various olive branches that Reagan extended to the Soviet 
leadership, and demonstrates that Reagan had an agenda for peace from the first months of his 
presidency. Reagan‘s letter to Brezhnev following the attempt on his life in 1981, constitutes 
documentary evidence that Reagan wished to establish a dialogue with the Soviets that would 
reduce tensions and create a lasting peace. The theory that the peace between the Superpowers 
was Gorbachev‘s gift and one that Reagan merely had to accept is erroneous: Reagan extended 
olive branches to Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko long before Gorbachev came onto the 
scene. Also, it is noteworthy that when Gorbachev did come to power in 1985, it was Reagan 
who made the first move, immediately writing the Soviet leader and proposing a Superpower 
Summit. Nonetheless, the Reagan/Gorbachev partnership was just that—a partnership, whereby 
the two established a personal relationship that reduced mistrust and created a framework for 
continued dialogue. The warmth of the ‗fire-side Summit‘ at Geneva helped melt the ice of the 
Cold War, but it was in Reykjavik where the wall of terror finally came tumbling down. When 
each side saw in the other not a potential aggressor but rather a fellow believer in a world free of 
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nuclear weapons, Superpower relations were freed from the straightjacket of mortal fear, and a 
full normalization of relations could follow. Gorbachev‘s view of America changed when he 
visited Washington in 1987, and when Reagan reciprocated by visiting Moscow in 1988, he 
declared that he was no longer in an ‗Evil Empire‘. Who won the Cold War or the exact means 
by which it came about has not been a central concern of this research. Rather, the fundamental 
question posed, was: Did Reagan believe himself to be a peacemaker, and did he think that peace 
had been achieved? The answer to both those questions, given the evidence obtained through 
extensive and intensive research, is in the affirmative—that by the time Reagan left office, he 
believed that he, along with Gorbachev, had ended the Cold War. 
 
 Areas for Further Research 
Two areas for research seem to arise out of this thesis that requires further inquiry. Firstly, if 
Reagan was far more engaged in America‘s Soviet policy than had been previously thought, how 
engaged was he in other areas of policy during his presidency? Is it true that Reagan had ‗lost 
interest‘ in everything but Superpower relations by his second term? Having examined Reagan‘s 
paperwork at the Reagan archives, there is a noticeable decline in the amount of comments or 
corrections that he would write on the margins of pages as the years of his presidency 
progressed, which would suggest a reduction of interest. But again, Reagan‘s diary tells another 
story—Reagan records the tedious, day to day work of the presidency—mainly liaising with 
Congress to get a bill passed, or fighting to keep something in the budget. It often makes for very 
dull reading indeed, and perhaps one could understand if Reagan did mentally ‗check out‘ when 
these issues were discussed—but there they are, in his diary, telling us that he was still there, was 
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still well aware of what was going on, and as boring as it might have been at times, he was still 
involved in the process. These diary entries necessitate a revision of Reagan‘s presidency in full.  
 The second area of further investigation that arises out of this research is a closer 
examination of the Reagan/Gorbachev relationship.  As James E. Goodby observed: ‗Two 
revolutionaries, each in his own way, became history's catalysts for change.‘749 But this raises the 
question: Who deserves most of the credit for this historic change in Superpower relations?  As 
Gorbachev said in Reykjavik, ‗it takes two to tango‘, and obviously both played major roles. But 
who played the leading role? In a letter to his actor friend Charlton Heston, Reagan assured him 
that he should not be concerned with his dancing with the ‗Russian bear‘, because it was he who 
was ‗leading the dance‘. Was Reagan ‗leading the dance‘, or was it Gorbachev? On whose terms 
did the Cold War end? What were the motivating factors for their personal outreach: economic, 
military, or something else? And to what extent did their relationship—the chemistry and 
friendship between the two Superpower leaders—play in reducing hostilities and mistrust? How 
much did the ‗human factor‘ come into the equation?  The definitive history of the Cold War‘s 
ending, therefore, has yet to be written.  
 Scholarship on the Reagan presidency is entering a new era aided by the change of 
government in Washington, D.C. The end of the administration of George W. Bush will not only 
cause historical review of that complicated and contentious presidency to begin in earnest, but 
also opens up the way for new scholarship on Reagan, his administration, and the ending of the 
Cold War. Already this researcher has found that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
requests for classified documents, lodged from the Reagan library, which were denied under the 
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Bush II Administration, have now received the ‗green light‘ for release by the Obama White 
House.
750
 While making available thousands of pages of requested documents comes too late for 
inclusion in this study, no doubt they will be used by this author and other scholars in the future. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
Ronald Reagan may have risen to the office of President of the United States, but according to 
himself, his happiest days were those of his youth, when he had worked as a life-guard at Lowell 
Park, in Dixon, Illinois. Reagan had spent each summer looking over a treacherous watering-
hole, and had during the course of those summers, saved 77 people from drowning.  
At the end of Edmund Morris‘ controversial biography of Reagan, the author, in an act of 
fiction, inserts himself into the text as one of the 77 individuals whose life Reagan had saved. 
Morris credits Reagan with his life over the ‗last seven decades‘, and ends by adding: ‗Some day, 
I hoped, America might acknowledge her similar debt to the old Lifeguard who rescued her in a 
time of poisonous despair, and in Joseph Grucci‘s words, carried her breastward out of peril.‘751 
 In 2004, America did acknowledge its debt of gratitude to Reagan, following his death at 
age 93. As cable news networks covered every moment of Reagan‘s transfer from California to 
Washington for memorial services, and then back again for burial, the accolades kept pouring in. 
Reagan was lauded as the all-American hero, as a leader who had come at a decisive moment in 
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American history and saved it from recession, nuclear war, and paralyzing self doubt. Reagan‘s 
funeral, with its week long pomp and ceremony, had the feel of a canonization:
752
 Reagan had 
become a mythic figure, and the 1980s, in comparison to the Bush years, were held up as a 
Golden Age. 
   Historians and political scientists must be wary of myths: both those that make Reagan a 
new ‗King Arthur‘ and his era another ‗Camelot‘, and those inspired by political opponents that 
downplay Reagan as a leader, and overlook the real accomplishments of his years of public 
service. True objectivity and a fair assessment of the pros and cons of the Reagan era is needed; 
a task made harder by the fact that Reagan remains such a polarizing figure. That polarization is, 
no doubt, a result of Reagan being the iconic face of the Republican Party, and depending on 
political persuasions, a negative or positive portrayal of the 40
th
 President is sure to receive a 
strong reaction either way.  As Gil Troy wryly noted in his book, Morning in America: ‗Studying 
Ronald Reagan is not for the faint-hearted or the untenured.‘753 While this author comes from 
outside American political culture and therefore arguably has a greater degree of objectivity than 
one raised and existing in it, no doubt the revisionist nature of this study on Reagan is bound to 
cause some debate.  And that debate should be welcomed. 
 History and political science are an endless debate, the arguments swinging back and 
forth like a pendulum in opposite directions according to the work of different researchers. This 
study has entered into that debate, and presented evidence that supports the argument that 
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President Reagan was far more involved in the formulation and execution of American Soviet 
policy than had hitherto been recognized.  The conclusions were reached after an analysis of the 
evidence available; but no doubt, as more documents become accessible to scholars, different 
authors will propose different arguments. Reagan is viewed differently today than he was 20 
years ago,
754
 and will be viewed differently again in another two decades.  Nonetheless, future 
historians and political scientists will want to take into account the evidence presented herein, 
and incorporate it into their analysis and arguments. This thesis, which has cut into the multi-
disciplinary fields of international relations and presidential and diplomatic history, hopefully 
will spur on greater research into the very important question of the Cold War‘s end, and of the 
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20: Reagan inaugurated 40
th
 President of the United States of America. 
29: Reagan‘s first Press Conference, in which the President said of the Soviet Union that 
‗they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat...‘etc.  
March: 
30: Assassination attempt on President Reagan. 
April: 
24: Personal letter by the President sent to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. Grain 




17: Commencement address, at Notre Dame University in which Reagan says that the 
West ‗won‘t contain communism, it will transcend communism‘ and adds, ‗it will 
dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being 
written‘. 
27: West Point address, Reagan lays out vision for military modernization program. 
 
November: 
18: Reagan announces the INF ‗Zero-Option‘ in an address before the National Press 
Club. 
December: 
13: Martial law declared in Poland 
23: Address to the Nation on situation in Poland. 
25: Cable from Brezhnev which accuses Reagan of ‗defaming our social and state 
system‘, and adds: ‗Attempts to dictate your will to other states are in gross contradiction 
to the elementary norms of international law. I would like to say further: they are 




5: Reagan and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt meet in the White House, and 
release a joint statement warning the USSR that: ‗any military intervention in Poland 
would have the gravest consequences for international relations and would fundamentally 
change the entire international situation‘. 
May: 
9: Reagan gives Commencement address at his alma mater Eureka College, unveils 
START proposals. 
June: 
8: Reagan addresses Members of British Parliament, and predicts that ‗the march of 
freedom and democracy‘ will ‗leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history, as it 
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has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the 
people‘.  
25: Al Haig is forced to resign as Secretary of State, and Reagan announces George 
Shultz as his successor. 
November: 
11: Leonid Brezhnev dies, Reagan states publicly his desire to ‗work toward an improved 
relationship with the Soviet Union‘. 
22: In an address to the nation, Reagan unveils the ‗closely based spacing‘ deployment 
option for the MX Missile and states: ‗I intend to search for peace along two parallel 
paths: deterrence and arms reductions. I believe these are the only paths that offer any 
real hope for an enduring peace‘.  
1983 
March: 
8: Reagan addresses Evangelical Pastors in Orlando, Florida and calls the USSR an ‗Evil 
Empire‘. 
23: Reagan announces the Strategic Defense Initiative in an address to the Nation.  
 
May: 
31: Reagan concludes his chairmanship of the Williamsburg Economic Summit, and a 
joint statement supporting INF deployment is released. 
July: 
11: Reagan writes to Soviet leader Andropov and states that if the two are to maintain 
international stability, it ‗will require a more active level of exchange than we have 
heretofore been able to establish‘. 
August: 
5: Andropov writes Reagan, stating that Soviet SS-20 missiles are a ‗counterbalance‘ to 
British and French nuclear arsenals and asks: ‗Is this not an honest and moderate 
position?‘ 
24: Reagan replies to Andropov‘s letter, stating that any Soviet linkage of INF weapons 
to British and French nuclear forces is ‗not a relevant point‘ as they ‗are not at all in the 
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same category as the land based SS-20 missiles‘. Furthermore, Reagan proposes three 
elements necessary to consolidate international security: 1) acceptance of the principle 
that international disputes must be settled peacefully, without the threat or use of force; 2) 
nuclear arms reduction; and 3) the establishment of a relationship of trust that could 
permit the realization of the first two objectives.   
 
September: 
1: Korean Airliner, Flight 007, is shot down by the USSR, killing 269 civilians. 
3: Reagan rules out a cancellation of the Geneva Arms Talks in response to the attack. 
5: Address to the Nation on the Korean Airliner Crisis. Reagan says: ‗And make no 
mistake about it, this attack was not just against ourselves or the Republic of Korea. This 
was the Soviet Union against the world, and the moral precepts that guide human 
relations among people everywhere.‘ 
 
28: Andropov condemns Reagan as ‗risking war‘ through his rhetoric and states: ‗Even if 
someone had illusions as to the possible evolution for the better in the policy of the 
present American Administration, the latest developments have dispelled them‘. 
 
November: 
2-11: NATO war games named ‗Able Archer‘ begin, realistically practicing a response to 
a Soviet attack on Western Europe.   




16: Reagan gives address on US/Soviet relations, with a emphasis on bettering relations: 
‗We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as serious and constructive as 
possible‘. 
25: State of the Union Address, Reagan calls for nuclear disarmament.  
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28: Letter from Andropov arrives, harshly critical of Reagan‘s policies, saying that the 
US had ‗destroyed the basis‘ on which an INF agreement could have been made and 
stating, ‗a heavy blow has been dealt to the very process of nuclear arms limitation‘. 
February: 
9: Andropov dies, and is replaced by Konstantin Chernenko.  
11: In a radio address on US/Soviet relations, Reagan extends an olive branch to the 
Kremlin saying: ‗America is ready. We would welcome negotiations…If the Soviet 
Government wants peace, then there will be peace.‘ 
12: Letter from Chernenko arrives, condemning Reagan‘s rhetoric and stating that 
relations between the two nations was ‗abnormal, and let‘s face it, dangerous‘.  
March: 
7: Reagan writes Chernenko, stating that the US ‗has no desire to threaten the security of 
the Soviet Union‘. In a postscript, Reagan wrote of his ‗profound commitment‘ to 
achieving ‗lasting reduction of tensions between us‘. 
May: 
8: Soviets announce boycott of 1984 Summer Olympic games held in Los Angeles. 
August: 
23: Reagan accepts party‘s nomination for re-election to the Presidency. 
September: 
28: Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visits the White House and meets with 
Reagan. 
November: 




8: Soviets agree to a resumption of Geneva arms control talks, without preconditions. 
20: Reagan is inaugurated as President 
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21: Reagan gives second inaugural address. 
22: Reagan meets with American Arms Control Delegation, publicly announces: ‗I have 
no more important goal than reducing and, ultimately, eliminating nuclear weapons.‘ 
March: 
11: Chernenko dies; Gorbachev succeeds. Reagan releases a statement offering 
condolences and stating: ‗I wish to reiterate the strong desire of the American people for 
world peace.‘ 
13: Reagan writes Gorbachev, and proposes a Summit. 
July: 
1: The Soviets agree to a Summit, to be held in Geneva in November. 
5: Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko takes up the ceremonial post of President of the 
USSR, with Eduard A. Shevardnadze appointed his successor in the Foreign Ministry. 
November: 
19: Reagan and Gorbachev meet for the first time as the US/USSR Geneva Superpower 
Summit begins.  
21: Geneva Summit ends with the declaration: ‗Nuclear war cannot be won, and must 




1: Reagan and Gorbachev give a New Year‘s Address to each other‘s nation. Reagan‘s 
address focuses on human rights. 
11: Gorbachev writes Reagan to inform him that human rights questions in the USSR 
were an internal matter, and not America‘s business. 
15: Gorbachev publicly releases a letter to Reagan that calls for total nuclear abolition by 
the year 2000, a moratorium on nuclear testing, a ban on SDI, and the acceptance of the 
Zero-Option in Europe. 
 April: 





26: Geneva arms talks end without any substantial movement towards an agreement. 
July: 
18: Reagan writes Gorbachev, proposing total elimination of all ballistic missiles. 
September: 
4: US News and the World Report journalist Nicholas Daniloff is seized by the KGB in 
Moscow and accused of espionage.  
19: Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visits White House with a letter proposing a 
snap Summit to be held in Reykjavik, Iceland. 
30: Upcoming Summit publicly announced, after resolution of Daniloff Affair. 
October: 
11: Reykjavik Superpower Summit begins 
12: Reykjavik Summit ends, with Reagan and Gorbachev coming close to an agreement 
on the abolition of all nuclear weapons, but failing to agree on the issue of defense 
systems.  
13: In an address to the nation, Reagan explains why he walked away from Gorbachev‘s 
arms proposals over SDI: ‗I went to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable 




12: Reagan gives address at Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, and challenges the Soviet 
Leader saying: ‗Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!‘ 
September: 
15: Gorbachev writes Reagan, accepting the INF Treaty and stating that together Reagan 




30:  Shevardnadze visits White House and announces the Washington Summit and the 
signing of the INF Treaty. 
November: 
5: Caspar Weinberger resigns as Secretary of Defense; is replaced by Frank Carlucci. 
December: 
8: Washington Summit begins: INF Treaty is signed by Reagan and Gorbachev. 




  29: Moscow Summit Begins. 
June: 
1: Moscow Summit Concludes, and Reagan speaks of the ‗hope for a new era in human 
history, an era of peace between our nations and our peoples‘. 
December: 
7: Gorbachev Addresses the UN in New York, announcing drastic reduction of 
conventional forces; meets with President Reagan and President Elect Bush at Governors 





11: Reagan gives farewell address from the Oval Office, and states: ‗My view is that 
President Gorbachev is different from previous Soviet leaders‘, adding, ‗We must keep 
up our guard, but we must also continue to work together to lessen and eliminate tension 
and mistrust.‘ 













TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW WITH GEORGE SHULTZ 
 
Transcript for the interview between the Honorable, Former Secretary of State Treasury 
and Labor, George P. Shultz and Doctoral Candidate Ciarán John Ryan, held at the 
‘Herbert Hoover Memorial Building’ on the campus of Stanford University, California. 
 










CR: First of all, ‗peace through strength‘, the idea of deterrence, of having enough military 
strength to deter the Soviets: was this the guiding principle behind the military modernization 
program of the 1980s? 
 
GS: Well there were three key words in the Reagan Administration. One was realism, the other 




GS: Diplomacy. Ronald Reagan never forgot that. 
 
CR: I know that you say in your memoirs that there some in the administration who didn‘t wish 
to negotiate at all. They were fiercely opposed to talks. How did you overcome that?  
 
GS: Well the reason was that they thought that the Soviets would always get the better end of the 
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bargain; that there would be too much political pressure on the negotiators to reach a settlement 
of some kind. That was their experience of history, but we had a different approach than the 
détente era. President Reagan had been the president of a union, and he liked to talk about 
negotiations, and I had some experience in negotiations. But I can remember testifying to 
members of Congress and they said that ‗You‘ve been secretary of state for x period of time, and 
don‘t you feel badly that there is no agreement with the Soviets?‘ and I said, ‗No I don‘t, because 
a poor agreement is much worse than no agreement‘. As a negotiator, you have to realize that if 
the other side sees that you want to have an agreement then you are giving away all your hole 
cards.  
 
CR: You were willing to wait it out. 
 
GS: Yes, we were willing to wait it out. And we did. 
 
CR: And Reagan obviously believed that he needed sufficient military strength to deter 
aggression, but did he want superiority over the Soviets? Or did he want parity? 
 
GS: Well, he wanted to deter…he wanted to have strength such that no one would be tempted to 
attack us. 
 
CR: But did he want to be number one at all? Did he express a desire to be superior? 
 
GS: I don‘t know about ‗number one‘…We were very careful and cautious with the use of 
military force. The only time that we used it was in Grenada. It was a very quick operation. 
 
CR: And Reagan was given two options: one to launch a rescue mission the other to actually 
overthrow the government. Why do you think he chose the second option? 
 
GS: Well they were so intermixed that there was hardly any point….We tried to get the hostages, 
the students out by a plane or a ship at least, but we didn‘t have that option so we proceeded with 




CR: What effect do you think that had on the Soviets? Some say that it was the first time that the 
Brezhnev doctrine was overturned, that a communist government was overthrown. 
 
GS: Well I think it had a different impact on different people around the world. I think the 
―Vietnam Syndrome‖ was over. [inaudible] 
 
CR: Now moving onto the nuclear issue, 1983 you called the ‗year of the missile‘, it was the 
NATO deployment in November of that year of INF weapons, and if you recall there was 
widespread fear about nuclear war; that this would provoke the Soviets to attack, and some 
thought that it would be a repeat of the ‗Cuban Missile Crisis‘ where one superpower places 
nuclear weapons on the doorstep of the other superpower. You write in your memoirs that it was 
a ‗gut wrenching moment‘ but that Ronald Reagan had had a ‗cool hand a cool head‘. 
Afterwards though, you can see that Reagan realized that he needed to inform the Soviets that 
they had ‗nothing to fear from America‘ and began to speak more intensely of his desire to 
abolish nuclear weapons. So obviously the year 1983 had some impact on him. Do you ever 
remember seeing him stressed about the decision to deploy? 
 
GS: No. He was very clear. And if we hadn‘t had deployed, we might have had a different 
outcome to the Cold War. This was the test of will. We felt that obviously many were worried 
about the war talk, but it was largely Soviet propaganda, causing so much unease in Europe. But 
once they were deployed, then things changed very rapidly. We then had a coordinated effort to 
get back to negotiations. Reagan gave a speech about Soviet relations, and in Stockholm I gave a 
more precise speech on the same theme. 
 
CR: Is this prior to deployment? 
 
GS: No, it was after deployment. And after that I had my meeting with Gromyko where we 
agreed to resume negotiations... It [deployment] was a turning point that demonstrated the 




CR: And how important was President Reagan‘s personal leadership with the other NATO 
leaders? 
 
GS: It was critical. 
 
CR: Because I know that some of the leaders came to Reagan hoping to delay deployment 
because they thought that they could lose their governments. 
 
GS: They were pretty stressed out over the whole issue. But the deployment in Britain- they had 
their protests-but there wasn‘t the slightest hesitation by Margaret Thatcher about deployment, 
and it was the same in Italy. First there were the cruise missiles, and the combination of ballistic 
missiles, Pershing….[inaudible]. 
 
CR: And looking at the ideology of the Cold War, Reagan spoke of America as the nation that 
was‘ chosen by God‘, a providential ‗shining city on a hill‘ where freedom of religion, speech, 
democracy, business and so on was allowed to flourish.  And the Soviet Union on the other hand, 
was its opposite, saying ‗there is no God, there is no freedom of religion, speech, protest, no 
freedom of business‘-they told the people where to work-so it makes sense that Reagan saw 
them- if America was God‘s ‗chosen vessel‘ then the Soviets were the ‗evil empire‘. But do you 
think that Reagan in his Cold War policy was guided more by realism or ideology? 
 
GS: Well the first part of what you said wasn‘t ideology; it was realism. That was his appraisal- 
that was the weakness of the Soviet Union. There were many people who were talking about 
their strength all the time, and this is one of the main arguments. In our view the Soviet Union 
would change because of its weakness, and the people who could only see the strength said that 
it would never change. And then there was the speech ‗tear down this wall‘. That was a 
metaphor. Many people thought that the wall was there forever, like the Great Wall of China. 
And by saying ‗tear down this wall‘, it was his way of saying, ‗This isn‘t permanent‘.    
 






CR: And from reading through his speeches, from 81-83 he was condemning the Soviets and 
seeking to say the ‗truth‘ about their system and predict its demise, and from 84-86 he changed 
and started speaking more about dialogue…. 
 
GS: No, he didn‘t change. I‘m saying that he didn‘t.  
 
CR: But did you think he changed his emphasis at all? 
 
GS: There were negotiations from the beginning. The first deal that we made, we negotiated the 
release of the Pentecostals. 
 
CR: There were always elements, but do you think that after 1983 he decided to tone down some 
of the inflammatory rhetoric? 
 
GS: He never changed. In fact when we went to Moscow for the Summit in 1988 we had all the 
dissidents in for lunch at the embassy. And we insisted on the release of, I forget their name, but 
no, he never changed.  
 
CR: Do you think that at that stage he was more interested in challenging Gorbachev, saying that 
‗If you are serious about change then this is what you need to do‘? 
 
GS: No. He [Reagan] was serious about human rights, he was serious about what he felt about 
[inaudible]. He gave a fascinating speech to the students at Moscow State University. And I had 




GS: …and it was all simultaneous translations and they all heard it in real time. They had all 




CR: Did you have a hand in writing that speech?  
 
GS: Well partly, but there were other people who wrote his speeches. 
 
CR: Because it seemed to be like your ‗classroom in the Kremlin‘ when you spoke to Gorbachev 
about the micro-chip and the wave of the future that was about to come. 
 
GS: It was there. 
 
CR: And those speeches seemed to be the culmination of his lifetime of speeches on the USSR; 
was that the plan? You have the speeches at Danilov monastery on religious freedom, the speech 
to the dissidents at the embassy and the address to the students; was it the plan to cover all those 
freedoms at the summit? 
 
GS: We had our ideas of what we wanted to accomplish…[inaudible] I think one of the funniest 
things was that I had told the president and Nancy, whom I knew pretty well, that when you go 
to Moscow you‘ve got to see Red Square. And the so called ‗hardliners‘ said absolutely not, 
because they didn‘t want the picture of Reagan in front of Lenin‘s tomb. And so I wrote out a 
little cue card for him, and I said that sometime when you are sitting with Gorbachev, why don‘t 
you say, ‗I understand that Red Square is very beautiful and I‘d like to see it.‘ And when he said 
that Gorbachev got up and said, ‗Let‘s go‘. So it was completely unplanned.  And that‘s where 
some of the best images of the summit were shot, the two leaders in Red Square; Reagan was 
holding up a baby. 
 
CR: And that‘s when a reporter asked him ‗Do you still consider yourself to be in an evil 
empire?‘ and he said ‗No‘, and Gorbachev saw this as a major breakthrough because Reagan had 
changed his view of the Soviets. 
 
GS: Because the Soviet‘s had changed. And after Reykjavik he could see that. But many people 




CR: And after Reagan‘s administration, the Bush administration came with their six month 
‗pause‘ where they wished to review US/Soviet relations; do you think that was due to a failure 
to grasp the  tremendous changes that had occurred? 
 
GS: Brent Scowcroft joined with Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon and wrote an article for 
‗Time Magazine‘ opposing ratification of the INF Treaty. Because for them the Soviets were the 
same as they were- they hadn‘t changed.  
 
CR: They still had the old Cold War mindset, while Reagan and Gorbachev were able to see 
beyond it, even if members of their own governments or previous administrations could not. 
 
GS: Yes. The government has people with all kinds of views. 
 
CR: And within the administration, with people like Cap Weinberger, who was always the 
hardliner- do you think that playing ‗good cop/bad cop‘ might have helped with negotiations as 
the Soviets realized that there were people who were opposed to better relations? 
 
GS: Not particularly. I think what…‘The Strategic Defense Initiative‘ was very important. Not 
that we ever bargained about the research program, as such, but it had a big impact. It was very 
useful. 
 
CR: And so with SDI, whatever the origins of it, Ronald Reagan took the idea and ran with it. He 
obviously saw it as a means of defending America against attack, but to the Soviets it would 
seem as though America was trying to achieve a first strike advantage. Did Reagan ever speak of 
SDI enhancing deterrence in that way?  
 
GS: He thought that ‗Mutual Assured Destruction‘ was an immoral, terrible thing to rely on and 
it would be much better if we could defend ourselves. And he said on many occasions to 




CR: But could he understand where the Soviets were coming from, that if SDI were up and 
running then America would have a first strike advantage and that this would be destabilizing?  
 
GS: People worried about that. But there were many people who thought that it wasn‘t possible 
to have a defensive shield, that if the Soviets fired 5000 missiles at it… 
 




CR: But some say that the Soviet‘s greatest fear was more that SDI research would lead to a 
technological breakthrough… 
 
GS: I think they also had it in their minds that America was beginning a new endeavor and they 
didn‘t know where it would lead. They knew of our expertise… 
 
CR: NASA and so on… 
 
GS: and they also had their own scientists who understood this. 
 
CR: And with nuclear arms limitation, Reagan wanted actual reduction and eventual elimination 
of all nuclear weapons. When Reagan first raised this issue with you did you think that it was a 
utopian dream or did you believe that he would be serious about it? 
 
GS: He was a serious man, and he didn‘t say things that he didn‘t believe. And nuclear weapons 
to him were an immoral weapon- they were so destructive that he wanted them eliminated. And 
Gorbachev, at the Reykjavik Summit agreed with him. 
 
CR: And at that summit both sides agreed to total nuclear abolition; do you think this would have 
been possible to achieve even if Reagan and Gorbachev had come out saying that they had 




GS: I think it would have been a step. People were shocked that it had even been talked about.  
 
CR: Margaret Thatcher… 
 
GS: But when Reagan first announced his objectives in arms control, that is, eliminating INF 
weapons and cutting strategic weapons in half, the arms control community said the man isn‘t 
interested in arms control, because these positions are so ridiculous and impossible. And yet they 
were both achieved. 
 
CR: And Secretary Haig said of the ‗zero option‘, lets have a higher ceiling and Reagan said 




CR: But the sticking point on that agreement at Reykjavik was confining SDI to the lab for 10 
years; despite some progress with research at the moment, do you think looking back now that it 
would have been agreeable to limit research to the lab for 10 years? 
 
GS: No I think that would have…limiting to the lab is eliminating it. Depending by what you 
mean by ‗lab‘. Afterwards, several months later Gorbachev said ‗Laboratory wouldn‘t have been 
so bad‘. Anyway, their proposal essentially was to stop missile defense research.  
 
CR: Ronald Reagan always said that when you are negotiating, you never push the other side 
into a corner. And Gorbachev did that when he said, ‗It‘s either laboratory or goodbye‘ and that‘s 
when the summit broke up.  
 
GS: Well it broke up on the other hand….In a negotiation all these things are put on the table and 
you can‘t get them off the table. So Reykjavik actually did achieve the zero option, cutting 
strategic weapons in half and also achieved putting human rights on the agenda. A lot of people 




CR: Were those few days the most extraordinary days of your tenure? 
 
GS: Yes, they were. It was denounced at the time as a failure but in retrospect we have come to 
see its importance.  
 
CR: Do you ever feel that the nuclear abolition issue was a missed opportunity? 
 
GS: I think that ….. 
 
CR: Or were the realities of SDI and so on that there could have never been an agreement on 
that, as Reagan and Gorbachev had different visions on how to go down the path of abolition? 
Reagan tied it to deployment of SDI while Gorbachev absolutely didn‘t want that. So there could 
never have been an agreement. 
 
GS: If you start down the road of abolishing nuclear weapons, if you start to do that, you realize 
how many important difficult steps need to be taken as you try to get to that objective. So it 
would have been a start; an important start towards nuclear abolition. 
 
CR: Do you think that its greatest importance was maybe a psychological breakthrough, that 
both sides realized that they no longer had to fear each other as neither side would launch a first 
strike and that both sides were on the same page about abolishing nuclear weapons? 
 
GS: I think that it‘s sort of the other way around. That we began to feel that things were 
changing; the Cold War was beginning to break open. There was a sense of euphoria around 
Gorbachev‘s visit to Washington in December in 1987. 
 
CR: When he got out of the limo…. 
 
GS: …because people could see that he was a different sort of leader, and you could feel it in 
many different ways.  So, as Reagan said, ‗We don‘t have disputes because of weapons we have 
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weapons because of disputes. So let‘s try and work on the disputes‘. 
 
CR: So how important was the human factor in that, with Ronald Reagan‘s personal friendship 
with Gorbachev? 
 




GS: ..where they both clicked. They were two very different people, but at the same time they 
had a lot of respect for one another.  
 
CR: And with the end of the Geneva summit, that statement ‗Nuclear war can never be won and 
must never be fought‘. Nixon refused to make a statement like that because it would reduce 
America‘s nuclear deterrent; that there needed to be ambiguity whether America would fight a 
nuclear war. Nixon felt that if he had a statement like that then countries like Japan would feel 
that they couldn‘t rely on America‘s nuclear umbrella. Was there any fear that by Reagan 
constantly saying that ‗nuclear war must never be fought‘ and that ‗we should abolish nuclear 
weapons‘ that this would reduce America‘s nuclear deterrent? 
 
GS: Well nuclear deterrence is relevant to the nuclear world. So if we were to 
disarm…[inaudible] 
 
CR: When Ronald Reagan came back form NORAD he said that in the event of a nuclear attack 
the president has two untenable options: one, watch LA or Washington be destroyed or two, 
launch a retaliatory strike killing millions of people. He said that neither of those two options are 
good. Do you think that in the event of an attack on America that he would have responded, that 
he would have launched a counter attack? 
 




CR: You can‘t say how he would respond in that situation? 
 
GS: The system is such that all a president would have to do is push the button. It would be done 
in a very short time period. 
 
CR: So the president would only have a few minutes? 
 
GS: Thirty minutes. 
 
CR: And looking at Reagan as a peacemaker, its obvious from his memoirs that after the 
assassination attempt he felt that God had ‗spared him‘ to end the Cold War, which he defined as 
ending the nuclear standoff between the superpowers. Michael Deaver said that he actually ran 
for president because he felt pre-destined to end the Cold War. Can you recall a conversation 
with him where he spoke in these terms of destiny? 
 
GS: That‘s what he campaigned on in 1976 when he was up against Gerald Ford. He campaigned 
against the concept of détente. Détente said, ‗We‘re here, you‘re there, that‘s life. So what we 
should try to do is get along‘. Reagan said, ‗We‘re here, and they are there in a very unstable 
system. Sooner or later they are going to have to change‘. So we negotiate, because that country 
has all those nuclear weapons, but we don‘t do it under the assumption that they will always be 
there. 
 
CR: Do you think that détente was working while Nixon was in office? That it required a strong 
leader that was willing to make the tough decision to make it work. That Gerald Ford and Jimmy 
Carter didn‘t understand that on the one hand it required negotiations but at the same time quick 
responses to issues like the Middle East when Nixon put America‘s forces on nuclear alert, and 
always played hardball with the Soviets, and for détente to work it required this leadership and 
Ford and Carter didn‘t understand this? 
 
GS: I think they understood it perfectly well. On the other hand, I was speaking with Henry 
Kissinger and he said that the hardest advice he would have to give the president was whether to 
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tell the president to launch a nuclear strike knowing that hundreds of thousands would die. 
 
CR: Kissinger is known as a strong realist, Secretary of State James Baker is known as a 
pragmatist /politician ;  do you see yourself in terms of a ‗Wilsonian values‘ Secretary of State 
trying to promote freedom, or would you prefer to be remembered as a realism/values Secretary 
of State? 
 
GS: Well if you don‘t have a sense of realism you aren‘t going to get very far. So I think the idea 
that they are two very different things is not correct. 
 
CR: They are intertwined?  
 
GS: Yes.  
 
 CR: And you said to your testimony to the Senate in 1982 that ‗realism and strength could deter 
aggression but negotiation would lead to peace‘. Do you think that‘s the formula of how the Cold 
War ended? 
 
GS: As I said at the start of the interview, ‗Realism, strength, diplomacy‘; these three things 
guided everything. 
 
CR: And you said that the Cold War was over by the time that Reagan left office. 
 
GS: Not officially, but it was already beginning to show. There were things to be completed, the 
re-unification of Germany etc. 
 
CR: Would you say at its core that the issue was that nuclear standoff? 
 
GS: At the core the issue was the system of government the Soviets had. 
 




CR and GS then discussed various scenarios that caused the ending of the Cold War: The idea 
that the military modernization program cornered the Soviets, the ‗Gorbachev factor‘, the 
Chernobyl disaster etc. GS concluded that it was a combination of numerous factors. 
 
On that note the interview ended at 10:45, at which time CR thanked GS for his interview and 
gave him a 2004 bottle of Australian ‗Cabernet Sauvignon‘ by the Brown Brothers. GS 
expressed thanks and stated that Australian wine is ‗very good‘ and that it was competition to the 
Californian wine industry. 
Susan Schendel, assistant to GS came in and took two photos, and GS signed a copy of 















Interview between Richard Perle and Ciaran Ryan at Mr Perle’s home at Chevy Chase, 





RP: On the several occasions when I was together with Reagan and Gorbachev, Reagan really 
led the conversations, shaped the agenda, and uh, and I don‘t think there is much doubt that if 
Gorbachev had had his way, the Soviet Union would still exist. He was trying to save it: and he 
said so! 
 
CR: And I think that if you look at what Reagan did with the arms buildup, and his rhetoric and 
the INF deployment-it was all cornering the Soviets-and I think that by ‘84 they realized that 
they needed to negotiate and then, that decision was made prior to Gorbachev, so the thesis that 
Gorbachev came along as the great reformer and caused this…. 
 
RP: I think that Gorbachev wanted to reform the performance of the communist party and the 
institutions of the Soviet Union. I had a conversation with him at a state dinner and he made that 
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very clear. He was very interested in how we handled centralization verses federal authority, he 
was interested in how American companies managed far flung subsidiaries: he was an intelligent 
man and he was thinking all the time ‗How do I…I‘ve inherited this mess, an unproductive 
economy, massive waste, fraud, corruption-how do I reform this so that we can survive?‘ And, 
he tried ‗glasnost‘. Its not that Gorbachev was a democrat, he wasn‘t. And he would have been 
perfectly happy to remain in power as General Secretary of the Soviet Union.. 
 
CR: For life. 
 
RP: For life, with a competitive Soviet Union. He just didn‘t know how to make that happen. 
And with glasnost which was an instrument and not an end in itself, actually unleashed a lot of  
forces within the Soviet Empire and even within the Soviet Union and so the whole thing 
collapsed. But he was horrified [by] what happened on his watch. And its now fashionable in the 
West to think of him a great reformer, but he was nothing of the sort. 
 
CR: And if you look at the negotiating record, he was all about getting rid of SDI and so on and 
he ended up giving up those types of demands and gave into Reagan‘s agenda. 
 
RP: Yes, absolutely; including the arms reductions which were American proposals. The US 
proposed eliminating Intermediate Range missiles. The US proposed the 50% cut in offensive 
weapons, that in fact was ultimately agreed to. And both of these were rejected out of hand by all 
Soviet leaders up to and including Gorbachev in the beginning. So, that‘s the real history. And I 
know it‘s not popular. 
 
CR: Yes, I‘ve read articles that said that America just accepted the gift that was given them. 
 
RP: That‘s complete rubbish. 
 
CR: And that Reagan just happened to be lucky enough to be in power when Gorbachev came 
along. 
 
RP: No reading of the history brings you to that conclusion.  
 
CR: No.  
 
RP :It was the US that proposed what became the agreements that are now mis described as a 
‗gift‘. Its absurd. 
 
CR:   And was Reagan like, how would you describe him as a leader. Was he a visionary 
thinker? And how would you compare him to another president you had dealings with, Jimmy 
Carter. 
 
RP: Well Carter never saw the big picture because he was always down in the minutiae;  
And didn‘t have a very clear understanding of the world, in my view. Reagan had definite ideas, 
which were elaborated in many years of commentary and letters, I‘m sure you‘ve seen ‘In his 




CR: Which proves that he was thinking through the same issues… 
 
RP: Absolutely and long before he became president. 
 
CR: And how much do you think he was influenced by people like yourself and Senator Jackson 
in the 1970s who were part of this similar type of movement. 
 
RP: I don‘t know how much he was influenced by Jackson-he wouldn‘t have taken any notice of 
me. But uh, he admired Scoop greatly and wanted to bring him into the administration. So, I 
infer from that he had a lot of interest in Scoop‘s ideas and he appointed him to his Central 
American Commission. But by the way, have you talked to Dick Allen? Cause he‘s in your 
neighborhood in New Zealand. 
 
CR: Yes..he‘s agreed to an email interview. 
 
RP: Good. Well Dick was one of the people who I think brought Scoop to Reagan‘s attention. 
And they had conversations about Jackson. So its worth talking to Dick Allen. 
 
CR: And what role did Reagan envision for Jackson in the administration? 
 
RP: Well, my understanding is that he wanted to offer him either Secretary of State or Secretary 
of Defense and the so called ‗kitchen cabinet‘ the group of mostly Californian conservatives who 
were around him were horrified at the idea.  
 
CR: Of bringing a Democrat in. 
 
RP: Because these were old fashioned conservatives and interested principally in the domestic 
agenda and they worried about brining a democrat into the administration. They were just rather 
shallow partisans and they worried about brining a democrat into the cabinet. 
 
CR: So, talking about some of the key players: what would you say about Casper Weinberger‘s 
role? 
 
RP: Well, he was very important not in shaping the ideology the ideas, the framework, that was 
Reagan, though it was shared by Weinberger, but Weinberger was the implementer, he was the 
person who was tasked with restoring American defenses and restoring them in a way that 
recognized that for some years prior to Reagan, American defenses had been allowed to 
deteriorate: Under Nixon and then under Ford to some degree and then of course under Carter. 
And all this while the Soviets were building their military forces; so an imbalance or an apparent 
imbalance had developed. And it was Reagan‘s view that needed to be fixed and that Weinberger 
was the man to fix it. 
 
CR: And the idea underpinning that was ‗deterrence, peace through strength‘? 
 
RP: Yes. I also think, I didn‘t think immediately at the time, but Reagan better than anyone, 
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better than any of his advisers, instinctively understood that the Soviet Union was vulnerable, 
that the combination of political illegitimacy, and the failed economy made them vulnerable. 
And he wasn‘t prepared to accept the prevailing doctrine of all the presidents who had preceded 
him which was to accept the permanence of the Soviet Union and find a way to get along with it. 
Sometimes it was called ‗peaceful co-existence‘, some times it was called ‗détente‘  sometimes it 
was called establishing a modus vivendi, but in every case, it began with the assumption that the 
Soviets were a fact of life and that they were there forever. 
 
CR: And what do you make of Richard Nixon‘s switch in 1980 when he wrote ‗the Real War‘, it 
seemed that he rejected détente himself and became a ‗hawk‘ again. 
 
RP: You know I didn‘t pay…I think I actually reviewed that book at one point, but I don‘t.. As a 
matter of fact I do now vaguely recall pointing out the inconsistencies between what Nixon was 
saying then… 
 
CR: And what he had just a few years ago 
 
RP: and what he had been doing as president. 
 
CR: Do you think that it might have been opportunism, that he knew that Reagan was going to 
be there so he needed to switch and become the hard-line anti-communist again 
 
RP: I think that‘s entirely possible. Nixon was a man who always wanted to be with the majority 
of people he cared about. 
 
CR: He wanted influence. 
 
RP: He wanted influence. But there was also some things had changed: there was the invasion of 
Afghanistan, for example, the collapse of the SALT talks, so, but it struck me reading that book 
at the time that the views expressed there didn‘t sound at all like the views he was expressing 
when we were fighting with him.  
 
CR: And you were in Defense when Al Haig was Secretary of State… 
 
RP: I was. 
 
CR: What was the relationship like between Defense and the State Department like with him in 
control? 
 
RP: Well, its never a good relationship. Though from time to time a month or two. But there is 
an inbuilt difference in perspective and mission that inevitably causes conflict. The Defense 
Department seeks to maximize within its budget and a larger budget if it can get one, American 
military capabilities and military strengths. The State Department is always looking for deals that 
will improve relations with other countries, including adversaries. So their mentality is not to… 
 




RP: Yes, and they think that an aggressive military program can be an impediment to the kind of 
diplomacy they want. By military program I mean not the actual use of force but strengthening  
our position vis-a -vis various adversaries. 
 
CR: And did it change at all when Shultz came in? Because I seem to… 
 
RP: Well Shultz was a much easier person to work with. Although Weinberger and him didn‘t 
get along very well. Haig‘s problem was that he thought he was president. And Reagan, in his 
diaries, some of which, exceprts of which has now been published says exactly that. He says at 
one point in there, ‗Either Al Haig is going to run our foreign policy or I am‘. 
 
CR: Were you surprised by anything you read in the diaries?  
 
RP: I was surprised by one thing: there was a reference to me and an instant that I hadn‘t known 
about, so that was kind of amusing. And it was just a very short entry before the Geneva summit 
between Reagan and Gorbachev. And it simply reads, ‗The Soviets have complained that 
Richard Perle is part of our delegation for Geneva. They are not going to tell me who I can bring, 
Perle stays‘.  And what I concluded reading that, and knowing how these things work, is that 
they had complained through diplomatic channels, the State Department dutifully related the 
complaint… 
 
CR: To Reagan.. 
 
RP: To Reagan, and Reagan almost certainly with a recommendation.. 
 
CR: By Shultz… 
 
RP: that they leave me in Washington rather than… 
 
CR: Just the idea of them dictating to him who he could bring I think he would say no. 
 
RP: And so, he overruled the State Department advice. 
 
CR: And Gorbachev didn‘t shake your hand at that summit. 
 
RP: That‘s the occasion on which he refused to shake my hand. So they obviously had a bad 
impression of me at that point. 
 
CR: I think he did the same to Edward Teller when he met him once. 
 
RP:I didn‘t know that. 
 
CR: He said that he thought the man was ‗the devil‘. So moving onto INF, you were the man 
who originated the brilliant idea of ‗zero weapons‘ that put the Soviets on the defensive and 





RP: Well, the idea had been kicked around but, mostly when people referred to it before we 
tabled it as a proposal it meant ‗zero‘ for us. Nobody, I don‘t know of anyone who was 
suggesting that the SS-20 program be abandoned. Yes, it seemed to me that we were in a very 
difficult political position because there was a great deal of opposition to our deployment. And I 
didn‘t think that it was an entirely valuable deployment. The system seemed vulnerable to me.  
In theory, they achieved survivability by their mobility but in practice it seemed to me very 
unlikely that we could utilize their mobility because to do that we clearly were not to keep these 
weapons in constant motion, so it was intended that they would be at fixed places and move on 
alert. Well, when you start moving large numbers of nuclear weapons on alert, you create a crisis 
if there hasn‘t been one already. And if there has been one already the argument is against 
deepening the crisis by.. 
 
CR: by moving them.. 
 
RP: By moving them... So I thought we were deploying sitting ducks. And there was an illusion 
that were survivable. And in the context of deterrence the last thing you want is to provide the 
incentive to the other side to act preemptively. So I was quite happy to be rid of those weapons if 
we could get rid of the SS-2os.  
 
CR: And so it was a real proposal, it wasn‘t propaganda? 
 
RP: No it was a real proposal with an unusual characteristic which was, if we didn‘t get it we 
were still ahead of the game because it would help us politically. And if we did get it, we ahead 
of the game, because I didn‘t think the weapons were very useful. 
 
CR: What did you think of Al Haig‘s opposition to it? 
 
RP: Well, the State Department‘s reaction was typical. They are always interested in getting an 
agreement. And this was such a bold and aggressive proposal that they immediately concluded 
that there was no chance. And therefore, if we proceeded with this, there would be no agreement. 
 
CR: So, when that went forward, the deployment, Jay Winik has in his book that you had a 
‗smile‘ on your face and that someone else popped a bottle of champagne. Is that true?  
 
RP: I don‘t recall that, but I was certainly very pleased that deployment went forward. Not 
because I liked the weapons but because failure to deploy would have been such a catastrophe 
for NATO. So this was a hurdle that we had to surmount.  
 
CR: And what was Ronald Reagan‘s leadership with NATO like? 
 
RP: Well, he was very effective dealing one on one with individuals, particularly with Margaret 
Thatcher and Helmut Khol and even Mitterand.  
 




RP: He could be persuasive. But, most of all he conveyed that sense of clarity and determination 
that permitted the people who dealt with allies day in and day out to have come credibility. 
 
CR: And Gorbachev in his memoirs says the weapons were like a ‗literal pistol to the head‘, he 
seems to see them as a massive threat to the Soviet Union. Was that the case or was he 
overstating their importance? 
 
RP: Well, he every reason to claim that because the whole Soviet propaganda campaign 
particularly, the campaign aimed at influencing German opinion was intended to create that 
sense. That we were aggressors, we were threatening them, they were simply responding to our 
threat. In fact, if they had a competent evaluation of the pershing and cruise missiles they would 
have understood that they have a very limited pre-emptive capability. 
 
CR: Could they strike Moscow? 
 
RP: Barely. Some, and not all. So that we had ICBMS that could do the job in about the same 
time. So.. 
 
CR: It was more a symbolic act of NATO resolve? 
 
RP: Yes, and it started with the ss-20s. 
 
CR: And looking at Reagan‘s rhetoric, what was your reaction to, first of all to the ‗Evil Empire‘ 
speech? 
 
RP: Well, the ‗Evil Empire‘ speech and other speeches of a similar nature were intended to raise 
fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the Soviet dictatorship. And did. And I believe 
that was essential to ending the Cold War. It was essential to the Western victory. Because by 
silence, or worse, previous administrations had accepted the legitimacy of the Soviet government 
and even the empire.  
 
CR: And what did you think in January of ‘84 when he gave that speech that emphasized 
dialogue. Did you see that as a retreat or? 
 
RP: No, no, no…that was fine. Dialogue, but dialogue from a position from strength. And by 
then we had deployed and we were in a very strong position. We had deployed, he had proposed 
the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Soviets were seriously worried about whether they could 
maintain their position. That was exactly the right time for real dialogue. 
 
CR: And then the ‗tear down this wall‘ speech, seemed to move from condemning them, to 
talking about dialogue to then challenging Gorbachev saying, ‗If you are serious about reform, 
then this is what you need to do‘. 
 
RP: Well, Reagan saw that Gorbachev was doing some things that were understood in the West 
as reform and in the Soviet context were reforms, but intended to strengthen the Soviet Union 
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not pave the road to its abolition. So he wanted to drive home the fact that it remained an empire, 
it remained a totalitarian state that was governing otherwise independent people. 
 
CR: And looking at nuclear arms reduction, first of all there was the INF treaty but Reagan 
actually went further and wanted total nuclear abolition. When did that first reach the Pentagon 
that Reagan had these types of ideas and what was the reaction like? 
 
RP: Well I never believed that that was his underlying idea. I was wrong about that, because 
there has been subsequent research that shows that he had been thinking in terms of total nuclear 
disarmament for a very long time, in some of his earlier writings and so forth. I understood him 
to take a more immediate and tactical position. And at Reykjavik he proposed, in terms of 
serious proposals, not the back and forth talk, he proposed the elimination of offensive ballistic 
missiles. But did not put on the table anything in writing that suggested eliminating all nuclear 
weapons. 
 
CR: But there is that time when Gorbachev said, ‗Are we talking about everything?‘ and Reagan 
says, ‗Let‘s do it‘. 
 
RP: Yes, but I didn‘t take that all that seriously because the work of the negotiators, who picked 
up after these conversations between the leaders were focused on a much narrower agenda.  
 
CR: You can see that Shultz was a little bit confused because he thought ‗strategic‘ meant 
ballistic missiles but Gorbachev believed it involved all types of nuclear weapons. Is it true that 
Shultz wanted to accept that 10 year limitation and that the details could be worked out later? 
 
RP: I think he was willing to accept it. 
 
CR: And Reagan turned to you? 
 
RP: Well he turned to everyone on the delegation and went around the room and asked us our 
opinions. 
 
CR: And what did you say? 
 
RP: My opinion was rather narrowly focused and I said that I didn‘t believe that SDI could 
continue if we accepted that. I didn‘t say, I don‘t have a transcript of it, there probably is one 
somewhere that will be produced someday, uh, I didn‘t say ‗you shouldn‘t do this‘, I confined 
myself to observing that if we accepted this I didn‘t see how the SDI program could continue. 
 




CR: It says, ‗Shultz agreed to this saying that the details could be worked out later. Reagan 
turned to Perle and said, ‗Can we carry out research under the restraints the Soviets are 
proposing?‘‖ It says that your mouth was ‗dry‘, you felt ‗short of breath‘, Reagan was asking you 
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for a reason. If you said ‗yes‘, it gave Reagan cover with the conservatives, (ie: ‗Richard Perle 
assured me) if you said no, you would be arguing against Shultz. You then said no. 
 
RP: I said I didn‘t believe we could do that. Because in confining the program to the laboratory, 
by which they meant within four walls, they didn‘t mean a test range. Uh, that‘s pretty much 
what happened.  But it wasn‘t so much that I would give cover for conservatives, it was that 
Reagan wanted an honest answer, he wanted to know… 
 
CR: He never thought about political ramifications did he? 
 
RP: He wasn‘t, at that moment, he certainly wasn‘t thinking about that. He was thinking about 
whether SDI could continue. He believed in SDI. He believed that a defense against ballistic 
missiles was the practical and moral way to maintain stable deterrence. 
 
CR: And what did you think when you first heard it? I think you were in Portugal with 
Weinberger at the time.  
 
RP: Yes, well there‘s been some confusion about that. I favored a ballistic missile defense 
program. 
 
CR: So you didn‘t think it was ‗ludicrous‘?  
 
RP: No, I didn‘t think it was ludicrous, but I was unhappy with the way it was about to bust into 
the world stage. Because we hadn‘t done any of the preparatory work with our allies. 
 
CR: I think that Reagan knew that if he went through the usual process then it would probably 
die. 
 
RP: Well, he was probably right about that I was probably wrong. Although I still think that we 
could have, Weinberger could have been authorized but wasn‘t to say ‗The president is going to 
announce..‘ Now if he‘d said that much in advance it would have leaked out of the NATO 
ministers meeting and it wouldn‘t have been a good thing. We should have timed it for 
simultaneous release. That is Weinberger should have said, ‗In a few minutes the president is 
going to give a speech in which he is going to say the following…‘‘ 
 
CR: Do you still think that SDI can be achieved or is worth achieving? 
 
RP: Oh yes, the idea that we will go on into the indefinite future without any defense against 
ballistic missiles seems to me quite absurd. Ballistic missile technology is becoming more widely 
available. It all depends on your time horizon. If you are thinking five years, seven years, that‘s 
one thing, if you are thinking 50-100 years…I can‘t imagine that a hundred years from now there 
will be no defenses against ballistic missiles. And if they are going to develop then you have got 
to get started at some point. The time to start is before you are facing ballistic missiles, 
possibility in the hands of people who would happily use them. 
 
CR: They always painted it as a ‗pipe-dream‘ that was ‗silly‘, but the idea that there is no 
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defense against incoming missiles is just…. 
 
RP: Well it was a ‗pipe-dream‘ to defend the United States against the full weight of the Soviet 
arsenal, so that the Soviets could not deliver any nuclear weapons on American territory. That 
never made sense to me, I never endorsed that, I never believed in that. You didn‘t have to 
believe in that to believe that a limited defense had very substantial virtues. It could deal with an 
accident, it could deal with a miscalculation, it could deal with an unauthorized launch. And it 
could deal with capabilities that might emerge in third countries, and were almost certain to 
emerge. It was never intended to deprive the Soviets of a deterrent. It was intended to make 
deterrence more stable. The calculations that were widely believed to be performed before a 
decision to strike first were entirely different if there was no defense. You could make rather 
precise calculations. There would always be uncertainty. If you had a defense the uncertainty 
became enormous. 
 
CR: And that would deter them from making a first strike.  
 
RP: Absolutely.  
 
CR: But to the Soviets it looked like America was preparing for a first strike.  
 
 
RP: Well, that‘s what they said. On the other hand, when we put it to them, as we did in the arms 
control negotiations, ‗Why do you object to defense once the missiles have been eliminated‘? 
They never had a convincing answer to that. 
 




CR: And with the Geneva summit I read that there was some sort of disagreement with the 
talking points that that president was going to use. Do you even know if he used the talking 
points prepared, because I get the sense reading the transcripts that he just said what he felt-that 
it was kind of a free-wheeling discussion.. 
 
RP: Yeah, he was not the sort of person who would glance down at his talking points. He often 
ignored them completely. He handled the Geneva summit brilliantly. I think he was seriously 
underestimated by Gorbachev and that changed with Geneva. Because Reagan was in command 
of that summit from day one, from moment one.  And it was little things, little symbolic things. It 
was quite cold…. 
 
CR: Yes, because Gorbachev came out of the limo quite coated up. 
 
RP: That‘s right, and Reagan was not bundled up, he looked relaxed. He could overcome the 
weather was while Gorbachev was…It was psychological and symbolic, but, Geneva was full of 




CR: And the final statement had no reference to human rights… 
 
RP: No, that‘s not true. It did. Well, the final statement that was issued at the time.. 
 
CR: Oh, it had a different word… 
 
RP: We had two: we had an English version and a Russian version. And the English version said 
‗human rights‘. The Russian version said, I think ‗Humanitarian concerns‘. And I remember that 
part of the negotiation because I was the one that suggested that we use the two language 
approach, which the Soviets set themselves up for when they said, ‗We can‘t say ‗human right‘s 
because there is no Russian translation for that term‘. And I said to Berserzmick who was in 
charge of the Soviet delegation at the negotiating table at four in the morning, I said, ‗Well, what 
is the closest Russian equivalent?‘ And he said, ‗humanitarian concerns‘. It would translate into 
humanitarian concerns. And I said, ‗So why don‘t we say ‗human rights‘ in the English version 
and you can say the Russian words ‗humanitarian concerns‘ in the Russian version. And that was 
agreed. And that was a huge victory for us, because the whole world read the… 
 
CR: The English version. 
 
RP: The English version. Now I‘m told but I‘ve never researched this, that, the Soviets 
complained subsequently and the State Department went back and changed the wording of the 
English communiqué. But what mattered, in my view, is what went out to the world while we 
were still in Geneva. That was the communiqué and any subsequent revision would be 
unimportant.  
 
CR: And at the Washington Summit you were seated at Gorbachev‘s table. Was that in thanks 
for the INF ‗zero option‘? 
 
RP: I don‘t know. I don‘t know whether that was so or not. But Nancy Reagan said to me, 
‗You‘re seated next to me…that for…I need moral support‘. So I was on side of Nancy and 
Gorbachev was on the other. 
 
CR: And what was the discussion about? 
 
RP: Well it was pretty wide ranging. But among other things I asked him about the Soviet 
defense budget. And I said, ‗How big is it as a percentage of GNP?‘ And he said, ‗That‘s a 
secret‘. And I said, ‗Do you know‘? Knowing full well that he probably didn‘t, that it was very 
difficult to calculate. That the official figures that he would be given would be understated…And 
he said, ‗I am chairman of the defense council, I know everything‘. And he said it with, almost 
with a wink, which I took as a confirmation that he really didn‘t know, and he knew that he 
didn‘t know. 
 
CR: And I read that, when they were discussing numbers, that certain people had to leave the 
room because it was a state secret how many weapons that they had. 
 
RP: Well, from time to time in negotiations we would use a number and you would see the 
420 
 
Soviet negotiator recoil, because they knew that there were people in the room who weren‘t 
cleared to hear that. 
 
CR: And was the defense department in the Kremlin was quite separate from the foreign affairs 
department the ss-20 went ahead without their state department knowing anything about it. It 
was a power unto itself. 
 
RP: Well it was the predominant power and the diplomats came second. That was clear. And 
during the Gromyko period it didn‘t matter if the diplomats came second because Gromyko was 
as tough and hawkish as anybody in the military. 
 
CR: And do think the those types of agreements could have been made if he remained in power 
as foreign minister? 
 
RP: He was pretty intractable. I think Shevardnadze was with the program. That is, he 
understood that the Soviet Union couldn‘t survive in an all out arms competition with the United 
States and therefore agreements were in their interest. And I don‘t think Gromyko ever accepted 
that. 
 
CR: And, going back to the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Nixon, Kissinger and Ford were quite 
angry about that and said that they actually got more immigration when it was done quietly.  
 
RP: Well, they had numbers that showed that after the amendment there was fall off and they are 
right about that happening. Again it‘s a question of time horizon. The immigration was more and 
more restricted at the point when we offered the Jackson-Vanik. They were discriminating 
against people with educations by imposing exorbitant taxes. And for a while the people were 
actually raising the money to pay these taxes. But it was sixty to seventy-thousand dollars per 
person, and they were arbitrary in the way they granted the emigration permissions. So a bus 
driver from Kiev could get it, but a school teacher might not. 
 
CR: They would separate families and so on… 
 
RP: And it was just a matter of time before they really put a stop to it. At least there was no 
reason to assume that it would go on-there was no agreement establishing that it would go on. 
The harassment of people who applied was pretty severe. People lost their jobs, more or less 
immediately. It was an intolerable situation. And while it was true that they were allowing a 
trickle, it was not stable, it was not permanent. And the effect of the amendment, ultimately, was 
to open the floodgates. And so more than a million people leave. In the beginning it was a few 
thousand a year. 
 
CR: So eventually it had the effect. 
 
RP: Eventually it had the effect because they had to choose between restrictive emigration policy 
and some sort of economic relationship with the United States. By the way, the ‗Wilson Centre 
Cold War History Project‘ has published a number of transcripts including a transcript of a 
discussion about Jackson-Vanik between Brezhnev, Andropov and others. It‘s fascinating. 
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Brezhnev says, ‗What are we going to do about this?‘ He asks Andropov for some figures, ‗How 
many people are we letting out? How much are we charging with this new tax we are imposing‘? 
And he says, ‗Well, I‘ll have to get back to you on that‘. He doesn‘t know. It‘s a  very amusing 
conversation. But what is very clear is that this got Brezhnev‘s attention. He wanted to get rid of 
the amendment, one way or another. And, he was prepared to make concessions to do it. 
 
CR: And during the ‗80s when you realized that the Soviets knew about you and didn‘t like you, 
were you ever concerned that you were being spied upon by the Soviets? Or that they might tap 
your phones? 
 
RP: No, I never thought much about that.  
 
CR: It‘s just that, ‗the Kremlin knows about you‘… 
 
RP: Well, I wasn‘t going to the Soviet Union in the ‗70s. And they had sent one of their agents to 
try and establish a relationship with me. A fellow who was a ‗diplomat‘, operating under a 
diplomatic cover, a KGB agent working in New York at the UN. 
 
CR: He tried to make you a ‗double-agent‘? 
 
RP: I don‘t know what he had in mind. The relationship never got far enough. But the FBI was 
very interested in him, so at their request I gave a little dinner party for this spy and invited 
among others an FBI agent who was posing as a student, because they wanted a close up look at 
him. 
 
CR: And there was Robert Hansen, the US double agent operating back then. Did you know at 
the Defense Department that there was somebody..? 
 
RP: I certainly had no idea about it. But I wouldn‘t have been informed on something like that.  
 
CR: Have you looked into that case at all? 
 
RP: No. I saw the movie [laughs].  
 
CR: Because apparently he did quite a bit of damage to America. 
 
RP: Oh he did, there‘s no question.  
 
CR: And that amendment for equal ceilings for weapons, didn‘t America have an advantage in 
different areas and the Soviets had advantage in different areas so that, the effect of this 
amendment was that the America had to build up in other areas as well?  
 
RP: Well the effect of the amendment was to sober people on the euphoria that surrounded arms 
control. And to make it much tougher to enter into a questionable agreement after that. It was a 
very clever amendment. And it was actually proposed, the original idea came from Freddie Clay, 
who was the director of the arms control and disarmament agency. He was in no position to 
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propose it, but he mentioned it to me. I then saw that Jackson introduced it. And it annoyed the 
hell out of Kissinger, because it really did tie his hands. Which was fine, because we wanted to 
tie his hands. Not because we were opposed to any agreement, but we were concerned that the 
interim agreement, if made permanent, was made favorable to the Soviets.  And interim 
agreements have a way of becoming permanent.    
 
CR: You opposed SALT II the entire time. 
 
RP: Oh yeah, because it did not entail the kind of deep reductions that we thought were 
necessary. 
 
CR: And why did Reagan go along with it for a while, when he had been against it as a 
candidate? 
 
RP: Well he, he was persuaded not to abandon it as soon as he took office. He rejected it as a 
legal obligation for the United States. So we informally subscribed to the limits. But he had 
complete flexibility, at any time to bail out of those limits, whereas formal ratification would 
have bound us to those limits, in a legal sense. 
 
CR: And who came up with a broad interpretation of ABM? 
 
RP: A lawyer by the name of Phil Consberg. 
 
CR: So it wasn‘t you? 
 
RP: No, he uh…The way this came about, and nobody believes this, but this is how things 
sometimes happen in government. A man by the name of Don Hicks had been nominated to be 
under-secretary of defense and Don was an industry type from the Northrop Corporation and he 
went before the arms services committee and had to answer a lot of questions, and some of the 
questions had to do with interpretations. The SALT II Treaty and… he didn‘t know how to 
answer those questions, it wasn‘t his area of expertise. So an inter-agency committee was set up 
to provide him with a briefing book so that he could answer the questions. And to draft answers 
to the questions that were requested of him in writing. And I chaired that working group, and we 
went around the table to get answers to specific questions that various senators had put and there 
was an immediate disagreement on how to answer the question of the interpretation of one article 
of the ABM treaty, the one dealing with ‗future systems‘.  And I said as chairman, I said, ‗We 
can‘t have differing interpretations, we‘ve got to get an agreed interpretation‘. And we couldn‘t 
get an agreed interpretation within the working group, inter-agency committee. So I grabbed a 
young lawyer, who had not been previously involved in this, he was doing other work, he had 
come to defense from the CIA. A smart young lawyer, and I said, ‗Would you take a week to 
read the treaty and read all the associated memoranda of conversations and provide an answer to 
these questions. And he did, and he prepared a very thorough, very careful memo. And the memo 
established, beyond any doubts, that the Soviets had never agreed to ban new technologies-
technologies based on other physical principles. And when you looked at the exchanges between 
United States representatives and the Soviet representatives, we were pushing for the banning of 
systems based on other physical principals and the Soviets rejected it. They said, ‗You can‘t ban 
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something that you can‘t define‘. So, this was a discovery for me: I‘d never looked at the details 
of the negotiating record. And when Phil drafted this report, we sent it immediately to the State 
Department. It was reviewed there by the State Department lawyer, Abe Zofer, and he agreed 
with it.   He said he found it, ‗very convincing‘.  
 
CR: People didn‘t think that he‘d agree with it, did they? 
 
RP: No…there was a group of people within the State department who had been involved in 
those negotiations who took a different interpretation. But was very clear was, was that the 
record didn‘t support that interpretation. They were arguing for an interpretation that reflected 
their preferences, not what had actually been agreed.  
 
CR: And then Senator Biden then introduced an amendment about treaties… 
 
RP: I don‘t recall that: I do recall that it was pretty explosive.  
 
CR: With the Senate… 
 
RP: Because it had been made to appear that we were… 
 
CR: ..re-writing treaties? 
 
RP: That we had conjured up some interpretation in order to permit SDI to go forward.  
And, it was very badly handled, and I sometimes think deliberately badly handled by Bud 
McFarlane, who simply blurted out this new interpretation before there had been any 
consultations.. 
 
CR: On ‗Meet the Press‘ 
 
RP: On ‗Meet the Press‘, and when you looked at the document on Phil‘s paper and the 
quotations from the record, it was so clear, that I think we could have convinced members of the 
Arms Services Committee for example, and the time to announce this interpretation was after 
that work had been done. Coming as it did, blurted out on a Sunday talk show, there was an 
immediate… 
 
CR: No consultation with allies… 
 
RP: No, it was just…And to this day I don‘t know whether McFarlane was sabotaging that 
interpretation or not, and I don‘t think he would ever say. 
 
CR: What did you think of him as a National Security Adviser? 
 
RP: I thought he was in over his head. 
 




RP: No, I think Clark was very good. I think Allen was very good. Clark was derided, ridiculed 
because he didn‘t seem to know some of the… 
 
CR: Shultz didn‘t seem to like him in his memoirs, because he wore cowboy boots. 
 
RP: Well, there were stylistic….one of the good reasons that Bush is disliked is his style. And I 
think you‘ve got to look beyond style. But Clark didn‘t know the name of some African 
president, you know, so what? He had very good instincts and he certainly understood what, 
where Reagan was coming from and that‘s really important. 
 
CR: And what was Colin Powell like? 
 
RP: Well Colin was… 
 
CR: Was he just a manager? He wasn‘t really…. 
 
RP: He‘s a manager. He‘s never been very strong, in my view, conceptually. He‘s a leader, he‘s 
charismatic, he‘s a manager: he‘s a very capable man in many respects, but he‘s not a strategist.   
 
CR: Because I got the sense…I looked at his papers in the Reagan archives, that he was just a 
manager; he didn‘t really propose new ideas to the president. 
 
RP: I think that‘s right. 
 
CR: And when you left the Pentagon, you were given a farewell meeting with Reagan, what did 
you tell him? 
 
RP: Oh, well that was an interesting meeting. I told him that I thought that the dream of zero 
nuclear weapons was unrealistic. And remember at that time I didn‘t know how much he had 
written about this previously. Its interesting that no-one had done this work in the archives before 
this, now maybe they weren‘t available, but certainly a lot of his public stuff was. And I 
remember offering what I thought was a very powerful argument, put in the kinds of terms that 
he liked to use when he making an argument, that is in images. So I said, ‗So you have to 
imagine Mr. President the day on which the last remaining nuclear weapons are turned over. And 
you have to imagine the Soviets producing their last weapons and we produce our last weapons, 
for destruction‘. I said, ‗I have no doubt that we would produce ours, but I don‘t believe that the 
Soviets would produce theirs. Because if they withheld them, from the moment ours were 
destroyed, they would have a nuclear monopoly, and that would be an intolerable situation. 
 
CR: How did Reagan react?: 
 
RP: He said, ‗That‘s why we need SDI!‘ 
 
CR: He didn‘t say, ‗Trust but verify?‘ 
 




CR: You could always hide some, and you would expect that they would. You‘d expect both 
sides to some, wouldn‘t you, as a back up? 
 
RP: Yes, of course. He makes a reference to this in his diary, he refers to the conversation. He 
very kindly describes me as ‗brilliant‘, but he says something like, ‗Had a talk with Richard 
Perle, or he did the talking‘ something like that [laughs] But I went in there thinking I should use 
the opportunity to discourage this. 
 
CR: Instead of just a photo-op? 
 
RP: Yes, no it was a substantive conversation that went on for about an hour. 
 
CR: Wow And any final thoughts about Ronald Reagan and the ending of the Cold War? 
 
RP: I believe that Reagan was a great president. He saw things in broad terms, he knew how to 
delegate, he knew how to take decisive action, and he didn‘t read the polls in the way most 
politicians do. 
 
CR: He wasn‘t poll driven? 
 
RP: Not at all poll driven: he had a set of ideas, he had a set of purposes, things he wanted to 
accomplish and he set about doing it and stuck with it even when it was hard. He knew for 
example in Reykjavik that had he come back with a treaty he would have been celebrated around 
the world. All that abuse he‘d taken, all those years, about being a cowboy with a six shooter in 
each hand, all of that would have evaporated. And he‘d probably get a Noble prize. It was in 
October, as I recall, and there was the November elections...it had huge benefits… 
 
CR: An ‗October surprise‘… 
 
RP: Huge benefits, and he refused to be suborned by those benefits because he believed that SDI 
was essential to maintaining the American position and ending the Cold War. So he was a 
remarkable man, he was also a very warm personality; he was a pleasure to be around. 
 
CR: And did you think that he was correct in his estimation of Gorbachev at the time, or have 
you changed your view about that: because he was criticized a lot for being ‗too friendly with 
Gorbachev‘. 
 
RP: I think he was trying to test Gorbachev. And if he had maintained a hostile posture, it 
wouldn‘t have worked. It wouldn‘t have worked as a test, it wouldn‘t have worked as an 
instrument of American policy. So I think he pretty much did the right thing. But he never 
abandoned the tough policies, he just expressed and portrayed an openness to agreement on his 
terms. 
 




RP: OK, all the best. 
 
End of verbatim transcript. 
 
Following this interview, RP and CR had an off the record discussion on the George W. Bush 
Administration, the issue of the Iraq War, and the lingering problem of Iran‘s nuclear ambitions. 
The discussion was serious, but greatly informative. RP posed for some photographs, and thus 
ended a very pleasant morning of talks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
